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SECTION B: TENSIONS BE~~EN OAU MEMBER STATES ARISING
FROM INTERNAL CONFLICTS:
THE LEGAL CONCEPT OF POLITICAL REFUGEES
The international law on asylum is of comparatively
recent genesis, having taken its present form after the
end of the Second World War(1). Traditionally, asylum
existed in favour of political offenders, but it could
include anyone unjustly persecuted for reasons of
opinion, race or religion. This assumption has its
basis to some extent, in Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 which proclaims that
••••everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution(2) •••• Despite the
fact, the question of the right of asylum could be
connected with the fundamental problems of the status
of the individual in international law(3). Accordingly,
(l)A distinction is made between territorial and ext~a-
regional asylum. As, however, there is no consensus of
opinion on the question of extra-territorial asylum, and
as international customary law does not generally
recognise the right of states to protect fugitives in
places like embassies or ships, we shall refrain from
dealing with this aspect here.
(2)
Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.248
(3)
According to the classical theory of international law,
states were the only possible subject of the law of nations
and any direct relationship between that law and the
individual was denied. In recent years, organisations
whose aims were to protect the individual from the state,
sprang up soon after the First World War. Subsequently,
treaties were concluded safeguarding the rights of
minority groups. War criminals were persecuted and
punished by international tribunals after the Second World
War and Human Rights were solemnly proclaimed by the UN.
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states have, under certain circumstances, the right to
protect individuals seeking refuge within their border,
from being extradited to a foreign power(4). In
practice, howe!er, no such procedure could take place if
the seeker of asylum did not gain at least temporary
physical presence within the borders of the country of
asylum(5). Sometimes, for a variety of reasons,
refugees are subsequently expelled to a third state
willing or obliged to take them. Nonetheless, this way,
under certain circumstances, can be regarded as a form
of assistance to the refugees. Therefore, it must not
be taken for granted that the temporary presence of
refugees within the territory of a state implies a granting
of asylum(6). Thus, there can in fact be no question of
status without admission, nor can admission take place
without the physical presence of the applicant. On this
principle, refugees not admitted are not granted the
benefit of the protection which asylum affords, and no
right may be derived from the mere physical presence.
This could, however, be based mostly on the fundamental
rule of traditional international law, that individuals
could lay no claims of this kind against state sovereignty(1).
Consequently, it remains up to the states to admit or deny
(4)Whiteman, Marjorie, Digest of International Law,
Volume 6, !i2l, pp.199-804 '
(5) Krenz, Frenk, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law
ICLQ, Volume 15, 1266, p.l03
(6) .
Bassiouni. Cheri! M., International Extradition and





admittance to the seeker of asylum. Despite the fact,
modern international law has developed a shift on this
subject which reveals a unity of purpose and a common
behaviour in this field(8). However, a tendency towards
a certain uniformity can now reasonably be expected. The
elaboration, conclusion and application of a number of
international instruments regarding refugees has already
contributed a good deal towards this end. Accordingly,
there are no'grounds on which an asylum seeker would have
to be expelled because of a lack of legal provision,
allowing him admission and protection(9). It would appear
that the international community has accepted the human-
itarian principle that people persecuted because of their
political belief ~re not to be returned to their country
of origin. This recognition established the logical
corollary to this principle, usually the existence of an
individual right to asylum. Nonetheless, states have,
so far, found it difficult to recognise the existence of
such a right(10). Accordingly, refugees not admitted are
not granted the benefit of protection which asylum provides.
States' practice has demonstrated that individuals who
have well-founded fears of being persecuted on account of
their race, religious, political and social beliefs have
often been granted asylum(11). The granting of asylum
(8)castel, J.G., International Law, Butterworths, Toronto,12Z2, p.519
(9)~ pp.519-520
(1°1bid pp.525-526
(11)Bassiouni, Cherif M., Ope Cit, pp.97-113
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has never been made the subject of a converitional settle-
mente The pre-war refugee treaties did not provide for
the admission of refugees to the contracting states, but
these treaties have been superseded by the 1951 convention
relating to the status of refugees which is now the most
universally-accepted instrument for refugees(12). Despite
this fact, provisions were made for the admission of refugees
as envisaged in the 1951 convention, but were rejected
by the participating representatives. They only agreed to
include the provisions of Article 31(1) which prohibits the
imposition of penalties on refugees because of their illegal
entry to the territories of the contracting states(13).
Subsequently, an agreement was reached on the admission of
refugees by the conference of plenipotentiaries which was
envisaged as a recommendation in the final act(14). In
this respect, the participants agreed to receive refugees
into their territories within the framework and spirit of
international co-operation, in the hope that refugees may
find asylum and subsequently the possibility of re-
settlement(15). The question of the duty of states not
to expel asylum seekers was included in the 1951 convention
which obliges the contracting states not to expel or return
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to any state where his
(12)weis, P., The 1967 Protocol Relatin£ to the Status of
Refugees and Some Questions on the Law of Treaties,
BYBIL, Volume 42, ~, pp.39-41
(13)Kreng, Krenk, E., Ope Cit, p.l06
(14)~ p.l07
(15)Weis, PaulA The International Protection to Refugees,
~, Volume 4 , !2i!, p.197 .
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life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion(16). Under the terms
of this Article, exp~lsion and return of a refugee to his
country of origin applies to states to the extent that they
share a common frontier with the country of origin. Under
these circumstances, the 1951 convention only regulates
the status of refugees once they have been found eligible
to the status and have been admitted to residence. This
meant no more than the granting of asylum to, and the
protection of, certain refugees who were recognised by the
contracting states as a consequence of events that occurred
b f J 1 t 1951(17).e ore anuary s, Despite the fact, this
limitation was subsequently removed by the 1967 Protocol
adopted for this purpose(18). It is noteworthy that since
the conclusion of the 1951 convention, hundreds of thousands
of refugees have sought and been given the right to asylum.
In fact, special administrative machinery was established
in all the contracting states in order to deal with the
arrivals of refugees who were found eligible under the
definition of Article I of the 1951 convention(19).
(16)The duty of states not to expel asylum seekers at
their borders was initially embodied in Article 3(2) of
the 1933 convention relating to international status of
refugees. This position obliged the contracting states
in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at their
frontiers.
(17)weis, Paul, Ope Cit, pp.195-196
(18)Ibid pp.57-62
(19)Krenz, Frenk, Ope Cit, p.107
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Subsequently, substantial developments have occurred in
the direction of recognising the right of refugees to
admission to a particular country in international
instruments. In this re~pect, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights proclaims that everyone has the right to
seek and enjoy, in other countries, asylum from persecution(20).
This means individuals would be allowed to seek asylum, and
once admitted, they would be free from expUlsion but they
have no right to be admitted(21). Once the asylum seeker
has been admitted, there are certain rights and duties
to which he is entitled in accordance with the law of the
country of refuge. Accordingly, the asylum seeker's status
is governed by the fact he now falls under the territorial
jurisdiction of the receiving state(22). As an alien, the
refugee is entitled to the benefit of the minimum rules of
-treatment, otherwise the refugee cannot claim rights which
are not granted by legislation to foreigners, such as
permission to work, assistance under public and social
schemes, free education and the like(23). As far as the
(20)The original draft of Article 17 then Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was as follows:-
••••Everyone has the right to seek and be granted in other
countries asylum from persecution •••• This wording was,
however, considered too radical and the words ••••be
granted •••• were amended to read D ••enjoying ••• meaning that
individuals ~ou1d be allowed to seek asylum, and once
admitted, to be free from expulsion but had no right to be
admitted.
(21)Weis, Paul, Ope Cit, pp.198-199
(22)In general, international law is silent on the question of
the political rights of refugees in their cou~try of residence.
By their very nature, political refugees incline towards a .
regrouping in the country of refuge. The attitude of some
states for instance, Switzerland, is stricter in this matter
than others. It would seem that in general refugees have no
right to engage in political activities going beyond the
nature of freedom, such as freedom of speech.
(23)Weis, Paul, Ope Cit, p.200
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question of the political rights of refugees is concerned
in their country of residence, customary international
law is silent on this question. In this respect, the
attitude of states is stricter in this matter than others.
It would seem that in general, refugees have no right to
engage in political activities going beyond the normal
freedom, such as freedom of speech(24). Consequently,
receiving states may incur international responsibility
if they support the subversive activities of exiles,
directed against the governments of other states. Finally,
the consular authorities of the state of origin remain
competent to enter into contact with the subject of its
Nonetheless, the refugee may refuse such
contact and the receiving state has the right under its
territorial jurisdiction to take appropriate measures to
have his wishes respected(26). Under these circumstances,
the UN conference on consular relations which took place
.in Vienna in 1963 could not reach an agreement on the
provisions relating to refugees(27). It adopted a
(24) .Krenz, Frenk, Ope Cit, p.l09
(25) Under customary international law, nationals abroad
remain under the supremacy of their home-state. According
to rules of private international law, their personal
status is governed by the law of the country of either
nationality or legal domicile. The law is vague on this
point and it all depends on the arrangements made by the
individual states.




resolution which declared that the position of refugees
was not to be prejudiced by any provision in this
convention(28). Accordingly, the personal status of
refugees is governed by the laws of the country of
asylum and they are to be exempted from exceptional
measures. In this respect, the practice of states has
revealed that the most favoured national treatment has
been accorded to refugees in respect of permission to
establish and join non-political and non-profit making
associations and trade unions as well as in matters
relating to the right to engage in wage-earning employ-
ment(29). They also provide identity papers to any
refugee in their territory who does not possess valid
travel documents(30). In any event, the provisions
of the 1951 convention became national law and the
asylum seeker is thereby placed in a position to claim
his right before the competent tribunal and municipal
authoritie •• However, the UN is extremely anxious to
promote an international standard of treatment of
refugees which would place the protection of refugees
under the international community as a whole.
(28)
~ p.205
(29)stockton, Charles, Outlines of International Law,
George Allen, London 1914, pp.260-269
(30)Weis, Paul, Op. Cit, pp.205-207
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TilE rr-iPLTcATION OF AFRICAN REFUGEES ON REGIONAL DISPUTES:
The twentieth century has witnessed the eruption
of a massive migration of refugees which has been hindered
by restrictive immigration policies. These movements
have been caused by war, large scale social upheaval,
nationalism and authoritarian political regimes which
have compelled large masses to emigrate in order to
seek security in both neighbouring or distant countries.
The initial tragedy of this kind occurred in consequence
of the Balkan War of 1912-1914, where tens of thousands
of Bulgars, Greeks and Turks were displaced from their
homes (1)• Subsequently, the two l{orldWars and the
peace settlements that followed, caused the most formidable
displacement of population ever experienced in Central
Europe and Palestine(2). Consequently, the International
Refugees Organisation and its successor, the Office of
the UN High Commission for Refugees were established in
order to deal with the problems of disruption and dis-
location of these pOPulations(3). The problem of
refugees in the post-war years were for sometime an
essentially European and Middle Eastern one. Nonetheless,
since the beginning of the nineteen-sixties, which
(1)
Weis, Paul, Op. Cit, pp.193-194
(2) 1!W! p.200
(3)
Maynard. D.P., The Legal Competence of the UNHCR,1&12, Volume 31, 1982, pp.415-416
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coincided with the upheaval of decolonisation, one
wave after another of African refugees has occurred,
which directed the central focus of international
concern(4). Subsequently, the number of refugees in
Africa has increased rapidly during the seventies and
early eighties and African refugees posed the largest
refugee problem the world has had to face. Actually,
Africa is now the home of millions of refugees; it is
estimated that over a third of the world's total
refugees are in black Africa(S). This continuous
increase in the number of African refugees poses
serious social, economic and political problems for
African states. It is essential to distinguish between
refugees originating from African-dependent territories
and those driven by violence and uncertainty in
independent African states(6). On the one hand, the
intensification of the struggle for independence in the
colonial territories, thus witnessed a dramatic upsurge
in the number of refugees. Despite the peaceful process
(4) Following the outbreak of a revolt in African
colonial territories, thousands of refugees fled to
a number of African countries. Refugees from
Portuguese Guinea sought a haven in Senegal; Angolans
fled to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; Mozambican
refugees fled to Tanzania and Zambia and most recently,
thousands of Eritreans have taken refuge in the eastern
region of the Sudan. By 1981, official estimates placed
the number of refugees in Africa at close to four million.
(S)AdepOju, Aderanti, Dimension of the Refugee Problem
in Africa, Africa Affairs, Volume 81, 1981, p.21
(6)Cervenka. Zdenek, The Unfinished Quest for Unity,
Friedmann, London, ~, p.70
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of decolonisation in most of the colonial territories of
Africa, various nationalist movements attained their
independence by resorting to force on a large scale(7).
The intransigence of some colonial powers compelled
nationalist movements to follow a strategy of armed
resistance which has been supported by the OAU(S).
As a result, the colonial regimes have retaliated with
repressive measures in order to put down these move-
ments and thus to deter potential popular uprisings.
This has led to the uprooting of considerable numbers
of populations who have had to flee from their respective
countries and seek refuge in African independent states(9).
This is the underlying reason for the flight of refugees
from dependent territories in order to search for security,
educational and economic opportunities as well as bases
for operations from which to engage in armed resistance
in order to attain their independence. On the other hand,
the most delicate situation is posed by refugees from
(7)
The sole exception of the Algerian civil war, Namibia,
Portuguese African territories, Rhodesia and South Africa,
the national liberation movements have launched guerrilla
wars in an effort to end colonial regimes.
(8)
Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p. 71
(9)
Adepoju. Aderanti, Ope Cit, pp.22-23
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independent African states ~ho are victims of inter-
ethnic tensions, political persecution or from
unfavourable economic and social conditions(10). The
one-party system which the majority of African states
have adopted, often provides a tempting opportunity to
drive opponents to establish a party in exile in
neighbouring countries whose interests or policies could
be furthered by the overthrow of the party in power(ll).
Moreover, African governments usually look on political
opposition as a form of disloyalty and have equated
opposition with treachery or sedition(12). This has
led to the breakdown of law and order which compelled
their opponents to employ illegitimate means to express
their dissatisfaction with such policies of their govern-
ments. Therefore, refugees in Africa fall into two
categories: those who are politically conscious and
those who, for the most part, are passive and are merely
seeking an escape from violence and uncertainty(13).
(10)At three different conferences held during 1962 and
1968 in France, Sweden and the United States, experts in
the field met to discuss and exchange views on the subject
of African refugees. The focus of these conferences ranged
from the causes of the population movements and their
impact on recepient states, to the methods devised by the
UNUCR in conjunction with non-governmental organisations
and individual states to integrate refugees into their
new settings. The participants, however, tended to
view refugees as the result of instability within African
states and tensions between them.
(11)1>fcKeon,Nora, African States and the OAU, :!.!A,
Volume 42, 1966, p.391
(12)The deteriorating situation has also been caused largely
by a series of political crises that erupted in several
African states, notably Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia,
Uganda and Zaire.
(13)Adepoju, Aderanti, Ope Cit, pp.23-24
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TIloserefugees WllOare entirely passive do not always
remain unconscious to events taking place in their homc-
lands. As long as they are not permanently settled, they
remain susceptible to th~ appeals propagated by the
politically conscious refugees. Thus, the passive refugees
often provide support to those who are politically conscious
and constitute a ready-made source of new recruits for
agents of subversive activities(14). Parallel to the
distinction between types of refugees, there is another
matter related to the attitude of the receiving states.
There are those governments which offer asylum for essentially
political reasons by which they encourage and support the
political opponents in their subversive activities. They may
also encourage passive refugees to engage in subversion against
their home governments. The others simply provide asylum
on humanitarian grounds and endeavour to curtail attempts
by refugees to bring about internal change in their countries
of origin(lS). These states usually hesitate to grant
admission to those politically conscious refugees for fear
that in granting them asylum they would conduct subversive
activities against their homes of origin. Under these
circumstances, inter-state tensions have, in fact,
developed which have led to conflict situations(16).
(14)Matthews, Robert 0., Refugees and Stability in Africa,
JIO, Volume 26, 1971, p.67
(lS)Krishnan. Maya, Ope Cit, pp.218-219
(16) African refugee situation worsens as new crises emerge
or they escalate, as in Chad or as existing ones deteriorate
as in the Ethiopian/Eritrean conflict. The political
situations in southern and Central Africa; the disturbance
in the Horn of Africa; in Nigeria; the trouble in Shaba
province of Zaire and the recently renewed confrontation
in Chad are all examples of the high, unpredictable causes
of refugees increasing in number in Africa.
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Consequently, the humanitarian attitude of the countries
of asylum, together with the existence of refugees on
its territories, may be seen as a threat or a danger to
the country's security from which the refugees have
fled(17). Accordingly, the willingness of one state
to receive refugees from another is considered as an
intrusion by the former into the domestic affairs of the
latter. The refugees in a sense are regarded as agents
of separation between the two states concerned. The
suspicion of insecurity has given rise to tensions which
have served to exacerbate relations between OAU member
states(18). At the same time, when it is known that
the host state is supporting the efforts of the refugees
to return to their own country, the threat to the govern-
ment of origin looms even larger. Consequently, receiving
(17)Sander, AJGM, Ope Cit, pp.122-123
(18)In spite of a pledge by the Ivory Coast and Senegal
to extradite any exiled Guineans found violating the
OAU principle of non-intervention, the presence of
thousands of Guineans in these two countries has created
considerable concern in Conakry. The obvious suspicion
of Guinea's insecurity and poverty, have, because of these
refugees, given rise to tensions between Conakry on the
one hand and Dakar and Abidjan on the other. Tunisia's
granting of political asylum to Colonel Tabar Zbini,
charged by Algeria with leading an unsuccessful plot against
the late President Hourai Boudedienne in December 1967,
was interpreted in Algeria as an act of hostility. Although
Zbini subsequently left for Europe, Tunisia's action
brought about a set-back in its border negotiations with
Algeria. Finally, even though Sudan now strongly denies
giving active support to Eritrean refugees living in the
Eastern Sudan, their presence near the frontier has
served to exacerbate relations between the two countries.
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refugees from one state to another has precipitated
hostilities between two or more countries. Ghana as a
recepient of refugees from neighbouring countries, was placed
continuously at odds with Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Niger,
Nigeria, Togo and Upper volta(19). Likewise, the Sudan
became involved in a series of bilateral disputes with
Ethiopia(20). Relations between Durundi and Rwanda were
also strained when refugees, with the support of the Durundi
government, sought to restore the deposed monarchy in Rwanda(21).
J.reanwhile,the rising tide of political instability in several
OAU member states increased the extent of continued outside
intervention in the domestic affairs of these states. As a
result, the OAU requested its member states to take all
necessary steps to prevent the refugees from becoming a source
of tension. It recommended restrictive controls on their
freedom of movement at the borders(22). Nonetheless, the
presence of refugees may be perceived by the state of origin
as a threat to its.security(23). Therefore, as long as
(19)J.1ayers,David B., Ope Cit, p.133
(20)Likewise, the Congo (Kinshasa) became involved in 1964
and 1965 in a series of bilateral disputes with Burundi;
the Congo (Brazzaville), the Sudan and Uganda; Malawi's
relations with Tanzania and Zambia were severely strained
by the assistance allegedly given by the latter to elements
opposed to the governments of origin.
(21)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, pp.62-63
(22)Welch. Cloude, The OAU and Human Rights Towards a
New Definition, ~, Volume 19, 1981, pp.401-403
(23)nespite Sekou Toure'S efforts to curb Nkrumah's subversive
activities from Guinea and his repatriation of 35 Ghanaians
living there, the fact that the late President of "Ghana
continued to live in Conal~y was interpreted as a potential
threat to the new regime in Ghana. Similarly, as long as
certain Nigerian refugees remained in Accra, relations
between Ghana and Nigeria would never be entirely restored
to normality.
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certain refugees from one state remained in another, relations
between these states would never be entirely restored to
normality. The refugees usually established their bases
close to the borders of their country of origin and far
from the capital of the host state. In this respect, the
host country has been drawn into tensions with neighbouring
countries by the refugee's subversive activities and by
the support of its own citizens who remained beyond the
reach of its central authority(24). This may be attributed
to a weak sense of nationhood and irreconcilable divisions
within the host state in which tribal and other dissident
groups have been able to take advantage of this situation
to act contrary to the interests of the central government.
~{oreover, it is very difficult to distinguish the refugees
from the people amongst whom they settle, where communi-
cations are extremely difficult and in parts, non-
existent, which precludes close surveillance by the host
government(25) •. Therefore, it is the inability of the
host government to extend its authority to the outer limits
of its own borders and control refugees, as well as its
own citizens(26). Large numbers of Tutsi refugees from
Rwanda evoked a sympathetic response from the people among
whom they settled in Burundi. The refugees scattered
over large remote areas with poor communication, thus it
(24)Smock. David, Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan,
~, Volume 20, 1982, p.453
(25)Stovens, Richard, The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and
the Sudan's Afro-Arab PolicY, J}~S, Volume 14, !212, pp.528-529
(26) -Polhemus. Higbie J., Ope Cit, pp.300-301
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was very difficult for the host country (Burundi) to prevent
those refugees who are politically conscious to recruit
guerrilla fighters among the refugees, in order to attack
their own country of origin(27). Usually, the host state
undertakes to proscribe subversive activities against
neighbouring countries, but its efforts have not been
wholly successful(28). This failure has partly resulted
from a willingness of the host state to close its eyes to
what was going on in its territory. On the other hand,
however, the rugged geography of the frontier region, the
immense length of the borders and the natural sympathy of
the border populations of the host state for the insurgents,
have made it virtually impossible for the host government
to seal off its borders(29). Under these circumstances,
the country of origin has usually undertaken measures in
order to eliminate this threat. Thus, this has often led
to clashes or skirmishes between the armed forces of the
two neighbouring countries(JO). Unfortunately, these
(27)The Ugandan Minister of Information informed the OAU
Council of Ministers at Lagos in February 1964 that his
country was no longer able to deal with Rwanda's refugees.
Despite Kampala's efforts to prevent those refugees from
carrying out any illegal acts, they abused Uganda's
hospitality by forming groups to invade Rwanda.
(28)For instance, the efforts of the Sudanese government
to prevent Chadian and Eritrean insurgents from organising
and launching attacks on their respective countries.
Despite its undertaking to proscribe subversive activities
against Chad and Ethiopia, the Sudanese government has not
been wholly successful. The immense length of the borders
in question and the natural sympathy of the Sudan's border
population for the insurgents, have made it virtually
impossible for the Sudanese government to seal off its
borders.
(29)Matthews, Robert 0., Ope Cit, p.72
(30)1e!S p.73
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clashes or skirmishes have prevented attempts to maintain
positive goals of peace and to promote the development
of a pattern of co-operation and integration between
regional human groups. These positive goals envisaged
in Article 1(3) of the UN Charter provide for a universal
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples on international co-operation
to solve economic, social, cultural and humanitarian
problems and on the promotion of respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedom for all, without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion(31). Unfortunately,
the attempts of African states to maintain these positive
goals of peace and to promote regional co-operation have
been confronted with the stubborn resistance of the
sovereign states to regional intrusion on its domestic
affairs. African states are naturally reluctant to give
in to the dictates of other African states or to regional
organisations. They are only prepared to adopt policies
involving a loss of sovereignty when these policies can
be viewed as an overshelming necessity, or as a means
of strengthening national independence(32). Thus, African
states have perceived regional co-operation to be restricted
to dealing with the symptom rather than the root of these
positive goals. Consequently, African peace-making often
assumes the form of short-run stability in which the
(31)PanhuyS, R.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.25
(32) .Matthews, Robert 0., Ope Cit, p.72
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.
responsibility is limited to prevent or refrain
incidents of organised violence. Accordingly, measures
are devised to alleviate this threat but not to cure
the rooted elements which have caused the refugee
This attitude seems to be regarded as
a potential threat to regional peace and security. It
has been admitted that the most important legal right
for refugees is the right of non-expulsion, or the
right of asylum. This right has been secured under
the provisions of the 1951 convention in which the
contracting states undertake not to expel a refugee
lawfully in their territories, except for overriding
reasons of national security or public order(34).
Nonetheless, the 1951 convention is limited to refugees
resulting from events prior to 1951, but this limit-
ation has been removed by a protocol adopted in 1967(35).
(33) .
Cervenka, Zdenek & Legum, Colin, The OAU in 1972,
Africa Contemporary Record, 1972-1973, pp. A47-A50
(34)
Krenz, Frenk, Op. Cit, p.127
(35)Weis, Paul, Ope Cit, pp.57-62
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In this respect, African states conceived the need for
something to be done for the refugees as a whole, but
not much has been achieved. So far, the question of
the classification of refugees has not yet been
satisfactorily settled(36). It has been agreed that
there are humanitarian considerations, but there is a
demand to eliminate the abuse of hospitality of the
host state by refraining from any subversive activities
on the part of neighbouring states, or any others, as
provided by Article III of the OAU Charter(37). This
(36)·
On the one hand, there are refugees who are
conscious participants in domestic crises and who,
because of internal conditions in their country of
origin and their particular beliefs, find it
necessary to continue the liberation struggle from
outside their own countries. There are also
freedom fighters from Namibia, the Republic of South
Africa and territories still under colonial rule who
fall into this category, as do political refugees
from independent African states, who are guilty of
sedition. Since these individuals are actively
involved in hastening the liberation of their
countries from colonial or neo-colonial rule, they
are not legally considered refugees. On the other
hand, there.·are the passive victims of the under-
lying processes of decolonisation and modernisation,
fearing for their very lives. These refugees
have sought asylum in neighbouring states in the
hope, at least initially, of returning to their
homes and their belongings. Nonetheless, these
refugees do not always remain entirely passive to
the events taking place about them.
(37)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article III(S),
Ope Cit, pp.l0-11
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concern has also been embodied in a resolution of the
OAU Assembly of Heads of State adopted at the second
ordinary session which took place in AccraJ Ghana in
1965(38). The resolution proclaimed the OAU member
states' desire and readiness to give all possible
assistance to refugees from any OAU member states on
a humanitarian and fraternal basis. At the same timeJ
it also declared that the OAU member states have
pledged themselves to prevent refugees living on'their
territories from carrying out, by any means whatsoever,
any acts harmful to the interest of other states of the
OAU. It also requested the OAU member states never to
allow the refugee situation to become a source of
regional disputes among them. Moreover, the OAU
Assembly set up a special commission in order to deal
with refugee problems(39). The commission was also
charged with the responsibility of drawing up certain
principles, and rules to govern the treatment of refugees.
These aims were largely met by the OAU convention which
regulates the specific aspects of refugee problems in
Africa, concluded in Addis Ababa on September 6th,
1969(40). The convention was carefully drafted to
compromise between the recognised need to alleviate the
misery of the refugees and not to allow them to become
(38)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, pp.17-24
(39)~ p. 16
(40)The OAU Convention Concerning the Specific Aspects
of Refugee Problems in Africa, Published by the
Information Division, OAU General Secretariat,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, !212, pp.1-2
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a source of friction among the OAU member states. The
convention defines the refugee as ••••every person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and unable, or owing to .
such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country, or who not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence
as a result of such events is unable or owing to such fear
is unwilling to return to it•••(41). The convention has
also extended the term refugee ••••to every person who owing.
to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or
the whole of his country of origin or nationality is compelled
to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
(42)nationality... • The convention also enumerated the
circumstances under which its provisions cease to apply to
an individual claiming refugee status but who has been guilty
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN and




acts of subversive activities on the part of the OAU
member states or other states which would nullify the
right of asylum and the protection from extradition to
the state claiming the refugee1s return(44). These
provisions were designed to eliminate-any tension or
friction between the country of origin and the host
state. In this respect. Article III provides that
•••••every refugee has duties to the country in which
he finds himself which require in particular that he
conform with its laws and regulations as well as with
measures taken for the maintenance of public order.
He shall also abstain from any subversive activities
against any member states of the OAU ••••(4S).
·Signatory states undertake to prohibit refugees residing
in their respective territories from attacking any state
member of the OAU by any activity likely to cause
tension between member states, any in particular by use
of arms through the press or by radio •••• (46). Finally,
Article VI provides that •••••member states shall issue
to refugees lawfully staying in their territories travel
documents in accordance with the UN convention relating
to the status of refugees and the Schedule and Annex
thereto, for the purpose of travel outside their territory
unless compelling reasons of national security or public
. order otherwise require. Member states may issue such
a travel document to any other refugees in their
.territory ••••(47)" This right would allow a refugee





to travel so that he can pursue his studies or seek
employment. In practice, however, neither the UN nor
the African conventions relating to the status of
refugees are applied universally. The problem arising
here is the inescapable fact of the sharp ideological
divisions among states. Therefore, granting asylum
to a refugee is, to a large extent, coloured by
consideration of public policy. Consequently, in the
absence of internationally recognised documents, refugees
are often unable to exploit their potential to the
The OAU convention came into force on
June 20th, 1974 when Algeria as the fourteenth OAU
-member state, deposited its instrument of ratification(49).
However, the provisions of this convention have little
effect on the situation in Africa which has increasingly
assumed a disturbing dimension in terms of number,
composition of the persons involved, the cause of
regional disputes and limited success obtained thus far
(48)
Ghana issued Commonwealth passports to refugees
from southern Africa, which contained details of the
refugee's identity, provided pages for visas and
included a return clause. Tanzania on the other hand,
offered refugees identity papers which, because they do
not include the automatic right to return, caused
immigration difficulties in other countries and gave
refugees less security than the Ghana documents did.
Similarly, the Central African Republic and Zambia have
issued identity cards to persons with refugee status,
but these papers only allow for internal freedom of
movement within the country of issue. They are less
useful for travel abroad. In the case of the large
numbers of rUral refugees, simply issuing identity cards
is sufficient, since for the most part this group of
refugees neither 'wishes, nor is able to travel inter-
nationally.
(49)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.73
- 365 -
in the search for a permanent solution. Consequently,
the Summit of the OAU Assembly took place at Port Louis,
Hauritius in July 1976 and discussed the situation,
adopting a resolution to deal with the most disturbing
aspects of the refugees(50). It also called upon all
OAU member states to declare a general amnesty which
would enable many of the refugees to return to their
homes(Sl). Under this general amnesty, there were three
possible options open to all refugees, as follows:-
(1) Voluntary repatriation,
(2) local integration in the country
of first asylum,
(3) resettlement in another country(S2).
It should be noted that African states have generally
favoured the first of these resolutions, that of re-
patriation by consent. Despite the regional efforts and
the universal support for the principle of repatriation,
very few refugees have chosen this solution. This may
be attributed to the fact that an unequal situation would
face a refugee in his country of origin, where he must
fend for himself, while in the country of asylum he is
provided with considerable assistance in installing himself
there. It is also, however, the condition of instability
that led to the displacement of refugees in the first
instance, this apparently tending to persist ~nd thus
precluding repatriation. t-{oreover,the refugees, once





settled among people with whom they are closely related,
may hesitate to return even if conditions at home have
slightly changed for the better. Under these circumstances,
once repatriation is ruled out, at least in the short-run,
consideration should be given to the permanent settlement
of refugees in their countries of asylum. Unfortunately,
most African states are already confronted with over-
whelming demands on their limited resources. Therefore,
the countries of asylum are usually unable to solve this
problem alone(S3). It should be mentioned here that
this is not meant to belittle the efforts of the OAU
member states which for the most part, bear the major
portion of the expense and responsibility for resettle-
ment. The UNHCR has extended considerable assistance
to many African states confronted with a problem of
refugees in order to elaborate programmes ~or their
resettlement(S4). This assistance is based on voluntary
-contributions extended by-the UNHCR in conjunction with
a number of international bodies such as the Red Cross
and the World Food Programme. These programmes intended
to provide the refugees with basic needs, such as food,
water, clothing, some form of.shelter, medical supplies,
seeds, as well as essential educational services. In
addition to these programmes, the UNHCR undertakes a
further step referred to as The Initial Land Settlement.
(S3)ACR_,
(S4)Ibid
1969-70, Op. Cit, p. C169
pp. C189-C190
- 367 -
Accordingly, the refugees would be encouraged to clear
the land and plan crops and eventually become self-
sufficient. Finally, the settlement of these refugees
would be consolidated and integrated with the local
community of the country of asylum in an overall African
regional plan(55). The implementation of these
programmes would ensure the benefit of both the local
population and the refugees, at the same time minimising
the friction between these two communities. The question
of how best to utilise these people and their newly
acquired skills has come increasingly to the fore. This
question was among other matters of legal, economic and
social aspects of African refugees discussed and tackled
by the OAU Council of Ministers at its October 1967
meeting which took place in Addis Ababa(56). It decided
to set up, within the OAU Secretariat General, a bureau
responsible for the education and placement of individual
African refugees. In addition, to'provide an inventory
of available places for refugees in universities and
technical schools and to act as a broker between refugees
and African states needing skilled personnel(S7). Despite
the OAU efforts, African states are unable or unwilling
to treat the root causes of African refugee problems.
As a matter of fact, they have shown a concern to prevent
(SS)Ibid pp. C170-C172
(56) .. Afr1ca Contemporary Record, 1971-72, p.C7
(S7)The Bpear OAU, Published by the Press and Information
Department of the OAU General Secretariat, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, !222, pp.l-S
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refugees from becoming a threat to the peace and security
of the African continent. This desire has resulted
in sub-regional efforts to deal with these problems.
In this respect, in April 1966 the Heads of State of
-..
the Congo (Kinshasa), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, the
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia and ministerial
representatives of Burundi, Malawi and Rwanda held a
good neighbour Summit at Nairobi(58). At the conclusion
of this conference, the participants signed a treaty
dealing with the need for the host states to control
the activities of refugees within their borders(59).
It also provided that any refugee taking advantage of
the hospitality of the host.country to indulge in
subversive activities or agitation against their country
of origin, were to be refused assistance. Subsequently,
a series of sub-regional summits took place at Kampala
in December 1967 and at Dar-es-Salaam in May 1968,
affording these states the opportunity to discuss and
consider their differences in order to find peaceful
settlements to their disputes(60). Finally, the
(58)Matthews', Robert 0., Ope' Cit, p.79
(59)For instance, the agreement of March 1971 concluded
between Ethiopia and Sudan provided for inter alia:
••••(1) taking all necessary measures in order to put an
end to all forms of subversive activities directed against
the other including such activities as may take place across
their common border; (2) prohibiting the activities of all
subversive organisations; (3) disarming all rebel elements
and dismantling their camps; (4) expelling all rebel and
dissidents leaders as there may be by the governments
concerned and taking the necessary measures to prevent the
return of such leaders; (5) taking all necessary measures
to encourage the voluntary repatriation of refugees and
providing all facilities to official representatives to
visit refugee camps; (6) removing refugee camps to a
distance of at least 50 miles from the common border ••••
(60)lofatthews,Robert 0., Ope Cit, p.79
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tensions caused by the presence and activities of refugees
in various host states led to the conclusion of bilateral
and multilateral agreements(61). These agreements have in
the main, envisaged the generally recognised and accepted
principles governing refugee status including that of voluntary
repatriation and the intention to co-operate in the elimin-
ation of subversive activities. They also embodied provisions
providing for the deportation or extradition of any refugees
involved in carrying out activities that harmed the security
of the country of origin. They also regulated the immediate
cause of tension on the border in which the host country
expressed its willingness to move the refugees from the
frontier while in turn, the country of origin undertakes
not to violate the former's territorial sovereignty when it
pursued local insurgents. Finally, these bilateral or
multilateral treaties often established joint ministerial
commissions to deal effectively with incidents that may
arise in the future(62). Unfortunately, agreements of this
kind are not always observed. Consequently, border tensions
did recur along the frontiers such as that between Ghana and
its neighbouring countries and that between Burundi and
Rwanda which would be considered as follows:
(61)After the assassination of Togo's President Olympio on
June 13th, 1963, the Heads of State of thirty independent
African states who met in Addis Ababa at the Summit Conference
in May 1963, not only condemned these subversive activities,
but also specifically included in the fifth principle of the
OAU Charter ••••unreserved condemnation in all its forms of
political assassination as well as subversive activities on
the part of neighbouring states or any other states ••••
(OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Article III(S),
Ope Cit, pp.l0-11)
(62)Matthews. Robert 0., Op. Cit, p.79
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REFUGEE PROBLEM BETWEEN GHANA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS:
The one state in Africa that was most often alleged
to have interfered in the domestic jurisdiction of its
neighbouring states was the Ghana of Nkrumah. The latter
pursued a realm of policies which opposed African states
of contrasting ideological complexions or political
interests. In this respect, Nkrumah established training
camps for political dissidents from other independent
African states whose policies and ideologies did not
conform with those of Nkrumah. He extended facilities
to freedom fighters from Nigeria, Togo(I), Niger, Cameroon,
Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Congo (Kinshasa)
and Burundi(2). Nonetheless, it was to be Ghana's nearest
neighbouring states, namely, the Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo
and Upper Volta which took the lead in raising the dispute
in the forum of the OAU(3). There were a number of
political quarrels or ideological differences which caused
the tension between Ghana and its neighbouring states
that frequently led to mutual charges of subversive activities.
These unfriendly relations between these states directly
affected the function of the OAU for a number of years.
This tension was originated in the re-activation, of the
Council of Entente which was initially formed in May 1959
by the Ivory Coast, Niger, Dahomey and Upper Volta(4).
(l)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, pp.218-219
(2)Tandom, Yashpal, The OAU as an Instrument and Forum of
Protest, The University Press, Oxford, 1976, p.1179
(3)~ p.1179
(4) McKeon, Nora, Ope Cit, p.398
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The Council was the design of Houphonet-Boigny, President
of the Ivory Coast who, since his break with the French
Communist Party in 1950-51, had consistently favoured close
collaboration with the Western European powers on the
international scene(5).- Subsequently, Togo joined the
Council which had been the object of Nkrumah1s territorial
aspiration(6). Under these circumstances, Entente states
had condemned Nkrumah1s welcome to political dissidents
from these states and his offering them training camps in
Ghana for the purpose of overthrowing the governments in
their countries of origin. This resulted from Nkrumah1s
implication in the 1963 Togo coup and the abortive attempted
assassination of the President of Niger in April 1965(7)
by a number of political dissidents allegedly trained in
Ghana(8). As a result of these rising tensions with
Ghana as well as their sharp differences with the other
OAU member states over the Congo crisis(9), these states
felt insecure. Consequently, they decided to re-establish
(S)Ibid p.398
(6)~ p.399
(7)The threat which the President of Niger called the
Seige of Africa by communism. Niger in particular had
been the object in October 1964, of attack by Sawaba
commandos allegedly trained and supplied by Ghana.
(8)Tandom, Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.1179
(9)on the Congo the majority of the (OCAM) regarded Tshombe
as the head of the legal Congolese government. The group
was far from unanimous as to the type and degree of support
to offer to Tshombe and certain states like Congo (Brazzaville)
and Dahomey were openly hostile to him.
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the Organisation Commune Africaine et ~Ialgache (OCAM)
which was abolished as a political organisation after
the establishment of the OAU(10). These states felt that
the OAU had been unable to meet their needs. Accordingly,
they re-activated the political side of the OCAM as a
sub-regional instrument in order to maintain solidarity
among themselves, and for confronting the most urgent
task, Nkrumah's subversive activities against their
governments(11). Under these circumstances, the tensions
between Ghana and these states remained unsolved until the
first half of 1965, the date set for the second ordinary
summit of the OAU Assembly in Accra, Ghana(12). The
first ordinary session of the OAU Assembly which took place
in Cairo in July 1964 accepted Nkrumah's invitation to hold
the second ordinary session of the Assembly in Accra, Ghana.
This invitation brought the tension between Ghana and its
neighbouring states into the open. It was important to
Nkrumah's prestige and to the stability of his .regime that
the summit of the OAU Assembly scheduled for Accra in 1965
be successful. Consequently, the Entente states took
advantage of this opportunity by raising a series of
grievances against Ghana and threatened to boycott the
second summit of the OAU Assembly(13). At this stage,
(10)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.75
(11)Some members of this organisation feared that a sub-
regional organisation of French-speaking states with
political overtures would menace the action of the OAU,
while Senegal remained faithful to the format of the OCAM
in the hope of persuading Guinea and Mali, her partners in
the exploitation of the Senegal River, to rejoin the group
of the former French West African States.
(12)Polhemus, Higbe J., Ope Cit, p.193
(13)Mayers. David, Ope Cit, p.131
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Ethiopia and Liberia endeavoured to mediate in order to
persuade the boycotters to attend, but their attempts at
mediation were unsuccessful(14). Subsequently, Nigeria
requested the OAU Council of Ministers to hold an extra-
-ordinary meeting in Lagos in order to hear the accusation
against Ghana and this was acceptable to all states in
dispute(lS). The Entente states presented dossiers on
subversive actions allegedly perpetrated by Ghana, but
the latter denied the charges and claimed that its training
camps were for African nationalists who were fighting in
South Africa and other non-independent African states(16).
Under these circumstances, the OAU Council initially
decided to examine the charge against Ghana and persuade
Nkrumah to give assurances to halt intervening in the
domestic affairs of his neighbouring states(17). Accordingly,
it established a sub-committee consisting of Ethiopia,
Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Tunisia to implement the Council's
decision(18). The five-nation sub-committee engaged in
(14)Ibid p.132
(lS)Tandom, Yashphal, Ope Cit, p.1180
(16)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, pp.86-87
(17)With the Rhodesian crisis looming up, the majority of
the OAU member states were reluctant to support the OCAM
member states and cause a rift among the OAU member states.
The handling of the Rhodesian crisis made unity more
essential than ever before. Beside Nkrumah's firm stand
on Rhodesia, granted him respect in the OAU forums.
(18)Tandom, Yashphal, Op~ Cit, p.1179
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negotiations with Ghana and elicited commitments from
Nkrumah to the effect that he would expel all refugees
residing in Ghana who were considered undesirable by
their countries of origin. He also agreed to stop the
formation of political organisations whose aims were to
oppose any regimes of the OAU member states(19). The
report of the sub-committee was received with relief by
the OAU Council of Ministers. Subsequently, the
Chairman of the OAU Council of Ministers and the Secretary
General visited Ghana. At the conclusion of their visit,
they expressed satisfaction with the measures being taken
towards the success of the summit of the OAU Assembly(20).
The Secretary General also declared later in Addis Ababa
on August 24th, 1965 that Ghana had taken great pains to
fulfil its pledge(21). Moreover, eight days before the
summit was due to begin, President Nkrumah travelled to
Bamako, Mali to meet President Houphonet-Boigny of the
Ivory Coast, Diori of Niger and Yameogo of Upper Volta,
in order to give them his personal commitment of their
safety in Ghana(22). Nonetheless, the three Presidents,
together with five other heads of the OCAM member states,
boycotted the summit of Accra(23). Consequently, the
refugees who had been deported from Ghana were allowed
to return(24). Therefore, the root of the dispute
•
(19)MeyerS, David B., Ope Cit, p.133
(20)Ibid p.133
(21)~on, Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.1180
(2~)~ p.1180 .
(23)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.7S
(24)Polhemus, Higbe J., Op. Cit, pp.196-197
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centering around the subversive activities continued.
It was not eliminated until the coup of February 1966
which brought to power a military government pledged
to repudiate Nkrumah policies(2S). It should be noted
that Nkrumah seemed to have made unprecedented
concessions in order to placate his neighbouring states.
He had taken a backward step in renouncing all protection
to political refugees from states that he had consistently
regarded as less than fully independent states.
Nonetheless, they refused to come to Accra to attend the
summit of the OAU Assembly. The clue to their attitude
was likely to be found in the way in which the OAU
handled the.disputes. The OAU Council of Ministers
acted strictly pragmatically which was a disappointment
for the OCAM member states. The Council considered the
threat posed by the re-activation of the OCAM to the OAU
interest as greater than the threat to the security of
the states concerned. Despite the fact, the Lagos
meeting of the OAU Council did extract concessions from
Nkrumah in order to placate the OCAM member states, but
this was done more in order to salvage the unity of the
OAU than to ensure the security of the OCAM states. The
concessions that were extracted from Ghana were really
(25) After the overthrow of Nkrumah, who had all along
denied complicity in the initiation of subversive
activities in neighbouring states, the National Liberation
Council threw open to the world a secret African freedom
fighters' training camp in the jungles of Ghana. It
was also stated that Chinese ,instructors assisted to
train African saboteurs in the camps, from South Africa,
Rhodesia and other African independent states, in the
handling of weapons and explosives under the Nkrumah
regime. Nkrumah was deposed when he was on his way
to Peking.
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short-term only. There was no guarantee that
once the summit of the OAU Assembly was over,
Nkrumah would not resume the policy of providing
a base for dissidents from neighbouring states.
'Moreover, the machinery that was set up by the
OAU Council at the Lagos meeting, namely the
five-nation sub-committee, was established for a
temporary purpose of obtaining commitments from
Nkrumah rather than a permanent supervision
machinery on the latter's future subversive
activities(26). It was notable that the sub-
committee did not even seriously investigate the
,
charges against Ghana which were contained in the
dossiers submitted to the Council by the Ivory
Coast, Niger and Upper Volta(27). Furthermore,
the OCAM states also failed to obtain specific
condemnation of Nkrumah's subversive activities
by the OAU(28). Consequently, when the entirely
temporary basis of the formula became apparent to
the OCAM states, tlleydiscerned that the concessions
made by Ghana were politically' insignificant.
(26)TandoD, Yashpa~, Ope Cit, p.1180
(27)
1..2.!.!! p.1179
(28)Polhemus, Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.196
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BURUNDI-R\'lANDA REFUGEE PROBLEr-I:
This is the other major dispute which involved charges
of aiding refugees in attempts to overthrow the government
of their country of origin. Burundi and Rwanda had highly
similar political and social structures(1). In both,
the population consisted of two major ethnic groups - the
Hutu Bantu agriculturalists who constituted 85% of the
population and the dominant Tutsi who constituted 15%(2).
Both had been well-established Kingdoms prior to the
European colonial presence. In each, the minority Tutsi
had established political and economic ascendancy over the
majority Hutu popu1ation(3). In the early colonial era,
both countries became part of the German East Africa.
After the First lvorld War, the two countries became Belgian
Mandated territories. After the establishment of the UN,
following the Second World War, they became the Belgian
Trusteeship of Burundi and Rwanda(4). The minority groups
ruled in both countries through a centralised administration
based around the Tutsi monarchy. In 1959, the Rwandese
lIutu through a successful revolution, forced the Tutsi king
and thousands of his followers to flee the country, many
of them crossing the border to Burundi(S). On June 27th,
1962, the UN General Assembly decided in agreement with the
(1)Heyers, David B., Ope Cit, pp.133-134
(2)Andemicae1, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.62




administering power to terminate the Trusteeship agreement
of December 1946 in respect of Rwanda and Burundi on
July 1st, 1962 on which date the two states would emerge
as two independent and sovereign states(6). Rwanda became
independent under a Hutu-dominated republican government
while simultaneously, Burundi became an independent
constitutional Kingdom with the traditional Tutsi in
power(7). The contrasting regimes, combined with the
presence of thousands of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda in
Burundi, made the tension between the two states inevitable.
Under these circumstances, Tutsi refugees armed and supported
by Burundi, formed terrorist organisations that carried out
raids across the border into Rwanda(8). Consequently,
relations between the two states became severely strained
and the union of common services, customs and monetary
systems inherited at independence, was terminated(9).
subsequently, relations worsened when Rwandese troops in
pursuit of terrorists crossed the border and retaliated
against Tutsi in Burundi. Against this background, the
Burundi government requested both the Secretaries General
of the UN and the OAUC10) to interfere in putting an end
(6)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 21, 1963, p.213
(7)polhemus, Higbe J., Ope Cit, p.189
(8)Ibid p.189
(9)~leyerS,David B., Ope Cit, p.134
(10~he Provisional Secretary General of the OAU sent identical
telegrams to the foreign ministers of both states expressing
his concern over the deterioration in relations between Burundi
and Rwanda and urging them to settle their differences
peacefully, within the framework of the OAU and in accordance
with Article III(4) of the OAU Charter which adjures peaceful
settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation
and arbitration.
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to Rwanda's provocation(11). Both Secretaries General
appealed to Burundi and Rwanda to do all in their power
to find a mutually acceptable solution to their differences.
In addition, the UN Secretary General despatched the
officer-in-charge of the UN operat~on in the Congo as his
personal envoy in order to assess and endeavour to find
a Inutually acceptable solution to the dispute(12). After
examining the situation, he held consultations with the
two governments. Subsequently, he reported to the UN
Secretary General that neither government wished to have
UN observers or commissions of inquir~ to be stationed on
its territory. Therefore, he submitted a set of recommend-
ations to the two governments in order to be the basis for
an eventual settlement to the disputes(13). They contained
the following elements:-
(1) Burundi was to take appropriate measures to curb
the subversive activities and agitations among the refugees.
(2) 'The refugee burden on Burundi was to be all~viated
through mutually acceptable measures such as resettlement
or voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.
(3) Rwanda was to take all appropriate measures to
halt renewed retaliation against its TUtsi population.
(4) Both countries should maintain regular contact with
the UN Secretary General's special envoy(14).
(11)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.64
(12) .Meyers. David B., Qe. Cit, p.135
(13)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p. 63
(14)Ibid p. 64
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It should be mentioned here that the OAU was also requested
to assist in the settlement of this dispute only six
months after its establishment. At the same time, it was
already burdened with the task of conciliating the border
dispute between Algeria.and Morocco(15). Therefore, the
OAU was unable to apply any prompt action beyond the appeal
of its Secretary General. He felt that it was clearly the
duty of the UN to assist in these refugee problems. None-
theless, he maintained the position that he would be as
helpful as'possib1e in the situation of this kind to assist
the two member states(16). Consequently, the OAU Secretary
General requested the UNHCR and the relevant specialised
agencies of the UN, to provide emergency assistance to the
refugees and to other victims of the conflict(17)•. Actually,
the relief and refugees resettlement activities of the UN's
various agencies, especially the UNCHR were instrumental in
calming the conflict. Meanwhile, the OAU Council of ~linisters
discussed the refugee problems in Africa with particular
reference to the Rwanda refugees, at its second ordinary
session which took place in Addis Ababa in February 1964(18).
(lS)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp.70-73
(16)Polhemus, Higbe J., Op. Cit, p.190
(17)ACR, 1969-70, Ope Cit, p. C169
(18) .At Addis Ababa, the Rwandan }linister of Posts, Tele-
communications and Transport submitted to the Council of
Ministers a note which protested against terrorism and
infiltration of armed bandits from Burundi. Rwanda's
allegation was denied by Burundi. The Council decided
to submit·.the dispute to the Commission of Mediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration. ,However, the Commission'S
jurisdiction in the case was optional and Burundi preferred
not to resort to the Commission.
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It set up a ten-nation Commission which included Burundi
and Rwanda, in order to examine and investigate the refugee
situation and to make recommendation to the OAU(19). It
became clear to the Commission that there were two aspects
-to the dispute; one the maintenance of refugees, and the
other the threat of conflict coming from the refugee
activities. The Commission preferred initially to deal
with the second aspect, the threat of conflict. In this
respect, it made a series of recommendations, including one
to the effect that bilateral negotiations commence between
the countries of origin and asylum, as well as recommending
that refugees be settled as far as possible from the border
of their· country of origin(20). Unfortunately, Burundi is
a poor, over-populated country also pla'gued by government
instability and it was unwilling and unable to relocate
the refugees and control their subversive activities(21).
Moreover, the two countries were not able to reach a
mutually acceptable solution to their dispute. Furthermore,
the situation was complicated in October 1965 when an
abortive coup d'etat in Burundi which was carried out by a
group of lIutumilitary officers and politicians, also
provoked a sporadic uprising among Hutu peasants(22).
(19)polhemus, Higbet J., Ope Cit, p.190
(20)~ pp.191-192
(21)Refugees were scattered over large, remote areas with
poor communications, and who were desirous of taking revenge
against Rwanda. Large numbers of TUtsi refugees, who
evoked a sympathetic response among the people with whom
they settled. Thus, it was very difficult for the host
country, Burundi, to prevent the Tutsi guerrilla fighters,
recruited among the refugees from attacking Rwanda.
(22)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p. 64
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Consequently; the Burundi government retaliated when a
large number of lIutuprominent politicians and labour
leaders were executed. This led to international
condemnation(23). Nonetheless, neither the UN nor the
OAU played any significant role at this stage in the
crisis. Under these circumstances, Rwanda was deeply
concerned about the situation in Burundi and had opened
its border for any incoming refugees. Also, it did not
request any intervention by either the UN or the OAU(24).
At this stage, the conflict became somewhat intertwined
with the civil war in the Congo in which Rwanda supported
Tshombe's government and was in turn allied with the more
conservative African states. In contrast, Burundi
assisted the rival Congolese liberation movements and
in turn was allied with the more radical African states.
Therefore, the dispute remained unsolved until the Congo
civil war ended and the OAU became more interested in
ending the conflict between Burundi and Rwanda. During
1966 there was a complete impasse as a consequence of a
series of conflicts and mutual accusations of border
violations reported to the OAU(2S). Subsequently, in
September 1966 Rwanda complained before the third ordinary
session of the OAU Assembly which took place in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia(26). It drew the Assembly1s attention
(23)Ibid p. 64
(24)~ p. 64
(2S)Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.136
~26)1£!g p. 136
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to the dangerous situation which resulted from the activities
of refugee organisations based in Burundi, which had carried
out subversive activities against Rwanda. A similar
complaint had been made by Burundi before the Assembly(27).
Under these circumstances, the Assembly requested President
~Iobutu of Zaire to extend his good offices between the two
states. The reason behind the choice of President ~Iobutu
was the tripartite agreement of August 1966 concluded
between the three states, namely, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda
on mutual security, trade and cultural affairs(28). The
three states agreed in this agreement to expel from their
respective territories, individuals or groups of individuals
who might be suspected of subversive activities. against the
governments of the contracting states(29). In response to
the OAU Assembly's request, and in the spirit of the Kinshasa
agreement, President Mobutu succeeded in bringing the
Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda together at Goma, Zaire in
At this meeting, Mobutu made a successful
attempt to persuade the two leaders to reduce the conflict
between their countries by disarming the refugees on both
sides of the border(31). Subsequently, at the fourth
(27)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p. 65
(28)Matthews, Robert 0., Op. Cit, p.79
(29)1£!g p. 81
(30)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p. 64
(31)The heads of the three states issued, at the conclusion
of their summit, a statement recognising the generally
accepted principles governing refugee status, including that
of voluntary repatriation and declared their. intention to
co-operate in the elimination of subversive activities.
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ordinary session of the OAU Assembly which took place in
Kinshasa in November 1967, Mobutu reported on his efforts
which had been endorsed by the Assembly which requested
him to continue his efforts(32). Under these circumstances,
events in Burundi helped to reconcile the conflict between
the two states. A Tutsi soldier deposed the monarchy,
declared a republic and stated his desire to improve
relations with his neighbouring states(33). Under this
atmosphere, the OAU Secretary General visited Burundi and
Rwanda in order to attempt to reconcile the two member
states(34). Following this visit, bilateral ministerial
meetings were held in January and February 1968 at which
they agreed to open diplomatic relations(3S>. They also
agreed that all refugees who wished to return to their
homes could do so, but they had to give up their arms within
a month. They established a special committee to study
refugee problems and recommended appropriate measures against
gun-running among refugees •. Finally, they agreed that the
two heads of state would meet regularly to discuss mutual
co-operation between the two states(36). Despite these
efforts, Burundi was unable to relocate large numbers of
refugees. This served to maintain a certain level of tension
in the area, but there were no further large scale incidents.
The problem of settling the refugees was still extremely
difficult. In April 1972, a Hutu uprising in Burundi




(36)~, 1969-70, Oe· Cit, pp. B128-B129
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provoked massive executions which were condemned by the
international community(37). Consequently, the UN Secretary
General was entrusted to take appropriate measures to
prevent further loss of life and to alleviate human suffering.
-Therefore, his efforts were focussed on mobilizing massive
humanitarian aid and to ensure that such assistance reached
all the victims in Burundi(38). However, the role of the
OAU was limited to one of expressing satisfaction with the
UN humanitarian assistance. It had little success in
dealing with this conflict. It had never attempted the
difficult and potentially explosive role of verifying the
charges of subversive activities alleged by one member
against the other. Even if evidence of subversive activities
were found, the OAU had no sanction to impose and might be
embarrassed by this clear violation of its Charter. At the
same time, refugees constitute a bi-faceted problem of
humanitarian support and security. The OAU lacks the
resources necessary to support refugees. Its main contrib-
ution to this aspect is to bring collective African pressure
on international organisations dealing with refugee problems
in order to extend the necessary financial assistance(39).
(37)Andemicae1, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p. 65
(38)The assistance usually involved providing the refugees
with basic needs. These included food, water, clothing,
some·form of shelter and services. It also referred to
initial land settlement. So far, two large rural settle-
ments have been set up for refugees, each comprising a
number of villages. Each group of settlements had over
60,000 refugees within a year, representing the largest
organised refugee settlement in Africa.
(39)The recent international conference on assistance to
refugees in.Africa, was held in Geneva in April 1981. There
were three other conferences on the same subject held during
1967 and 1968 in France and Sweden at which was also discussed
and exchanged, views on the subject of the threat to the
stability of Africa by the refugees.
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In respect of the security matter and the threat of
subversive activities by the refugees against their country
of origin, the OAU has endeavoured to encourage the host
country to control refugee activities. Under customary
international law as well as the OAU Charter, member states
are obliged to refrain, not only from fomenting civil wars
and rebellions in other member states, but also from
extending assistance to political refugees in their terri-
tories. The OAU member states are now facing the problem
of subversive activities carried out by political refugees
from the territory of the host state for the purpose of
overthrowing the regime in their country of origin. Under
existing circumstances, charges of subversive activities
by neighbouring states and denial of such charges, have
become the order of the day in Africa. Against this
background, the OAU Charter envisaged several related
principles, sovereignty, equality of all member states,
respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and the
inalienable right to independence and unreserved condemn-
ation of political assassination and subversive activities(40).
Moreover, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State at its second
ordinary session, found it necessary to adopt a declaration
on the problem of subversive activities(41). In the
declaration, the OAU member states undertake solemnly in
conformity with Article III(S) of the OAU Charter:-
(40)OAU Charter and Rules of Procedures, Ope Cit, pp.l0-ll
(41)~ pp. 10-11
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"••••(1) not to tolerate any formof subversive activities
originating in foreign powers and carried out with or
without the collaboration of an African state;
(2) to refrain from conducting press and radio
campaign against any African states;
(3) not to create dissention with or among member
states by fomenting or aggravating racial, religious,
linguistic, ethnic or other offences;
(4) to observe strictly the principle of international
law with regard to all political refugees who are nationals
of any member states of the OAU ••••(42).
Since the OAU's formation, refugees have posed a growing and
multi-faceted problem for the African states. In recent
years, the refugee situation in Africa has increasingly
assumed a disturbing dimension in terms of number, composition
and tension. The deteriorating situation has been caused
largely by a series of political crises that erupted in
several African states. Accordingly, the internal aspects
of political instability have played a prominent role in
the contemporary refugee situation in Africa(43). In addition,
to the external aspects driven from minority racist regimes
in Southern Africa and to a large extent from the continued
(42) .Brown11e, Ian, Ope Cit, p.17
(43)During the writing of this section, more than a million
Ghanaians are being expelled from Nigeria, along with all
other illegal immigrants of Togolese, Beninois, Upper Voltan
and Chadian origins. The expulsion order of the immigrants
was announced by the Nigerian Interior Minister on January
24th, 1983. The repatriation of Ghanaians is complicated by
the fact that their own country closed its land border in
September 1982 in an effort to stop smuggling.
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extra-regional intervention in domestic affairs of the
OAU member states by foreign powers. The involuntary
movements of large numbers of people in Africa constitute
a tragedy of major proportions. For the refugees, it
involves deprivation, personal distress and psychological
uncertainty. For the country of asylum, it creates
a series of problems at a time when its limited re-
sources and skill are already overtaxed. There are many
other aspects to the refugee situation in Africa but not
least, the problem of regional tensions and disputes
which may ensue between the state of origin and the state
of asylum. There is also the possibility that the state
of asylum may seek to employ the political refugees as
an instrument for subverting the regime of the state of
origin which would heighten the tension to regional
crisis level. Likewise, the situation is problematical
in that even if the country of asylum adopted a friendly
attitude, the very existence of refugees on its soil may
be regarded as a threat by the country of origin.
Moreover, there is a danger that the political refugees
may seek to use the territory of the host state as a
base for overthrowing the regime of the state of origin,
regardless of the friendly attitude of the host state.
Furthermore, the presence of large numbers of refugees
may exacerbate tensions along already sensitive frontiers.
Under these circumstances, the OAU has endeavoured to
prevent regional tensions and potential African refugee
problems. Nonetheless, the OAU lacks the resources
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necessary to solve the refugee situation in Africa.
In respect of the effectiveness of the OAU in solving
regional tensions, it is necessary to distinguish
between normalisation of relations between member states
and final settlement of regional disputes. In respect
to the former matter, the OAU was able to act as an
effective instrument for resolving inter-state tensions
without solving the main causes of the dispute.
Regarding the settlement of regional disputes between
its member states, the OAU has pursued a combination of
methods, both direct and indirect with varying degrees
of success. The direct method involved the channelling
of appeals to the member states in dispute to solve the
dispute by conducting direct negotiation in order to
find a mutually acceptable solution. It has often
established a mediation commission or the designation
of an individual mediator. The indirect method
involved, is one of providing a forum for bilateral
contact between the leaders of states in dispute. It
also involved the development of mediatory initiative
on the part of individuals or groups of individuals
of African statesmen.
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GUINEA VERSUS GHANA (DETENTION OF DIPLOMATS):
BACKGROUND TO THE INCIDENT AND THE OAU EFFORTS IN
ACHIEVING PEACEFUL SETTLE~mNT
On February 24th, 1966 President Nkrumah of Ghana
was overthrown in a coup d'etat which was staged whilst he
was on his way to Peking(l). The coup created a major
uproar in most African radical states where the coup was
described as part of an imperialist plot directed against
the people of the entire African continent(2). In contrast,
the conservative African states, particularly Niger, Ivory
Coast, Togo and Upper Volta immediately recognised the
military regime headed by General Ankrah. Most of the
conflicts between African states are thus due in large
measure to the division of its states into two camps and
their inability or unwillingness to resolve their differences
within the framework of the OAU Charter. The radical states
do not consider Africa an autonomous system of inter-state
relations. Therefore, events in some African states are seen
as a reflection of outside interference. However, relations
between Ghana and Guinea deteriorated, as the latter state
had given asylum(3) to Nkrumah and seemed prepared to
(l)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, p.225
(2)Guinea, Mali, Tanzania and UAR not only refused to recognise
the new regime in Ghana, but also offered Nkrumah active
support to regain power. These states also initiated a move
to reconvene a conference of revolutionary states of Africa
to discuss the situation in Ghana.
(3) On March 2nd, 1966 Ghana's deposed President Nkrumah was
given a state welcome with a 21-gun salute when he arrived
in Guinea's'capital, Conakry from Moscow. Subsequently,
the Guinean.President made a dramatic announcement on March
3rd, 1966 offering the Presidency of the Federation of Guinea
and Ghana to Nkrumah and determined to assist him to regain
power in Ghana.
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assist him in organising a counter-coup(4) which introduced
a new potential for conflict between the two states. There
were also other factors whdch contributed to this conflict.
The most direct factor was the intense continuous hostility
demonstrated by Guinea towards the military regime in Ghana.
In this respect, Guinea had not only given shelter to the
ousted Ghanaian President after he had become a man without
a country, but it carried out a policy of grave provocation
against the new regime in Ghana(S). It had also been
stated that Guinean troops were preparing to move into
Ghana and this would have required their passing through
Ivory Coast in order to overthrow the military regime
in Ghana. However, the Ivory Coast affirmed that it would
not allow its territory to be used as a basis for an act
of aggression, launched against anOAU member state(6).
(4)President Sekou Toure announced that he was mobilizing
troops to be sent to Ghana with the least possible delay.
liesaid that the troops would free the people of Ghana
from the dictatorship of the military traitors. He
justified his intervention on the grounds of the existence
of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which was approved by the
national assemblies of the three states.
(5)
tVhen Nkrumah arrived in Conakry he stated n ••• I have
come here on purpose to use Guinea as a platform to tell
the world that very soon I would be in Ghana •••n He
declared that he would overthrow the military leaders and
teach them the lesson they deserve.
(6)
Skurnik. W.A.E., Ghana and Guinea 1966 - A Case Study in
Inter-African Relations, ~, Volume 5, 1967, p.379
- 392 -
The Guinean threat did materialise and it created a major
regional split among ''lestAfrican states. It was notable
that there was no distinction between the inflammatory
language used by Nkrumah and by the Guinean government(7).
The latter stated that it must consider itself in a state
of war with the military regime in Ghana. It also determined
to halt the criminal action of the imperialists and crush
all subversive elements(8). However, the immediate factor
that had led to the conflict between Guinea and Ghana was
the question of the Ghanaian nationals(9). The Ghanaian
ambassador and his family were arrested by Guinean
authorities. At the time, the ambassador and his family were
taken off a plane at Conakry Airport·whilst returning to
Ghana. He was placed under house arrest(10). Subsequently,
(7)Both sources called the military leaders imperialist
puppets and murderers and incited the Ghanaian people to
revolt and oust them. Nkrumah was also allowed to address
the people of Ghana on a regular broadcast over Guinea
national radio, inciting them to revolt against the new
regime.
(8)Matthews. Robert 0., Inter-State Conflicts in Africa,
310, Volume 24, !2lQ, p.344
(9) There were about a hundred Ghanaians, seventy of whom
had been members of the security squad which had accompanied
Nkrumah on his trip to China. They were wanted in Ghana
for questioning and presumably faced arrest the moment they
set foot on Ghanaian soil. In addition, there was a
contingent of twenty-eight Ghanaian students just returned
from Moscow. Ten of these students had expressed a desire
to return to Ghana while still attending police training
courses in the Soviet Union. The students appeared to have
been detained in military camps after they arrived in Guinea.
Subsequently, nine were allowed to return to Ghana.
(10)Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.344
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the Guinean authorities also arrested the Ghanaian
embassy staff. ~loreover, the Guinean government confiscated
Ghanaian property in Guinea and allowed Nkrumah to withdraw
Ghanaian public funds lodged in Guinean banks. Further-
more, it bestowed upon Nkrumah the co-Presidency of Guinea
which was also an action that would be interpreted in
Ghana as an insu1t(11). The final factor which
contributed to the conflict between the two states
n •••• is expressed by an African proverb that if you
cannot find the master, beat his dog and the master
011 (12)nW1 come •••• In this respect, the immediate
objective of Ghana's arrest of Guinean diplomats was to
prompt the OAU to come and take action in freeing the
Ghanaians. At the same time, this action would serve
the additional purpose of showing Guinea's hostility in
a regional forum. The OAU would then be used to put
pressure on Guinea to cease subversive activities against
Ghana. In addition to the consideration by Ghana's
military government that the consistently hostile attitude
of ~uinea was extraordinary enough as to justify extra-
ordinary counter-measure(13). Therefore, it had
recognised the adverse consequences that the action
was contrary to international norms as observed among
(11) Oe· Cit, p.373Skurnikl W.A.E.,
(12)Ibid p.374
(13) Cit, p.198Polhemus. Higbie. 3., Oe·
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the international community. However, before taking
such action, the new regime in Ghana endeavoured to
initiate efforts at mediation through the OAU, but was
unable to secure any action from its institutions(14).
Consequently, the Ghanaian military regime turned to
retaliatory action in order to strike back at Guinea
for its active support for Nkrumah and detention of
its nationals. Thus, this action came up with the
convening of the seventh ordinary session of the OAU
Council of Ministers which took place in Addis Ababa in
October 1966 to precede the third ordinary session of
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State(1S). The Guinean
delegation to the OAU Council of J.1inisterswas en route
to Addis Ababa aboard a Pan-American Airways jet which
made a scheduled landing at Accra(16). The delegation,
which had remained on board was removed from the plane
and detained by the Ghanaian authorities who announced
that the delegation would not be allowed to leave until
the members of the Ghana embassy in Guinea were re1eased(17).
(14)Andemicae1, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.8S
(15) Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.360
(16)Nineteen Guineans left Conakry for Monrovia, Liberia
where they boarded a Pan-American Airways plane for
Lagos, Nigeria. The Guinean delegation was scheduled for
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia where it was to represent Guinea
at the meeting of the OAU Council of ~1inisters. The four
diplomats were the Guinean Foreign Minister, the Ambassador
to Tanzania, the former Resident Hinister in Accra and
the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry. The other
fifteen Guineans were students on their way to Lagos.
(17)The Guinean delegation detained included £ifteen
Guinean students en route to Lagos who were transported
to an army camp near Accra and placed under house arrest.
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The Guinean reaction was swift and they insisted that the
United States was entirely responsible for the arrest
of the Guinean nationals(18). Thus, this reaction left
the field open for ad hoc third party efforts to secure
the release of the diplomats and to resolve the broader
differences between Ghana and Guinea. In this respect,
a unilateral initiative was made prior to the opening
meeting of the OAU Council of J.Iinistersby Nigeria,
Liberia and Ethiopia(19). They had despatched missions
to Accra and Conakry. Simultaneously, the UN Secretary
General appealed to both states in dispute, but
all these efforts at mediation were unsuccessful
to reconcile the two states(20). Accordingly, there was
concern at the conference site that many delegations
might boycott the meeting of the OAU Council of J.Unisters
in sympathy with Guinea. Therefore, the-Council at a
special meeting decided to send a three-member mission
of ministers to Conakry and Accra in an effort at mediation(21
(18)As a result, the American Ambassador to Guinea was placed
under house arrest for nearly 24 hours in Conakry. Moreover,
anti-American demonstrations took place throughout Conakry
where the Ambassador's residence and the embassy were
vandalised. The Guinean government also withdrew Pan-
American's landing rights into Conakry.
(19)The Emperor of Ethiopia despatched his Minister of
Justice as his personal envoy to Accra in an attempt to
secure the release of the detainees. He subsequently flew
to Conakry and Dakar where he conferred with President
Senghor and requested his assistance. The outcome of these
negotiations was concerned largely with the question of
some one hundred Ghanaians residing in Conakry. This had
been the immediate excuse for the arrest of the Guineans.
(20)Skurnik, W.A.E., Ope Cit, p.J71
(21) -Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.88
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The mission again failed in Ghana to secure the release
of the delegation but was at least able to return from
Guinea with the conclusion that there was no evidence of
Ghanaians held there against their will(22). Consequently,
it was not until the Summit Conference of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State meeting for its third ordinary session
in Addis Ababa, that a settlement to the dispute was
found(23). The OAU Assembly held an informal meeting
where it was agreed that the heads of state of Ethiopia,
Egypt and Liberia would meet with General Ankrah, who was
in attendance at the Summit, in order to find a solution
that would free the Guinean diplomats(24). The three
leaders persuaded the Chairman of the Ghanaian Liberation
Council that he should release the Guinean diplomats rather
than be responsible for the failure of the Summit, and that
in return they would see to it that Ghanaians wishing to
return home would do so. Accordingly, the Guinean diplomats
were released. Nonetheless, General Ankrah proved unable
(22)The mission was composed of the Kenyan Vice-President,
the Foreign Minister of Congo (Kinshasa) and the Minister
of Information of Sierra Leone. The mission was informed
in Conakry that it would be allowed to interview Ghanaians
livi~ in Guinea and that any who desired it, would be
immediately repatriated to Ghana. The mission interviewed
eighty-one of the eighty-five Ghanaians and all of those
interviewed signed statements expressing their wish not to
return to Ghana at this time. The Ghanaian military
government refused to accept the mission's report, claiming
that the Ghanaians had so testified only because of fear
of Guinean retaliation.
(23)polhemusa Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.201
(24)Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.144
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to get any OAU discussion concerning Guinea's hostile
acts(2S>. Consequently, relations between Ghana and
Guinea remained antagonistic and tense throughout the
period of military rule. Despite the fact, the OAU
Assembly entrusted the President of Liberia to extend
his good offices in order to resolve the outstanding
differences between the two states in dispute. Accordingly,
President Tubman remained sporadically active. As a
result of his efforts at mediation, thirty-five of the
former security personnel returned to Ghana via
Liberia(26). It was notable that the downfall of
Nkrumah as President of Ghana was not a minor event,
considering his influence in many African states •. Despite
the fact, the OAU was able to avoid an ideological division
over the Ghana-Guinea situation and resolved it in an
impartial manner. N~netheless, the role of the OAU
Council of Ministers was inconclusive regarding the
proper steps to be taken, and it was further divided by
the suggestion that the Ghanaian delegation be barred
from attending the Conference(27). Unfortunately, the
(2S)McKeon. Nora, African States and the OAU, dIA,
Volume 42, 1966, p.406
(26)Meyers. David B., Ope Cit, p.145
(27)The OAU could deal with less divisive disputes. The
difficult matter in the Guinea-Ghana dispute was the
prompt resurgence of the old ideological division which
Africa had sought to neutralise by establishing the OAU.
Eleven of the then thirty-three member states, Egypt,
Algeria, Tanzania, Somalia, both Congo states, Mali,
Sudan, Mauritania, Kenya and Sierra Leone were described
by the Guinean government as having adopted a helpful
attitude. The others remained silent or offered their
good offices for mediation without taking sides.
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.Council has often adopted a habit of shelving major
decisions and passing them to the Assembly of Heads of
State. Thus, this practice might threaten to turn the
OAU into a facade rather than an active instrument of
co-operation. The Council was conceived to provide a
permanent safety-valve for tension which might arise
among member states. The abstention of the Council on
a number of important decisions led to undermine the
OAU's ability to function on a regional basis.
Consequently, there must be compliance with decisions
taken at Council level, and member states must ensure
that the decisions of the Council be afforded as much
attention as would the decisions of the Assembly of
Heads of State. Following the brief review of this
incident, it is necessary to set the stage for the legal
consequences. The international legal position is
obvious: detention of diplomats constitutes a flagrant
violation of international principles concerning the
diplomatic privileges and immunities. In this respect,
the Ghanaian government had violated these principles
as had previously the Guinean government(28). These
acts were in violation of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations signed on April 18th, 1961 to which
both states are signatories(29). Article 29 of the
(28)The Vienna Convention deals with the subject of
diplomatic relation and immunities in a comprehensive and
general manner. The conference held under the UN auspices
and the mandate assigned to it by the UN General Assembly
was that of adopting the international customary law that
had grown up concerning diplomatic intercourse and
immunities. A set of forty-five draft articles on the
subject prepared by the International Law Commission formed
the basis of the 1961 Vienna Convention.
(29)Panhuys, a.F. van at al., Op. Cit, p.156
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1961 Viel1na Convention stipulates that •••••the person
of diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not
be liable t~ any form of arrest or detention ••••(30).
Also mentioned explicitly is the inviolability of a
diplomatic agent in transit through a country to which
he is not accredited • Article 40 stipulates that
•••••if a diplomatic agent passes through or is in the
territory of a third state which has granted him a
passport visa if a visa is necessary while proceeding
to take or to return from his post or when returning
to his own country, the third state shall accord him
inviolability and such other immunities as may be
required to secure his transit or return •••• (31).
As a matter of fact, the Guinean diplomats were in
transit at Accra International Airport, Ghana, and
since they did not plan to leave the aircraft, required
no visa(32). Detention of the Guinean diplomats is
also in violation of the OAU General Convention on
Privileges and Immunities. It provides that
•••••representatives of the OAU member states to the
principal and subsidiary bodies and to conferences
convened by the OAU shall while exercising their
function or during their travel to and from the place
of meeting be accorded immunity from personal arrest
or detention ••••(33). It should be mentioned here
(30)rbid p.160
(31)~ pp.162-163
(32)Skurnik, W.A.E., Op. Cit, p.379
(33)polhemus. Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.199
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that Ghana unlike Guinea had not ratified the General
Convention(34). Despite the fact, it would seem that
the Convention is legally binding since it had been adopted
by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and the ratification
is only a matter of realising it in practice. Since the
resolution adopted by a two-thirds majority of the member
states, the General Convention then is binding on all
member states of the OAU. It would also appear that
Ghana did not seek to argue this point. Indeed, Ghana
justified its action as a retaliation against previous
Guinean violation of these international norms, especially
the detention of the Ghanaian Ambassador(3S). As a matter
of fact, this retaliatory action was contrary to inter-
national principles enshrined in the UN Charter.
•••••To maintain international peace and security and to
that end ••••(36). •••••the party to any dispute, the
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security, shall first of all
seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means
of their choice ••••(37). In this respect, the OAU
General Convention on Privileges and Immunities also
provides that •••••al1 differences arising out of the
(34)Ibid p.199
(3S);;;;rs, David B., Ope Cit, p.360
(36)PanhuYB, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.24
(37)~ p.33
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interpretation or application of the present Convention
.shall be referred for arbitration to the OAU Commission
of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration unless in
any case it is agreed by the parties of a certain dispute
to have recourse to another mode of--peaceful settlement •••(38)
In fact, international norms can only be satisfactorily
applied if their provisions are respected by all states at
all times. It would appear that Ghana sought to have
its dispute with Guinea solved peacefully within the
framework of the OAU Charter. Nonetheless, Guinea
denied Ghana's charges and refused to participate in any
meeting of the OAU until its officials had been released(39).
The Guinean refusal left the field open for ad hoc third
party efforts. To this effect, Ethiopia, Liberia and
Nigeria despatched missions in an effort to secure the
release of the diplomats and to resolve the broader
differences between the two states in dispute(40). It was
also reported that the UN Secretary General had extended his
good offices in connection with the release of the Guinean
diplomats. Despite these efforts, Guinea continued to
deny Ghana's charges and placed the blame for the incident
on the United States government and Pan-American Airways,
and demanded the transportation of its officials to their
destinations(41). The argument advanced by Guinea to
(38)Polhemus, Higbie J., Op. Cit, p.301
(39)McKeon. Nora, Op. Cit, p.301
(40) Andemicael. Berhanxkum, Op. Cit, p.88
(41)Skurnik, W.A.E., Op. Cit, p.310
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justify its position was that its officials had no prior
knowledge that the Pan-American jet would stop in
Accra(42).' Despite this argument, Article 40(4) of the
Vienna Convention stipulates that •••••the obligation of
third states under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article -
shall also apply to the persons mentioned respectively
in those paragraphs and to official communications and
diplomatic bags whose presence in the territory of the
third state is due to force majeure ••••(43). Therefore,
international convention exonerated the United States
government and Pan-American Airways from any legal
responsibility towards Guinea in connection with the
incident at Accra. Article I of the 1944 Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation to which Guinea
is a signatory, also makes it clear that •••••the contracting
states recognise that any state enjoys complete and
exclusive sovereignty in air space above its territory •••(44).1
Thus, this would imply that the competent authorities of
the contracting state have the right to visit landing and
departing aircrafts of other contracting states and also
(42)
The Guinean officials boarded a regular twice-weekly
Pan-American flight, originating in New York and stopping
at Dakar, Monrovia and Accra and terminating in Lagos.
Moreover, the National Guinean Airway is the official
Pan-American agent in Conakry. Hence, flight schedules
and information were available to the Guinean officials.
(43)Panhuys, M.F. van et a1., Ope Cit, p.163
- 403 -
implies that such visits may be followed by detention
or arrest of passengers and crew by public authorities.
Accordingly, the Ghanaian authorities were acting in
conformity with the provisions of the Chicago Convention
and exercising its legal right as a sovereign state when
it arrested the non-diplomatic passengers. "~ether this
was a wise act is of course another question. Consequently,
the United States government should not be held responsible
for action by a third state. Likewise, it had no legal
right to interfere in a dispute between two sovereign
African states. As far as the responsibility of Pan-
American Airways was concerned, the Chicago Convention
makes no mention of the duty of an airline to transport
passengers against the opposition of the government of a
nation. At any event, detention or arrest of diplomats
of one nation by the authorities of another for any
reason, is not permitted by the Vienna Convention and
is in violation of the principles of international law.
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GUINEA VERSUS IVORY COAST (SEIZURE OF DIPLQ~~TS):
BACKGROUND TO TIm INCIDENT AND THE OAU EFFORTS IN
ACHIEVING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT
The tension in West Africa following the coup d'etat
in Ghana also affected relations between Guinea and the
Ivory Coast. In addition to that, there were ideological
differences between their respective Presidents which had
begun before independence(I). Nonetheless, the danger
of direct conflict between Guinea and the Ivory Coast had
remained limited, until the Ghanaian coup in 1966 when
tensions throughout the West of Africa rose greatly.
Since the Ivory Coast lies between Guinea and Ghana, the
announcement by Guinea of its intention to invade Ghana
induced the Ivory Coast to mobilize troops on the common
frontier with Guinea(2). Even after the immediate threat
of armed confrontation had passed, tension between the
Ivory Coast and Guinea remained high and culminated in an
incident similar to that between Guinea and Ghana(3).
(I)Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.146
(2)President Sekou Toure of Guinea announced on March 10th,
1966 that he was mobilizing troops to be sent to Ghana with
the least possible delay. Soon afterwards, Guinea's troops
supported by heavy equipment began moving towards the
frontier of Ivory Coast, which separates Ghana and Guinea.
However, Ivory Coast affirmed that it would not allow its
territory to be used against its friendly neighbour. With
the refusal of Ivory Coast to give passage to Guinean troops
through its territory, it may be expected that subversive
activities would be engineered from Guinea, perhaps with the
assistance of other African states who stated their deter-
mination to overthrow the military regime in Ghana.
(3)The Ivory Coast authorities arrested and detained the
Foreign Minister of Guinea and permanent representative of
Guinea to the UN and members of Guinea's delegation to
the fifth emergency special session of the UN General
Assembly,' who were in transit on a KLM plane on their
return journey from the UN General Assembly session at
the time the plane was forced to make an unscheduled
landing at Abidjan.
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In May 1967, Guinea arrested several citizens of the Ivory
Coast residing in Guinea and captured an Ivory Coast
fishing trawler, alleging that its crew were planning to
kidnap the·former Ghanaian President Nkrumah(4). Under
these circumstances, the Ivory Coast initially tried to
initiate efforts at mediation through the OAU, but was
unable to secure any action from its institutions(5).
As a result of the OAUls inability to make an effort at
mediation, President TUbman of Liberia, who had good
relations with the leaders of Guinea and Ivory Coast,
extended his good offices in an effort to reconcile the
two states in dispute, but was unsuccessful(6).
Consequently, the Ivory Coast turned to a reprisal action
to strike back at Guinea for the detention of its nationals
and property. On June 26th, 1967 the Ivory Coast
authorities detained Guinean officials returning from the
fifth emergency special session of the UN General Assembly
as well as Guinean citizens serving with the Universal
Postal Union, together with their families(7). The Ivory
Coast authorities explained that its action was a
retaliatory act and that the Guineans would be held until
the Ivory Coast citizens in detention in Guinea were
released(8). Simultaneously, both states publicly
(4)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.89
(5) l-feyers.David B., Ope Cit, p.360
(6) Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.89
(~)Whiteman, t-farjorieM., Digest of International Law,
Volume 13, 1963, p.129
(8)Meyers, David B~, Ope Cit, p.360
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exchanged mutual charges of subversive activities going
Under these circumstances,
Guinea went directly to the UN in an effort to secure
the release of its officials and citizens(10), thus its
efforts at the UN had also been supported by a number of
African states and the OAU Secretary General(11).
At the same time, the Ivory Coast Government requested
the UN Secretary General to assist in an exchange of
persons detained by both states(12). Despite the
UN Secretary Generalis refusal to link the two affairs,
he despatched a personal envoy to both states but was
unsuccessful in his efforts to free the detainees in both
countries(13). Accordingly, the UN Secretary General
endeavoured to encourage the OAU to use its good offices
in this dispute(14). Consequently, the OAU Assembly at
-( 9)McKeon, Nora, Ope Cit, p.406
(10)On June 30th, 1967 President Sekou Tour\ of Guinea
informed the UN Secretary General, of illegal arrest and
detention by the Ivory Coast authorities on June 26th, 1967
of the Guinean delegation to the fifth emergency special
session of the UN General Assembly. The delegation consisted
of Dr. Lansana Beavogui, Minister for Foreign Affairs and
Mr. Achkar Marof, Permanent Representative of Guinea to the
UN, as well as Mr. Montalouv Joseph ITU staff member of
Guinean nationality.
(11)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, p.225
(12)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.90
(13)The UN Secretary General despatched Jose Polz-Bennett,
then Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs as his
personal envoy to the Presidents of Guinea and the Ivory
Coast. He was subsequently joined by I.S. Djermakoye,
then Under-Secretary for the Department of Trusteeship
and Non-Self-Governing Territories.
(14)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.90
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its fourth ordinary session which took place in Kinshasa,
requested that the host, President ~Iobutu~ make efforts
to release the detainees in both states(1S). Accordingly,
he mad~ great efforts to get the heads of the Guinean and
the Ivory Coast delegations to sit together and discuss
their dispute, and avoid acrimonious debate at the UN
General Assembly. At this time, the OAU efforts were
successful. The detainees were released before the
issue was discussed officially at the UN General Assembly.
Both leaders announced that they were doing this in the
interest of African unity(16). Despite the conflict
being taken directly to the UN, its final settlement
had come through the mediation of an OAU-designated
statesman. Following the brief review of the incident,
it is necessary to set the stage for the legal consequences.
Initially, Guinea addressed a letter to_the UN Secretary
General charging the government of the Ivory Coast with
flagrant violation of·the UN Convention on Privileges and
Immunities and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations(17). Actually, detention of diplomats was
in violation with international conventions to which
the Ivory Coast is a signatory. The latter action
had provoked international repercussions and even affected
the responsibility of the UN Secretary General. In this
(15)




Panhuys, H.F. Van et al., Ope Cit, p.128 and 156
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connection, Ambassador Ackhar, Chairman of the Special
Committee on the Policies of Apartheid was invited by
the UN Secretary General in conformity with the UN
General Assembly request envisaged in Resolution
2202A(XXI) (18). He was consulted by the UN Secretary
General in connection with a seminar on Apartheid which
was scheduled to take place on July 24th, 1967(19).
Accordingly, the Guinean diplomats were covered during
their return journey from the UN General Assembly session
by the immunities provided for in Article IV(11) of the
UN Convention on the Privileges and Immunities(20).
Whilst the Guinean nationals working with the Universal
Postal Union were covered during their journey by the
privileges and immunities of the UN Specialised
Agencies(21). It should be noted that the Ivory Coast
is a signatory to these conventions. However, the UN
Secretary General informed the government of the Ivory
Coast that ignoring these diplomats~ immunities,
constituted a grave precedent. It was also in violation
(18)








with the general principle of international law enshrined
in Article 40 of the Vienna Convention with respect to the
inviolability of diplomatic agents when travelling abroad
in the exercise of their official duties(22). Under these
circumstances, the Ivory Coast approached the UN Secretary
General for assistance in bringing about the release of
its citizens who had been detained in Guinea, but he chose
to ignore the link between the two incidents. Despite the
fact, he endeavoured to use his good offices in the case
of the Ivory Coast nationals detained in Guinea. However,
he reported to the UN Security Council on the situation
between Guinea and the Ivory Coast in order to keep it
fully informed of matters which might lead to international
friction(23). Since no progress was made after a month
of intensive efforts by the UN Secretary General, Guinea
requested him to include the situation on the agenda of
the UN General Assembly(24). Accordingly, the issue was
placed on the agenda of the twentieth session as an
additional item(25). It was an important question of
(22)The rule adopted at the 1961 Vienna Conference reflects
the view of governments that the duty of a third state
requires only that a member of a diplomatic mission or a
member of his family transiting through a third country to
or from his post, be treated with dignity and that his
onward travel not be impeded. For that reason, the diplomatic
agent was accorded personal inviolability as may be required
to facilitate his transit.
(23) •Whiteman. MarJorie M., Ope Cit, p.130
(24) Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.90
(25)Whiteman. Marjorie M., Ope Cit, p.130
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principle which had arisen concerning the privileges and
immunities specified in Article 105 of the UN Charter
and Section II of the UN Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities(26). Failure to reaffirm the relevant
provisions could set an undesirable precedent. Therefore,
the UN Secretary General considered it timely to reaffirm
those provisions and called upon all member states to
ensure that their representatives to the principal and
subsidiary organs of the UN and to conferences convened
by the UN, enjoy immunities from arrest or personal
detention during their journey to and from the place
of UN meetings (27)• In any event, before the debate
took place in the UN General Assembly(28), the Secretary
General received on September 25th, 1967, an official
communication from the Ivory Coast to the effect that
(26)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Op. Cit, p.130
(27)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 7, !222, p.127
(28)The General Assembly adopted a resolution on the
question of diplomatic privileges and immunities,
deploring all departures from the rules of inter-
national law governing diplomatic privileges and
immunities of the UN. It urged member states to
take every measure necessary to secure the implement-
ation of the rules of international law governing
diplomatic relations and in particular, to protect
diplomatic missions and to enable diplomatic agents
to fulfil their tasks in conformity with international
law. The resolution also urged states which have not
yet done so, to ratify or accede to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18th,
196i, The resolution further urged member states of
the UN which have not yet done so, to accede to the
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN
adopted by the UN General Assembly on February 13th,
1946. (GA Resolution 2328(XXII) December 18th, 196Z)
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it was on that day releasing the Guinean diplomats.
This was the outcome of an earlier decision by Guinea
to set free the Ivory Coast nationals detained there(29).
The Guinea-Ivory Coast dispute was initially handled by
the UN rather than the OAU. This was the consequence
of Guinea's strong protest that the UN should be held
responsible for the release of its officials because
the meeting from which they were returning was convened
by the UN. In addition to this, it was concluded that
the Ivory Coast had violated Section 11 of the UN
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities to which the
latter state is a signatory(30). The UN Secretary
General had. thus asserted that in the interest of the
proper functioning of the UN, he would have no other
choice but to lodge a strong protest against such
violation and to contemplate the means which were open
to remedy the situation(31). The direct interest of
the UN in this conflict was thereforeobviolls, by the
fact that the UN encouraged the intercession by the UN
Secretary General. Accordingly, the OAU renounced its
role, but after the unsuccessful efforts made by the UN,
it then stepped in to encourage settlement through the
good offices of an African statesman. The OAU made great
efforts to reach a settlement of the dispute before the
(29) •~reyersl Dav1d B., Op. Cit, pp.147-148
(30)l~itemanl Marjorie M., Ope Cit, p.130
(31)Meyers, David B., Op. Cit~p.360
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UN General Assembly started debating the situation between
two of its member states. This was in consequence of
avoiding an acrimonious debate concerning the violation
of the UN Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and
Immunities by two member states of the OAU •. The conflict
had two dimensions: an incident constituting some form
of retaliation, and an underlying history of political
and ideological differences expressing itself in sub-
versive activities. The respective roles of the UN and
the OAU and the nature of their collaboration is based
on Chapter VIII of the UN Charter concerning regional
arrangements(32). The immediate consequences of this
conflict were based on the extent to which each organ-
isation was directly affected by the incident. Thus, the
Guinean officials detained by the Ivory Coast, being of
special concern to the UN had to be handled initially by
the latter organisation. Subsequently, the OAU was,
by its Assembly of Heads of State, to take up the conflict
which was mediated by a designated statesman. The
immediate problem of this conflict was settled, but as
, .,
far as the political and ideological differences were
concerned, neither the UN nor the OAU attempted to
(32)
Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Opo Cit, p.36
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resolve them. Nonetheless, the two organisations have
sought to halt further subversive activities by issuing
similar declarations that underlined the principle of
non-interference in domestic affairs(33). Finally,
the collaboration which had existed between the UN
and the OAU during the settlement of this conflict, had
largely conformed to the principle of regional arrange-
ments. This has confirmed the principle that all
regional disputes should initially be sought through the
OAU to the extent that it is able to provide effective
settlement to such disputes. However, the nature and
extent of the UN role in the settlement of African
regional disputes would depend upon the degree of success
that the OAU may gain in settling these disputes.
The common cause of these conflicts described in
this category, are the domestic instabilities that
plagued both of the states involved, as well as the
intervention by other African states in these internal
disorders. It has already been mentioned that disorder
resulted from the challenging of the legitimacy of the
political authority in power. However, neighbouring
states have chosen, for reasons as varied as humanitarian,
(33)
The Accra session of the OAU Assembly thus found it
necessary to adopt a declaration on the problem of
subversion. In the declaration, the OAU Assembly under-
took solemnly, in accordance with Article IIX(S) of the
OAU Charter, not to tolerate any subversive activities
between African states and to oppose collectively any
form of subversion originating in foreign states and
carried out with or without the collaboration of an
African state. TWo months later, upon the initiative
of African, Asian and Latin American states, the UN
General Assembly p~oscribed all forms of subversion
when it adopted a declaration on the inadmissibility
of intervention in the domestic affairs of states.
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ethnicity, ideology and religion, to support· the political
refugees in their struggle either to secure a change of
regime or to achieve their separate independent state. The
assistance that African states have given to opposition
groups from another state has been the cause of friction
between OAU member states. It was notable that following
the overthrow of Nkrumah, Ghana~s relations with most of
its neighbouring states were gradually restored to normality.
Nonetheless, the downfall of Nkrumah was not looked upon as
a blessing in disguise, but rather as a neo-colonialist
threat to their continued existence. However, the coup
had led to a deterioration in relations between Guinea on
the one hand, and Ghana and the Ivory Coast on the other.
Despite the reconciliation of these disputes by the OAU,
relations between Guinea, Ghana and the Ivory Coast have
remained impervious to all efforts by African statesmen to
normalise relations between them. -One of the central
concerns of the OAU has been to resolve disagreements
between its member states peacefully. The amicable settle-
ment to all African regional disputes is deemed necessary
in order to maintain the autonomy of African regional
arrangements. It is understood that prolonged and violent
regional disputes could only weaken the united front of
Africa and hasten the introduction of extra-regional inter-
vention. In an effort to maintain peace and security,
African states have developed, over an era, a set of norms
and regional institutions to guide their relations and curb
the outbursts of regional conflicts. Article III of the
OAU Charter provides a set of norms to govern relations
between its member states. They are - the sovereign
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equality of all member states, non-interference in the
internal affairs of other member states, respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and
for its inalienable right to independent existence and
peaceful settlement of disputes by peaceful means(34).
The second principle of non-interference is envisaged again,
more precisely and explicitly in Article III(S) which
provides for unreserved condemnation of political assassin-
ation in all its forms as well as of subversive activities
on the part of neighbouring states or any other state(3S).
It has already been mentioned that evidence of Nkrumah1s
interventionist activities, along with the knowledge that
the political refugees from neighbouring states were
obtaining substantial support and assistance, resulted in
an Entente-led campaign to bring an end to subversion.
Despite the absence of these states from the OAU Summit
which took place in Accra, Ghana, in protest of Nkrumah's
interventionist activities in their state's domestic
aff~lirs. The OAU Assembly passed a resolution reaffirming
the OAU principle of non-interference and condemning any
state that allowed refugees to carry out subversive activities
against their state of origin. Despite the fact, the OAU
has not made the progress expected towards achieving its
aims. The OAU member states are beset by the twin dangers
of nationalism and regionalism. )Iost OAU member states
(34)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, pp.2-3
(3S)Ibid p.3
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are beset by border disputes, deep-rooted internal
political strife and the nagging problems of disease,
poverty and refugees on a massive scale. However, the
OAU has achieved a litt1~ progress in the settlement of
regional disputes(36). At the same time, the member
states are extremely slow in practice to submit their
disputes to the OAU machinery. This could be attributed
to the OAU approach to peaceful settlement of regional
disputes and the typical approaches employed by the OAU
in settling regional conflicts, one has already been
adopted in order to pass resolutions that clearly outline
proper and proscribed behaviour. The seizure of diplomats
did not, however, call for such action, this being
forbidden under international law. These acts were also in
violation of the 1961 Vienna Convention and the UN and
OAU Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities(37).
(36)Unable to take prompt action to present regional
disputes, a number of African leaders suggested
considering ways and means in which the OAU would be
able to react immediately on occasions when neither
the Council of Ministers nor the Assembly of Heads of
State were in session. Some member states proposed
the establishment of a special permanent body em-
powered to act for the OAU when the principal organs
were not in session. Some member states suggested
giving the OAU Secretary General authority to mediate
in regional disputes. Unfortunately, neither of these
suggestions received substantial support and both were
quickly forgotten.
(37)Panhuys, H.F. van et a1., Ope Cit, p.156
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Nonetheless, the OAU has exerted a considerable influence
in assisting settlement of these disputes. The existence of
the OAU has served to hold the lid on things. It has
also provided a forum whereby the states in dispute were
frequently able to meet and dispel any misunderstanding
that existed between them, and where the other member
states were able to bring pressure to bear on the
conflicting parties. The effectiveness of the OAU in
settling regional disputes has thus rested less on its
role as a mediator than on its capacity as a forum.
Despite the elaborate machinery evolved by the OAU to
deal with regional disputes between its member states,
the most successful technique of conflict settlement in
Africa has involved the mediation of heads of state who
are widely respected and trusted by both parties in
dispute. In fact, the OAU has, on several occasions,
limited its efforts to request some African leaders to
initiate mediation or to pursue such a role as he may
already have begun. Unfortunately, the Secretary
General of the OAU neither possesses the institutional
authority nor has developed the reputation for fairness
which would enable him to play a vital role in the
settlement of regional disputes. This was in consequence
of, and in part by default of, the Secretary General and,
in part as a result of the significance of regional
disputes in continental policies. Consequently, African




THE OAU ROLE IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS
WITHIN ITS MEMBER STATES
THE OAU AND THE CONCEPT ON NON-INTERFERENCE IN
DOMESTIC JURSIDICTION:
As stated earlier, the history of pan-Africanism from
1958 onwards, was a struggle for the maintenance of the
principle of non-interference in domestic jurisdiction
as a cardinal value of African inter-state relationship.
However, in the debate on this concept at the founding
conference of the OAU, the fear prevaiied among some
member states that the organisation might arrogate to
itself the right to interfere in the domestic affairs
of member states whom they regard as neo-colonialist(1).
(1)
In spite of the fact that the assassination of
President Olympio of Togo occurred five months before
the founding Summit of the OAU in May 1963, Nigeria
proposed intervention by the Inter-African and
Malagascy Organisation (Monrovia Group). It requested
the convening of the latter organisation in Lagos in
February 1963 in order to consider the legality of the
new regime in Togo. The Conference debated whether
automatic recognition be accorded to the provisional
government in Togo without taking into account the
suspension of the constitution or dissolution of the
national assembly and the abrogation of the electoral
laws of the Republic of Togo. It considered, in
addition, whether recognition be accorded without
taking into account the external influences and the
military constraints which contributed to bringing
the new regime to power. The Conference failed to
reach a conclusion on the issue of recognition but
recommended the setting up of a five-nation commission
to enquire into the circumstances of the coup. This,
however, was disbanded five weeks later. It was also
notable that none of the states participating followed
the implied suggestion of severing relations with
Ghana.
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At the same time, there was also a fear of external
intervention by acts of subversion originating in
African states acting as accomplices of foreign states
hostile to the unity and independence of the state
conce~ned(2). Consequently, the working papers tabled
by the Ethiopian delegation called for the strongest
safeguards to protect the hard-won independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states
and urged resistance to neo-colonialism in all its
forms, including political and economic interference(3).
Accordingly, Article II of the OAU Charter provides
for defence of territorial integrity and for joint
co-operation on defence and security(4). It is in
reality preoccupied with external subversion, while
giving the impression that it is condemning intervention
by other member states. According to Article II, eac~
member state has a solemn and sacred duty to respect
the right'enjoyed by all other member states in
conformity with international law. The member states
also pledge to refrain from any subversive activities
against neighbouring states or other states. Moreover,
the Article also envisages, inter alia, of the right
of a state to defend its territorial integrity, to
exercise within its boundary, exclusive jurisdiction
(2)
Tandon, Yashpal, Ope Cit, pp.1153-1154
(3) Okoye, Felix Chuks, Ope Cit, pp.124-127
(4) Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.3
- 420 -
over all domestic affairs and to freely determine
political, economic and cultural standards without
interference and intervention(5). Therefore, the
conclusion to be drawn from the provisions of the OAU
Charter is that interference by other member states
is not frowned upon, while at the same time, there is
complete opposition to external intervention. According
to Article 11(c), the OAU shall promote international
co-operation having due regard to the UN Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(6). Accordingly,
this Article could be considered as being a reminder that
the OAU founding members conceived of their organisation
as being a regional arrangement within the terms of
Article 52(1) of the UN Charter(7). As concluded in an
earlier Chapter, the OAU is a regional organisation of
the UN under the provisions of Article 52(1)(8).
Consequently, the OAU Charter cannot detract from the
right conferred by the UN Charter in connection with
non-interference in domestic jurisdiction of member
states. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the definition
which the UN has given'to the concept of non-interference
in domestic jurisdiction of member states envisaged in
Article 2(7). It provides that •••••nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene
(S)~ p. 3
(6)~ pp. 2-3
(7)Bowett, D.W., The UN and Peaceful Settlement.
International Disputes, the Legal Aspect, Europa
Publications, London, !i2!, pp.189-192
(8) Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, pp. 233-236
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in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state ••••(9). The provisions
established two restrictions, one upon the competence
of the UN and the second on the member states. Firstly,
-intervention by the UN in domestic affairs of its member
states is prohibited. Secondly, the individual members
are under an obligation to refrain from interfering in
domestic affairs of other member states(10). The League
of Nations in fact had a different wording, but the
essential content of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter has
been deduced from Article 15(8) of the LN Covenant(11).
Article 15(8) maintained that the Council of the League
had no jurisdiction in the case of a dispute which had
arisen from matters which were solely within the domestic
jurisdiction of a party to the dispute(12). There can
be little doubt about the existence of matters which by
their very nature are solely within the domestic juris-
diction of a state. There .isno matter which cannot
be regulated by a rule of customary or contractual
internationallaw(13). Therefore, if a matter is
regulated by a rule of international law, it is no
( 9)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Op. Cit, p.26
(10)Kelson, Hans, The Law of the UN, Stevens & Sons,
London, !ii2, p.770
(11)It runs as follows ••••if the dispute between the
parties is claimed by one of them and is found by the
Council to arise out of a matter which by international
law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that
party, the Council shall so report and shall make no





longer solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the
member states. Accordingly, the language adopted by
the UN Charter resulting in a limitation of UN
competence is less rigid than that maintained in
Article 15(8) of the LN Covenant(14). Thus, the UN has
adopted definition of intervention which in the accepted
technical sense, can be conceived of as dictatorial
mandatory interference intended to exercise direct
pressure upon the political independence of the state
concerned(IS). However, this approach does not rule
out action by way of discussion, investigation, study,
enquiry and recommendation falling short of intervention.
In this respect, the power to conduct these activities
is expressely conferred only upon the UN Security Council
and only for the purpose of determining whether the
continuance of a dispute or a conflict is likely to
endanger international peace and security(16). Thus,
this approach is identical to the ICJ's interpretation
of the domestic jurisdictional clause in its advisory
opinion in the Certain Expense Case(17). It declared
that in regard to action taken by the UN which was
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of its stated
purposes, the presumption is that such action is not
(14)Bowett, D.W., Ope Cit, pp.180-183
(lS)Kelsen, Hans, Op. Cit, p.769
(16)l2!2 p.772
(17) .The Certain Expense Case, Advisory Opinion of July 20th,
1962, ICJ Report, pp.176-177
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ultra vires the organisation(18). At all events, the
concept of non-interference in matters of domestic
jurisdiction may be of great importance with respect to
the function of the organisation under Chapters IX and X
which authorizes the UN to promote international co-
operation(19). Accordingly, it is hardly possible to
fulfil these functions without interfering in matters
of domestic jurisdiction. Hence, the UN has usually
asserted jurisdiction over extremely wide areas, including
those of Human Rights(20). Consequently, it is essential
to consider the OAU in its relationship to the UN in
view of what has been mentioned above. Despite this
fact, the limiting factor on intervention in domestic
jurisdiction could not come from the UN practice, but
would have to be inherent in the practice and the
provisions of the OAU Charter. The latter makes_a
similar distinction envisaged in Article III, but the
obligation of non-interference in domestic jurisdiction
is only imposed upon member states and not upon the
organisation itself(21). Despite this fact, the OAU
(18)Ibid p.179
(19)~uys. H.F. van et al., Op. Cit, pp.36-40
(20)The UN General Assembly on April 20th, 1949 adopted
Resolution 272(111) on this question in which it expressed
its deep concern at the grave accusation made against the
governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania regarding the
suppression of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms in
their countries. The Secretary General of the UN was
authorized to investigate the situation in these countries
but the governments of Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania
refused to co-operate. Consequently, the UN General Assembly
decided to submit the matter to the ICJ for an advisory
opinion.. (International Status of South West African Opinion,
~, ICJ Report, pp.176-177)
(21)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.21
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Assembly of Heads of State has chosen to interpret
Article III restrictively to favour inaction(22).
Unfortunately, with the non-interference provision of
the OAU Charter construed in absolute terms to exclude
any active role in internal conflicts, the OAU is
severely handicapped in handling threats to the general
peace and security of the African continent, arising
out of internal conflict. In contrast, the UN has been
able to take up issues such as the racist policies of
South Africa and to handle the Congo crisis and other
situations that would originally be regarded as falling
within the domestic jurisdiction of member states(23).
It is also worthwhile to question whether the organ-
isation should interfere in a civil war resulting from
a power struggle between factions, not for the right to
form a separate state, but for the control of the
machinery of government. This in fact is a classic
form of civil war and is undoubtedly an internal matter(24).
In this respect, what about the legality of a government
coming to power by a military coup? Such a situation
was initially raised in the OAU forum in connection
with the overthrow of President Olympio of Togo, who
was killed in the course of the coup on January 13th,
At that time the OAU was not in existence,
(22)Komonu1 Onxenoro, 2I!. Cit, pp.371-372
(23)Ibid p.372
(24)Akinyemi, .Bolaji, Oe· Cit, PP.·379-381
(25) Zdenek, 22· Cit, pp ,'76-77Cervenka.
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but preparations for the founding Summit in May 1963
were already well on the way. It should be noted
that Ghana was suspected of having engineered the coup
because of its strained relations with Togo over the
harbouring of Ghanaian political refugees(26). However,
the Togo coup reverberated at the founding Summit in
May 1963, which condemned political assassination and
subversive activities as incompatible with the OAU
Charter(27). Nonetheless, the futility of the
principle of recognising a government coming to power
by military coup was soon exposed by a series of coups
of which the one in Togo was only the beginning.
Conspiciously, the legality of these governments which
came to power was never questioned, except after the
overthrow of Ben Bella of Algeria in 1965, Nkrumah of
Ghana in 1966 and Obote of Uganda in 1911(28). Even
in these three cases legality gave way to reality.
(26)n!!!, p.78
(27)Sanders, AJGM, Op. Cit, pp.122-123
(28)When Idi-Amin deposed President Obote on January 25th,
1971, military coups were no longer unusual events. By
that time 13 member states of the OAU were governed by
the military, who had seized power unconstitutionally.
The OAU was confronted with the Ugandan coup when two
delegations arrived at the 16th session of the Council
of Ministers of February 16th, 1971 in Addis Ababa.
One of the delegations represented General Amin and the
other, the deposed President Obote. Under these
circumstances, the Council of Ministers was unable to
resolve the question of Ugandan representation.
Consequently, the meeting adjourned and referred the
matter to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State scheduled
for June 1971.
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Accordingly, legality requires the character of
permanence and its acceptance by other members of the
international community is merely a matter of time. It
has also been argued that recognition is a political and
-not a legal act which is accorded by states for political
or economic reasons of their own, or simply because
there is nothing they can do about it(29). As has been
pointed out, the series of compromises reached in drawing
up the OAU Charter at least left the issue of inter-
vention in usurpation of power unresolved(30). Moreover,
it has been asserted that the non-interference provisions
of the OAU Charter are interpreted in absolute terms
to prohibit intervention in those issues. Despite this,
there is evidence to suggest that the OAU practice does
not regard Article III(2) as absolutely prohibitive(31).
For instance, the civil wars and the legality of these
governments coming to power by military coup was not
treated as a purely int~rnal conflict because the~e
situations were being fuelled with arms or financial
assistance supplied by outsiders, to at least one of
the factions(32). In the case of the Nigerian civil
(29)Cervanka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, pp.77-78
(30)The OAU position on this matter was revealed only
after the conclusion of the OAU Council's meeting by
the Zambian delegation. He said that it was agreed
by the heads of the delegations attending the Con-
ference of the OAU Council that the attendance by the
Ghanaian representatives did not amount to recognition
by the OAU of the new regime in Ghana. It was also
agreed that if another Ghanaian delegation arrived, the
matter would be reconsidered with a view to excluding
both delegations.
(31)Bolaji, Akinyemi, Op. Cit, p.397
(32)Komonu, Onyenoro, Ope Cit, p.372
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war, the Federal Government of that country insisted
that the war was a domestic affair(33). Nevertheless,
from the outset, the OAU took notice of this view and
discussed the war at its annual summit in Kinshasa,
The OAU Assembly asserted its
competence on the basis that a civil war has ceased
to be an internal matter when third parties interfere
to such an extent as to upset the equilibrium between
the protagonists and determine the outcome. Accordingly,
the OAU adopted a resolution to set up a consultative
committee consisting of six heads of state, in
connection with the Nigerian Civil War in order to
bring about a mutually acceptable national reconcil-
iation(3S). Previously, the Congo crisis was not
only considered as an internal conflict being fuelled
with external arms supply, but as a conflict which posed
a series of threats to the peace and security of Africa
as a whole (36)." Therefore, the OAU established an
(33)The Nigerian-Biafran war had purely internal origins,
but it ceased to be an exclusively internal affair when
Britain, France and the Soviet Union became involved in
the conflict. Therefore, a civil war ceases to be an
internal matter when third parties interfere to such an
extent as to upset the balance between the protagonists,
and determine the outcome. By following a policy of
non-interference in such cases, the OAU is in effect
allowing the outcome of the conflict in the African
continent to be determined by the action and wishes of
non-African powers.




ad hoc commission in connection with the Congo crisis
in order to bring about a mutually acceptable national
reconciliation. As to the problem of governments
coming to office through illegal seizure of power, there
is no definite conclusion which can be drawn from these
episodes because of all the coups that have taken place,
only three have been the subject of OAU discussion. It
should be emphasised that the reason why the OAU discussed
the three issues was because two rival delegations turned
up at the Conference(37). In the other coups, no such
situation arose. Nonetheless, the important point to
note is that the three cases considered by the OAU have
become precedents. Consequently, it has thus been shown
how the OAU became involved in issues of civil wars and
coups d'etat which, it could be argued, come within
the domestic jurisdiction of member states. In spite
of this, the OAU did not consider that action taken on
these issues could be seen as intervention in the
domestic jurisdiction of its member states. However,
(37)
After the coup in Ghana on February 24th, 1966,
a Ghanaian delegation was despatched to represent the
new regime at the 5th session of the OAU Council of
M1nisters in Addis Ababa. Its credentials were
questioned by Mali, Guinea, Tanzania and Egypt, all
of whom objected to its presence. After a lengthy
debate, the meeting decided to accept the Ghanaian
delegation as a full participant adding a rider that
this was not to imply recognition of the new regime.
Subsequently, another delegation sent by the deposed
President Nkrumah, arrived at the Conference. When
the head of the Ghanaian military delegation rose to
speak, he was stopped by the Chairman of the Political
Committee. Consequently, the Chairman of the Council
convened a plenary meeting at which a number of
delegations announced they had been instructed by their
governments to withdraw from the session (Guinea, Mali,
Egypt, Somalia, Algeria, Kenya, Tanzania) in protest at
Ghana's continued presence. The meeting was then adjourned
indefinitely to allow tension to abate.
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it would be difficult to argue that denying the new
regime in Togo the right to participate in the
inaugural conference of the OAU and the refusal of
seating to the Idi-Amin delegation at the 1971 OAU
Council of ~llnisters' meeting, did not constitute
intervention in domestic jurisdiction(38). As stated
earlier, the UN approach to Article 2(7) of its
Charter is determined by the ICJ-sanctioned rule that
anything which would further the realisation of the
organisation's purposes, could not be ultra vires(39).
This principle, therefore, should be applied to the
OAU. In the preamble to the OAU Charter, there is
the reaffirmation of the inalienable right of all
peoples to control their destiny(40). A common
determination is also enshrined in the preamble to
promote understanding among African peoples and
co-operation among African states in response to
the aspiration of African peoples for brotherhood and
solidarity in a larger unity, transcending ethnic and
national differences(41). There is also reaffirmation
of African adherence to the principles of the UN
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which provide a solid foundation for peaceful and
positive co-operation among states(42). Moreover,
(38)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.77 and p.80
(39)The Certain Expense Case, Advisory Opinion of
July 20th, 1962, p.168




Article II(d) provides for the eradication of all
forms of colonialism in Africa(43). Accordingly,
it is hardly possible to fulfil these purposes and
functions without interfering in matters of domestic
jurisdiction •. In this respect, matters such as form
of government, acquisition or loss of citizenship,
treatment of minorities, questions of tariff or
immigration may be subject to international agree-
ment. The fact that these matters are normally
regulated by a rule of customary international law
does not mean they are matters within domestic
jurisdiction of member states. If they are so,
then anything which might fUrther the realisation
of the OAU purposes could be considered by the
organisation.
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EAST AFRICAN MILITARY }.WTINIES OF 1964:
The initial example of OAU involvement in internal
conflict of a member state was unusual. The initiative
for an OAU role came, not from other member states, but
from the government of the afflicted country itself.
Consequently, the OAU's willingness to act in a situation
that was primarily a domestic matter within the juris-
diction of a member state, has altered the view that the
non-interference provisions of the OAU Charter constitute
an absolute prohibition. This came in the aftermath of
the January 20th, 1964 East African military mutinies(l).
In this respect, troops of the 1st Battalion of the
Tanganyika Rifle stationed at Colilo Barracks on the
outskirts of Dar-es-Salaam rose against their British
officers(2). They also marched into the capital to
present their demands for higher pay and total African-
isation of the officer corps, to senior officials of the
government(3). At the same time, the mutineers removed
the British officers and took them into custody. The
following day reports confirmed that the mutiny had
sparked off rioting and looting and that at least 17
civilians had been killed(4). It was also confirmed that
(l)African Report, Volume 9. No.2, February 1964, p.21
(2)polhemus. Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.206
(3)The delegation was received by the Minister of Home Affairs
and by the ~nister of Defence and External Affairs. The
latter Minister was subsequently transported to the barracks
for further negotiations. Nonetheless, he demurred at the
mutineers' demands on the grounds that presidential approval
.would be required to implement the changes required.
(4)polhemus " Higbie. J., Op. C-it,p.206
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President Nyerere with most of his cabinet ministers, had
gone into hiding(S). Consequently, the mutineers were
able to establish control over key points in Dar-es-Salaam
and there was good reason to suspect more extensive
political effects. Subsequently, the mutiny was quickly
followed by similar outbreaks in Uganda and Kenya(6). It
would appear that the military uprisings in these East
African countries flowed from dissatisfaction with the
slow pace of Africanisation of the officer corps and with
the low rate of pay. It was also evident in the
Tanganyikan situation that the mutiny might have been
caused by the despatch of 300 police to assist the new
revolutionary government of Zanzibar(7). In any event,
the mutineers required rapid, effective response by the
governments concerned to restore law and order. Under
these circumstances, there was need for external aid to
restore and keep law and order. The Ugandan and Kenyan
(S)President Nyerere broke his silence to broadcast very
briefly to the nation in Swahili on the crisis which had
occurred. Subsequently. he toured the capital for four
hours to dispel rumours that he was a prisoner of the
Tanganyikan army.
(6)The Kenyan government, fearing that army dissatisfaction
might soon manifest itself in Kenya, filed.a precautionary
request with the British High Commissioner in Nairobi for
the reinforcement and availability of British troops in the
event of an emergency. In Uganda, the Minister of the
Interior was held hostage by two companies of the 1st Battalion
of Uganda Rifles until he agreed to sign an order increasing
army pay. However, the Ugandan government took the view that
this incident was not a mutiny on the Tanganyikan pattern,
but rather an example of misbehaviour by a few newly-recruited
troops. As a precautionary measure, it requested British
military assistance in order to insure against the spread
of the disturbance to other units.
(7)polhem~. Higbie J., Qp. Cit, p.206
- 433 -
governments quickly requested the assistance of British
forces, who were already on hand in the two countries to
put the mutinies down(8). In this respect, the British
government said it was prepared to allow its forces to
remain in the three countries as long as the ,overnments
concerned required their presence to maintain law and
order while their own forces were being trained(9).
Both Uganda and Kenya accepted the offer(lO). The govern-
ment of Tanganyika was at first reluctant to avail itself
of the forces available in two British ships standing off
the Tanganyikan coast(ll), but after four days of
negotiations with the mutineers, which failed to produce
a settlement and when the situation seemed to be deter-
iorating, the Tanganyikan government followed the example
of the governments of Uganda and Kenya in seeking British
assistance(12). British troops landed early in the
morning of January 25th. By the end of the day, the
mutineers had been disarmed and placed in custody and the
mutiny had collapsed(13). The Tanganyikan government was
( 8)~M~ey~e~r~S~,~D~a~v~i~d~B~.,Ope Cit, p.171
( 9)~ p.170
(10)African Report, Ope Cit, p.22
(11)polhemus, Higbie J., Ope Cit, p.208
(12)~ p.207
(13)nrigadier Patrick Shollo Douglas, whom the mutineers
had ousted as Commander of the Tanganyikan army earlier in
the week (replaced by Lieutenant Elisha Kauana as Commander
of the Tanganyikan Rifles) led the assault. Three Africans
were killed in the engagement. An estimated 30 soldiers
fled to the bush. By noon, 450 commandos had moved into the
capital to protect strategic points. Meanwhile, British
paratroops dropped onto.two inland camps. One unit over-
powered mutinious soldiers of the Second Battalion and
the other dissarmed mutineers at Nachingwea near the
Mozambique border.
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then confronted with the problem of what to do next,
because it did not want a lengthy British presence(14).
This was in consequence of some criticism raised by a
number of African leaders who accused the three governments
of having re-introduced troops from the former colonial
power. In particular, President Nkrumah of Ghana accused
them of having fallen prey to neo-colonia1ism(15). This
compelled President Nyerere to seek the replacement of the
British troops with forces from African states. Consequently,
on January 27th, the situation in Tanganyika became an OAU
concern when President Nyerere requested an emergency meeting
of the Council of Ministers to discuss the situation created
by the mutinies in East Africa(16). He also requested the
Council to consider replacement of the British troops by
forces from African states(17). It was evident at that
meeting that the Council was concerned not to allow
deliberation of a domestic matter to become a form of
interference. Accordingly, President Nyerere of Tanganyika
(14)
}.[eyers,David B., Op. Cit, p.173
(15)Ibid pp.171-172
(16)President Nyerere sent telegrams to all heads of
African states suggesting an emergency meeting of African
Foreign and Defence Ministers to consider what implication
the events in'Tanganyika might have for African unity and
non-aligned policies. He was also concerned that the
situation in his country might affect the morale of the
African liberation movements in the remaining non-independent
territories, since the headquarters of the OAU co-ordinating
committee for the Liberation of Africa is in Dar-es-Salaam.
(17)African Report, Ope Cit, p.24
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restricted his speech to events in his own country,
respecting the decisions of Kenyan and Ugandan governments
that occurrences in their countries did not require OAU
consideration(18). Under these circumstances, the OAU
Council restricted its discussion to the Tanganyikan
situation and to Nyerere's plan for the replacement of
British troops by forces from African states(19). During
the debate, Ghana's delegation tabled a proposal that the
OAU Council should consider the establishment of an African
High Command of the type Nkrumah had proposed at the founding
Summit of the OAU in May 1963(20), but the delegation was
reminded that this matter was not on the agenda and should
not be considered(21). Eventually, the Council established
a 12-nation committee to consider alternative methods of
replacing British troops in Tanganyika by some form of
African force(22).· The final resolution adopted by the
Council noted the decision to replace British troops by
troops from one or more OAU member states within two to
three months. It also endorsed the Tanganyikan plan
that the despatch of African troops be accomplished
through bilateral arrangements between Tanganyika and the
individual governments supplying military assistance. The
initial agreements were to run for six months but could be
extended if retraining of the Tanganyikan forces was not
(18)MeyerS, David B., Op. Cit, p.171
(19)African Report, Op. Cit, p.24
(20) .Polhemus, Higbie 3., Op. Cit, p.208
(21)Ibid p.208
(22)African Report, Op. Cit, p.24
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completed by then. The African troops thus provided would
be under the command, direction and control of the
Tanganyikan government. Finally, all details of cost and
replacement procedures would be decided between Tanganyika
and the states furnishing the troops(23). On the basis of
the OAU Council's resolution, Tanganyika requested Ethiopia,
Nigeria and Algeria to provide troops to serve primarily as
a reserve for local police, while·1ocal troops remained in
The involvement of the OAU in the Tanganyikan
mutiny could be seen, therefore, as a success for both the
organisation and for the state concerned. The OAU had
successfully served as a pan-African vehicle for arranging
military assistance to help solve a serious internal problem
of a member state. The point which stands out in this first
involvement of the OAU in one of its member's internal
problems, was the great care that was taken during the
handling of the process. The entire proceedings were
controlled by the Tanganyikan government. In fact,
the main reason which compelled the OAU to consider an
internal matter in one of its member states was the realisation
that most of its members achieved independence with a
remarkably low level of defence capability which had direct
(23) .On March 20th, 1964 a bilateral agreement was signed
between Tanganyika and Nigeria for the loan of troops with
recent experience in UN peace-keeping operations in the
Congo. A few months later, a 60-man Ethiopian air force
training contingent also arrived in Dar-es-Sa1aam. The
expenses for the Nigerian and Ethiopian contingents were
both met bilaterally by the donor and host governments.
There were no expenses for th~ OAU.
(24)Meyers, David B., Op. Cit, p.173
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implications to the continent's international relations.
It was obvious that most African states lacked the
traditional tools which nations possess to maintain their
internal peace and security. Host of them were fundamentally
dependent in security matters on their former colonial
masters(2S). They had retained security pacts with these
powers and regarded these pacts as the basis of their
national security. But, such pacts have been seen as
affecting the development of military co-operation within
the region. It has been demonstrated that extra-regional
sources of military assistance have helped African states
in their hour of need(26). This has reduced any perception
of the necessity to establish African collective security
arrangements at regional 1evel. Indeed, regional security
policy would serve not only to support the states structure
and to maintain domestic-order, but would strengthen inter-
African relations. Recently the view has been taken that
regionalism is the only alternative to outside assistance(27).
Therefore, increased interest in the security activities of
regiona1 organisation has been seen in the establishment
of the OAU. In this respect, at the OAU's founding
Summit, African 1eaders showed considerable awareness of
the security concerns of their states(28). Consequently,
(2S)Crocker. Chester A., Military Dependence: The Colonial
tefacy in Africa, ~, Volume 12, !iZ!, p.285
{2 ).!I?!!!p.284
(27)MeyerS, David B., Ope Cit, p.118
(28).!I?!!!p.199
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consideration was given to potential problems of internal
disruption. Accordingly, the OAU Charter envisaged that.
among the purposes for which the member states formed the
organisation, was the defence of their sovereignty, their
territorial integrity and political independence(29). In
order to bring this about, African states agreed that co-
operation for defence and security was necessary. Despite
this, provisions for collective defence which the OAU
Charter enshrined, are very weak. This is the consequence
of considerable differences in outlook on the question of
defence and security. There was more concern with the
possibility of interference by one member in the internal
affairs of another than with the threat of interference
by an extra-regional state(30). As already stated, the
majority of African states maintain good relations with
their former colonial power and are dependent upon them
-for security and defence. Under these circumstances, the
OAU Charter says very little about specialised institutions
for security(31). At the founding Summit of the OAU,
(29)The OAU Charter presumably commits the organisation to
defend the territorial integrity of its members, even against
threats of purely internal origin. Technically, the OAU at
the behest of the member state affected, has an obligation to
interfere to suppress an internal disruption. Consequently,
the participation of the OAU in the settlement of an internal
conflict which might threaten the break-up of a member state
is necessary.
(30)Akinyemi. Bolaji, Ope Cit, pp.393-394
(31)African inability to participate effectively in major
strategic issues affecting the continent, is a continuing
reflection of military dependence. Similarly, African armed
forces have hardly begun to play their natural role as an
instrument in the evolution of African power balance and
·conflict patterns. The OAU system has protected the inherited
colonial order and impeded the emergence of the kinds of
·groupings and alliances which will be required in the African
security system. This led to continuing direct external
influence on African governments, which is a major factor in
such restraint.
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Ghana proposed the establishment of a Common Defence System
with an African High Command, in order to ensure the stability
and security of Africa(32). At the same time, Ethiopia
proposed a more modest Defence Board composed of each
-..member's chief of staff and empowered to make recommendations
to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. Unfortunately, there
was no support for either of these proposals(33). It was
evident that this was the consequence of fear and mistrust
among African states over the sharing of military information.
The only specialised defence structure that was established
was a Defence Commission, one of the five specialised
commissions responsible to the Council of Ministers(34).
The OAU Charter mentioned nothing. about its purposes or
responsibilities. It deliberately left these functions
to be worked out at some future time. Two meetings were
held by the Defence Commission following the OAU's founding
Summit and if nothing else, it demonstrated the difficulty
of reaching any more than the most minimal agreement on
security issues. It was agreed only that the commission
would serve as an organ of consultation, preparation and
recommendation for the collective or self-defence and the
maintenance of security of member states(3S). Thus, general
unwillingness to institutionalise collective defence, and
to establish a force or permanent advisory and co-ordinating
(32)Polhemus, Higbie J., Op. Cit, p.208
(33)Heyers, David B., Op. Cit, p.120
(34)Ibid p.120
(3S)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, pp.210-213
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body remained entrenched during the following years.
Recently, there was a proposal to establish an African
Defence Organisation that would have been entirely
voluntary and ~ould not have compromised national
sovereignty and political independence. Member states
that chose to participate could designate forces for
service in the Defence Organisation(36). These forces
would only be called upon at the request of a member
state with the approval of the donor state and the OAU
Council of Ministers. This proposal was rejected by
the OAU Council of Ministers and also by the Assembly
of Heads of State(37). Consequently, the OAU is still
no better prepared to assist its member states in defence
against external aggression or internal disruption than
it was at the founding Summit. Obviously, the existence
of a regional organisation with power to assist members
in defence and security would decrease dependence on the
former colonial powers. Nonetheless, most OAU members
,
found difficulty in identifying the contribution that
the OAU could make in assisting members who had been the
victims of external aggression or lack of internal security.
The reason for this conclusion is the lack of trust in
military co-operation among OAU member states and the general
shortage of resources available to most African states. In
addition, there is a lack of shared interest in a real sense
of continental community. Moreover, most African armies are
small and are particularly deficient in logistic capabilities,
especially air transport. These problems make inter-state
co-operation in the field of defence and security, very difficult.
(36)Meyers, David B., Op. Cit, p.120
(37)Ibid p.120
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THE CONGO CIVIL '''AR
BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS:
Belgian colonial policies in the Congo had set
the stage for the longest and most complex civil war
in Africa. ,The Belgian administration had no intention
of granting independence to the Congo in the foreseeable
future. Accordingly, it had done very little to develop
Congolese capabilities. The colonial administration was
highly centralized with directions coming from the Belgian
King and Parliament to the local administration. In addition,
all positions of responsibility were held by the Belgian
nationals and the Congolese were permitted to participate
only in minImal capacities(1). Horeover, the establishment
of political parties was prevented by restrictions on the
right of association(2). Furthermore, the colony1s
budget had to be approved by the Belgian Parliament, since
the Congolese had no political institution of their own(3).
(1)
Dishier. Albert P., The Congo Economic Crisis,
Africa, Special Report, Volume 5, November 6th. 1960, p.6
(2) .Th!!! p.2
(3)
Wigny. Pierre, Bel£ium and the Congo, International
Affairs, Volume 37, ~, p.274
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Consequently, the policies pursued by the colonial
power were obviously designed to prepare the Congo for a
very slow evolutionary process of decolonisation(4).
Nonetheless, seve~al factors converged to ignite interest
in independence on the part of the Congolese. The period
of decolonisation reached its height in 1960 when sixteen
newly independent African states joined the UN(S). In
this respect, fervour towards eradicating colonialism
was so strong among African peoples that no colonial
power could afford to oppose this sentiment(6). In
addition, there was a shift in political power towards
the third world because of the increasing number of
Afro-Asian states in the UN(7). Consequently, both the
United States and the Soviet Union were pursuing
policies to win the support of the African states.
(4)The Belgian colonial administration pursued a s~stem
of development in the scene, in that it insisted on
raising the living standard and then rapidly developing
a ruling elite. Otherwise, it assumed that its task was
to work for economic and social development rather than
political development of the Congolese people. Nonetheless,
the management of business was firmly in the hands of the
Europeans and the colony's budget had to be approved by the
Belgian Parliament. Therefore, the policy pursued by the
colonial power was clearly not designed to prepare the
Congolese to administer their own country. Thus, policy
conceived a combined rule of Belgian and Congolese by which
a middle class would emerge. At the same time, the King
of Belgium would also be the King of the Congo. Therefore,
there was still a great deal of time before independence.
(S)Newcome, Hanna et al., UN Voting Patterns, l!Q,
Volume 24, !212, p.IOI
(6)~ pp.120-121
(7) Cohen. Andrew, The New Africa and the UN, ~,
Volume 36, 1960, pp.476-481
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Thus, these immediate consequences had led the Belgian
government to re-evaluate the policy, thereby committing
itself to the Congo's independence(8). In this respect,
a meeting of round-table of Belgian and Congolese leaders
was scheduled for January 1960 in order to determine the
Congo's future(9). The Belgian government agreed to
terminate colonial rule by June 30th, 1960(10). This
sudden end of the colonial administration was a result of
the Belgian government's inability to gain internal support
for a policy to control the Congo through force. In
addition, the French success in the establishment of a
community with its former colonies inspired the Belgian
.government to pursue the same endeavours. In the meanwhile,
during the round-table discussion, most of the provinces
in the Congo were totally outwith Belgian control and an
agreement of some kind had to be secured with the Congolese
leaders(11). Moreover, the success of the National
(8)' .
The Congolese leaders emerged as nationalists and party
leaders in consequence of the election held at the close of
1957. This process was also strenghtened by the attendance
of Lumumba at the Pan-African Conference held in December
1958 in Accra, Ghana. Moreover, the presence of a large
Congolese delegation at the World Fair in Brussels
contributed to a re-evaluation of the Belgian policy. Further-
more, the Leopoldville.riot of January 4th, 1959 and the
arrest of political leaders made them national heroes which
led the Belgian government to commit itself to Congo's
independence.
(9)OIDonovan. Patrick, The Precedent of the Congo,
~, Volume 37, ~J p.1a3
(10)African Report, Volume 6, February 1961, pp.2-3
(11)O'Donovan, Patrick, Ope Cit, pp.183-184,
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Progressive Party (Partie Nationale du Progres) in the
election of December 1959 had encouraged the Belgian
government that a moderate party would form the first
Congolese government(12). ConsequentlYJ Belgium
conceived that the Congo would contrive to rely on her
in running the government after independence(13). To this
effectJ the Belgian government concluded a Treaty of Friend-
ship with the Congolese government which regulated policy
areas, such as defenceJ foreign affairs, currency, tele-
communications and financial arrangements(14). In contrast,
the Congolese expectations regarding independence were
different. They perceived that independence would answer
all their problems, but the colonial policies remained the
same in the administrative control, taxes, and the presence
of many Belgian army officers(15). Consequently, the
discontent was particularly great among the members of the
Congolese armed forces(16). This came to the crunch when
(12)Africa, Special Report, Volume 5, November 1960, pp.2-3
(13)The Belgian government handed over power on June 30th,
1960 to a Congolese government headed by Kasavubu as
President and Lumumba as Prime MinisterJ and incorporated
most of the major political groups in the Congo.
Subsequently, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba on September 5th,
1960 which marked the break-up of the Leopoldville
government. •
(14) Belsem, Van A.A.J., Some Aspects of the Congo Problem,
JIA, Volume 28, 1962, pp.42-45
(15)Africa, Special Report, Volume 5, November 1960, pp.6-7
(16)Wigny. Pierre, Ope Cit, p.279
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the Belgian commander called the Congolese non-
commissioned officers together and wrote on the blackboard -
•••••After Independence - Before Independence ••••(17).
Accordingly, the Congolese soldiers mutinied against their
Belgian Officers. The mutiny erupted on July 5th, 1960
and spread quickly throughout the Congo(18). Consequently,
the Belgian government despatched paratroopers into the
Congo without the prior consent of the Congolese govern-
ment, as required by the Treaty of Friendship(19). This
action was justified by the Belgian government on the
grounds that it was necessary to protect its nationals
and maintain law and order(20). On the other hand, the
Congolese government perceived the move as an attempt to
establish a neo-colonial regime and was regarded as an
act of aggression against its territorial integrity and
its political independence(21). Accordingly, it requested
military aid from the UN in order to prevent a threat to
international peace and secur.ity. The UN Security Council
(17)
McNemar, Donald W., The Post-Independence War in the Congo,
edited by Falk, Richard A., International Law of Civil War,
The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Maryland, !iZ!, p.251
(18)~ p.251
(19)Belsem, Van A.A.J., Ope Cit, p.42
(20)McNemar, Donald W., Ope Cit, p.273
(21)Ibid p.278
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authorized the establishment of a UN peace-keeping force
and the despatch of such forces within twenty-four hours
to the Congo(22). In the meantime, the central govern-
ment headed by Kasavubu and Lumumba and incorporating
most of the political groups in the Congo, collapsed on
September 5th, 1960(23). Thus, this constitutional
crisis marked the break-up of the Congolese government.
The followers of Lumumba fled to Stanleyville, where
they consolidated their power and claimed the right to
control the entire Congo. But, Lumumba remained at his
official residence in Leopoldville under UN protection.
On November 27th, 1960 he left UN protection in order to
join his supporters in Stanleyville but was captured by
Leopoldville troops on December 1st, 1960. Subsequently,
he was transferred to Katanga where he was killed(24).
On the other hand, Tshombe declared on July 11th, 1960
shortly after the mutiny, the independence of the province
of Katanga(25) •. Under these circumstances, Belgium
(22)The UN peace-keeping for;e went into the Congo at the
request of the Kasavubu-Lumumba government. The ONUC was
established by a Security Council res9lution of January
14th, 1960 which was passed with abstention by the U.K.,
France and Nationalist China. The force involved 93,000
men from 34 countries (32 African and two Asian countries,
India and Indonesia) with an average strength of about
15,000 troops. The total cost of the military operation
from July 1960 through June 1964 was $411 million.
(23)This resulted from the development between Kasavubu and
Lumumba over who had the authority to fire, which led to
the collapse of their joint government. Lumumba remained
at his official residence in Leopoldville under UN protection.
He left UN protection on November 27th, 1960 to join his
supporters at Stanleyville but was captured by Leopoldville
troops on December 1st, 1960. He was subsequently trans-
ferred on January 17th, 1961 to Katanga where he was murdered.
(24)Belsem, Van A.A.J., Ope Cit, pp.49-50
(25)1£!g p.97
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attempted to persuade the followers of Lumurnba to call
in the Belgian troops. When they refused, it granted
Tshombe1s request for assistance(26). The latter, with
Belgian military aid and with control of 45% of the
Congo state revenues coming from Katanga, was able to
maintain independence until January 21st, 1963(27).
There were thus three separate regimes in the Congo
making the primary struggle during this time, for the
(28)establishment of a central government ·In this atmosphere,
the UN peace-keeping force went into the Congo and was
involved in technical assistance programmes and in re-
conciliation efforts. Nonetheless, the main task of
the ONUC was to restore law and order and to secure the
withdrawal of Belgian troops. In this political vacuum,
and absence of a clearly recognised government, the UN
declined to recognise any factions as legitimate and at
the same time endeavoured to work toward the establishment
of a central government(29). To this end a conciliation
(26)Higgins, Rosalyn, Ope Cit, p.212
(27)HcNemar, Donald.W., Ope Cit, p.279
(28)The three protagonists were the central government in
Leopoldville, the Tshombe government in Elisabethville,
Katanga and the Gizenga government in Stanleyville. The
situation had continued until the Lovanium Parliament of
August 1961 by which all splinter groups participated in
the National government under Adoula and Gizenga, a
follower of Lumumba, serving as the first vice-premier.
The Adoula government remained in power until July 9th,
1964 when Tshombe, who had previously headed the
secessionist regime in Katanga (ended on January 14th,
1963) came back from his exile in Spain to head the
central government.
(29)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.27'9
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commission was established and was active during this
period in obtaining agreement among the factional groups
in order to reconvene the Congolese Parliament.
Consequently, the convocation took place on June 25th,
1961 at the University of Lovanium by which time the internal
vacuum had ended(30). All the political groups particip-
ated at the meeting and formed, on August 2nd 1961, the
Adoula government(31). Despite the fact, Tshombe
refused to attend the meeting and the following stage
set for ending the secession of Katanga(32). To this end,
as soon as the central government took office, it began
pursuing a policy designed to reintegrate Katanga. At
the same·time, the UN Security Council requested that
the UN operation in the Congo (L'Op~ration des Nations
Unies dans Ie Congo - ONUC) remove foreign mercenaries
from the Congo since many of them were located in Katanga.
As a result of this move, the ONUC clashed with the
Katangan gendarmarie in three rounds of·fighting in the
province(33). Nonetheless, the ONUC was able to repatriate
a number of non-Congolese personnel from the Katangan
gendarmarie(34). This did not accomplish the task,
(30)McNemar. Donald W., Op. Cit, p.254
(31)Higgins. Rosalyn, Ope Cit, pp.65-66
(32)McNemar. Donald W., Ope Cit, p.255
(33)Mercenaries were an important part of Katanga's
fighting units and proved a source of continual inter-
national contention. Tshombe recruited five hundred to
bolster his fighting force. The UN attempted to remove
these foreign fighters. The ONUC repatriated 273 non-
Congolese personnel in August 1961, but subsequent efforts
were successful.
(34)Sohn, Louis B., Cases on UN Law, The Foundation Press,
New York, !221, p.7S3
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therefore further efforts were unsuccessful, and produced
considerable fighting. Thereupon, the UN Secretary
General reached the legal conclusion that the UN efforts
were designed ~ot to remove foreign personnel, but rather
to end the independence of Katanga. Unfortunately, the
Katangan gendarmarie claimed victory over the ONUC and
the fighting ended in a ceasefire(3S). Subsequently,
in December 1961.a new round of fighting broke out when
the ONUC took steps to ensure freedom of movement and to
restore law and order in the province. This round of
fighting ended when Adoula and Tshombe met at Kitona and
concluded an agreement to reintegrate Katanga into the
Republic of the Congo(36). Nonetheless, the two leaders
were unable to implement the reunification agreement in
consequence of different positions of interpretation.
The negotiations reached a point of standstill_whereupon
the new UN Secretary General, U-Thant, proposed a plan of
national reconciliation(37) •. The plan was designed as
the basis for setting up a new constitution, integrating
the army and unifying the economy(38). In spite of this
(35)Higgins, Rosalyn, Ope Cit, pp.232-233
(36)Sohn. Louis B., Ope Cit, p.746
(37)!2!2 p.747
(38) .This was followed by the Secretary Generalis announcement
that such economic sanctions were in accord wi~h this plan
and requested Belgium to exert pressure on the Union Miniere
to cease payment of revenue to the Tshombe government. The
mining concern provided Tshombe with 80% of the $100 million
in revenue received during the first year of secession. The
decision not to pay the money to the Katanga regime was an
extremely important factor in ending the secession by the
ONUC on January 14th, 1963.
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effort at mediation by the UN Secretary General, Tshombe
continued Katanga's independence. Consequently, U-Thant
requested, on December 14th 1962, that the UN Security
Council should impose sanctions on the Tshombe regime(39). In
any event, before the economic sanction could be put
into effect, a final round of fighting between the ONUC
and the Katangan gendarmarie broke out. The ONUC
occupied strategic points in the province, whereupon
Tshombe proclaimed on January 14th, 1963 that the Katanga
secession was ended(40). Consequently, he accepted
U-Thant's plan which marked the reunification of the Congo
and the end of the post-independence civil war. In spite
of the end of the post-independence civil war, the Congo
still faced continuing conflict. lVhen the ONUC withdrew
on June 30th, 1964, a third of the Congo's territory was
under the control of the rebels (Congo National Liberation
The legal question involved in the Congo civil
war was extremely complex. This was evident from the
brief review of events. The civil war involved not only
control of the central government, but also relations with
the former colonial power, foreign intervention and the
right of parts of the country to secede. Both East and
West endeavoured to establish influence in this developing
nation thereby playing a vital role in the conflict. The
presence of a UN peace-keeping force also introduced a new
dimension into an internal conflict. The combination of
all these legal questions presented unique ,and important
legal considerations.
(39}Higgins. Rosalyn, Ope Cit, pp.242-243
(40)Ibid p.243
(41)~micael, Berhanykum, Qp. Cit, p.66
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FOREIGN INTERVENTION:
The relationships of foreign countries to the parties
involved in the Congo civil war raised an extremely important
question, namely t~at the withholding or extension of
assistance by several countries could be decisive in deter-
mining the outcome of a conflict. There was also the
corollary that intervention would produce counter-
intervention and an internal conflict would be transformed
into an international war. As far as the Congo civil war
was concerned, outside states were not committed to any of
the Congolese factions until the Belgian intervention
occurred{l). Consequently, this led to the conclusion
that other states were no longer constrained to remaining
aloof. As a matter of fact, the Congo was considered to
be an important African country and therefore, foreign
powers were anxious to play an active role in its civil
war. The East and West had a general interest in Africa
and especially in the Congo, but each bloc had an even
greater interest in avoiding a confrontation(2). By involving
the UN, each bloc endeavoured to prevent gains by the other,
while avoiding the policy of a unilateral commitment(3).
{l)It intervened without prior consent of the Congolese
government in conformity with the Treaty of Friendship
concluded between Belgium and the Congo after its accession
to independence. However, the deaths of a dozen Congolese
in the Belgian bombardment of Maladi, from which Europeans
had been evacuated, and the declaration of Katanga's
secession, convinced the Congolese that Belgium was
attempting to take control of the country once more.
(2)Whiteman, Marjorie, Digest of International Law,
Volume 5, ~, p.314
(3).Th!,g p.462
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Thus, unilateral efforts would be considered before the
multilateral operation of the UN which endeavoured to
insulate an internal conflict from external intervention.
As stated. earlier, shortly after reaching independence,
the Congolese soldiers mutinied against Belgian officers(4).
The hostile acts were primarily directed at Belgians
remaining in the Congo(S). Accordingly, the Belgian
government was under pressure to interfere in order to
re-establish law and order. The paratroopers despatched
into the Congo on July 10th, 1960 were deployed in 26 areas
throughout the country(6). This move entirely changed the
nature of the situation in the Congo and affected the
posLt.Lons of the factions in the conflict. The Belgian
troops went into the Congo without prior request from the
Congolese government in conformity with the Treaty of
Friendship between the two states(7). It provided that
•••••all military intervention by Belgian forces stationed
in Congo bases can take place only on the express command
(8)of the Congolese Minister of National Defence.... ••
This action led the Congolese to conclude that Belgium was
pursuing attempts to establish neo-colonialism in their
country. In this respect, the Congolese government
(4)~IcNemar, Donald W., Ope Cit, p.2S1
(5)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.211
(6)OtDonovan. Patrick, Ope Cit, p.184
(7)Whiteman, J.larjorieM., Op. Cit, p.522
(8) .McNemar, Donald W., Ope Cit, p.272
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declared that the Belgian action constituted an act of
aggression against the Congo's territorial integrity and
political independence. At the same time, it requested
military assistance from the United States, but the American
administration advised that it should seek aid from the
On the other hand, the Belgian government justified
its action on the grounds of fulfilling a duty to protect
its nationals(10). Nonetheless, the Belgian position was
weak on the basis that it failed to seek Congolese consent
in conformity with a specific treaty obligation. In
addition, the Belgian military action shifted the character
of the mutiny to an extreme civil crisis and seduced the
movements of secession in the Congo(ll) •. It also
jeopardised Belgian relations in general with all African
states and especially with the national government of the
Congo. Finally, it led to the characterization of the
conflict as a threat to international peace and security,
thereby justifying the necessary measures to be taken by
the UN in order to restore international peace and security.
( 9)0'Donovan. Patrick, Ope Cit, p.185
(10) . .Higg1ns, Rosalyn, ~p. C1t, p. 211
(11)Belgian intervention waS effected without the
consent of the Congolese government. Its sympathy
was also being extended to Tshombe who had declared
the secession of Katanga on July 11th, 1960. The
Belgian government was firm to point out that Tshombe
should be supported as the only stable and pro-Western
element in the Congo. It also wanted the mineral
resources of Katanga to remain under Belgian and
Western control. Therefore, Belgian troops were put
at the disposal of Tshombe and requested by him to
restore law and order. They engaged in functions that
clearly went beyond the protection of its nationals _
on the contrary, it was directly endangering the livesof Belgian citizens.
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The UN assistance was initially extended to the Leopoldville
government as the national authority in control of the country(12).
Nonetheless, the authority of the Leopoldville government was
subsequently challenged by the Stanleyville government and the
seceded provinces. Despite this fact, many states whose emba~~ies
were located in Leopoldville, recognised the latter government
and due to this, gained special advantages to communicate with
other countries through diplomatic channels(13). Leopoldville
used this instrument and broke diplomatic relations with Belgium.
It also expelled the staff of the Soviet embassy from the country
in consequence of its having extended aid to the Lumumba regime
and engineered a plot against it. Moreover, in November 1960,
it broke relations with the UAR and Ghana(~4) because of assistance
extended to Lumumba. The Leopoldville government did not
hesitate to sever diplomatic relations as a means of eliminating
support for its opponents and of registering public disapproval.
Under these circumstances, a shift of diplomatic support towards
the Leopoldville government was witnessed on the part of the
Communist countries and radical African states.
(12)0IDonovan, Patrick, Op. Cit, p.185
(13)McNemar. Donald W., 00. Cit, p.274
(14)These radical states were in favour of strong and forceful
measures by the UN peace-keeping force. When the ONUC refused
to assist Lumumba to end Katanga's secession, they withdrew
their troops from the ONUC and their representative from the
UN Conciliation Commission. They feared that endorsement of
secession in an African state might boomerang against their
socialist oriented one-party rule. On the other hand, the
conservative African states were opposed to the UN intervention.
They favoured the secession of Katanga. }Iost of these states
are small, thereby "swamped" in the centralized regime in the
Congo, a potential threat to their national existence.
Consequently, the attitude of African states towards the civil
war in the Congo had led to the conclusion that there was a
clear divergence.of approach among them on the issue of inter-
vention in a civ1l War in an African state. The Casablanca
group approved UN intervention while the l-Ionroviagroup favoureda policy of strict neutrality.
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In this respect, these states recognised the regime of
Lumumba at Stanleyville as the national government of
the Congo(1S). When Lumumba was murdered in February
1961, these states continued to recognise the Stanleyville
government headed by Gizenga and continued-to supply it
with military aid. The UN did not recognise any faction
during this period as the national government of the
Congo. Accordingly, the Congo seat in the UN was
disputed by two rival delegations, one designated by
Kasovubu and the other by Lumumba(16). As stated earlier,
the West assisted the Leopoldville government and
consequently, the United States government refused to
grant the delegations of Lumumba and Tshombe visas to
enter the.country. Consequently, these latter delegations
were prevented from presenting their cases before the UN(17).
Nonetheless, the East continued to extend aid to Lumumba
who took a stance compatible with that of the Communist
states. At the same time, Western aid to Kasavubu was
extremely important in the struggle for power control(18).
(15)Krishnan, Maya, Op. Cit, p.220
(16)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, pp.266-267
(17)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.274
(18)After the constitutional crisis and subsequent power
struggle between Kasavubu and Lumumba, the Soviet Union took
Lumumba's part. It did not accept Hammarskjold's decision
that Kasavubu had the authority to dismiss Lumumba and that
the UN must recognise this. When the ONUC took action after
the constitutional crisis to assist Kasavubu in themainten-
ance of law and order, the Soviet Union insisted that the
ONUC was improperly intervening in domestic affairs of the
Congo. Simultaneously, it was claimed that the UN was not
sufficiently supporting Lumumba who was head of the valid
government in Soviet eyes. After the death of Lumumba in
February 1961, several countries recognised the Stanleyville
government. These were the USSR, Communist China, Mongolia,
Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, the UAR, Guinea,
Mali, Morocco, Ghana and the Algerian provisional government.
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It was very difficult to determine precisely how much
military and economic assistance the Leopoldville govern-
ment received, but it was clear that the United States was
the major contributor(19). Under these circumstances,
the UN Security Council requested all states to halt aid
to the Congo outside the UN framework(20). Nonetheless,
the Soviet Union extended assistance when Lumumba requested
military aid in order to continue his military campaign.
This was in consequence of an unsuccessful effort to
persuade the ONUC to carry out his plan for ending the
secession of Katanga(21). The Soviet Union justified its
unilateral aid on the grounds that the UN resolutions did
not contain any provisions in any way to restrict the
right of the Congolese government to request assistance
directly from the governments of other countries.
Nonetheless, the UN did not accept the argument of the
Soviet Union and took the position that the giving of such
aid was inconsistent with the multilateral effort which
had already been undertaken(22). Accordingly, an Afro-
Asian. resolution introduced in the UN Security Council,
provided that no aid for military purposes be despatched
to the Congo except as a part of the UN framework.
Unfortunately, the resolution was not passed because
the Soviet Union exercised its veto and for the first time
split with the third world states(23). Subsequently, a
(19)McNemar. Donald W., Ope Cit, p.274
(20)Whiteman. Marjorie, Ope Cit, p.S29
(21)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, pp.248-249
(22)1JUJ! p.248
(23)McNemar. Donald W., Op. Cit, p.276
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similar resolution was adopte~ on September 20th 1960
by the UN General Assembly. It was passed by a vote
of 70 to nil with France, South Africa and the Communist
bloc abstaining. It called upon all states to halt the
direct or indirect provision of arms or other materials
of war and military personnel and other aid for military
purposes to the Congo during the temporary period of
military assistance through the UN(24). Despite the fact,
the Soviet Union continued to defend its argument for
granting aid, and launched a bitter attack on the UN
Secretary General, but it did refrain from despatching
any more military aid(25). On the other hand, the
Belgian government was active in providing military aid
to the Leopoldville government even after the break in
.(26)diplomatic relations • In this respect, a resolution
condemning Belgium failed in the UN Security Council as
a consequence of a French veto(27). Nonetheless, the
UN Secretary General considered the Belgian aid to be in
violation of the UN General Assembly resolution which
banned unilateral military aid during the temporary period
of military assistance through the UN(28). As far as
(24)Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.514
(25)Higgins. Rosalyn, Op. Cit, pp.256-257
(26)It sent military advisors and supplied equipment at the
request of the Kasavubu government. In December 1960, it
assisted the troops of Kasavubu's government in moving
through Ruanda-Urundi to attack.Bukavo, the capital of
Kivu province.
(27)McNemar. Donald W., Ope Cit, p.276
(28)~ p.276
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the extent of foreign involvement was concerned, it was
extensive in the secession of Katanga. In proclaiming
Katanga independent, Tshombe requested all states to
recognise the right of Katangan people to self-determination(29).
But, all states declined to respond to his request, even
Belgium. Nonetheless, the latter granted Tshombe's request
for assistance(30). At all events, the Katangan leaders
continued earnestly in their attempts at the diplomatic
recognition which was necessary to give the province legal
and political stature as a state. But their argument was
weakened by the well-established international norm that
states or colonies with established boundaries and fixed
populations should have their independent sovereign states(31).
Moreover, the consensus among the majority of states that
self-determination should be limited to cases of colonialism
and peaceful secession(32). Therefore, there can be no such
thing as self-determination for a province within the
political unit of a state. Furthermore, Katanga was heavily
dependent on outside support, but certain states considered
Tshombe's regime as one of the Congolese factions in




Belsem. Van A.A.J., Op. Cit, p.48
(31)
Delupis. Ingrid, pp. Cit, pp.17-18
(32)
BUchheit. Lee C., Op. Cit, pp.97-100
(33)
McNemar. Donald W., Op. Cit, p.279
- 459 -
Therefore, these states assisted Katanga by maintaining
communication routes, protecting its borders, serving as
places of refuge and allowing the recruiting of
mercenaries(34). As far as the e~onomic measures were
concerned, Katanga faced no financial difficulties, as the
government received revenues from taxes, dividends and
duties paid by the Union Miniere(3S). This enterprise
took the position that its taxes on revenue would be paid
to the provincial government as the de facto legal
authority in the area(36). As a matter of fact, the
revenue received from the company was extremely important
in assisting Tshombe to maintain "independence for about
two years. Tshombe was also assisted by the Belgian
government which provided him with advisors and established
a technical mission immediately after he declared independence.
In addition, it extended extensive military aid to Tshombe.
Unfortunately, its troops in Katanga went far beyond the
protection of its nationals by occupying key posts in the
province, disarming and expelling troops unfriendly to the
Tshombe regime. They also trained the Katangan gendarmarie
and maintained law and order in the province. When they
(34) •While no states accorded diplomat1c recognition, several
states such as the Western powers, Rhodesia, South Africa and
the Francophone states maintained unofficial relations with
the Tshombe regime in Katanga. Tshombe launched a major
diplomatic campaign for support in these states and
established offices in New York, Brussels, Paris and in several
capitals of the Francophone states.
(3S)M~Nemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.219
(36)Higg!ns. Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.243
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withdrew from the Congo completely, in accordance with
the UN Security Council resolution, they left their
military equipment for the Tshombe gendarmarie. Despite
the withdrawal of its troops, it continued to supply
military aid to Katanga which assisted Tshombe to
maintain an effective military force, capable of
defending the independence of the province against
external challengers(37). There were also the
mercenaries who were an important part of Tshombels
fighting units, which proved a source of international
contention. Tshombe managed to recruit five hundred
white mercenaries in South Africa, Rhodesia and Western
European countries in order to strengthen his fighting
force(38). The UN hardly attempted to evacuate these
foreign fighting personnel out of the Congo. In this
respect, a UN Security Council resolution adopted on
February 21st 1961, urged that measures be taken for
the immediate withdrawal and evacuation from the Congo
of all foreign military and paramilitary personnel not
under UN command(39). Subsequently, the UN went further
in authorizing the ONUC for this purpose, to use the
requisite amount of force to repatriate the mercenary
personnel(40). It was a very difficult task for the
(37)Belsem. Van A.A.J., Op. Cit, p.48
(38)Yasuf. Abdul-Qaui, Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict,
The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, edited h%
Cassese Antonio, Eohtorinale Scientifica, Napoli. 1972, p.113
(39)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p~S16
(40)Ibid p.S18-
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ONUC to remove the mercenaries and resulted in fierce
fighting between the UN troops and the Katangan
gendarmarie(41). In fact, Tshombe was not willing to
dispense with their services voluntarily since his
power was largely dependent upon them. At all events,
after the passing of the February 21st 1961 resolution
by the UN Security Council, both Belgium and France
offered to withdraw the passports of their nationals
continuing to serve in Katanga(42). With the ending
of Katanga's secession, the policy of external
intervention shifted drastically. The reunification
of the Congo marked the end of the post-independence
civil war and the UN took the position that its
mandate had been fulfilled. Accordingly, any further
rebel activities were considered strictly a domestic
matter in which the ONUC should not be involved.
(41)
Higgins. Rosalyn, Op. Cit, pp.219-220
(42)
McNemar. Donald W., Op. Cit, p.280
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APPLICATION OF'THE LAWS OF WAR TO THE CONGO CIVIL WAR:
During the course of the Congo civil war, the aims of
the parties were not total devastation of the enemy, but
rather the achievement of certain goals. The common interest
of,both sides was using force to pursue their aims,'but
not so as to intentionally kill civilians or prisoners.
Consequently, restraints on the conduct of war had been
maintained in order to promote humanitarianism and avoid
undesirable destruction(l). In fact, many international
norms of war have been codified in a number of treaties, the
most general formulation being the Geneva Convention of 1949(2).
Accordingly, the law of war has been developed in the context
of international wars, but there was now common interest in
its application to civil wars. Since the establishment of the
UN, wars fought within states have become more prevalent than
had been realised. Increased destruction and human suffering
have occurred in civil wars, thus demanding the application
of laws of war to internal struggleJ3). Consequently, the
(1)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.256
(2)Bond, James E., The Rules of Riot, Internal Conflict and
the Law of War, Princeton University Press, New Jersey,
!.2.ZJ., pp.80-84
(3)As a matter of fact, the UN have not been able to mobilize
a coherent world response to civil war conflicts in which the
two supreme powers find themselves on opposite sides. There
is then no machinery to obtain a fair interpretation of the
facts associated with a variety of claims and counterclaims
asserted, in relation to civil war conflicts. Unfortunately,
states have been inconsistent with regard to the relevant
legal questions. It must be consistently borne in mind that
states act out of self-interest.
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..Conference held at Geneva in 1949 for the purpose of
codifying the laws of war in the four Geneva Conventions
considered their application to civil war for the first
Accordingly, Article 3 of each Convention
introduces a minimum standard to be applied in cases of
armed conflict not of international character(S).
Previously, it was essential for a state to recognise the
state of war before Conventions on the laws of war came
into effect(6). The situation was changed after the
conclusion of Geneva Conventions in which Article 3 of
each made the provisions applicable, irrespective of
recognition by outside states(7). They also permit the
involvement of humanitarian bodies such as the Red Cross
without predetermining the question of recognition(8).
This is clear from the term •••••armed conflict not of
an international character ••••• which is clear cut as
an inclusion of civil wars in the Geneva Convention. This
(4)Friedman, Leon, The Law of War, A Documentary History,
Volume 1, Randon House, New York, !2Z1, p.525
(S)Ibid p.S26
(6)In fact, difficulties arose during the course of the
deliberations of the Convention concerning the applicability
of Article 3 to civil war situations. Eventually, the
participants agreed to include civil war situations in the
Convention by which they adopted the term ••••armed conflict
not of international character •••• The term pointed out an
obvious intention to apply provisions of humane treatment to
conflicts within states, without defining exactly which
events would be covered.
(7) Friedman, Leon, Op. Cit, p.S26
(8)Ibid p.S26
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was the obvious intention of the drafters to extend
provisions of humane treatment to conflicts within states
without exactly defining which struggle could be covered(9).
With reference to the Congo crisis, the existence of armed
conflict between factions of organised armies controlling
territory, certainly fulfilled the condition for the
application of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This
would include the provisions of Article 3 of each Convention
in connection with protection for individuals not engaged
in the hostilities. This would also include members of
the armed forces who laid down their arms and those placed
hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other
relevant cause(10). To this end •••••the following acts
are and shall remain prohibited, murder or torture, the
taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity and
the passing of sentences without judicial guarantee •••(11).
The second paragraph of Article 3 provides that
•••••the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
(12),and that humanitarian bodies may offer their services... •
Moreover, Article 3 requests the parties in a conflict to
endeavour to bring into effect by means of special arrange-
ments, all or part of the other provisions of the present







of Article 3 of Geneva Conventions were strengthened by
the conclusion of similar provisions in the Hague Convention
of 1954(14). They provide that restraints shall be applied
by states in reaction to rebellion withi~ their territory.
Accordingly, states accept a significant limit on their
domestic jurisdiction(15). As stated earlier, the Congo
conflict produced the condition for the application of
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and other relevant
international provisions. Therefore, the participants
in the conflict were bound in every way by these inter-
national provisions. It was notable that the Congo
Republic had not yet signed the Conventions because the
Republic had been in existence for only one month when
the civil war began. Consequently, the Congo had not
become a signatory to the Conventions and therefore, the
provisions were not operative in the conflict. However,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
took the position that the Congo as a former Belgian
colony was a party to the Conventions in conformity with
the law of state succession(16). There is no doubt that
the Geneva Conventions of 1948 created real rights that
(14)Baily, Sydney, Prohibitions and Restraints in War,




O'Connell, P.P., Op. Cit, pp.93-96
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survived changes of sovereignty. '. Consequently, accession
of newly independent states to the Geneva Conventions can
be admitted as implied by virtue of the signature of the
former colonial power(17). Thus, the Congo was regarded
-as being bound by those Conventions since Belgium had
ratified the Conventions in 1952(18). At all events,
the government of the Congo transmitted a declaration
on February 20th, 1961 to the ICRC reaffirming the
adherence of the Republic of the Congo to the Conventions(19).
Therefore, the position of the Congo's government during
the course of hostilities made the situation clear that
the Congo would be regarded as party to the Conventions.
On the other hand, Tshombe also informed the ICRC on
February 22nd, 1961 that his government in Katanga would
adhere to the principles envisaged in the Geneva Conventions.
At the same time, he had given authorization to the delegate
of the ICRC to visit places of detention-in the province(20).
Despite the fact, Katanga was not an independent state
(17)
The development of international law on a wide
range of multilateral and bilateral treaties in case
of change of sovereignty, has been attained. A
distinction came to be drawn between multilateral
conventions of a law-making or legislative character
which it was alleged continued to affect a successor
state. The practice of African states to multilateral
cODventions of the UN has shown that most African states
in fact claimed to be parties to a number of conventions
by virtue of their colonial signatures.
(18)O'Connell. P.P., Op. Cit, pp.9-11
(19)1oIcNemar.Donald W., Op. Cit, p.259
:(20)Ibid p.260
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but its officials responded positively to the appeal of
the JCRC to uphold the principles of the Geneva Conventions.
As far as the UN peace-keeping force in the Congo was
concerned,-this question might need special legal
consideration(21). The fighting between the ONUC and
the Katangan gendarmarie added a new experience in which
a UN peace-keeping force became involved in regular
combat. In this respect, three arguments have been
expounded which proved that UN peace-keeping forces are
not bound by the Laws of 'War. The first argument
contends that the UN is not a signatory to the Geneva
Conventions. Consequently, it is not bound by Conventions
to which it is not a party. Nonetheless, there is nothing
in the Geneva Conventions to suggest that they should not
be equally binding to an international force under UN
command. To this effect, Article II states that
·•••••although one of the powers in conflict may not be a
party to the present Convention, the powers who are parties
thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.
They shall, furthermore, be bound by the Conventions in
relation to the said power if the latter accepts and
applies the provisions thereof ••••(22). Accordingly,
a UN peace-keeping force in conflict with a party to the
Convention 'Would also become subject to the Geneva
Conventions through Article II. The second argument
(21)A normal role of the UN in civil war situations is to
endeavour to reinforce the exclusion of third parties and
to offer good offices for mediatory, buffering or a
settlement role between the'parties to a civil 'War conflict.
(22)Friedman, Leon, Op. Cit, p.525
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contends that the UN peace-keeping forces in the Congo
were national contingents seconded to the UN for that
particular operation. It is obvious that the troops
during the cours~ of the secondment must be placed at
the disposal of the UN as long as they are engaged in
carrying out the mandate entrusted to them. Nonetheless,
the troops are regarded as national units subject to the
military rules and regulations of their respective
countries. Accordingly, the UN does not have the means
to enforce the laws of war. Nonetheless, the UN did
assume international responsibility in the Congo in the
case of claims against the ONUC which were submitted to
the UN Command Headquarters and in turn,'the latter did
present demands and protests on behalf of the contingents
to the government of the Congo(23). Thus, the UN has
assumed international responsibility for the UN peace-
keeping forces and could thereby further assume the
competence to enforce the laws of war. The third
argument contends that since war is now prohibited in
conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter, any
conflict thereby in which the UN becomes involved would
(23)According to Article 14 of the Congo UN Status
Agreement ••••the Commander shall have general responsibility
for the good order and discipline of the force. He may make
investigations, conduct inquiries and require information,
reports and consultations for the purpose of discharging
this responsibility. Responsibility for disciplinary action
in national contingents provided for the force rests with
the Commanders of national contingents. Reports concerning
disciplinary action shall be communicated to the Commander
who may consult with the Commander of the national contingent
and if necessary through the Secretary General with the
authority of the particular state concerned ••••
(Higgins. Rosalyn, Ope Cit, p.23)
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be a war of aggression. Consequently, the position in
that limitation should not be imposed upon the UN in
conformity with the laws of war in order to repel an
illegal aggression. This conclusion was expounded during
the course of the Korean civil war by a number of inter-
national jurists. They argued that the UN enforcement
action in Korea was different from that of a war between
two states. They based their argument on the principle
of sovereignty as the condition required in order to
apply the laws of war to a conflict situation(24).
Nonetheless, they have emphasised the necessity for the
UN not to ignore all the laws of war, but to select
such provisions as may be seen to fit its purposes(2S).
At all events, the three arguments failed to distinguish
between the manner in which a war is conducted and the
aims of the parties to the war. In fact, as soon as a
de facto war occurs, then there is a need for specific
limitation and restraints in respect of the victims of
the conflict(26). Such rules as those founded on
(24)OIDonovan, Patrick, Op. Cit, p.182
(25) It may be desirable to encourage specific humanitarian
procedures whereby claims that are unconnected with the
military dimension of the conflict are made on behalf of
the international community. Therefore, it is necessary to
enforce them against all parties to the civil war even theUN peace-keeping forces.
(26)
The rationale for the Geneva Conventions does not
rest on the nature of a particular war. Some of the laws
of war,such as those relating to occupation and economic
settlement, may not apply in all types of conflicts, but
the humanitarian norms are just as necessary and applicable
whether the suffering is caused by hostility between states
or whether between international or regional organisationsand an aggressor.
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humanitarian principles are just as requisite and their
application is necessary whether the suffering is caused
by hostilities between a UN peace-keeping,force and an
aggressor, or between states. Therefore, the UN should
not be exempted from these requirements. As far as the
Congo civil war was concerned, the UN operation did not
constitute an enforcement action as contemplated by
Article 43 of the UN Charter(27). In fact, the ONUC
had been despatched to maintain law and order and to
prevent civil war in the Congo thereby the UN troops were
bound by the laws of war. Consequently, the Congo UN-
status Agreement stipulated that •••••the force shall
observe the principles and spirit of the general inter-
national conventions applicable to the conduct of
military personnel ••••(28). Accordingly, the application
of the laws of war in the Cong~ was observed by all
parties in which humanitarian principles prevailed in
several areas. As far as the treatment of prisoners was
concerned, Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions stipulates
that •••••members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention or any other cause shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely ••••(29). It also explicitly prohibits
•••••violence to life in particular murder of all kinds,
mutiliation, cruel treatment and torture •••• (30). In
(27)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.76
(28)Ibid pp.SS-60
(29)Friedman, Leon, Ope Cit, p.642
(30)Ibid p.642
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this respect, prisoners in the Congo civil war were
detained under reasonable conditions and exchanged or
released during the course of hostilities(31). The ICRC
regularly visited captives representing all facti~ns in
the struggle in order to ensure that prisoners were given
treatment in conformity with the Geneva Conventions. After
these visits took place, the ICRC submitted reports to the
detaining factions thereby improvements had been made in
a number of prisons(32). Despite these requirements, no
major complaints had been made by the ICRC which concluded
that adequate prison standards were being maintained. At
the same time, the ICRC were engaged in efforts to release
prisoners. In this respect, many prisoners in Katanga
taken by both sides, were subsequently exchanged. The
ONUC released the Katangan troops at the end of 1961 and,
subsequently the Katangan authorities reciprocated by
freeing the UN contingents. Finally, the September Cease-
fire Agreement of 1962 provided for the mutual exchange of
prisoners held by both sides(33). Despite these facts,
(31)The provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were
generally observed in the Congo civil war. Most prisoners
of war were well treated. The protection of civilians and
their property as provided in the Conventions were also
observed by all parties to the conflict and the UN forces.
Nonetheless, the Congolese Army was responsible for many
violations of the Geneva Conventions relating to the
protection of civilians.
(32)McNemar, Donald, Ope Cit, p.263
(33)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, pp.412-416
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violations did occur and'strong protests had been lodged
by the ICRC to the accused party in the struggle. On
April 28th, 1961 the Congolese National Army (Armie
Nationale Congolai~e) captured a number of the Ghanaian
troops of the ONUC, disarmed them, herded them together
and executed them(34). The second violation occurred on
November 11th, 1961 when the Congolese National Army
(ANC) attacked a number of Indian troops of the ONUC,
arrested them and subsequently shot them. The officers
in charge of the ANC reported that they could not control
their soldiers during the course of th~ incident(35). On
the other hand, the Liberian troops of the ONUC disregarded
the proper treatment of prisoners when they loaded a number.
of Balula tribesmen into unventilated railroad cars. The
prisoners suffocated during the course of transportation
from Kasai province, where they were captured, to the
UN prison(36). Despite these acts of violation by both
sides, the majority of prisoners received adequate treat-
ment and subsequently were exchanged. As far as the
protection of civilians is concerned, the Geneva Conventions
made distinction between those who are actively involved
in combat and those who are not(37). Nonetheless, they
prohibit measures of such a character which might cause
the physical suffering or extermination of protected
persons in the hands of the parties involved in the conflict(38).
(34)~ pp.315-317
(35)Higgins, RosalYD, Op. Cit, pp.354-35S
(36»)ICNemar,.Donald W., Op. Cit, p.265
(37)Friedman, Leon, Op. Ci~, p.642
(38)~ p.642
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In the course of the Congo civil war a number of civilians
were killed but their numbers did not reach such proportions
as to obliterate the distinction between military personnel
and civilians(39). As far as the fighting between the
- -ONUC and the Katangan gendarmarie was concerned, few civilians
in densely populated areas lost their lives during the course
of hostilities. However, a considerable number of
civilians lost their lives both as a result of tribal struggle
and of starvation(40). Unfortunately, most of these tribal
deaths were civilians, victims of massacres. These events
occurred in August 1960 after Lumumba's military campaign
against the secessionist provinces of Katanga and South
Kasai.. When Lumumba's troops recaptured the capital of
South Kasai on August 26th, 1960, they engaged in a wholesale
slaughter of the Baluba tribe(41). Consequently, the UN
Secretary General despatched a strongly-worded protest to
the Congolese government stating that unarmed persons were
deliberately slaughtered simply on the grounds that they
belonged to the Baluba tribe. He also expressed the·
seriousness of these massacres by articulating them as
constituting a most flagrant violation of elementary human
rights. Moreover, he characterised the act as crimes of
genocide since it appeared to be directed toward the
extermination of a specific ethnic group, namely the Baluba(42).
(39)The UN presence contributed to the effectiveness of the
laws of war. It also contributed to the effective functioning
of the ICRC which helped to enforce the integrity of inter-
national normative restraints.
(40)McNemar. Donald W.,·Op. Cit, p.266
(41)Higgins, Rosalyn, Ope Cit, pp.333-335
(42)McNemar. Donald W., Op. Cit, p.226
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Moreover, another event occurred at the close of 1960
in Northern Katanga which caused great physical suffering.
In this instance, the Baluba tribe roamed the area,
killed tribal chiefs and terrorized the public.
Consequently, Tshombe despatched his gendarmar!e to
re-establish his authority and control the area. The
troops advanced into the hostile Baluba region, burning
villages and murdering civilians as they went(43).
As far as the political prisoners are concerned, the
Geneva Conventions envisaged that under the laws of
war, political prisoners may be executed for treason
by the state(44). Nonetheless, they must be given a
fair trial by a regularly constituted court, offering
all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as
indispensible by civilized peoples(45). As stated
earlier, Lumumba was captured by Leopo1dvi1le troops
and subsequently was transferred to Katanga where he








Unfortunately, retaliatory killings were carried out by
all factions in the Congo civil war. This constituted a
flagrant violation of the laws of war(46). This approach
served to eliminate political prisoners taken from
opposing forces, thereby denying them the basic right
of fair trial. Moreover, Article 34 of the Geneva
Convention on civilian persons stipulates that
•••••the taking of hostages is prohibited ••••(47).
In violation of these provisions, the National Liberation
Army took, in November 1964, a considerable number of
European hostages and threatened to execute them if the
Congolese army advanced to the territory controlled by
the Stanleyville regime. Unfortunately, this illegal
act had led to the American-Belgian military operation
which caused severe deterioration in relations between
African states and the Western countries(49). As far as
(46)Lumumba was the most important political prisoner in
the Congo. After his capture by the National Congolese
Army, he was manhandled and severely injured. The UN
Secretary General called upon the Congolese government to
treat Lumumba humanely and requested that the ICRC send
its representative to visit him at Thysville. On July 17thl
1961, Lumumba was transferred from the prison at Tbysville
to Katanga where he was executed. Lumumba's death
triggered a series of retaliatory killing of political
prisoners. On February 9th, 1961 seven Lumumba prisoners
were transferred from Leopoldville to Bukwanga where
they were tried for crimes against the Baluba nation by
a traditional court of Baluba chiefs. Six were executed
and one imprisoned. In retaliation to these acts, fifteen
political prisoners from the Leopoldville government were
shot on February 22nd, .1961 by an army firing squad in
Stanleyville.
(47) 6Friedman, Leon,-Op. Cit,.p. 52
(48) .Tandon, Yashpal,.Op.Cit,.p.1160
(49)Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.91
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the protection of non-military targets was concerned,
the question caused controversy in the Congo civil war.
According to Article 19 of the Geneva Convention on the
wounded and sick •••••fixed establishment and mobile
medical units of the Medical Services may in no
circumstances be attacked by the parties to the
conflict ••••(SO). In this respect, the Belgian govern-
ment informed the UN Secretary General on December 8th,
1961 that hospitals had been attacked by mortars aimed
at them which resulted in the wounding of hospital staff
and in heavy damage. The UN Secretary General responded
that the hospitals shelled as a consequence of a mercenary
observation post being situated on its roof. The other
hospitals had only been hit by some shells aimed at the
main base of the Katangan gendarmarie, two hundred metres
In any event,. the most flagrant violation
of the law of war occurred in connection with non-military
targets i.e. the killing of three Red Cross personnel
on the outskirts of Elisabethville(S2). Consequently,
a joint commission was established by the ONUC and the
ICRC in order to investigate the incident, but its report
(SO)Friedman. Leon, Op. Cit, p.S32
(Sl)Higgins. Rosalyn, Ope Cit, pp.238-241
(S2)On December 12th, 1961 an Indian-piloted Canberra
jet flying for the UN staged an attack on a hospital
at Shinolabwe on the outskirts of Elisabethville.
Three bodies of the Red Cross aides were found on
December 23rd, 1961 buried a few yards from their
burnt-out ambulance. The ambulance'was marked with
the protective emblem of the Red Cross.
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was not made public. Nonetheless, the ONUC paid reparation
to the ICRC for the injury it had caused, without admitting
any legal or financial obligation(S3). At the same time,
misuse of the Red Cross emblem caused a complication in
-connection with the protection of non-military targets.
According to Article 21 of the Geneva Convention on the
wounded and sick •••••the protection to which fixed
establishment and mobile medical units of the Medical
Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are
to commit outside their humanitarian duties, acts
harmful to the enemy ••••(S4). In this respect, the
ONUC made a number of accusations that the Katangan troops
employed vehicles painted with the Red Cross symbol in
order to transport troops of the gendarmarie for the
purpose of sniping at UN personnel. Consequently, it
was very difficult to determine which medical units had
been used in this manner by which they lost their
protection in conformity with the laws of war(S6)~
(S3)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.268
(S4)Friedman, Leon, Ope Cit, p.532
(SS)McNemar. Donald W., Ope Cit, p.269
(S6)A heavy air attack against the Union Miniere in Elisabeth-
ville in December 1961 raised the question of whether the
company could be considered a non-military target or not.
The Tshombe government claimed that the company was a
civilian property and should not have been bombarded.
However, it was suspected that the company was supplying
Tshombe's gendarmarie with arms and equipment and was
providing working papers for the mercenaries. This
conclusion became obvious when the UN troops occupied
the company after having been under mortar attack from
the ground. Despite the fact, the company was not formally
a part of the Katangan military bases but it forfeited
its right to protection as a non-military target in conformity
with the laws of war when the grounds of the company·were used
to fire upon the UN troops.
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THE ROLE OF ONUC A~~ UN EFFORTS AT
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:
The initial limitation on the UN intervention in
the Congo is domestic jurisdiction by which states usually
endeavour to shield internal struggle from international
and regional involvement. Normally, states hesitate to
sanction such involvement for fear of establishing
precedents for future actions within their own territories.
Nonetheless, when an internal struggle reached the stage
of being fuelled by outside states committed to particular
factions in the strife, then the situation ceased to be a
domestic matter. As far as the Congo civil war was
concerned, the Belgian intervention transferred the
definition of the struggle to a threat to international
peace and security. Accordingly, the UN involvement in
the Congo became necessary in conformity with Article 34
of its Charter(l). Despite the fact, UN action must be
undertaken with the consent and support of its member
states. However, it was a difficult task for the UN to
maintain the continuing support of its member states,
particularly those permanent members of the Security
Council, throUghout a prolonged civil war which proved
formidable. As it became apparent that the UN operation
was compatible with the interest of some members and
inconsistent with the interest of others, the support for
the operation disappeared. This was obvious in the position
of the USSR when its representative turned against the
operation and bitterly attacked the UN Secretary General(2).
(I)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.60
(2)Ibid pp.244-24S
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At all events, the UN operation in the Congo was launched
on the initiative of the Secretary General, who informed
the Security Council of the request for military assistance
from the Congolese government(3). The Security Council
adopted a resolution which was Bupported by the two super
powers while the U.K., France and China abstained. It
made no reference to the legal basis under which the UN
was acting(4). Subsequently, debate on the legal basis
for the operation had concluded that it was not an
enforcement action but rather internal security measures
under Article 40 of the UN Charter(S). Therefore the
operation did not constitute a sanction or an enforcement
action as contemplated by Article 42 and 43 of the UN
Charter. The ONUC was not established as a means of
taking action against Belgium as an aggressor. It was
rather as an effor~at the invitation of the government
concerne~to counter the threat to international peace and
(3)The UN operation in the Congo was undertaken on the
Secretary General's initiative when the latter informed
the Security Council about the request of the Congolese
government for military aid in order to prevent a threat
to international peace and security. Hammerskjold acted
under Article 99 of the UN Charter which envisages that
••••the Secretary General may bring to the attention of
the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and
security ••••
(4)The original resolution of July 14th, 1960 only called
for the withdrawal of Belgian troops and authorized the
Secretary General to provide military and technical assist-
ance to the Congolese government. This was in consequence
of the urgency of the situation and the difficulties
involved in reaching agreement among the permanent members
of the Security Council. Therefore, the Council did not
lay down in its resolution even the,legal principles on
which the ONUC should act, as the General Assembly had done
in the case of the UNEF. Moreover,'it left to the Secretary
General the matter of organising the force, including the
appointment of its supreme commander.
(S)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.297
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security and to maintain law and order. However, there
was another argument which indicated that the situation
in the Congo was considered as a threat to international
peace ~nd security. Accordingly, the legal basis of the
operation was best regarded as Article 40 of the UN
Charter which allows provisional measures to be taken in
order to deal with the threat to international peace and
In so far as the operation was based on
Article 40, the principle of non-intervention in matters
of domestic jurisdiction enshrined in Article 2(7) does
not apply in cases of enforcement action under Chapter
VII. It also continues to be relevant to the application
of provisional measures under the same Chapter. At the
same time, another legal question arose as to whether or
not the resolution of the Security Council was binding
upon member states since enforcement measures were not
involved. In so far as the operation was based on
Article 40 resolutions were binding. In this respect,
the resolution of September 17th, 1960 specifically
referred to Article 25 and 49 of the UN Charter, thereby,
member states had agreed to accept and carry out decisions
of the Security Council(7). However, the original
(6)Panhuys. HtFt van et al., Opt Cit, p.26
(7)Resolution S/4526 paragraph (5) stated that ••••calls
upon all members in accordance with Article 25 and 49
of the Charter to accept and carry out the decisions
of the Security Council and to afford mutual assistance
in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security
Council •••• (Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.513)
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resolution of the Security Council on July 14th, 1960
called for the withdrawal of Belgian troops. It also
authorized the Secretary General to provide the Congolese
government with military and technical assistance(8).
In response to the changing circumstances, five security
Council and five General Assembly resolutions later
expanded and clarified the mandate(9). Accordingly,
the preamble to these resolutions contained the general
tasks of the ONUC in the Congo. A major part of the
threat to international peace and security was the
disorder within the Republic of the Congo. Therefore,
the ONUC was despatched to assist the central government
of the Congo in the restoration and the maintenance of
(8)
The costs of the military and technical assistance
were covered by the UN in essentially the same manner
as the UNEF. In 1961 the expenses of the ONUC
averaged approximately $10 million per month, of which
about 83% was for direct expenses and about 17% was for
reimbursement to the governments providing contingents.
The budgets for 1962-63 were of the same order. The
sums were assessed upon member states after deduction
for voluntary contribution and waiving of reimbursement
by states providing aircraft services. The General
Assembly expresse1y decided that the expenses were
expenses of the UN, subject to legal binding assess-
ment of member states under Article 17 of the UN
Charter. Nonetheless, they were to be kept separate
as being essentially different in nature from expenses
under the regular budget. However, some member states
refused to accept this decision and pay the corresponding
amounts assessed upon them. Accordingly, the General
Assembly decided to submit the matter to the ICJ for an
advisory opinion.
(9)
McNemar, Donald W., Ope Cit, p.288
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law and order. Thus, this committed the UN to support
the country as a unit and oppose secessionist movements(lO).
It was also designed to secure the withdrawal of Belgian
troops and to prevent outside intervention. In these
respects, the ONUC met these responsibilities ~y protecting
civilians and property from unlawful acts, disarming law
breakers and retraining the National Congolese Army (ANC).
However, in the course of training the ANC, a difficult
question arose as to whether the ONUC should disarm the
ANC who had been involved in the mutiny. The ONUC chief
of staff from Ghana made a strong case for disarming
such troops(ll). But, the UN acting officer in charge
of the UN operation, took the position that the ONUC
had no authority to disarm the military personnel of a
government in need of UN assistance(12). The main task
of this operation was to prevent the occurrence of a civil
war in the Congo. Consequently, the ONUC efforts
(10)An extensive military operation took place during
the final phase of the ONUC action in Katanga in December
1962 and January 1963. The ONUC initially cleared the
Katangan road blocks in Elisabethville and seized the
key positions in that city. Subsequently, it advanced
towards, and occupied other cities in Southern Katanga.
One of the actions carried out during this phase was the
first experience of UN peace-keeping forces in strictly
combat conditions in the field. By January 21st, 1962
the UN forces had under control, all important key centres
held by the Katangan gendarmarie, who as an organised
fighting force, had ceased to exist. Consequently, Tshombe
ended the secession and security forces of the central
government gradually moved into the province.
(11)McNemar. Donald W., Op. Cit, p.288
(12)Ibid' p.28S
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concentrated on securing the immediate evacuation from
the Congo of all foreign military, paramilitary and
mercenaries. To this end, the ONUC undertook, in
advisory personnel not under the UN command, and all
August 1961, an operation in Katanga designed to remove
nationals who were supporting the military efforts
there(13). This was done in conformity with the
Security Council resolution of February 21st, 1961
and at the request of the reunited central government
of the COngo(14). The operation was initially,
partially successful, but resulted in fierce hostilities
between the ONUC and Kataogan gendarmarie(IS).
Subsequently, another Security Council resolution went
further in authorizing the use of requisite measures
of force necessary for detaining and deporting foreign
personnel and mercenaries(16). Therefore, the ONUC
continued its efforts to evacuate the outside military
personnel until the end of Kataoga's secession. As far
as technical aid was concerned, the ONUC assisted in the
running of the country and re-establishment of an
effective administration throughout the COngo(17). The
(13)Sohn, Louis B., Op. Cit, pp.7S3-7S4
(14)Higgins, RosalYn, Op. Cit, p.128
(IS)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.289
(16)Resolution S 5002 adopted on November 24th, 1961,
ara ra h 11 stated that ••••authorIses the Secretary
eneral· to ta e vigorous action including the use of
requisite measure of force if necessary for the immediate
apprehension, detention, pending legal action and for
deportation of all foreign military and paramilitary
personnel and political advisors not under the UN command
and mercenaries as laid down •••• (Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.S1S
(17)Panhuys. R.F. van at al., Ope Cit, pp. 183-188
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initial effort was aimed at re-establishing a central-
government, whereupon a conciliation commission was
set up by the Secretary General's Advisory Committee
on the Congo shortly after the constitutional crisis(18).
It consisted of representatives of all African states
and the four Asian countries that were supplying troops.
It was empowered to prepare a study on the ways and means
of reconstituting a parliamentary. government in the
Congo(19). It proposed the expansion of parliamentary
support for the Leopoldville government. Consequently,
the ONUC arranged a parliamentary meeting and endeavoured
to ensure the participation of all-political leaders in
order to re-establish a reunified central government(20).
Subsequently, it engaged in active efforts at mediation
in order to negotiate a settlement between the re-
established central government headed by Adoula and
Tshombe for reintegrating Katanga. Consequently, Adoula
and Tshombe met at the UN military base at Kitona where
an agreement was reached between them which provided for
reintegrating Katanga(21). Nonetheless, the agreement
(18)The Tunisian representative at the Security Council
proposed that a UN conciliation commission be established
by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, to assume a more
positive role, particularly in regard to achieving peace
and national reconciliation. It should also be entrusted
to work towards the re-establishment of parliamentary
institution and the creation of mutual confidence among
the Congolese leaders.
(19)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.293
(20)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, pp.166-170
(2!)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, pp.422-423
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was not implemented and therefore, the UN Secretary
General proposed, on August 20th 1962, a plan for
national reconciliation as a basis for reunification
of'the Congo(22). The UN Secretary General again
endeavoured to bring Adoula and Tshombe together in
order to discuss the plan and to reach a mutually
acceptable solution. The plan proposed a federal
constitution, division of basic revenue with half going
to the central government and half to the local govern-
ment of Katanga. It envisaged the unification of
currency, integration of the armies, while foreign
representation would be the responsibility of the
central government. It also provided for a general
assembly and inclusion of all political groups in the
central government(23). However, the plan would be
a t~mporary arrangement until a permanent one could be
reached. In fact, all these principles proposed in the
plan had been enshrined in the previous agreement reached
between Adoula and Tshombe. But, the concrete condition
in the plan was that the Secretary General presented it
in a non-negotiable form for acceptance or rejection by
both Adoula and Tshombe. It was also established
that it must be carried out by a dead1ine(24). At all
(22)Ibid p.437
(23)McNemar, Donald W., Ope Cit, p.297
(24)Ibid p.298
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events, both Adoula and TshoIDbe accepted the.plan, but
again it was not implemented. ,Consequently, the Secretary
General stated on December 10th, 1962 that economic sanctions
were in accord with the plan if Tshombe did not take serious
steps in the direction of implementing the plan. To this
end, he requested that the Belgian government exert pressure
on the Union ~liniere to cease payment of revenue to the
Tshombe regime(2S). At the same time, the ONUC was
instructed to secure freedom of movement throughout the
entire province of Katanga. Despite the fact, this action
was taken only after the ONUC had come under fire(26).
Consequently, the ONUC action was justified as self-defence
and as necessary for the establishment of freedom of move-
mente To this end, the ONUC pursued the gendarmarie until
they held all the important centres throughout the
province(27). With the ONUC in control of the province,
the mercenaries fled to Angola and Tshombe announced the
termination of secession(28). Despite the end of Katangals
secession, the Congo still faced the problem of rebel activ-
ities. However, the threat to international:peace and security
(2S)Tshombe faced no economic difficulties as his regime
received revenue from taxes, dividends and duties paid
by the Union Miniere. The company concern took the
position that its taxes on revenue would be paid to the
provincial government as the de facto legal authority in
control of the province. Since the company provided
Tshombe with 80% of the capital he needed, the cessation
of payment was extremely important in forcing Tshombe
to accept the plan.
(26)Higgins. Rosalyn, Qp. Cit, p.439
(27)Ibid p.44S .
(28)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.7S
- 487 -
ceased by the evacuation of all foreign military personnel.
Therefore,.the ONUC did not stay on to deal with rebel
activities, but this also was a consequence of financial
and polit~cal pressure on the UN(29). In fulfilling its
functions, the ONUC followed the general principle
governing the activities of the UN peace-keeping forces
elsewhere. The rules thus in operation of UN Emergency
Forces established in the ~tlddleEast were considered as
precedents which would be followed(30). Nonetheless, the
ONUC in the Congo was dispersed throughout the territory,
racked by internal conflict, which proved to be quite
different from the UNEF in the )m, the latter having had
patrolled borders between the Arab states and Israel.
Accordingly, rules governing the force had to be inter-
preted in a different context, but must be upheld as the
basis which might govern the activities of the ONUC(31).
In this respect, the Security Council resolution set up
the ONUC as a subsidiary organ of the Council under the
command of the Secretary General(32). He was empowered
(29) 8Sohn, Louis B., Op. Cit, pp.763-7 7
(30)Higgins, Rosalyn, UN Peacekeeping 1946-1967, Documents
and Commentary, Oxford University Press, London 1969,
pp.260-263
(31)In fact, the UNEF in the ME was established at a special
session of the UN General Assembly convening under the
Uniting for Peace Procedures. Consequently, this led to the
argument to assume that the constitutional basis for UNEF
thus lies in the Uniting for Peace Resolution adopted during
the Korean situation. As a matter of fact, the resolution
was adopted in order to guarantee future UN action, even
when veto of a permanent member prevents agreement in the
Security Council. The other possible legal authority for
the UNEF might be based on the argument that everything
that is not explicitly prohibited in the Charter is permitted.
(32)The UNEF was designed as a subsidiary organ of the UN
General Assembly under Article 22 of the Charter. Consequently,the General Assembly authorized the appointment of the supremecommander of the force. In this respect, it was he, inconsultation with the UN Secretary General, who was entitledto recruit officers for the force.
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to make up the force on the basis of the UNEF precedent
by excluding troops from any country sitting as a permanent
member on the Security Council(33). In fact, he established
the force largely on the contributions of African states,
but at the same time, rejected the proposal for an all-
African force(34). Consequently, national units were
strictly under UN command thereby they were not free to
receive instructions from their national government(3S).
The Secretary General concluded an agreement with the
Congolese government covering the rights and all aspects
of the ONUC(36). It was obvious that consent of the
host state was essential, but the activities of the ONUC
were separated from those of the national authority.
Therefore, the activities of the ONUC were not subjected
to the direction of the Congolese government(37). Thus,
this legal conclusion was reached in consequence of the
split view maintained by the UN Secretary General and
Lumumba after the constitutional crisis. Lumumba.took
the position that he had invited the UN into the Congo
thereby the ONUC should co-operate with him in ending
the secession of Katanga(38). When the Secretary General
(33)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.277
(34)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.290
(3S)Sohn, Louis B., Ope Cit, pp.716~719
(36)Higgins, Rosalyn, Op. Cit, p.70
(37)Ibid p.72
(38)~he early months of the UN's military assistance,
Lumumba and Kasavubu insisted that the original mandate of
July 1960 ~bliged the ONUC:to assist the central government
to end the secession of Katanga. In this position they were
strongly supported by the Soviet Union and by many states
of the Afro-Asian group.
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did not accept this view, Lumumba requested the
withdrawal of the ONUC from the Congo(39). Thus, the
request raised the legal question of whether the
operation was dependent on the continuing consent of
the host state or not. In fact, the original
resolution envisaged that such ongoing consent was
necessary by declaring that UN assistance would be
given until the national security force might be able
to meet their task(40). Nonetheless, subsequent
resolutions emphasised the discretion of the Secretary
General in terminating the operation(41). As far as
freedom of movement was concerned, the ONUC followed
such established rules as the UNEF precedent, but
this right was quickly challenged in connection with
entry into Katanga. Consequently, the ONUC used force,
but only in self-defence and in order to maintain
positions already held in the airports and ,other key
centres,thus securing the freedom' of communication
and transportation(42). Apart from these acts, the
ONUC remained impartial in connection with the outcome
of the internal struggle. To this end, the Security
Council resolution of August 9th, 1960 emphatically
declared that the ONUC would not be a party to, or
(39)McNemar. Donald W., Ope Cit, p.291
(40)Brownlie. Ian, Op. Cit, pp.510-511
(41)Resolution 5/4526, paragraph (1) stated that
••••confirms the authority given to the Secretary General
by the Security Council Resolution S/4887 of 14 of July
and 5/4405 of 22 July 1960 and requests him to continue
to carry out the respon8ibilitf placed on him thereby ••••
(Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.512)
(42)Higgins, Rosalyn, Ope Cit, p.435
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in any way intervene in or be used to influence the
outcome of the internal conflict(43). This approach
was designed to avoid intervention in domestic
jurisdiction and to maintain sustainable support for
the operation. Accordingly, the ONUC had undertaken
active efforts to prevent the threat to international
peace and security and avoided imposing a political
solution to the crisis. To this end, the UN finalized
recognition of any factions after the constitutional
crisis as the government of the whole country but it
had undertaken active efforts at mediation to re-establish
the control authority headed by Adoula's government.
Finally, it denounced Katanga1s secession and supported
the reunification of the country.
(43)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.512
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THE OAU ROLE AND EFFORTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:
Since the advent of the sixties revolt against
colonialism in Africa became of the highest regional
interest(I). Despite the fact, a regional organisation
did not exist at the beginning of t~e Congo crisis, but
when it occurred, the nations of the continent came
together in a series of regional meetings(2). Consequently,
African leaders met in August 1960 at Leopoldville, a
meeting at which Lumumba requested them to support his
plan for a military campaign against Katanga(3). However,
they did not agree on regional operations, but they accepted
the UN efforts. Subsequently, this unity collapsed after
the constitutional crisis. Therefore, polarized into
groups known as the Casablanca and Monrovia groups over
the question of whether to back Kasavubu or Lumumba. In
spite of the fact, both groups opposed the secession of
Katanga and supported the UN operation, but they adopted
different stances over who would rule as the national
government. The radical African states met at Casablarica
(1) Carrington, C.E., Decolonization, the Last Stages,
JIA, Volume 38, 1962, p.29
(2)NO regional organisation in Africa existed when the
civil war in the Congo began, but Lumumba initiated a
meeting of the leaders of thirteen independent African
states to consider joint action against Katanga. This
request was rejected. Subsequently, African states
divided into two groups, one supporting Lumumba and
later the regime of his followers at Stanleyville, and
the other backing Kasavubu. Since the establishment
of the OAU in May 1963, it has been more effective in
furthering bloc policies rather than preventing or
settling regional disputes, as has been tragically
demonstrated after the withdrawal of the UN troops
from the Congo.
(3) .~fuNemar, Donald W., Ope Cit, pp.223-224
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in January 1961 and supported the Gizenga government in
Stanleyville, while the Monrovia group proclaimed its
support for the central government and reaffirmed its
faith in the UN, at its meeting in Monrovia in ~ay
Despite this split, African states managed to
unite in establishing the OAU at Addis Ababa in ~Iay
Once this regional organisation was established,
member states exerted greater and more active efforts at
national reconciliation in the Congo. As stated earlier,
with the end of the Katanga secession on January 14th,
1963, the UN decided to withdraw the ONUC, but the last
members of the troops left the Congo on June 30th,
1963(6). Despite the end of Katanga's secession, the
turmoil in the Congo which had broken out in 1960, had
never really ceased. Bitter rivalries among the Congolese
politicians and widespread dissatisfaction among the people
still remained(7). The situation deteriorated extensively
(4)Ibid p.285
(5) .Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.84
(6)McNemar, Donald W., Op. Cit, p.297
(7lIn March 1963, the period of relative stability in
the Congo came to an end as insurgency broke out in
several areas of the country. The rebellion was initially
launched in the Congo by the National Liberation Army
which had been organised by the political opponents of
the Adoula government. This was in consequence of the
declining ability of his government to absorb or provide
outlets for opposition. At the beginning of October
1963, a number of political leaders who had been
associated with the Lumumbist alliance in 1960 and the
Gizenga government in Stanleyville in 1960-61, fled to
the Congo (Brazzaville) where they established the Council
of National Liberation.
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after the withdrawal of the ONUC, to such an extent that
the outbreak of sporadic disturbances precipitated the
imposition of a state of emergency in the country(8).
Under these circumstances, the Lumumbist members of the
Congolese Parliament had deserted and formed a government-
in-opposition called -The National Liberation Council.-
By June 1964, the latter had liberated wide areas of
upper Congo, North Katanga, Mascena and Kwila and
established their headquarters in Stanleyville(9).
At this stage, the central government was headed by
Adoula who felt that he could no longer cope with the
situation and subsequently resigned. He was replaced
on 'July 10th, 1964 by Tshombe, who had been called by
President Kasavubu from his exile in Spain(10). The
appointment of Tshombe as Prime Minister accentuated
the ideological factor in the situation to such an
extent that it escalated the situation into a full scale
civil war, with considerable intervention from outsiders.
This coincided with the third ordinary session of the
OAU Council of Ministers scheduled to begin in Cairo on
July 13th, 1964, to be followed by the first ordinary
session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. The
Council decided to despatch a formal request to President
Kasavubu calling upon him not to send Tshombe with the
Congolese delegation which would represent the Congo at
the Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State(ll).
( 8)Young, Crawford,> Rebellion and the Congo, edited by
Robert Rotberg and Mazuri Ali, New York, !2ZQ, pp.970-971
( 9)Ibid pp.972-973
(10)Ibid p. 974
(11)Krishnan, Maya, Op. Cit, p.220
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Subsequently, several heads of state emphasized that they
were not prepared to sit at the Summit of the OAU
Assembly with Tshombe(12). When the Assembly opened,
the President of the ~ralagasy Republic argued that the
exclusion of Tshombe constituted interference in the
Congols internal affairs and was in violation of the
OAU Charter. Accordingly, the OAU Assembly closed
without having discussed the Congo situation(13).
Subsequently, the situation was further complicated when
Tshombe sent for the Katangan gendarmarie who had been
waiting in Angola. Moreover, he recruited, once more,
white mercenary personnel from South African, Rhodesia
and Europe. Furthermore, Tshombe made a successful
deal with the United States for military aid(14).
At this stage, the situation was set for the second
Congo civil war which caused concern to all African
states. In the normal course of international relations,
(12) .Subsequently, in October 1964 the second non-aligned
Conference took place in Cairo and the Congo was invited
to participate in the Conference. However, the political
committee of the foreign ministers decided Dot to recognise
Tshombe as a member of the Congolese delegation. The
President of the UAR transmitted an appeal on October 3rd,
1964 to the Congolese President to attend the Summit
himself instead of deputing Prime Minister Tshombe.
On October 4th, 1964 the Congolese delegation protested
against this appeal by walking out of the Conference.
It also called the appeal an act of interference in its
country1s domestic affairs. Despite the appeal, Tshombe
arrived at Cairo where he was detained by the Egyptian
authorities and prevented from attending the Conference.
(13)Krishnan. Maya, Ope Cit, p.220
(14). Tandon. Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.1156
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Tshombe1s request for foreign military aid would not
have been regarded as the OAU's concern. The latter's
Charter recognises such rights normally afforded to its
member states, including the right to seek foreign
militaryaid(lS.>. But, the situation in the Congo was
described as one of civil war, therefore, the OAU could
make a good case for seeking to prevent unilateral foreign
aid. There was a clear precedent in the UN efforts from
1960 to 1963 when the Security Council requested all states
to halt aid to the Congo outside the UN framework(16).
Under these circumstances, the OAU Council of ~linisters
was called into emergency session on August 22nd, 1964,
this taking place in Addis Ababa in order to discuss the
Congo situation(17). The Council initially debated a
Ghanaian proposal for a political conference of all
Congolese leaders, including the leaders of the Stanleyville
regime(18). It was also agreed that an ad hoc commission
(IS)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.3
(16)Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, pp.SI4-S1S
(17)Polhemus, Higbie, J., Op. Cit, p.214
(18)The proposal also envisaged the establishment
of a special committee of mediation composed of represent-
atives of Algeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sudan
to make preparations for the political conference. It
was also responsible for the suspension of a cease-fire
and the neutralization of all the armies in the Congo.
Moreover, the proposal recommended the convening in
Addis Ababa of a conference of leaders of the main
political parties including Kasavubu and Tshombe. In
the meantime, the OAU would organise a general election
and the OAU peace-keeping force would be responsible
for the maintenance of law and order and to assist the
provisional government.
- 496 -
be established in order to undertake efforts at national
reconciliation(19). }foreover, it called for an immediate
withdrawal of all foreign personnel and all mercenaries(20).
However, Tshombe who had participated in the deliberation
of the Council, assured the OAU member states that the
Congolese government was ready to dispense with the services
of mercenaries with the proviso that they would be replaced
by a contingent of African troops(21). But, African
states were concerned that if troops were despatched to the
Congo, they might be required to fight the Congolese national
movements, such as the National Liberation Council. In this
respect, Tshombe argued that the NLC was a group of rebels
and that, therefore, it was the duty of the central govern-
ment to foil their plot, if necessary with foreign military
aid. He also defended the C~ngols relations with the United
States and Belgium in the supply of military aid as a
strictly domestic affair(22). However, the Tshombe thesis
(19)The ad hoc commission consisted of ten states under the
Chairmanship of Prime ~Unister Kenyatta of Kenya who was
entrusted to implement the following mandate:-
(1) to assist and encourage the efforts of the
Congolese government in the restoration of national
reconciliation,
(2) to assist normalize relations between the
Congo and its neighbouring states, especially Burundi
and the Congo (Brazzaville).
However, with reference to the second mandate, all the parties
emphasised their readiness to facilitate the commission1s
efforts. Therefore, the commission was successful in
normalizing relations with the states concerned, but the
commission's efforts in connection with the first mandate
met with a.lot of difficulties.
(20)Hoskyns, Catherine, Case Studies in African Dip1omacx,




was not acceptable to the OAU who saw the necessary
problem as being identical to that of foreign inter-
vention. However, none of the OAU member states
recognised the government of the National Liberation
Council at Stanleyville but also rejected the description
of such a government as a rebellion(23). Consequently,
the OAU adopted two approaches, one designed to obtain
a consensus among its member states and to raise moral
and political status of the NLC to that of an authority
in effective control of a part of the Congo's territory
in order to prevent foreign intervention in the Congo.
The latter, designed to lower the image of the central
government headed by Tshombe which employed a large
number of mercenaries from South Africa and Rhodesia.
Accordingly, a large number of normally moderate African
states were to join the ranks of the radicals to
identify the 'internal situation'in the Congo as a
legitimate concern to the OAU. Therefore, the OAU
avoided direct condemnation of Tshombe's right to seek
foreign military aid in order to have a wide consensus
among its member states. Instead, the OAU Council
called upon foreign powers to cease intervention in the
Congo's domestic affairs and requested the Congolese
government to expel all mercenaries from the country(24).
It was obvious that the Congolese government was unlikely
to accept this decision unless the OAU could assure it
(23)Tandon, Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.l1S6
(24) Meyers, David B., Ope Cit, p.179
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that the NLC had ceased to receive military aid from
outside countries. The other alternative which might
be acceptable to the Congolese government was the idea
of an OAU peace-keeping force in order to assist its
troops to restore law and order in the whole country.
However, the Council also decided to encourage the
ongoing efforts of the ten-nation ad hoc commission in
order to find an acceptable solution through national
reconciliation(25). Despite this, the ad hoc commission
headed by President Kenyatta of Kenya failed in its
efforts at mediation between the Congolese government
and the NLC. Consequently, the commission decided to
stop foreign intervention before carrying out its efforts
at national reconciliation. Therefore, a delegation was
despatched which was headed by the Kenyan foreign minister,
to the United States in order to persuade its administration
to halt the supply of military aid to the Congo(26). It
was clearly inconceivable that the mission could succeed
in stopping American military aid, unless arrangements
were made simultaneously to halt military assistance
reaching the NLC from Communist states(27). ~Ioreover,
(25)Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, p.222
(26)Tandon, Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.1159
(27)At its first meeting, the ad hoc commission attempted
to halt foreign intervention and decided to send a special
delegation to Washington to request an end to the American
military involvement in the Congo. As a result, the
American State Department announced that it would not
discuss the military aid in the absence of the representative
within the OAU mission representing the Congolese government.
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the Congolese government made a strong protest that such
a mission was a manifestation of regional intervention
in its domestic affairs(28). Accordingly, the United
States administration advised the OAU ad hoc commission
that it could not receive the mission without the
participation of the Congolese government(29). However,
the mission was not received by President Johnson, but
as a matter of courtesy, the Secretary of State received
Subsequently, on September 30th, 1964 the
mission issued a statement detailing the American promise
for support in bringing about Congolese national reconcil-
iation. The question of military aid to the Congo was
not discussed owing to the American stance that a similar
mission should have been despatched to the Communist
states also to stop military aid to the NLC(31). Under
these circumstances, the OAU efforts to stop foreign
intervention also failed, thereby producing the most
explosive situation yet to evolve. Consequently, the
civil war was revived by the rivalry between East and
West with the NLC representing the aspiration of the
East, and Kasavubu and Tshombe those of the West. However,
the military aid provided by the Communist countries to
the NLC was small in comparison to the massive military aid
given to the Congolese go~ernment(32). Therefore, the
(28) .1-leyers.David B., Op. C1t, p.178
(29)Tandon, Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.1159
(30)Ibid p.1159
(31)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.88
(32)Tandon, Yashpal, Ope Cit, p.1160
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situation in the Congo deteriorated rapidly to such
an extent that the Congolese government requested the
convening of an emergency meeting of the OAU Council of
Ministers. It wanted such a meeting to be held in order
to bring pressure on neighbouring states to stop assisting
the NLC. -It also wished the OAU to accept its priorities
to end the_rebellion by securing'mi1itary support and
then attempting national reconciliation. The moderate
African states accepted this proposal, but the
radicals felt that the OAU'S initial concern should be the
I
removal of the mercenaries and the ending of foreign
military aid. However, the Council met on September 5th,
1964 to consider the external and internal aspects of the
crisis and its repercussions both on neighbouring states
and on the regional scene at large(33). Eventually, the
Council adopted a resolution intended as a compromise,
affirming the OAU competence to find a peaceful solution
to all conflicts which affect peace and security in Africa.
It appealed to the Congolese government to halt immediately
the recruitment of mercenaries and expel all those already
in the country, in order to facilitate the OAU solution.
It also called for an immediate cessation of hostilities
and requested all political leaders to seek national
reconciliation(34). Nonetheless, the Council did not
establish any more machinery to assist attaining a cease-
fire and supervising the expulsion of mercenaries, but
(33)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.67
(34)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Qp. Cit, pp.150-151
- 501 -
entrusted these tasks to the ad hoc commission. However,
the commission sought to carry out its mandate with
respect to national reconciliation, thereby endeavouring
to persuade Tshombe to sit with the representative of
NLC to find a mutually acceptable solution. But, Tshombe
rejected the commission's broad interpretation of its
mandate by arguing that it would constitute intervention
in Congolese domestic affairs(3S). With the intens-
ification of differences between the OAU commission
and the Congolese government, the situation began to
deteriorate. Consequently, some radical African states began
to assist the rebels openly, because they saw in Tshombe
a neo-colonia1 agent(36). Under these circumstances,
the OAU commission recommended a ceasefire between the
warring rebels and the central government's troops, but
the rising success of the mercenary-led Congolese army
- ,over the insurgents, considerably lessened the chances
of a ceasefire. Consequently, the rebels attempted to
stem the tide of war running against them by capturing a
considerable number of foreigners and detaining them as
hostages in order to secure military concessions(37).
The intent was clearly to put pressure on the United States
(3S)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.68
(36)McKeon, Nora, Ope Cit, p.397
(37)The conditions of the Europeans living in the territory
controlled by the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville changed
drastically when it became apparent that the employment of
white mercenaries had reversed the fortunes of the war in
favour of the Congolese army. The announcement by the
Stanleyville government that it would execute an American
missionary doctor accused of espionage and of bein~ a major
in the United States army, added to the tension. When the
United States offered to negotiate in Nairobi on the status
of the Americans held among the European hostages in
Stanleyville, it was only to gain time to complete prepar-
ation for the joint action with Belgium.
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and other Western powers to persuade Tshombe to cease
hostilities. Under these circumstances, the attention
of the OAU commission was focussed on a new task resulting
from the desperate act of the rebels. The Chairman of
the OAU commission, President Kenyatta, offered his good
offices and arranged a meeting in Nairobi on November 23rd,
1964 between the American Ambassador in Kenya and the
representative of the NLC(38). The purpose of the meeting
was to mediate between the American stand, which demanded
an unconditional release of the hostages, and the NLC1s
stand which demanded, in exchange, military and political
concessions(39). On the second day of the negotiation,
the United States, with the prior consent of the Congolese
government, furnished the necessary transport and landed
Belgian paratroopers in Stanleyville(40). The operation
weakened the NLC1s control of the city and allowed the
Congolese army to enter more easily than might otherwise
have been the case. As the crisis reached a new height,
the OAU ad hoc commission met on November 27th, 1964
and recommended that the Congo crisis be brought before
the UN(41). The Chairman of the commission felt humiliated
(38)Hoskyns, Catherine, Op. Cit, p.1S
(39)~ pp.33-37
(40)Extract from Tshombe1s letter to the American Ambassador
Goolby in the Congo on November 21st, 1964 ••••the govern-
ment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has accordingly
decided to authorize the Belgian government to send an
adequate rescue force to carry out the humanitarian task
of evacuating the civilians held as hostages by the rebels
and to authorize the American government to furnish necessary
transport for this humanitarian mission ••••
(HoskynSi Catherine, Ope Cit, p.3S)
(41)polhemus, Higbie 3., Ope Cit, pp.238-240
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at having his efforts toward a negotiated settlement
prematurely frustrated by the joint military action.
However, the United States denied that it was a military
solution and justified the action as a humanitarian
purpose for securing the evacuation of-civilians held
as hostages by the rebels(42). Despite the humanitarian
purpose of the operation, the means used were undeniably
military. In the light of the aftermath of the Stanley-
ville operation, it would appear that the NLC suffering
was one from which it would never recover. It lost
hundreds of its troops as well as its headquarters in
Stanleyville and it had allowed the Congolese army, with
the help of mercenaries, to carry out a military campaign
to a victorious conclusion. By March 1965, the NLC
were badly routed in the Northern Congo(43). Thus,
with the OAU member states divided and the commission
deadlocked, President Kenyatta urged that the Congo
crisis be brought before the UN Security Council(44).
l-teanwhilethe United States and Belgium informed the
UN Security Council on December 1st, 1964 of the completion
of the rescue mission and the departure of the paratroopers
from the Congo(4S). At the same time, 22 states, 18 of
them African, requested an emergency meeting of the Council
in order to consider urgently the situation created by
the Belgo-American operation(46). The OAU described the
(42)Ta~don, Yashpal, Op. Cit, p.1163
(43)!2!9. p.1163
(44)Heyers, David B., Op. Cit,p.179
(4S)Hoskyns, Catherine, Ope Cit, pp.36-37
(46)Ibid pp.SO-Sl
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operation as a flagrant intervention in African affairs
and a threat to the peace and security of the African
continent. Subsequently, the Congolese government
requested, on December 10th, 1964, the convening of an
emergency meetirig of the Security Council in order to
examine the charge of flagrant interference in its
domestic affairs by some African states as well as by
the USSR and Communist China(47). In the meantime, an
emergency session of the OAU Council of Ministers was
held in New York in order to co-ordinate African efforts
in the debate of the Security Council. Nonetheless,
African states were divided in their stand towards the
legality of the Congolese government's request for such
action(48). The conservative African states took the
view that the Tshombe government was the legal authority
of the Congo, but they viewed the Belgo-American
operation as an act of interference in African affairs(49).
,Despite the consensus among African states that the
operation was an act of interference, they lost by being
forced to conform to the language of their protest at
the Security Council(SO). The Western powers stood in
defence of their action and were ready with their veto
(47)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, pp.69-70
(48)The Nigerian representative to the UN dismissed African
complaints in the Security Council as inadmissible on the
grounds that the Belgo-American action had a proper legal
basis because it had been authorized by the sovereign
government of the Congo.
(49)Krishnan. Maya, Ope Cit, p.224
(SO) :After a long debate, the two African states of the
Security Council, Morocco and the Ivory Coast, introduced
a joint draft resolution incorporating the majority opinion
of the Security Council members. The draft provided a
sound basis for a compromise resulting from consultation
between the sponsors of the draft and other members of the
Security Council. Consequently, the resolution was adopted.
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to resist any strong condemnation of their operation. Thus,
it was impossible for the OAU to acquire a resolution of
the Security Council which might have condemned the Belgo-
American action as an act of aggression. Accordingly, the
resolution adopted on December 30th, 1964, made no
reference to the Stanleyville operation and simply called on
all states to refrain from intervening in the domestic
affairs of the Congo(51). Neither the action of the
United States and Belgium nor those attributed to some
radical African states, the USSR and Communist China,
were specifically condemned. However, the resolution
maintained that the OAU efforts at national reconciliation
should be encouraged in order to find a peaceful solution
to the crisis(52). Accordingly, the OAU Council of
Ninisters resumed its peace efforts on Harch 4th, 1965
in order to assist the Congolese government to achieve
national reconciliation in conformity with the Security
Council resolution. It appealed for a ceasefire in the
Congo and proposed a round-table conference for the
Congolese political leaders in order to find an acceptable
solution(S3). However, the OAU member states were still
deeply divided along political and ideological matters
and therefore, the OAU were not able to resolve the crisis.
Consequently, the Council of Ministers adjourned on March 9th,
1965 agreeing only to refer the Congo question to the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State(S4). Despite the failure of
(S1)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, pp.524-525
(52)Ibid p.5~5'
(53)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit',p.92
(54)Ibid p.92
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the OAU peace efforts the crisis remained unsolved until
new developments occurred which completely changed the
situation. In this respect, Tshombe's triumph was subsequently
over-shadowed by the deterioration of his alliance with
President Kasavubu who was d?ing his utmost to restrict
Tshombe's political influence. Eventually, President Kasavubu
forced Tshombe to resign on October 13th, 1965 and asked his
Foreign Minister to form a new government(5S). Nonetheless,
Tshombe still remained on the political scene and endeavoured
to rally support against President Kasavubu, but his era
came to an end in November 1965 when General ~lobutu overthrew
President Kasavubu and assumed power(56). Consequently,
Tshombe went into self-imposed exile in Spain(57). Finally,
the Congo question was dropped from the OAU agenda when
President }tobutu offered to expel the mercenaries and to
seek reconciliation with neighbouring states(59). At all
events, the OAU was unable to bring peace to the Congo
and could not restore its civil crisis. Above all, this
(55)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.73
(56)~ p.74
(57)Despite the fact, Tshombe did not abandon hope of a
return to power. Subsequently, on June 20th, 1967
there were rumours about a new concentration of the
former Katangan gendarmarie in Angola. On June 30th,
1969 the aircraft in which Tshombe was travelling from
Ibiza to Mallorca was forced to land in Algeria and he
was imprisoned by the Algerian authorities. Subsequently,
it was reported that he had died in prison.
(58)Most of the mercenary corps left by Tshombe, had been
provisionally retained as an integral part of the Congolese
national army. By the beginning of July 1967, responding
to the long-standing appeal of the OAU, President Mobutu
had dismissed all mercenaries except two units, but they
were subsequently disbanded after their revolt against the
Congolese army.
(59)Cervenka, Zdenek. Op. Cit, p.94
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was due to foreign intervention and rivalry between-
the East and West. nle OAU was unfortunate enough
to be hit with a series of problems which could have
shaken even an older and more solidly established
organisation. The Congo crisis represented an
internal conflict of a nation torn by civil war at
the very centre of the continent, headed by a leader
who was considered as controversial by a number of
African states and an army led by white mercenaries.
These combined factors created an extremely explosive
situation which was a difficult test for the newly-
established organisation. Therefore, the OAU proved
powerless to create and enforce harmony when a
considerable number of member states were in basic
disagreement.
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THE NIGERIAN CIVIL l\'AR
THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF THE CRISIS:
The Nigerian Civil War was perhaps the second
gravest civil war which confronted the OAU since its
establishment in May 1963. The roots of the co~flict
stretch deep into the tribal culture and religious
history of the region(1). Nigeria contains within its
borders four major ethnic groups: the Hausa and Fulani
in the north; the Yoruba in the west and the Ibo in the
eastern part of the country(2). Each group was
separated from the others by differences of culture.
religion and language, which made them uneasy political
factions even during the period of colonial rule. The
Hausa and Fulani in the north are primarily Moslems.
while the majority of the Ibos profess Christian beliefs
and the Yorubas contain a mixture of Moslem and Christian
allegiances. Adding to the problems arising from the
cultural diversity. they are geographically isolated from
each other. Moreover. there were even differences in
educational and economic development of the regions
(1)The Nigerian civil war had been attributed to a number
of factors. the country's heterogeneous ethnic composition.
cultural diversity. vast size. difficulties of transport
and communication. varied administrative practices and
controversial political and constitutional arrangements.
As a result. smouldering ethnic hostilities initially
erupted during the early 1950's when the western region
threatened secession if the capital, Lagos, were not
retained within its political orbit.
(2) Buchheit, Lee C., Ope Cit, p.162
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marked by a more rapid progress of the eastern-western
areas in comparison with the northern region. In addition
to the four ethnic groups, there are numerous smaller
tribal groups distinguishable both in language and in
culture from the dominant,groups(3). Under these
circumstances, it was not surprising that the political
union of such a highly pluralistic society was, from the
beginning, a very fragile creation. ~~en the British
introduced a scheme in 1914 for the political amalgamation
of the south and north, the latter seriously preserved
the right to secede, to protect its own interests(4).
Subsequently, a federal constitution was adopted in 1959
which was a reaction to the colonial solution to the
problem (i.e. political amalgamation), and solved the
northerners' fears of southern domination. Thus, the
north was allowed to remain far bigger than the rest,
a superiority in size that was far beyond its dreams,
and by which it was able to translate the electoral
system into political domination of the whole federation(5).
At all events, the formation of a coalition government
from the Northern People's Congress and the National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) at the end of
1959, convinced the British government that the Nigerian
political system could work t~gether in independence(6).
(3)Smock, Audrey Chapman, The N.C.N.C. and Ethnic Union
in Biafra, ~, Volume Z, .!.2.21, p.21
(4) Tumuno, Tekena H.! Separatist Agitation in Nigeria Since
.t2.M, ~, Volume ~, .!.2.Z.Q., p.563




Despite this fact, the first five years of independence
showed that the colonial system was unable to withstand
the centrifugal pressure of the political facts. Thus,
the parliamentary institutions o~.government and values
associated with them, such as a free election and the
right of opposition, had been used in a quite different
way for the manipulation of ethnic features. The
political elite which had evolved in post-independence,
took advantage of the system for its own power and profit
and did not hesitate to use any weapon for its purpose.
The final political fact involved the undermining of
the Nigerian political system by the redistribution
of the finance between the regions(7). The latter
derived between 75% of their revenue from federal
payments, therefore, each local government endeavoured
to employ every possible way of pressure on the federal
government(8). As a result of these conflicting
elements, Nigeria Was pushed to the brink of chaos by
the end of the general elections of December 1964.
Following bitter electoral campaigning, the main
political parties in the eastern and western regions
decided to boycott the elections because of the new
census which gave the northern region a clear majority(9).
(7)It was a special grievance of the eastern region that it
had only received about 60% of the rents and royalties from
the oil produced there. In the case of development capital
there were no fixed guidelines for the distribution between
the main regions.
(8)Post. K.W.J., Ope Cit, p.30
(9) .Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.77
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As a result, civilian rule was ended on ~anuary 15th, 1966
by a bloody military coup caused by a group of junior
officers, most of whom were Ibos. It resulted in the
assassination of the federal Prime Minister, two
regional Prime Ministers, the federal Minister of Finance
as well as many senior northern officers. The young
officers were ideologically committed to a united Nigeria
and claimed that the coup was carried out in order to
remove governmental corruption(10). Nonetheless, the
northerners perceived that most of the young officers
involved were Ibos and most of the politicians and senior
officers killed in the course of the coup, were northerners.
In fact, the new regime did not persecute the officers who
were responsible for the killings during the coup. Moreover,
most of the advisors to the new regime were Ibos, which
created antagonism in the northern region(ll). At all
events, the situation seriously deteriorated after the
establishment of a provisional military government under
the highest ranking Ibo officer, Major General Johnson
Aguigi-Ironsi(12). Moreover, the federal system was
superseded by a unitary regime. This was strongly opposed
by the northerners, who regarded the measures as a scheme
for Ibo domination(13). Under these circumstances,
rioting broke out in the northern and southern regions
in protest against the unification decree which was
(10)Merris. E. Zukerman, Nigerian Crisis, Economic Impact
on the North, ~, Volume 8, !il2, p.87
(ll)Ibid p.l01
(12)Buchheit, Lee C., Ope Cit, p.16S
(13)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.79
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considered as tantamount to Ibo domination of the country.
Unfortunately, the rioting escalated into anti-eastern
sentiment in the northern region in which a wave of violence
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Ibo residents there(14).
In this atmosphere, a group of northern officers carried out
on July 29th, 1966, a counter-coup, killed General Ironsi,
together with a number of high-ranking Ibo officers.
Subsequently, they called upon Lieutenant Colonel Yakubub
Gowon, a northerner, to form a federal military government(lS).
As soon as the latter took office he called for the
convening of an ad hoc conference on the Nigerian constitution,
~n order to hold a referendum to determine a widely acceptable
federal system. Accordingly, the representatives of the
main regions met in Lagos at which the northern delegation
tabled an initial memoranda containing proposals for the
reconstruction of the federal constitution. It suggested
-that Nigeria should be an association of the existing regions
and such other states as might be formed subsequently, with
a right to secede completely and unilaterally(16). However,
the conference adjourned on September 29th, 1966 without
reaching agreement, because of a re-introduction of northern
predominance over the country or alternatively, in a
secession of the north from the other regions(17).
(14)The country-wide rioting erupted in the north, bringing
in its wake the massacre of at least 10,000 easterners
residing in that province and the expUlsion of many times
that number, during the period September-October 1966.
(1S)Meyers. David B., Ope Cit, p.183
(16)General Gowon stated that the coup would result in either
a re-establishment of northern predominance over the country,
or alternatively, in a secession of the north from the other
regions. In the event, he was dissuaded from proclaiming
the secession of the north by American and British diplomatic
pressure.
(17) Buchheit, Lee C., Ope Cit, p.166
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Unfortunately, in the course of the conference's adjourn-
ment, the worst outbreak of anti-eastern violence recurred
in the north resulting in the massacre of a large number
of Ibos residing in that province. Subsequently, the
rest of the !bos were expelled from the northern region and
thereupon, the country drifted further into anarchy(18).
Under these circumstances, the ad hoc constitutional
committee urgently reconvened, but it had been decided
that in the absence of the eastern delegation, the committee
would remain adjourned indefinitely(19). In an attempt
to reconcile the eastern region which was deeply aggrieved
by the treatment of its citizens in the north, General
Gowon met, on January 4th 1967, with the four military
governors of Nigeria at Aburi, Ghana. The meeting was held
under the auspices of General Ankrah, the head of the
military revolutionary council of Ghana at which the
federal structure was discussed, including the issue
relating to the recognition of Gowon as supreme commander
and head of the government(20). On the other hand,
the eastern delegation proposed the permitting of its
region to control its own security, broad local power
and some compensation for the loss of life and property
of Ibos in the northern region. However, the
negotiations ended on a hopeful note with agreement
apparently having been reached on a number of issues(21).
(18)Post, K.W.J., Op. Cit, p.30
(19)Buchheit. Lee C., Op. Cit, p.167
(20)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.79
(21)Ibid p.79
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Nonetheless, there were subsequent differences by which
Gowon and Ojukwu dissented sharply in public over the
interpretation of the Aburi agreement. General Gowon
maintained that the issue of governmental structure had
been resolved in favour of an effective federal authority
which Ojukwu interpreted to envision a kind of con-
federation(22). Consequently, mutual accusations of
a deliberate breach of the agreement were launched by
each side and culminated in the eastern region's refusal
to pay revenues to the federal government, complaining
that the !bos had not received the promise of compensation(23).
In retaliation, the federal government imposed on May 27th,
1967 economic sanctions and issued a decree for de-
centralizing the country and creating twelve states out
of the former regions. The eastern region was divided
into one Tho and two minority-run states(24). Under
these circumstances, Colonel Ojukwu, the governor of the
eastern region met on May 27th with the regional committee
of representatives in order to consult them on the latest
development. Subsequently, he declared on May 30th, 1967
the eastern region as an independent, sovereign state in
the name of Biafra(2S). The federal government of Nigeria
(22) •Buchheit. Lee e., Ope C1t, p.167
(23)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.79
(24)~ p.79
(2S)Clearly, the act of secession on the part of Biafra was
a reassertion of the right to self-determination, a right
which its inhabitants might be deemed to have exercised
already in 1960 at the momept of Nigerian independence.
The argument applied only if Biafra could not establish
itself as a s~ecial case not be taken as a precedent forany further d1sinte~ation. This was in fact what wasclaimed on its behalf explicitly. The grievance givingrise to Biafra's demand for secession was regarded as
sufficiently exceptional and enough to warrant its
acceptance as a special case. Such treatment had convinced
them that the only safeguard for their livlihood, property
and their way of life, was a separate state of th ire o~.
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regarded the declaration as an act of rebellion and
responded by mobilizing its troops and warning all states
not to interfere in its domestic affairs(26). However,
the UN did not at any time consider the issue and sought
to refer the matter to the OAU. The reason for this
hesitation was that the UN simply refrained from discussing
the Nigerian question in the absence of overt military
intervention by outside states. In the case of military
aid, the UN Secretary General held that the supply of arms
and military equipment to the parties in the conflict was
(27)simply beyond the scope of the UN competence • Despite
this fact, he had the power under Article 99 of the UN
Charter allowing him to bring matters to the attention of
the Security Council which, in his opinion, may threaten
the maintenance of international peace and security(28).
On the other hand, the OAU was in a difficult position.
Initially, the federal government held firmly that any
intervention even in the form of a discussion at the
OAU, would be in violation of the domestic jurisdictional
clause envisaged in Article 111(2) of the OAU Charter(29).
(26)Meyers. David B., Op. Cit, p.183
(27)The UN's organs did not play any direct peace-making
role in the Nigerian conflict, but the role played by
the UN and its specialized Agencies with regard to the
humanitarian aspect of the crisis, was of great significance.
The UN Secretary General encouraged the specialized Agencies
such as UNICEF and the WFP to channel large scale relief
operations for the victims of war, through the help of the
ICRC which co-ordinated the aid being distributed to
governmental and non-governmental agencies.
(28)Goodrich. Leland M. et al., Ope Cit, pp.588-593
(29)Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, pp.2-3
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However, from the outset the OAU was against any further
balkanization of the African continent thereby Biafrans
were unlikely to find any sympathy in that quarter. In
contrast, the reactions of individual members of the
world community to the Nigerian civil war were mixed.
Five states chose to recognise the Republic of Blafra
as a sovereign member of the community of nations. The
first to do so was Tanzania on April 13th, 1968, followed
by Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Zambia and Haiti(30).
Nonetheless, in the absence of collective international
recognition, there was little to prove that Biafra did
exist as a state in international law. In fact, the
term state has no exact definition, but the essential
characteristics of a state in international law are
envisaged in the ~Iontevideo Convention of 1933 on the
rights and duties of states. It was concluded between
the United States and certain Latin American states
which required that for a state to be a member of the
community of nations, it should possess the following
qualifications:-
(1) a defined territory; (2) government; (3) capacity
to enter into relations with other states(31).
In dealing with the requirement to mean that a state must
have recognised capacity to maintain external relations
with other states. It would appear that there is no
other way of obtaining this recognised capacity than by
(30)Ijalaye. David A., Note and Comments, Was Biafra
at any Time a State in International Law, ~, Volume 65,
!iZ!, p.SS .
(31)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 12, 1963, pp.223-224
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the granting of formal recognition by existing members
of the community of nations. However, recognition forms
an integral part of that statehood which manifests
itself before an entity can claim to have attained it
in.international law. This case can be illustrated by
the Rhodesian situation in which Great Britain refused
to concede the validity of the unilateral declaration
of independence(32). Thus, Rhodesia was unable to
possess the capacity to enter into relations with other
states. Nonethele~s, the situation of Biafra was
different from that of Rhodesia, the Republic of Biafra
being recognised by five states of the community of
nations. But, in spite of the recognition of the five
states, Biafra's status was still controversial. In this
respect, Nigeria responded by withdrawing its diplomatic
representatives from the capitals of those states and
holding that they were contrary to Article 2(7) of the
UN Charter and Article III(2) of the OAU Charter(33).
In fact, whenever part of an existing state breaks away
to form another independent state, recognition is always
controversial so perhaps that was why no state came
forward to recognise the Republic of Biafra. In any event,
the four African states and Haiti which recognised Biafra
did not establish formal diplomatic relations with it(34).
(32)Fawcett, J.E.S., Security Council Resolution on Rhodesia,
BYBIL, Volume 41, 196a, pp.113-115
(33) Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.79
(34) .IJalaye, David A., Op. Cit, p.5S5
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As a matter of fact, the formal establishment of diplomatic
relations is not a requisite corollary of recognition.
In fact, the humanitarian considerations were clearly
brought out in the granting of recognition by the five
states(3S). There were no other reasons given by the
recognizing states. Most of the declarations announcing
the granting of recognition stressed the ferocity of the
Nigerian-Biafran conflict and saw little basis for any
future political unity of the federation. In this respect,
France called for a peaceful settlement of the conflict
on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination.
It noted that the suffering of the Biafrans had shown
their determination to affirm themselves as a people(36).
There was speculation that the reference to such inter-
national principle meant that France might prepare to
give Biafra formal recognition, but France never did so.
In fact, the recognition of a new state is the free act
by which one or several states.take note of the existence
of human society politically organised, of a fixed
territory, independent of any other existing state
capable of observing the principles of international law,
thus indicating their intention to consider it as a
member of the community of nations. Despite the fact,
(3S)Most of the declarations announcing the granting of
recognition stressed the ferocity of the Nigerian-Biafran
conflict and saw little basis for any future political
unity of the country. The first to do so was Tanzania,
on April 13th, 1968 which accused other African states of
having callously watched the massacre of tens of thousands
of people for the sake of upholding the territorial integrity
of Nigeria. Subsequently, it was followed by Gabon, the
Ivory Coast, Zambia and Haiti.
(36)Buchheita Lee C., OPe Cit, p.170
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the act of recognition is still by and large political
in nature, by which it is the perogative of an independent
sovereign state(37). Nonetheless, the act produces
legal consequences in the sense that it endows an entity
with rights and duties under international law.
Accordingly, such acts of recognition must in any way
be judged in conformity with the rules of international
law. Therefore, states are not deemed free to grant,
or refuse recognition to new states in an arbitrary
manner by exclusive reference to their own political
interests and regardless of legal principles. Under
these circumstances, the recognition of Biafra by the
above-mentioned states would appear to be unjustified
in that, at the time of a real struggle was still
proceeding. It was not abundantly clear that Nigeria
had lost all hope or abandoned all efforts to redeem
its sovereignty. Accordingly, the recognition given
to Biafra was in the circumstances, premature, thus
constituting an act of interference in Nigerian domestic
affairs. As a matter of fact, no country including
those recognising Biafra formally, granted the status
of belligerancy to either side in the Nigerian civil war.
The reason would appear to be that the warfare was in
the main on land, and foreign states were not sufficiently
affected by it. In the absence of any collective
international judgement on the legitimacy of the secession,
(37)Greig. D.W., Op. Cit, p.120
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there was little to inhibit outside powers from inter-
fering. Despite the fact, the reactions of individual
states to the Diafra secession were mixed. On the one
hand, France was reported to have indirectly supplied
the Diafrans with arms via the Francophone states.
Portugal also permitted the Biafrans to use Lisbon as
a base for propaganda activities and for arranging the
purchase of arms(38). On the other hand, Great Britain
as the former colonial power, felt particularly
responsible for the crisis in Nigeria and sought to
maintain that it would do all in its power to preserve
Nigerian unity(39). Consequently, it held that it
would not suspend its sales of military weapons to the
federal government of Nigeria because this would not
in any measure affect the ultimate outcome of the
conflict(40). At all events, Britain was not the
exclusive competitor in supplying arms to the federal
government and the Soviet Union found it in its interests
to sell military equipment to the federal authority(41).
In contrast, the United States imposed an embargo on the
sale of American weapons to the combatants shortly after
hostilities began. This policy of banning the sale of
(38)auchheit, Lee C.,
(39)The continued supply of weapons was also necessary
to preserve British influence with the Nigerian govern-
ment, particularly when the Soviet Union seemed eager to
fill any vacuum in this regard. It was also to increase
the faith of the other Commonwealth countries in Britain's
determination to support them in time of need.
(40)Buchheit, Lee C., Op. Cit, p.171
(41)Ibid p.172
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arms to either side was maintained throughout the
In spite of the ban, the American
administration did not recognise Biafra as a sovereign
independent state but generally deplored the inter-
vention of outside powers in the conflict by the supply
of arms to the combatants(43). However, the continued
supply of arms to the federal government did affect the
ultimate outcome of the conflict in its favour. The
military success of the Nigerian government in suppressing
the Biafran resistance removed the immediate need for any
further inquiry into the legitimacy of the secession.
Nonetheless, the Republic of Biaira did in fact enter
the community of nations for a brief period. The
comparison of the Biafran secession with that of
Katanga would appear to show strong arguments for
Biafran legitimacy. The main grounds of these arguments
could be attributed to the survey of objection to the
Katangan secession which were consistently maintained
by members of the community of nations. Unlike Katanga,
Biafra did not attempt to divide the country virtually
from the moment it became independent. The secession
of Biafra occurred six years after the accession of
Nigeria to independence and the economic viability of
the federation was never seriously in doubt. The
exceptional viability of the secession might have




its ethnic components. ''lithregard to the Republic
of Biafra~ it showed every sign of being able to survive
as a separate state. It had a population of around
14 million, natural resources, necessary facilities, a
relatively high educational level and so on(44). 'iith
respect to the Katangan population, there were grave
doubts in connection with the question of whether they
possessed enough ethnic or historical identity to
substantiate a claim to being a people. Contrary to
the fact that the majority of Biafrans were Ibos and its
cultural and historical differentiation from the other
Nigerian regions was apparent(4S). Moreover, the Ibos
had a colourable claim to excessive oppression at the·
hands of the northerners in the course of the widespread
killings and expulsion of easterners residing in the
northern region prior to the secession(46). In addition,
the non-Ibo tribes within the Republic of Biafra probably
had as little in common with the Ibos as with other
Nigerian ethnic groups. In fact~ the secession was
proclaimed on behalf of all the inhabitants and not just
on behalf of the Ibos and those who considered themselves
equallyaffected(47). At each stage of the events
(44)Ibid p.173
(4S)The Nigerian regions had embraced secession in theory
at one time or another. The danger of setting off further
secessionist reactions was made clear at the first meeting
of the ad hoc constitutional committee in 1967 when the
representative of the western region indicated that if the
east seceded from the federation, the west would not be
far behind. If this occurred, the north would be left to
confront the problem arising from a landlocked geographical
position with potentially hostile neighbours blocking its
access to the sea.
(46)nrick, S.K. Panter, The Right to Self-Determination,
Its Application to Nigeria~ ~, Volume 44, 1968, p.262
(47)Ibid p.262
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leading up to the secession, the action was taken under
authorization of the consultative Assembly and Advisory
Committee of Chiefs and Elders in the Eastern Region(48).
Consequently, it was a joint secession of those bodies
-which passed on May 27th, 1967, a resolution mandating
Ojukwu to proclaim at the earliest practicable date, the
eastern region as an independent sovereign state(49).
In the first analysis, the strongest piece of evidence
supporting the Biafran claim to being a distinct people
with an overwhelming desire for independence, was their
determination to suffer almost three years of civil war.
Despite those differences in the comparison between
Biafra and Katanga, both Biafra and'Katangals secessionist
attempts revealed lingering ~ncertainties, thereby they
had been opposed by the world community. Thus, the
non-recognition of the secessionist self-determination
by the world community was designed to close the flood-
gate.to further. disintegration and potential dismember-
ment of existing states in the globe. The consensus
among states was that the right of self-determination
is the right of the majority within an accepted
political unit and fixed population(SO). Consequently,
there can be no such thing as self-determination for
every self-distinguishing ethno-cultural group living
within a political unit to secede from an established state{Sl).
(48)Buchheit, Lee C., Op. Cit, p.173
(49)Brick. S.K. Panter, Op. Cit, p.260
(SO)Frank. Thomas M., Op. Cit, pp.697-701
(S1)As a matter of political realism after independence,
African states were virtually unanimous in agreeing that
respect for existing European-designed boundaries should
be a guiding principle in inter-African relations.
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The secession from an independent state would be a
dangerous precedent that would undermine the legitimacy
of pluralistic states. The break-up of an existing
state is a very rOadical solution to the political
problem arising from cultural diversity, and requires
exceptional circumstances to justify it. The fact of
being nationally, culturally, racially and linguistically
distinct is not in itself enough justification for a
group to demand secession and the establishing of
nation-statehood. Thus, the justification of Biafrans
could not merely be that they were different ethnically
or culturally from the rest of the Nigerian population,
but rather on the basis that they could no longer live
in peace and security(52). Despite this fact, the
OAU attitude towards the concept of secession is
inherently incompatible with the goal of African unity.
The break-away attempts of Biafrawere, from the outset,
denounced as inconsistent with pan-African unity. This
was in consequence of the assumption that any other
approach would lead to endless conflicts as African
states found themselves under pressure to join a general
revisionary march backwards to the ethnical status quo.
Therefore, the OAU has insisted that each colony in the
final stage of decolonisation must exercise its right
(52)Brick, S.K. Panter, Ope Cit, p.262
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of self-determination within the confines of established
boundaries. Consequently, the 1964 Summit of the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State adopted by acclamation, a
resolution by which member states pledged themselves to
, respect the borders existing, on their achievement of
national independence(53). At all events, it has been
realized that while there are injustices in some instances,
they could be handled better through functional
arrangements between African states in a way such as
regional common markets and rights of unhindered movement
across frontiers.
(53)
Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, pp. 360-361
,
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THE OAU ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR:
As stated earlier, hostilities between the troops
of the Nigerian federal army and of Biafra started on
.July 6th, 1967(1). The fighting developed into a war
of international dimension. The attitude of the OAU
towards the conflict was a difficult one to take.
Since the Congo civil war and the unsuccessful attempts
of the OAU, its member states had been extremely cautious
about involving the OAU in members' domestic affairs.
However, the OAU continued to avoid discussion of
primarily domestic issues until the war became of such
magnitude as to make its involvement extremely requisite.
Nonetheless, the Nigerian federal government held firmly
that any intervention, even in the form of a discussion,
would be in violation of Article III(2) of the OAU Charter.
On the other hand, the Biafran regime was constantly
pressing for the internationalization of the conflict
in order to involve international and regional organisations
in the matter(3). However, a-number of African states
called on July 8th, 1967 upon the leaders of both sides
to halt hostilities and seek a negotiated settlement(4),
(I)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.97
(2) Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, pp.2-3
(3) i 8Meyers, Dav dB., Op. Cit, p.l 4
(4)A joint appeal was made on July 8th, 1967 to the leaders
of both sides by the Emperor of Ethiopia and the Presidents
of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. But in view of the
insistence of Nigeria that the war was strictly a domestic
affair it remained uncertain.until the OAU Assembly met a~
Kinshasa on September 11th, 1967.
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but the federal government maintained that the conflict
was strictly an internal matter and should be solved by
the Nigerians themselves(S). Therefore, the situation
remained uncertain until the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State met on September 11th, 1967 for its fourth annual
session at Kinshasa, Zaire. However, the meeting of
the OAU Council of Uinisters which always precedes that of
the Assembly of Heads of State, did not propose the
Nigerian crisis for the Assembly's agenda. Despite this
fact, Nigeria's head of state eventually agreed to have
the matter discussed with the proviso to ensure no attempt
would be made to interfere in Nigerian domestic
affairs(6). The resolution adopted by the OAU Assembly
was carefully drafted so as to take full account of
Nigeria's preoccupation. Accordingly, it condemned
the secession of Biafra and recognised the-situation as
an internal matter, the solution of which was primarily
the responsibility of the Nigerians themselves. It also
established a consultative mission of six heads of state
whose task was to assure the Nigerian government of the
OAU Assembly's determination for the territorial integrity,
unity and peace of Nigeria(7). The composition of the
mission represented a careful equilibrium of the different
attitudes towards the Nigerian conflict. The President of
Cameroon was known for his sympathy with the Biafran cause.
I
(S)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.79
(6)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.98
(7)Buchheit, Lee C., Ope Cit, p.169
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This may be in consequence of the presence of a
considerable number of Ibos in Cameroon, especially
in the western region which was once part of Eastern
- Nigeria. However, it was reported that Cameroon had
co-operated with the 5iafran regime in breaking the
Nigerian federal blockade in the field of communications(8).
In considering Nigerls'attitude, the President had to
bear in mind the dependence of his country on the northern
Nigerian railways as a vital link between the Niger and
the sea. In addition, the people of Niger have a natural
affection and attachment to the population of northern
Nigeria as fellow mus1ims and because of their common
a~cestry(9). The Ethiopian and Liberian heads of state
were senior African statesmen wielding great influence
in African diplomatic circ1es(10). Finally, the
nomination of the Ghanaian President was motivated by
./--- the fact that he had been a host at the Aburi Conference
of January 4th, 1967(11). In any event, the resolution
did not call for a ceasefire or suggest a compromise and
did not even mention specifically good offices as part
of the mission's role. However, when the mission visited
Lagos on November 23rd, 1967, it was when the Biafran
forces were in retreat, it did not leave them much
leeway and, thereupon, General Gowon told the members of
the mission that •••••you were not here to mediate ••••(12).
( 8)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.99
(9)Ibid p.99 .
(10)Hassouna, Hussein A., Op. Cit, pp.214-215
(11)Perham, Marierl, Nigeria's Civil War, Africa Contemporary
Record, 196 -62, p.7
(12)cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.99
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Consequently, the mission supported the terms of the
federal government for a return to unification and
acceptance of the federal administrative structure of
the co~try(13). This stance unfortunately limited the
role of the OAU as an effective regional organisation
responsible for handling regional disputes. The only
thing which it was able to do was to persuade the
federal government of the need to establish contact with
the Biafran regime through one of its members in order to
convey to them the text of the OAU Assembly's resolution(14).
The latter maintained that any solution to the conflict
must be in the context of preserving the unity and
territorial integrity of Nigeria. Accordingly, the
outcome of the OAU mission was a bitter disappointment
for the Biafran regime. Under these circumstances, the
conflict was intensified, partly as a result of the
acquisition by both sides of additional arms from abroad.
As the war of attrition continued, the Biafran regime
began to seek mediation in a forum other than the OAU(IS}.
As had been discerned, the prospect for UN involvement
was even less than that for OAU mediation, the Biafran
regime started to explore the possibilities for mediation
(13)~ p.99
(14)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.79
(lS}Diafra started to explore possibilities for mediation
by the Commonwealth Secretariat. By this time, the
federal government had also begun to feel the need for
negotiations. In this respect, both sides were thus able
to agree early in May 1968 to start negotiations under the
auspices of the Commonwealth Secretariat. But, neither
this initiative nor the various subsequent initiatives of
the British government could produce positive results.
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by the Co~nonwealth Secretariat. Accordingly, preliminary
negotiations between the representatives of the federal
government and the Biafran regime took place in May 1968
at Kampala, Uganda under the co-Chairmanship of Uganda's
-Foreign Minister and the Secretary General of the
Commonwealth(16). The Peace Conference in Kampala
discussed the issues of foreign observers, giving
effective assurance of safety to the Ibo people, the
conditions for ending the hostilities and the arrangements
for a permanent settlement. The initiative of the Common-
wealth Secretariat offered a great deal of scope for
maneouvring, thereupon it could not conciliate the
fundamental disagreement between the parties in dispute.
The federal government's principal condition was renunci-
ation of secession by Biafra, before a ceasefire came
into effect, but the Biafran regime insisted on an immediate
cease fire with no such condition attached(17). Consequently,
the initiative could not produce positive results. In the
meantime, the war escalated, with federal troops advancing
into Biafran territory(18). This made it certain that
Biafra would not survive within the frontiers set out on
May 30th, 1967. Under these circumstances, the Peace
Conference broke down on May 31st, 1968. The Biafran
representative accused the federal delegation of exploiting
its military advantage by trying to dictate, rather than to
negotiate a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict(19).
(16)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.80
(17)Ibid p.80
(18)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.l00
(19)Ibid p.l00
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IIowever, the advances of federal troops into Biafran
territory resulted in appalling conditions for the !bo
population in the warring areas which aroused world-
wide concern, and the OAU was constrained to resume its
efforts(20). Therefore, the humanitarian considerations
were behind the reviving of efforts by the OAU consult-
ative mission on July 15th, 1968 at Niamoy, Niger at
which General Gowon told its members that the rebel leaders
were playing politics with the whole question of human
suffering to their diplomatic and military advantage.
He also revealed that the rebellion was already suppressed
and a unilateral ceasefire by the federal government
without any prior commitment from the rebel leaders to
give up secession, would offer them the opportunity to
regroup, rearm and prepare for the continuation of the
conflict. Moreover, he mentioned that a unilateral
ceasefire on humanitarian grounds would not in any way
relieve the sufferings of the innocent victims of the
conflict(21). Nonetheless, General Gowon did share some
understanding with the mission's members for the Ibo
fears for their safety. Therefore, he agreed to the
(20)The suffering of the population in the warring areas
aroused public opinion in Africa and elsewhere to such an
extent that many African leaders felt that the OAU should
not remain inactive. There was also the shift of
diplomatic initiative to the Commonwealth Secretariat.
Therefore, African leaders discerned that unless the OAU
resumed its initiative, it might lose prestige and
influence and might become irrelevant to the major
regional disputes. Moreover, the other factor was the
removal of obstacles to initiating negotiations between
the two sides which attracted the OAU to piay a mediatory
role rather than a more consultative one.
(21)Cervenka, Zden~, Ope Cit, p.IOl
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introduction of outside observers to ensure that federal
troops would not massacre the !bose Despite this fact,
he was firm on the terms of reference of the observers
who were not to be concerned with peace-keeping operations~
- (22)but should only observe and bear testimony • At all
events, the OAU Consultative )tlssion supported the
federal view for the territorial integrity~ unity and
peace, but stressed the need for the relief operation
in the distressed areas of Biafra. Accordingly, the
final resolution adopted by the mission emphasised the
need for the establishment of air and land mercy corridors
for transporting relief supplies to the civilian victims
of the war(23). It also invited the two sides in the
conflict to begin immediate preliminary talks under the
Chairmanship of the President of Niger in order to seek
implementation of the relief operation. Moreover~ it
requested them to resume peace negotiations as soon as
possible in Addis Ababa, under its auspices, in order to
achieve a mutually acceptable solution to the crisis(24).
In accordance with the proyisions of this resolution,
serious negotiations on the relief issue began at Niamoy.
It was also continued at the Addis Ababa peace talks
where an agreement was reached in principle, on the
establishment of air and land mercy corridors for trans-
porting relief supplies to the civilian victims of the war(2S)
(22)Ibid p.102
(23)-Andemlcael. Berhanykum, Qp. Cit, p.SI
(24)~ p.S2
(25) .Cervenka Zdenek, OPe Cit p 100, .
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The Peace Conference was opened on August 5th, 1968 by
the Ethiopian Emperor(26) and it soon became evident
that an agreement for political settlement of the
dispute was unobtainable(27). Under these circumstances, the
mutually agreed objective of setting up relief corridors
became irrelevant, particularly when it also became known
that General Gowon would not be able to participate
personally in the peace negotiations(28). Subsequently,
federal troops launched a final offensive in September
1968 by which the remaining towns still held by the
Biafran regime fell into federal hands(29). This in turn
put more pressure on the Biafran delegation at the Addis
Ababa peace negotiations, but it refused to compromise.
As a result, the Addis Ababa peace negotiations adjourned
on September 9th, 1968 indefinitely, when it became clear
that neither side was inclined to make any concession(30).
However, when the OAV Assembly of Heads of State met on
September 4th, 1968 in Algeria for its fifth ordinary
session, it gave emphatic support to the position of the
federal government(31). The political fate of Biafra
(26)His efforts and the humanitarian approach to the
conflict were appreciated by Pope Paul and supported
by the ICRC. The latter despatched a special envoy
to Addis Ababa to conduct an attempt to get the two
sides to agree on a mercy corridor which would help
in spreading relief supplies.
(27)Cervenka Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.l02
(28)MeyerS, David B., Qp. Cit, p.l07
(29)Cervenka Zdenek, gpo Cit, p.l02
(30)Ibid p.l02
(31)Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-69, p.620
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appeared to be sealed when the four states which recognised
Biafra could not muster any meaningful support for the
Biafran cause(32). Despite this fact, a considerable
number of African leaders sympathised with the humane
motives behind the recognition of Biafra by the four
member states, but they rejected their thesis that
•••••unity achieved by conquest was worthless ••••(33).
This was because of their fear of similar conflicts in
their own countries where many similar tribal and ethnic
problems prevailed. It was a decisive influence on all
delegates at the Summit of the OAU Assembly. Consequently,
the resolution adopted was in line with views of the
Nigerian delegation that any solution 'of the conflict must
be in the context of preserving the unity and territorial
integrity of Nigeria. J.foreover,it appealed to both
sides to declare a ceasefire and to the Biafran regime
to co-operate with the federal authorities in order to
restore peace and unity in Nigeria. Furthermore, it
called upon the federal government to declare a general
amnesty and to co-operate with the OAU in ensuring the
physical security of all Nigerians. Finally, it urged
all the OAU member states to co-operate in the speedy
delivery of humanitarian supplies to the needy(34).
As stated earlier, the OAU Assembly rejected the thesis
of the four states recognising Biafra and reaffirmed its
(32)Ijalaye, David A., Ope Cit, p.555
(33)Buchheit, tee C., Ope Cit, p.170
(34)Africa Contemporary Record, 1968-69, p.620
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policy of opposition to the secessionist self-determination.
In this respect, it called upon all member states of the
UN and its own, to refrain from any action detrimental to
the peace, unity and territorial integrity of Nigeria(3S).
This could be attributed to the strong support sustained
by the host country to the federal thesis(36). It was
also attributed to the desire of most delegations to be
on the winning side, and thus cement diplomatic relations
with Nigeria. However, in conformity with the resolution
of the Algerian Summit, the Consultative Mission pursued
its peace efforts in Monrovia. The meeting opened on
April 17th, 1969 and was attended by all members in addition
to the participation of the OAU Secretary General(37).
But, it ended without making any progress towards national
reconciliation. However, the last OAU efforts at national
reconciliation in the Nigerian civil war were made at the
sixth ordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State which took place at Addis Ababa in September, 1969(38).
,
The Assembly adopted a resolution containing similar terms
(35)Ibid p.620
(36)Algeria strongly sustained the federal view. It
did not allow a Biafran delegation to be admitted to
the country. .. However, President Boumedienne
in his opening speech, fiercely denounced plots against
Nigeria aiming at disintegrating and shaking the
foundation of the great African state to whose unity and
cohesion we were all proud. This set the course of the
conference which the majority of the delegations followed.
The antagonism between the majority and the minority was
such, that the President of Zambia refused nomination to
become one of the Vice-Presidents of the OAU Assembly and
even left the conference soon after the debate on the
Nigerian civil war was completed.
(37)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.l0S
(38)Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, p. C3
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as the previous ones, urging both sides to halt hostilities .
and negotiate for a united Nigeria. The four states which
recognised Biafra abstained(39). In accordance with this
resolution, the last round of peace talks between the
federal government and the Biafran regime took place at
Addis Ababa in December 1969(40). Both parties were
invited by the Ethiopian Emperor, but this gave rise to
the question of whether the Emperor was making his
initiative privately or in his capacity as Chairman of the
OAU Consultative Mission. The Biafran interpretation
was that it was a private initiative, but the Nigerians
insisted that it was within the framework of the OAU(41).
As a result of this impasse, the talks did not take
place(42) and the Biafran delegation, which had already
arrived in Addis Ababa, returned home. At all events,
by the end of 1969, the morale of the Biafran army was
rapidly declining and desertion was rife. The famished
soldiers threw away their arms and fled into the bush
or into the crowds of distressed refugees(43). On
(39)Ibid p. c6
(40)~enka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.l07
(41)This was in consequence of Biafrals refusal to have
anything more to do with the OAU. It had lost faith in
the OAU as a possible forum. Consequently, it attempted
to secure mediation in the conflict through Switzerland,
Austria, Sweden and Yugoslavia, but none of these
countries made an official approach to the federal govern-
ment of Nigeria. They stressed repeatedly that the OAU
was the only body authorized to mediate.
(42)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.l07
(43)Ibid .p.l07
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January 10th, the Biafran cabinet held a meeting at
which Colonel Ojukwu informed it that he would leave
the country in search of peace. He entrusted the Chief
of Staff, Colonel Philip Effiong with the responsibility
of administ·ering the government (44)• Subsequently,
Colonel Effiong offered, on January 12th 1970, the
federal government of Nigeria, the unconditional
capitulation of Biafra(45). It has already been
mentioned that the Biafran struggle for independence
was waged under the banner of the right of self-
determination. Without reference to the possible merit
of the Biafran people's claim to the right of self-
determination,. the secession was from the outset,
condemned as being detrimental to African interest.
It was also seen as an incompatible goal with African
unity and would set a precedent that could lead to
further balkanization of the continent. It was true
that the external involvement in the Nigerian conflict did
take the form of overt military intervention as it did in
the Congo crisis. Nonetheless, the supply of arms to the
antagonists in the conflict clearly affected the conduct
of the war. This process in some circumstances had the
result of affecting the outcome of the conflict in favour
of the federal government. However, the Biafran secession
(44)Ijalaye, David A., Ope Cit, p.S51
(4S)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.l07
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.
led to a massive civil war waged largely with foreign
weapons and resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands
of people. Despite this fact, the OAU treated the conflict
as of purely internal origin, therefore allowing external
intervention to such an extent as to upset the equilibrium
between the protagonists and determined the outcome of the
war. By following an approach of non-interference in
such cases, the OAU was in effect allowing the outcome of
African regional disputes to be determined by external
actions. The OAU's commitment to the absolute preserv-
ation of the territorial status quo in Africa would make
sense only if it were supplemented by a serious effort
toresolve the problems that underlie and breed secession.
Consequently, secessionist demands could be substantially
reduced if adequate safeguards were provided for the
rights and security of minorities in African states.
To be instrumental in tackling the underlying causes of
secession or in resolving actual secessionist conflict,
the OAU needs to develop new institutional structures
and procedures. A step in this direction is the revival
of the Commission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
to which both governments and their dissident groups
would have access somewhat along the lines·of the European
Human Rights Commission. The OAU Secretary General must
also be given some capacity to mediate in regional disputes
and in major internal conflicts, especially those which
potentially threaten the peace and security of Africa.
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CHAD'S CIVIL STRIFE
TIm HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
OF TIm CONFLICT:
Chad is a huge country, the fifth largest in Africa
.which achieved independence on August-11th, '1960. It was
one of the four sovereign states arising out of the
territory of the former French Equatorial Africa. The
Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and
Gabon are the other three. Each of the four territories
had formerly been autonomous members of the French
community(l). It is a landlocked territory stretching
from the Sahara desert to the tropical rain forests of
the equatorial belt. The entire northern half of the
country is sparsely populated desert. The southern half
of Chad is mainly in the Savanna land of the extreme
south where nearly half of the population lives, including
most of the Sara ethnic group(2). In fact, the complexity
of the Chadian imbroglio induced by the socio-cultural
context has shaped the course of civil strife. Chadian
society is split down the middle between the Sudanic-
Nilotic Muslims of the north and the Christian Bantu
population of the south. The north-south dichotomy
(l)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 2, 1963, p.140
(2)With Ndjamona some 700 miles from the coast, indeed
most imports have to travel up to 1800 miles to reach
Chad. The poor communication acts as a major develop-
mental constraint and inhibits national unification.
Intense socio-economic differences sharply separate
various population groups reflecting fundamental
diverging patterns of social organisation and life-
styles, and deeply entrenched inter-ethnic animosities.
- 540 -
conceals a variety of other ethno-regional cleavages
which in recent times have asserted themselves as far
more significant than the Muslim-Christian split(3).
Within the huge northern part of the country, one finds
at least three major ethno-regional aggregates each
subdivided into a multiplicity of cultural segments.
The first group is the Toubou, organised into a variety
of nomadic clans, owing nominal allegiance to a paramount
chief (Derbei). Their traditional habitat is the extreme
north and around the Tibesti-Massif(4). The second group
is the Arabs, belonging to several small-scale nomadic
or sedentary communities dispersed throughout the country.
Most the the traders found in the urban centres of the
south were of Arab origin and to this day, Arab elements
continue to play a significant role in tJleeconomic life
of the south (5). The third group is the so-called
Sahalian population, an extremely loose and arbitrary
grouping, including a variety of communities spread on
an east-west axis across the Sahalian belt. They comprise
very different cultural traditions and types of strati-
fication but there can be little question that their
common adherence to Islam offers a considerable potential
for cultural and political mobilization against the
non-MUslim(6). Despite this fact, the presence of major
(3)neCalo, Samuel, Regionalism~ Political Decay and Civil
Strife in Chad, ~, Volume 1 , 1980, p.21
(4)!2!d p.25 (5)~ p.21
(6)Of the various ethnic groups of the Sahal belt, the Maba
are the most numerous together with related fragments.
They are the third largest group after the Arabs and the Sara.
For the bulk of the population, Arabic has become the lingua
franco just as Sara is the common medium of communication
in the south. The Maba are semi-sedentary Muslim pastoral-
iats and more strongly pulled to the Maghrab and neighbouring
Sudan than to the south.
- 541 -
cultural and linguistic divisions among and within each
of these groups constitutes an equally powerful source
of political fragmentation. However, the ethnic
configuration of the south appears far more homogeneous.
There are the Sara, who constitute the numerically
dominant group and the most thoroughly Christianized(7).
The birth of Sara ethnicity is a classic phenomenon of
the extension of a common cultural awareness which had
discreted linguistically related entities, in which there
are countless parallels elsewhere in Africa. Within the
Sara consciousness, sub-loyalties persist, but all are
part of a wider Sara community(8). Despite this, tensions
have frequently occurred among these different levels of
cultural consciousness which are a major ingredient in the
politics of Sara ethnicity. Nonetheless, they shared
an awareness of the threats posed to their political
hegemony by the northerners(9). This was the most
powerful source of intra-Sara cohesion during the first
phase of the civil strife. But, cohesion shifted more
rapidly during the chaotic course of events that followed
the overthrow of the Tombolbaye regime on April 13th,
It would appear that the shift occurred in
part in the complexities of the ethnic configuration that
made up the social landscape. It was also in part the
dramatic changes that have taken place in the political
arena since the outbreak of the rebellion in the north
in 1965(11). The systematic exclusion of northern
( 7)Lemarchand, Rene, Chad: The Roots of Chaos, ~,
Volume 61, 1982, p.414
(8)Ibid p.41S
(9)Ibid p.416
(10)DeCalo, Samuel, ge. Cit, p.SO
(11)Ibid p.40
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elements from political participation made their recourse
to rebellion almost inevitable. They had been denied
political participation for 15 years since accession to
independence, while the Sara were politically and
economically dominant(12). Thus, it had resulted in
enormous resentment which had been building up since
independence among the rural sectors of the north, over
what they considered to be an intolerable domination.
As a result, anti-Sara sentiment gathered considerable
momentum in subsequent years of post-independence. It
also escalated in the face of the countless abuse,
humiliation and discrimination practices attributed to
Sara rulel which eventually led to.the prolonged civil
strife(13). In this respect, opposition to the Sara-
dominated Tombolbaye regime was channelled in 1966 into
an organised liberation movement (Front de Liberation
Nation~le Tchadion) initially led by Ibrahim Abatcha(14).
However, from the outset the movement was plagued by
factional divisions which came to a head in 19681 following
the death of Abatcha. Thus, this triggered a bitter
struggle for leadership among his lieutenants, but it was
temporarily resolved by the appointment of Abba Siddick
as Secretary General in 1969(15). In any event, whatever
(12)Lemarchand, Rene, Op. Cit, p.416
(13)Ibid p.416
(14)Fronlinat was the outcome of a merger of several move-
ments, notably Union Nationale Tchadian with Political
Union Generale des Files de Tchad and the Movement
Nationa1e du Liberation du Chad under Ahmed Moussa •. Of the
various liberation movements that sprang up to channel the
course of the rebellion in the northl the Frolinat wasofficially created when the leaders of the above-mentioned
movements slipped from Sudan into Chad and formally united
their movements.
(15)Lemarchand, Rene, Ope Citl p.416
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success the Frolinat initially claimed in increasing
supporters, it was perhaps not so much a reflection of
the strategic skills of its leadership. In fact, it
was as a consequence of the appalling record of incompetence,
-mismanagement, corruption and brutality associated with the
Tombolbaye regime(16). However, it was the Frolinat that
initially resorted to the use of force in the Chadian civil
strife. It launched a series of guerrilla attacks,
principally on government outposts in the rural areas of
Chad in 1966(17). As a matter of fact, the Frolinat
could not hope to establish the legitimacy of its military
action under internal law but under 'international law.
In this respect, traditional international law provided for
the legitimization of use of force by rebels only if the
use resulted in the establishment of control over
territory(18). Nonetheless, the Frolinat asserted the
flat proposition that a people suffering from oppression
had the right to use force against their oppressor.
Accordingly, hardships are seen as an immediate, ultimate
and direct spur to rebellion against an unpopular
government(19). Therefore, rebellion in Chad stressed
the hardship which individuals and groups suffered due
to the denial of political participation of the northerners
and to a wide measure of economic distress. Consequently,
(16)DeCalo. Samuel, Op. Cit, p.41
(17)Ibid p.41
(18);;:ieigh. Arnold, The Algerian Revolution as a Case
Study in International Law, The Johns Hopkins Press,
London, 12Z!, pp.189-190
(19)Nkemdirim. Bernard A., Reflections on Political Conflict,
Rebellion and Revolution in Africa, JMAS, Volume 15,
1977, pp.76-82 ----
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the Frolinat argued that it would not have to wait in
order to establish the legitimacy of its military action
until it achieved sufficient military success. At all
events, it is perhaps worth pausing briefly to consider
why international law deals with the problem of internal
war at all, since civil war takes place largely within
the territorial confines of a single state. Moreover,
it is a struggle over the locus of political power and
authority within that state which is a matter of domestic
jurisdiction(20). The major reason for international
law's concern with problems of civil war both in the
past and in the present international system, has been
the need to define the rights and obligations of outside
states, vis-a-vis the parties to the internal conflict(21).
Thus, it has comprised the form of legal norms concerning
inter alia, the recognition of states and government~,
legal characterization of the parties to a civil war
as either rebels, insurgents or belligerants, aggression
and intervention. The primary purpose of all of these
norms has been to restrict intervention on the part of
outside states(22). In this respect, Francels decision
(20)Boals, Kathryn, The Relevance of International Law
to the Internal War in Yemen, Johns Hopkins Press,
London, !2Z!, pp.303-30S
(21)Thomas. Ann van Wynen & Thomas, A.J., International
Legal Aspects of the Civil War in Spain 1936-32,
Johns Hopkins Press, London, !iZ!, pp.113-119
(22)Firmage, ° Edwin Brown, Summary and Interpretation,
Johns Hopkins Press, London, !21!, pp.406-413
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to prop up Tombolbaye's regime, "militarily and politically
seemed in contravention with these norms. The French
intervention took the form of large scale civilian-
military aid consisting of the Mission de Reforme
Administrative and military technical assistants(23).
The military mission was drawn mainly from the Foreign
Legion, the ~{arine Infantry and the Intelligence Networks
of the Service de Documentation et de Contre-Espionage(24).
The French intervention gave a new lease of life to the
Tombolbaye regime, but at the same timel gave the Frolinat
substance to accuse the regime of being stooges of the
French Imperialists. Howeverl the administrative reform
programme entrusted to the ~mA was almost immediately
deflected from its original objectives and was a dismal
failure after only a year of its commencement(2S). At
the time, the attack of rebel strongholds were accompanied
by considerable brutality and unnecessary bloodshed.
Nonetheless, neither ,the French Legion nor the Chadian
army were able to do more than engage in sporadic search
and destroy operations which inflicted more harm on
civilians than on guerrillas(26). ConsequentlYI the
(23)The French military aid was linked by major reforms
in the army and public service. Among the reforms enacted,
despite Tombolbaye's resistance, was the full reinstate-
ment of Chad's major Sultans with their former powers as
regards tax collection for the central government in exchange
for 10% title and traditional justice. At the same time,
they were held responsible for banning anti-government
sentiments among the population in the north. It was notable
that they had been removed from their competence in the
modernization reforms of the mid 1960's.
(24)Lemarchand. Rene, Op. Cit, p.416 .
(25)Ibid p.417
(26)Ibid p.417
French intervention had cast further discredit on a
regime whose legitimacy had already heen seriously
eroded by its own incompetence. Thus, the French
intervention accelerated the trend towards a
north-south polarization. By 1975 the north-
south dichotomy was no longer an appropriate axis of
reference for identifying loyalists and insurgents, but
serious dissensions began to emerge within the ranks
of both loyalists and insurgents, which triggered the
process of fragmentation(27). The Tomholbaye
Chadization policies which required all civil servants
regardless of age, rank or religion, to undergo the
traditional Sara initiation ceremony (Yonda), paved the
way for the civil war(28). With the arrest of the army
chief of staff General Felix ~ralloum in January 1975,
discontent spread to the armed forces. Consequently,
units of the army and gendarmarie moved, on April 13th,
1975 against the presidential palace and overthrew the
Tombalbaye regime. Since then, and for the next three
years, government responsibilities were entrusted to a
civilian-military junta headed by Malloum(29). Meanwhile,
(27)DeCalo. Samuel, Op. Cit, pp.50-51
(28)Lemarchand. Rene, Ope Cit, p.417
(29)After Malloum came to power, he succeeded in working
out the first abortive attempt at national reconciliation
in August 1978 at Khartoum, by appointing Hassine Habre
as Prime Minister. Malloum made this attempt in order to
bridge differences between predominantly Moslem Arab north
and the black Christian south so as to end the 12-year
guerrilla war. But the alliance between the two former
enemies was an uneasy one which came to an end in January
1979.
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at least three rebel armies claimed the mantle of
insurgency. IlassineHabre's second army later renamed
Force Arm~e du Nationale (FAN) was in the Borkou-
Enoredi~ibest area. Abba Siddick's Forces Populaires
- -de Liberation (FPL) were in the extreme northwest, along
the Sudan border led by Hohamat Idress. Hohammed
Baghlani's eastern army was in the Waddai region(30). By
1979 the rebellion had spawned a veritable alphabet soup
of factions and military tendencies. At this stage,
the peace and security of the country steadily deteriorated
from 1976 onwards evidenced by labour turmoil, friction
with students and increased rebel activities in the
north(31). Thus, these attempted uprisings were yet
another testimonial to the rapid deflation of authority,
legitimacy and unpopularity of the military regime. It
was against this background of military collapse on the
battlefield and inability to stabilize the fighting by
diplomacy that Chad's urban centres began falling to
the insurgents(32). Under these circumstances, the
military regime appointed Hassine Habre, leader of the
FAN (Force Arm~e du Nationale) as Prime Minister in a
compromise worked out in August 1978 in Khartoum, Sudan,
in an attempt to split the northern insurgents'along
existing ethnic division(33). But, on the contrary,






the appointment sharply polarized the administration and
the armed forces between the President and the Prime ~Unister.
In fact, the inevitable tug-of-war that had developed in
the capital exacerbated by conflicting external pressure
from France, Libya and the movements of insurgency, resulted
in virtual governmental paralysis. Thus, the crisis led
to an anti-Malloum revolt by the officer corps in order to
give the Prime Minister manoeuvrability in office(34).
In this essentially internal conflict, Habre's force
routed their opponents, including Malloum and his officers,
who sought refuge behind a French military cordon.
Consequently, the fall of Malloumts regime and the defeat
of his army in the capital was the death knell of Sara
dominance(35). However, it was not long before the
temporary lull in the civil war was shattered when
(Frolinat) forces heavily armed and supported by Libya,
defeated the scattered government troops in Borkou-
Enoredi-Tibesti (BET). With the fall of Faya-Largeau,
the capital of the northern half of the country passed
into rebel hands. The rebel advance continued pulverising
half of the Chadian army, which led to the total collapse
of central authority(36). In fact, Habre's army suffered
(34)Lemarchand. Rene, Op. Cit, p.436
(35)During the fighting between the President and the Premier,
the French government ordered its troops in Chad not to get
involved in the present fighting for power control, as it
was regarded as a purely internal matter. The French troops
did not interfere to balance the very delicate relations
between the President's supporters and the Premier's
followers. Nearly a week's fighting in the capital left
Habre's men occupying most of the town, including the Nationai
Radio Station with the exception of the areas populated by
the Sara, the southern ethnic group. A ceasefire was then
agreed after a Sudanese initiative with the French was
actively arranged
(36)neCalo, Samuel, Op. Cit, pp.52-53
- 549 -
a major defeat by his immediate rival and kinsman
Goukhouni~ who~ backed by Libya~ asserted himself as
the leader of (FAP) the People's Armed Forces. Consequently~
Goukhouni rose to power on March 23rd~ 1919 but this did
not usher in peace and stability in Chad(31). It merely
reversed the role of dominance with the capital in northern
hands and the Sara in the south became the centre of
resistance. However~ the Libyan intervention was a turning
point in Chad's civil strife and must be recognised as a
decisive factor in the equation of power among Chadian
warlords. Thus~ this has aggravated the cultural split
between Arabs and Toubous in which the tug-of-war has again
developed in early 1919 between the Frolinat leadership
in exile in Tripoli~ Libya. The leadership primarily
consisted of Arabs and the operational forces on the ground~
at first recruited were mainly from among the Toubou.
However, the Libyan government initially supported the
Toubous against Abba Siddick and subsequently backed
Goukhauni against Habre(38). At all events, the immediate
result of Libyan intervention led to the intensification
of factional rivalries within the Frolinat leadership.
On the other hand, France proved equally ineffectual in
preventing Libyan intervention which gave the Libyans a
(31)Liebenow. J. Gus.~ American Policy in Africa,
The Reagan Years, l£tl, Volume 62, March 1983, p.13S
(38)The immediate result of Libyan interference was
the territorial concession extracted from its proteg~,
Goukhauni~ by which the Libyan government took over,
in 1913, the Aenzov strip~ some 2,100 square miles on
the Chadian. side of the Libya-Chad border.
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free hand to assert themselves as the more credible
arbitor in a complex civil war, for power control.
Therefore, the French military presence in the north
evaporated, while its economic, financial and technical
.assistance to the south remained. The French withdrawal
from the north was followed by the opening of a Consulate
in Moundon(39). Thus, it had formalized the division
of the country into two separate spheres of influence.
The south, referred to as the French economic and
financial protectorate, has emerged to match that of
the Libyans in the north. The de facto secession of the
south was made feasible by massive injections of French
aid and made it highly unlikely that a viable formula
would soon be found to restore unity to Chad. However,
the Sara in the south have lost their representation
within the central government but they do remain a powerful
element in any attempt at national reconciliation.
Following the review of the immediate origins to this
civil war, it is necessary to set the stage for the legal
consequences. In this respect, it is necessary to discuss
the role of international law in regulating the conduct
of civil war. The subject of the conduct of the conflict
can be divided into the following areas:-
treatment of prisoners, protection of civilians and the
avoidance of non-military targets. With reference to the
(39)Lemarchand, Rene, Ope Cit, p.436
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Chadian civil war, the existence of armed conflict between .
factions of organised armies controlling territory
certainly fulfilled the condition for the application of
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention(40). Even in the
absence of specific statements by the parties to the
Chadian conflict, the minimum standards could be taken
as the basis for evaluating the action of the parties to
the conflict. This would include the provisions of
Article 3 of each Convention in connection with protection
for individuals not engaged in the hostilities, and
members of the armed forces who laid down
their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention or any other relevant cause(41). In
addition to the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International
Armed Conflict which was conceived as a supplement and
common development to Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Convention(42). Ilowever, the Protocol does not apply
to all internal conflicts but only to those which are
prolonged and of great intensity. Article 1 states that
insurgents must be organised armed groups which are under
responsible command, and exercise such control over a
part of the territory of the state as to enable them to
carry out sustained and concerted military operations(43).
As stated earlier, the Chadian National Liberation
Movements command a force which is well trained and well
(40)Freidman. Leon, Op. Cit, p.525
(41)Ibid ·p.526 .
(42)Cassese, Antonio, The Status of Rebels Under the 1977
Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed Conflict,
~, Volume 30, !2§!, pp.417-418
143)Ibid p.718
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equipped. HOl'leverJparagraph 2 of the same Article provides
that the Protocol does not apply to situations of internal
disturbance and tensions such as riotsJ isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
- nature (44). It is therefore apparent that the Protocol
has a high threshold of application and in substance, only
covers these civil wars which by their scale reach a level
comparable to that of the Congo and Nigerian civil wars.
At all events, it has an almost exclusive humanitarian
context. ThereforeJ it is primarily designed to protect
victims of the armed conflict, those who do not take a
direct part in the hostilities as well as those who have
ceased to take part in the armed conflict(45).
Consequently, at this timeJ the civil war in Chad was
governed in relation to the treatment of prisoners of
war by the provisions of the aforementioned inter-
national instruments. As far as the treatment of prisoners
was concerned, it varied a great deal during the course of
the war, but the application of the laws of war in Chad
were observed by all parties, in which humanitarian
principles prevailed in several areas. In this respect,
prisoners in the Chadian civil war were detained under
reasonable conditions and exchanged or released during the
course of hostilities(46). As far as the protection of
civilians was concerned, a number of civilians were killed
in the course of the Chadian civil war(47). The most major
(44)Ibid p.718
(4S)HcNemar, Donald W.J Op. Cit, p.256
(46)African Research Bulletin, Volume 16, No.5,
April 15, 1979, p.5195
(47)African Research Bulletin, Volume 16, No.4
JMarch 15. 1979, pp.5163-65
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violation occurred in August 1978 when the form of
a compromise collapsed, which had been worked out
in Khartoum, Sudan where both north and south were
_represented, through which IIabre acted as Prime
Minister and Halloum as President(48). The dead-
lock was ultimately resolved by a trial of strength
in February 1979 in which Habre with FAN was over-
whelmingly victorious. Consequently, Malloum~s
armed forces under the command of Lieutenant Karnougne,
withdrew from the capital to the south, leaving Sara
civilians to the mercy of Habre's men. Upon hearing
of the massacre of their kinsmen in Ndjamena, the Sara
populations of Sahr and Moundon retaliated by wiping
out the Arab communities in each t.own in the south,
killing a total of at least 800(49). Simultaneously,
anti-Sara sentiment spread to non-Sara minorities
of a key southern prefecture. In this respect, some
400 civilians, mostly Sara, were reported killed in
February a~d )~rch, 1979(50). Moreover, a considerable
number of civilians lost their lives both as a result
of tribal struggles and starvation. This was in
consequence of food scarcities, financial bankruptcy
of the country and rampant corruption of the local
warlords(51). Furthermore, Article 34 of the Geneva





Convention on civilian persons stipulates that
•••••the taking of hostages is prohibited •••~{52}n
In violation of these provisions, Habre's FAN
captured Francoise Claustre, wife of the head of
the MRA (Mission de Reforme Administrative) in
Bardoi in 1974, along with several other hostages
including a German national(53}. Unfortunately,
this illegal act had provided Habre with a unique
opportunity to demand a substantial ransom in the
form of cash, armaments and medical supplies from
the French and Germans. At the same time, Habre
used the hostage issue to drive a deep wedge
between the French and the Ndjamena authority.
(52)Freidman, Leon, Op. Cit, p.652
(53) Lemarchand, Rene, Op. Cit, p.417
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THE OAU ATTEHPTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION:
In the foregoing situation arising from internal conflict,
the role played by the OAU started with the Kano accord of
August 1979 which led to the setting up of the Transitional
National Union Government. The Kano Conference on Chad
was held under the auspices of the OAU at which a wide-
ranging agreement was concluded on Harch 15th, 1979 laying
the foundation for peace and national reconciliation(l).
The agreement incorporated a ceasefire demilitarization of
the capital to a 60-mile radius. It also envisaged the
establishment of a national transitional union government
composed of all Chadian signatories to the agreement(2).
(1)
The accord established the Provisional State Council in
Chad which defined the responsibilities and duties of its
members until the formation of the transitional national
union government as follows:-
(1) Goukhouni leader of Frolinat as official in charge
of information in addition to his duties as Chairman of
the Provisional State Council.
(2) ~Iohamed Nuri of the northern forces as official in
charge of public works, transport and communications.
(3) ltfohamedSalih Ahmed of the northern forces as official
in charge of finance and planning.
(4) Sayyed as-Shaykh Bin Omar of Frolinat as official in
charge of education and labour.
(5) Aboubakar Abdrahmane leader of the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Chad as official in charge of interior
affairs.
(6) Idris Adam Mustapha of the Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Chad as official in charge of health.
(7) The following present posts were given to the forces
of former President Malloum - Lieutenant Colonel Kamougue as
official in charge of agriculture and animal resource and
Barma Ramadan as official in charge of foreign affairs.
(African Research Bulletin, Volume 16, No.1, April 15, 1979,
p.S196)
(2)Signatories of the accord'were President Felix Halloum,
Prime }.finisterHissene Habre, Frolinat Commander Goukhouni
Oueddi and Aoubakar Adrahman leader of the Popular Movement
for the Liberation of Chad, as well as ministers from five
neighbouring countries -.Niger, Libya, Sudan, Cameroon and
Nigeria.
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Horeover, the a!!reement provided for a neutral force
consisting solely of Nigerian troops which would work
under an independent monitoring commission made up of
a Nigerian Chairman based in Ndjamena. It would also
consist of two delegates from each of the participating
countries and one representative from each of the
Chadian signatories. Furthermore, other points in
the accord were a ban on all pirate radio stations
combined with guaranteed neutrality of the state radio.
It enshrined a general amnesty for political prisoners,
release of hostages and a pardon for exiles(3). It was
notable that the Kano accord did not deal with the future
of the French troops based in Chad but it left the
matter to be decided by the new Chadian transitional
union government. Nonetheless, the French government
stated simultaneously its intention to reach an
agreement as soon as possible with Chad for the progressive
withdrawal of.its troops(4). Under these circumstances,
another Kano Conference was held in April 1979 to discuss
the means of implementing the agreement, but the OAU
attempts at national reconciliation proved utterly
ineffective. C~nsequently, a third Conference on Chad
was held in Lagos from August 12th to August 18th, 1979
in what turned out to be a replay of Kano I, once again
calling for a ceasefire, demilitarization and a
transitional union government(S). The only significant





innovation was the establishment of a central commission,
made up of African representatives and chaired by the
Secretary General of the OAU for the purpose of super-
vising the ceasefire and ensuring the effective
implementatio~ of the agreement(6). Despite this, the
Lagos accord injected another source of discord among
the eleven signatories, each blaming the other for this
lack of co-operation. ~roreover, mutual suspicion reached
a level of paranoia between the President of the transit-
ional union government and his Minister of State in charge
of national defence, Hissene Habre. In this atmosphere,
a full-scale battle erupted on ~rarch 22nd, 1980 in
Ndjamena between FAP and FAN(7). As the war of position
between the President and his Minister of Defence dragged
on, the Libyan government despatched its Islamic Legion
in mid-December 19BO, who shelled Habre's positions(B).
Consequently, Goukhouni's FAP marched with the Libyan
troops hand in hand into Ndjamena(9). However, in an
effort to end the increasingly fierce fighting, engendered
by the differences between the President and his Minister
of Defence, a peace conference was held under the aegis
of the OAU's ad hoc sub-committee in Lome, Togo on
October lBth, 19BO(10). Unfortunately, the meeting was
(6)Lemarchand. Rene, Ope Cit, p.436
(7)Ibid p.436
(B)~e~e Habre is Libya's bitterest enemy in Chad and
it is precisely for that reason that the latter is seen
by Sudan and Egypt as their most credible partner in
their joint effort to counter Libyan expansion in black
Africa.
(9)Liebenow, J. Gus, Op. Cit, p.135
(10)African Research Bulletin, Volume 17, No.1S,
1980, p.5822
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delayed in consequence of Habre's failure to appear
before the Conference but eventually both Chad's
protagonists did attend the meeting. The aims of the
Conference were to find a mutually acceptable solution,
arrange a ceasefire and despatch a neutral African
force to Chad(ll). To this end a five-point plan
was drawn up and debated by the sub-committee, which
envisaged the following principles:-
(1) the acceptance of a ceasefire, but the
date should be fixed by the conflicting parties;
(2) the sending of a neutral African force
to Chad;
(3) the liberation of prisoners of war by
both sides;
(4) suitable sanctions to be dra,~ up to
be taken against whichever party violated the
ceasefire;
(5) election to be org9ni~ed in Chad under
the supervision of the OAU~12}.
The text also enshrined the withdrawal of all armed forces
outside a limit of 100 kilometres around the capital and
the installation of a'control commission(13).
Although the peace proposals were accepted in principle
by both the President and his Minister of Defence,
nonetheless, there were radical differences in the
amendments proposed by each to the OAU sub-committee.
Habre's Armed Force of the North (FAN) demanded the
withdrawal of Libyan forces and insisted that Goukhouni's
People's ,Armed Force (FAP) only represent one of the





disapproval over the presence of one of the sub-committee
members because he had too close a relationship with
Libya. Consequently, Habre refused to have any
Beninis troops in the African neutral force(14). On
the other hand, Goukhouni emphasised that his govern-
ment represented the legal authority in Chad while the
FAN were simply a rebellion movement against the
recognised government(15). Under these circumstances,
the work of the OAU sub-committee was blocked at all
levels in its attempts to find a means to halt the
hostilities and bring about a mutually acceptable
solution to the conflict(16). As conditions continued
to deteriorate, the hostilities again erupted on
December 15th, 1980 but the government troops secured
the recapture of Ndjamena, the capital, after heavy
fighting(17). The force of FAN led by Hissene Habre,
the rebel defence minister, fled overnight across the
Chari river to Cameroon. Subsequently, he signed an
agreement on December 16th, 1980 in Yaounde, Cameroon,
under the OAU'S auspices for a ceasefire(18). Nonetheless,
he stated that he still considered the Chad government
illegal and illegitimate and pledged to continue his
(14)Ibid p.5822
(15)~ p.5822
(16)The sub-committee gave the opposing sides until
February 28th, 1981 to apply a ceasefire and until
March 15th, to open negotiations aimed at national
reconciliation under its auspices. The two sides would
have the month of April in which to draft a constitution
and should organise legislative and presidential elections
in May and June. .




struggle against it. Habre had also accused Benin
of acting as a Libyan agent. However, the latter
country was one of the five states who took part in
the negotiation of the ceasefire which called for
national reconciliation and the withdrawal of all armed
forces from Ndjamena, the capital. The other African
states which took part in the meeting held under the
aegis of the OAU, were Sierra Leone, Togo, Congo and
Guinea. The OAU also called for the withdrawal of
foreign troops from the whole of Chad(19). At all
events, the fall of the capital came after nine months
of fighting that ravaged the city and spread across
the country, bringing the intervention of Libyan forces
on the side of President Goukhouni. Unfortunately,
this external intervention played a key role in the
Chadian civil war which sharpened the edges of the
conflict. In this respect, France, Libya, the Sudan,
Nigeria and Egypt had all at one time or another, acted
as appendages or allies of one faction or another.
The Libyan intervention in Chad was made patently clear
by the announcement of a merger of the two countries
made in Tripoli on January 6th, 1981, which was initially
endorsed by Goukhouni(20). In fact, none of the other
Chadian factions was prepared to accept Libya1s proposed
merger and its military presence in northern Chad was
(19)Report of the Secretary General of the OAU on Chad,
Addis Ababa, June 1981, ,pp.8-9
(20)Lemarchand, Rene, Ope Cit, p.436
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too massive to resist. Therefore, the only way to
bring about a Libyan withdrawal was the establish-
ment of an OAU peace-keeping force. As conditions
continued to deteriorate, the need for an alternative
to the recent anarchy became all the more evident.
To most African neighbours the Libyan move appeared
to be an act of conquest. Therefore, Nigeria, the
Sudan, Egypt and other African states assumed an
active role, both inside the OAU to secure the
withdra~al of Libyan troops(21). In this respect,
a brief, heated debate on the Chad civil war had
taken place at the meeting of the OAU Council of
Ministers held in Addis Ababa on February 23rd,
1981(22). The said states had objected to Libyan
interference in Chad but the Chairman of the OAU
Council had proposed that the issue be left for
discussion by the OAU Summit of the Assembly of
Heads of State(23). However, prior to the Summit,
a meeting of four African heads of state seeking to
resolve the crisis in Chad, took place in May 1981,
in Ndjamena, Chad, but the Conference ended in failure(24).
(21)
012. Cit, p.125Liebenowl J. Gus,
(22) • Volume 18! No.2,African Research Bullet1nl
March 15, ~, p.5954
(23)Ibid p.5954
(24) Volume 181African Research Bulletin, No.~,June 15, ~, p.6048
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The four countries which took part in the Conference
were Libya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Chad, in the
hope of finding a formula for the withdrawal of Libyan
troops from Chad and the introduction of an African
peac~-keeping force(2S). However, the meeting ended
without agreement in consequence of Libya's refusal
to recognise the authority of the OAU in this matter
on the grounds that only the Chadian government could
ask for Libyan withdrawal(26). Under these circumstances,
the OAU Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State which
took place in Nairobi, Kenya on June 24th, 1981,
decided to review the proposal for an OAU peace-
keeping force to replace the Libyan troops(27).
At the same time, the Assembly called upon neighbouring
states of Chad to halt any act of destabilization or
sabotage, the peace process being undertaken in order
to reach a national reconciliation in Chad. The
Assembly also entrusted its Chairman to.visit Ndjamena
so as to discuss assistance which the OAU might extend
to Chad to rebuild its national army(28). However,
the Assembly avoided any criticism of Libya and
(2S)The expense of sending troops to a country as
large as Chad was enormous. The OAU was not empowered
to approach governments bilaterally. States particip-
ated in the OAU forces which might call upon foreign
powers to offer logistical assistance if it was necessary.
France agreed to send assistance to Senegal and Zaire,
while Nigeria sounded out the United States and some
European countries to extend possible logistical help.
(26)Ibid p.6048
(27)~can Research Bulletin, Volume 18, No.6,
JUl} 15, 1981, p.6068
(28 The Guardian, Saturday January 16, 1982
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accepted that the departure of Libyan troops was a
matter for the government of Chad to decide. In any
event, the Libyan withdrawal took place in the middle
of December 1981 before the OAU multinational peace-
--keeping force could assume its duties, which gave rise
to the serious threat of renewed fighting from
opposition forces to the central government(29). The
withdrawal of Libyan troops went far more quickly than
it had been anticipated. Subsequently, the OAU peace-
keeping forces arrived by the end of December 1981 in
order to replace the Libyan troops. The force would have
to keep the peace, to supervise the election and to
assist in the integration of the Chadian army(30). The
OAU force was placed under the authority of the OAU
Secretary General who would preside over an adminis-
trative committee consisting of representatives from
Benin, Congo, Guinea and Kenya(31). The OAU peace-
keeping forces in Chad were recruited from Senegal,
Zaire and Nigeria but were displayed by consent of the
Chadian government. Consequently, the government troops
were responsible for clearing out areas into which the
OAU forces would follow. However, the Chadian government
held the view that the OAU forces should assist the
Chadian army to suppress dissidence, but the view was
rejected outright by the OAU(32). As a result, the
(29)The Guardian, Thursday January 21st, 1982
(30)African Research Bulletin, Volume 18, No.6,
Jul} 15th, ~, p.6068 .
(31 African Research Bulletin, Volume 18, No.l1,
December 15th, 1981, pp.6249-50
(32}African Research Bulletin, Volume 19, No.1,
February 15th, 1982, p.6303
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OAU interests were at stake in Chad. In fact, this was the
first time the OAU found itself alone, charged with the
physical task of restoring peace and security to an African
state. Under these circumstances, Habre took advantage of
this situation and was able to burst out of his sanctuary in
neighbouring Sudan and launched an offensive against the
central government(33). The Chadian government had complained
that the OAU force was not fulfilling its task because it
refused to confront Habre's attack. The passive attitude
of the OAU peace-keeping force had given Habre's armed forces
of the north (FAN) advantage to pursue an unstoppable west-
ward drive right to the Chadian capital, Ndjamena which was
captured at the beginning of June, 1982, forcing President
Goukhouni into exile(34). The latter was given a grant
of political refuge by Cameroon which had refused to take
sides throughout the civil war.' Habre's victory came some
18 months after he was forced to retreat from Ndjamena with
his troops, to the east of the country, under pressure from
government troops(35). However, the strict neutrality of
the OAU peace-keeping forces had been praised by Habre. In
a letter despatched to the Presidents of Kenya, Nigeria,
Senegal and Zaire, Habre officially requested the prolong-
ation of the mandate of the OAU peace-keeping forces.
Nonetheless, the Kenyan President as the OAU Chairman, ordered
the OAU forces to be withdrawn from Chad(36). However,
Habre's victory had been compared to that of Mobutu after
(33)African Research Bulletin, Volume 19, No.7,
AUfjst 15th, ~, p.6513
(3~African Research Bulletin, Volume 19, No.6,
Julj 15th. 1982, p.6489
l35-African Research Bulletin, Volume 19. No.2,
March 15th, ~, p.6335
{30}African Research Bulletin, Volume 19, No.6,
July 15th, 1982, p.6491
- 565 -
the Congo coup of 1965 which ended the Congo civil war.
Therefore, lIabre could now offer a new deal involving national
reconciliation and the forgetting of the bitterness of the
prolonged civil war. However, the plight of the OAU forces
had in fact been amply highlighted both by lIabre's success
and by the enormous financial difficulties with which it was
faced. It would appear that the OAU forces would soon be
out of funds. Consequently, the OAU Secretary General
transmitted an unprecedented request for funding by the UN,
but the latter had never financed a force that was not under
its aegis(37). With its involvement in Chad's civil war,
the OAU accepted a role that the organisation's founders had
e~visaged for it at their first Summit in 1963(38). Since
then there have been several unsuccessful attempts at
establishing an All-African Force that would be available
to repel invasions of its weakest members, suppress inter-
African clashes and push civil war factions to the negotiating
table(39). However, the proposal for such forces has been
shelved because of the cost.
(37)The Guardian, Tuesday January 21st, 1981
(38)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Op. Cit, pp.124-126
(39)nuring the writing of this article, the forces of President
Habre suffered a heavy defeat on about February 23rd, 1983
after attacking Gouro on the fringe of the Aozon strip which
he was intent on recovering from the Libyans. This led to,
Habre's forces falling back over 400 miles to beyond Abeche
which was occupied by Goukhouni's troops, backed by Libyan
forces in early July 1983. Habre got behind Goukbouni to
recapture Oum Chalouba and the next day Abeche. Goukhouni
then fell back on Faya-Largeau where he was driven out on
July 30th, only to recapture it on August 10th, 1983 in a
battle which was dominated by Libyan forces. Consequently,
President Habre's forces, together with about 1000 French
paratroops sent_by President Mitterand and also perhaps up
to 2700 soldiers from President Mobutu of Zaire, had taken




CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE OAU AND THIRD STATES
AND THE OAUIS EFFECTIVENESS AT REGIONAL
COLLECTIVE DEFENCE
THE E~mRGENCE OF NEW INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES
CONCERNING DEPENDENT TERRITORIES:
During the debate at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, a change was introduced in the international
legal system with regard to colonialism. It was in
terms of which the victorious powers were committed to
.obser.ve two principles of paramount importance, the
principle of non-annexation and the principle that the
well-being and development of the colonial peoples
form a sacred trust of civilization(l). Thus, the
principles of nationalism and self-determination were
enshrined at the Paris Peace Conference and were also
given serious consideration in President Wilson's
Fourteen Points Programme of World Peace presented at
the Conference(2). Consequently, the Principal Allied
and Associated Powers agreed not to follow the usual
practice of annexing the conquered dependent territories
of the defeated ar~(3). In fact, they established a
new system called -The Mandates· in respect of those
(l)Goodrich. Leland et al., Ope Cit, pp.660-661
(2)Whiteman. Marjorie, Digest of International Law,
Volume 1, .!22.3., p.605
(3)Ibid p.S98
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territories which were placed under the umbrella of
the newly founded international organisation the
·League of Nations(4).. Therefore, the dependent
territories had ceased to be under the sovereignty of
states which had formerly governed them and which were
inhabited by peoples not yet able to assume a full
measure of self-government(5). The territories
concerned were the former German colonies which were
considered to be inhabited by peoples not yet able to
(
stand by themselves as it was envisaged in Article 22
of the Covenant of the League of Nations(6). The
latter Article designed states called mandatories
entrusting them to administer the territories on behalf
of, and subject to supervision by the League of Nations(7).
However, the states designated to exercise the adminis-
tration were those whose armies were already in occupation.
Nonetheless, the Covenant set forth guiding principles
of the Mandates system enshrined in Article 22 that
•••••the well-being and development of the peoples in
(8)question should form a sacred trust of civili&ation.... •
(4)Ibid pp.598-599
(5);;:U p. 599
(6)Goodrich. Leland et al., Ope Cit, pp.660-661
(7)TOgoland and Cameroon - Great Britain and France should
make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations on
their future. German East Africa, the mandate should be
held by South Africa. The German Samoan Islands, the
mandate should be held by New Zealand. The other German
Pacific possessions south of the equator, excluding the·
German Samoan Islands and Nauru, the mandate should be held
by Australia. Nauru Islands north of the equator, the
mandate should be held by Japan.
(8)Goodrich, Leland et al., Ope Cit, pp.660-661
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~loreover# safeguards for the performance of this trust
was included in the individual mandate agreements concluded
between the mandatory powers on the one hand, and the League
of Nations on the other# as approved by the Council of the
In conformity with such agreements, the
mandatory states were pledged to submit reports to be
examined by the Permanent Mandate Commission which was set
up as a subsidiary organ of the League of Nations(lO).
It consisted of nationals of non-mandatory powers who
served as experts and not as officials of their govern-
ments(ll). On the other hand, the inhabitants of the
mandated territories were entitled to submit petitions
through the administering power to the commission. Legally
the mandatory powers were obliged to forward these petitions,
attached with their comments if they so preferred(12).
Notably, the dependent territories were categorised in
three classes A, Band C mandates, conforming to the stage
of development of the 'people, its economic conditions,
the geographical situation and other related factors(13).
However, the difference between these three categories
lay in the degree of administrative control empowered
to the mandatory state concerned(14). In fact,
( 9)Whiteman, Marjorie# Ope Cit, pp.614-616
(10)Ibid p.609
(ll)sanders, AJGM, Op. Cit, p.73
(12)Whiteman, Marjorie, Op. Cit# p.611
(13)Kapleyn, P.J.G. et al., International Organisation and
Integration, Volume tA, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
The HagUe, 1981, p. I.A.l.6.
(14)For instance, in respect of the class A mand,tes themandatory states were authorized to render admin1str~tiveadvice and assistance, while in mandates Band C, theywere authorized to exercise an overall administrative andterritorial control. In addition, in the case of C mandates,the mandatory powers were authorized to administer them asan integral part of their territories.
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it was a remarkable development but the Covenant did not
envisage explicit provisions for the termination of the
Mandates. Therefore, neither the notion of eventual
independence for the mandated territories were expressly
mentioned nor implied that idea in the provisions of
Article 22 of the Covenant. Despite this, the agreements
of category A of former Turkish dependencies explicitly
provided for eventual independence(15), while those
relating to the class Band C mandates of the former
German territories were silent(16). As far as German
colonies in Africa were concerned, the Mandates system
resulted in allocating these territories under the
administrative control of Great Britain, France, Belgium
and South Africa. The latter power was entrusted to
administer South-West Africa (Namibia), under its laws,
as an integral portion of its territory, owing to its
geographical contiguity, subject to the safeguards
mentioned above, in the interests of the .native
population(17). The rest of the German colonial
empire in Africa. meanwhile, was placed under the form
B mandates(18). At this juncture, the administration
of dependent territories other than the mandated territories,
(lS)The A mandates, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-
jordan and Iraq recognised as independent, but received
the advice and assistance of the mandatory powers in its
administration, until such time as it was able to stand
alone.
(16)sanders. AJGM, Ope Cit, p.74
(17)Kapleyn, P.J.G. et al., Ope Cit, p. 1.A.13.4a
(18)Tanganyika ~ent to Great Britain with the exception
of Rwanda and Burundi, which went to Belgium. Togoland
and Cameroon were divided between Great Britain and
France.
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however, were still considered as a purely internal issue
within the domestic jurisdiction of the colonial powers.
Nonetheless, the colonial powers pledged under Article 23(b)
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to un~ertake
just.treatment of the native inhabitants of territories
under their control(19). Although this was an expression
of good intent it produced a strong argument for
claiming that the administration of the colonial terri-
tories was a matter of direct international concern.
Thus, the idea of direct international concern was
positively extended to colonial territories after the
Second World War by the newly established international
organisation -The United Nations.- Consequently, the
evolution that has taken place in the international
legal system has weakened the authority of the colonial
powers and therefore accelerated the drive towards the
process of decolonisation and eventual self-determination
among the colonial peoples. Meanwhile, national
liberation movements had been established in many dependent
territories which were struggling to preclude the re-
imposition of the pre-war mandates system(20). In addition,
a number of states hostile to colonialism were actively
engaged· in the drafting of the Charter of the new
international organisation intended to replace the League
of Nations. Moreover, active opposition to colonialism
(19)
Goodrich, Leland et al., Ope Cit, p.661
(20)
Bakhashab, Omar, Ope Cit, pp.2-4
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Was raised by two super powers, both of whom had not been
members of the League of Nations. Consequently, the UN
Charter envisaged a declaration on non-self-governing
territories as well as the trusteeship system which
replaced the mandates system of the League of Nations(21).
As a matter of fact, the effect of Chapter XI of the
Charter was that it made the administration of all
non-self-governing territories a matter of direct
international concern. Accordingly, the Charter
imposed certain international legal obligations upon
the administering powers and provided more clearly for
UN supervision(22). At all events, the African states
participated at the San Francisco Conference and were
enthusiastically interested in the fate of all colonial
territories. Consequently, they opposed the Charter's
differentiation between non-self-governing territories
and trust territories. Thus, they appealed to the
Conference to.observe the interests of the indigenous
inhabitants in all dependent territories to the ultimate
goal of self-determination. As a result, a political
compromise was introduced in order to bridge the gap
between the colonial and non-colonial groups within
the participants of the Conference(23). Thus, Article 73
of the Charter imposes upon the administering power to
recognise the principle that the interest of the
inhabitants are paramount and accepted as a sacred trust
the obligation to promote the utmost well-being.of
the inhabitants of these territories(24). However, the
(21)Panhuys, R.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.40
(22)Ibid p.40
(23)~youty, Yassin, Op. Cit, p.4
(24)Panhuys, R.F. van et al., Ope Cit. p.40
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-trusteeship system, designed to replace the mandates
system, was given a broad interpretation aimed at
extending the UN competence to include the evolution
of non-self-governing territories towards self-determination.
Moreover, it applies to a wider category of territories
than simply territories detached from former enemy states.
Furthermore, it specifies three categories of territories
which have been placed under it by means of agreements
being concluded between the UN and the administering powers.
These territories were the mandated territories, those
detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World
War and those voluntarily placed under the system by states
responsible for their administration(25). In contrast,
the trusteeship system does not adopt the previous
divisions of the mandates system of territories according
to the stage of development of the people, or to geographic,
economic or other related conditions. Moreover,
Article 76(b) of the UN Charter explicitly provided for
the goal of self-government and eventual independence
for the trust territories(26). Furthermore, the trustee-
ship system introduced an extensive role for the UN
(25)Ibid p.41
(26)The subjects dealt with in three Chapters, XI, XII
and XIII devoted to non-self-governing territories,
proved to be among the most difficult of all those
considered by the San Francisco Conference on the UN
and they were among the last on which agreement could
be reached. In fact, it was not until the final week
of the Conference that the agreement about the pro-
"visions of these Chapters could be reached. In the
subsequent London deliberation of the Executive Committee,
"agreement was reached around the correct interpretation
of the provisions of these Chapters.
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supervision aimed at extending its competence to include
the evolution of the non-self-governing territories
towards self-determination(27). However, the UN
supervision was given to the trusteeship council which
enjoyed greater access to the territories concerned than
the Permanent ~fandate Commission of the League of Nations.
However, the supervision of the Trusteeship Council has
been applied in practice only to the first and second
categories of territories aforementioned. In any event,
all the mandates which by 1948 had not achieved inde-
pendence, were brought under the Trusteeship system, with
the exception of South-West Africa (Namibia)(28). In
this respect, South Africa as the administering power,
refused to place the territory under the system on the
grounds that the mandates, and with it the international
supervision over the territories had lapsed with the
dissolution of the League of Nations(29). But, South
Africa's argument was rejected by·the UN and proved
unacceptable to the Iel on more than one occasion(30).
Ultimately, the UN General Assembly passed in 1966,
Resolution 2145 (XXI) on October 27th, 1966 by an over-
whelming majority, terminating the mandate and placing
the territory under the direct responsibility of the
UN(31). Subsequently, the legal validity of this
(27)Panhuys, R.F. van et al., Op. Cit. p.43
(28)Ibid p.97
(29)nugard, John, The South West Africa Namibia Dis ute,
University of California Press, Los An~eles, 1973,
(30)Xnternational Status of South West African Opinion,
~' 1&d, p.132
31 Kapleyn. P.J.G. et a1., Ope Cit, p. I.A.14.4.c.
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Resolution was endorsed by the ICJ in its advisory
opinion on the legal consequences for states, of the
continued presence of South Africa in South-West
Africa(32). Despite the fact, the Western powers
in the UN Security Council maintained a policy aimed
at blocking the imposition of enforcement measures
against South Africa by which the latter remain in
firm control of the territory(33). Consequently,
South Africa felt confident to implement the
application of its widely condemned domestic apart-
heid policy designed to evolve independence on ethnic
lines with black independence limited to the narrow
confines of the homelands(34). At all events, the
most important contribution of the Trusteeship system
was that it fostered similar thinking with regard to
all non-self-governing territories. They were governed
by Chapter XI of the UN Charter bearing the heading
•••••Dec1aration Regarding Non-Self-Governing
Territories ••••• and applicable to all territories
whose people have not yet attained a full measure of
self-government. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly
adopted a number of principles as a guide to determine
whether a territory is or is not self-governing(3S).
(32)Le a1 Conse uences for
of South Africa in Namibia
Report, pp. 9-92
(33)Andemicae1, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.129
(34)Ibid pp.132-133
(3S)~elman, James H., Collective Deco1onization
Committee of 24, JMAS, Volume 14, 1976, pp.41-42 and UN
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Accordingly, the UN General Assembly# in conformity with
Article 10, recommended member states administering
such territories to submit information in accordance
with Article 73(e) of the Charter(36). The most
important Resolution in this respect was Resolution
1514(XV) of Decenmer 14th, 1960 which set forth the
guide for granting independence to colonial countries
and peoples(37). The Resolution envisaged a presump-
tion that Article 73(e) of the Charter applies to every
territory which is geographically separated and is
distinct, ethnically or culturally, from the country
administering it. The presumption was also strength-
ened if the territory was in a position of acquiescence
to the administering power. However, it was a historic
Resolution under which a new system was established,
aimed at achieving orderly decolonisation. It determined
that a non-self-governing territory may achieve self-
determination by emergence as an independent state, by
association with an independent or by means of integration
in an independent state(38). Consequently# the people
of each non-self-governing territory couId be allowed
to choose freely which means they wish to follow(39).
However, the new system evolved in consequence of the
gains made possibly by the broad interpretation of
(36)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Op. Cit, p.28
(37)Ibid p.291
(38)~, Thomas M., Op. Cit, pp.698-701
(39)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Op. Cit, p.291
,
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Chapter XI of the Charter. The international legal
principles under Chapter XI has been cast in a looser
formulation than the one under Chapter XII and XIII
which deal with the Trusteeship system. Yet there is a
substantive degree of difference in their respective
terms of reference. In contrast to Chapters XII and
XIII, Chapter XI neither explicitly refers to UN
supervision nor provides for reports from the adminis-
tering powers or for accepting petitions from the
inhabitants of dependent territories or for visits to
the territories concerned(40). Despite this, it
stipulates that information of a technical nature be
. (41)submitted to the UN General Assembly , but such
information does not include information relating to
the political conditions of the territory concerned.
In this respect, a limitation was imposed to restrict
the transition of information in so far as the security
and the constitutional considerations of the territory
concerned may require. Moreover, Chapter XI also was
formulated in a sense to avoid the use of the term
"independence.- Furthermore, it does not explicitly
mention any function on the part of the UN, but this
could be implied by Article 10 and 72(e) of the
Charter(42). Therefore, the UN General Assembly may
discuss and make recommendations on the administration
of all dependent territories to which Chapter XI applies.
(40)Kelsen, Hans, Ope Cit, p.S50
(41)Ibid p.SSl
(42)Mittelman, James H., Op. Cit, p.45
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In addition, it is authorized to receive political
information irrespective of the name of the territory.
Consequently, it might be argued that the original motive
behind the formulation of Chapter XI of the Charter might
have been the drafter's intention to bring it gradually
into line with the Trusteeship system. Thus, it
has been manifested in a number of General Assembly
Resolutions relating to the type and form of information
to be submitted to the UN in conformity with Article
73(e)(43). Consequently, the process of decolonisation
reached its peak in 1960 and cu~nated with the admission
to the UN membership of sixteen independent African
states(44). Ultimately, it was time for a change
in the colonial approach by which the UN was called
upon to playa greater and more decisive role in the
orderly transition from dependency to independence.
Such calls to the UN were issued by a number of independent
African Conferences, in particular the 1958 Accra
Conference, the 1959 Monrovia Conference and the 1960
Addis Ababa Conference. The theme of these Conferences
was to continue to exert concentrated action through
all possible and peaceful means in order to complete
the eradication of colonial rule in Africa(4~).
(43)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.291 '
(44)Some of this manifestation was in French Africa.
The French community was being transformed into independent
sovereign states which were soon to take their places in
the UN. French Algeria was replaced by the name Algeria
in March 1960 by General de Gaulle. By June 1960, the:
Belgian Congo became the Republic of Congo. In British
Africa, Britain agreed to the UN call to accelerate the.
liberation of the remaining African colonies.
(4S)El-AyoutY, Yassin, Op. Cit, p.208
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Accordingly, African representatives at the UN
had taken an active role 'to draft a resolution
on the Declarationfor the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples which was--adopted
by an overwhelming majority in the UN General Assembly.
Thus, the declaration has become General Assembly
Resolution 1514(XV) which has been quoted as the
legal terms of constitutional basis in all future
UN Resolutions relating to the question of
colonialism(46). It was a remarkable achievement
aimed to bring about a speedy and unconditional
end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
However, it can be divided into three parts. The first
contained a condemnation of colonialism. The second
envisaged an affirmation of the right of self-
determination followed by the words •••••inadequacy
of political, economic, social or educational
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for
delaying independence •••• (47). The third part
enumerated a number of consequences and courses of
action which might follow in case of violation of
these principles set forth in the other two parts of
the Declaration. However, the administering powers of
(46) Kapleyn, P.J.G. et a1., Ope Cit, p. 1.A.13.3.A.
(41)Ibid p. 1.A.13.3.a.
- 579 -
non-self-governing territories regarded the UN General
Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) as constituting a bold
interpretation of Chapter XI of the UN Charter(48).
On the other hand,_ the majority of the UN member states
maintained that the Resolution was a fair interpretation
of the spirit of Chapter XI of the UN Charter. This
conflicting view was subsequently reflected on November
27th, 1961 in the course of deliberation on the Resolution
on the situation with regard to the implementation of the
Declaration. Despite this, the Resolution 16S4(XVI) was
adopted, which called upon the states concerned to take
action without further delay with a view to the faithful
application and implementation of the 1960 Declaration(49).·
It also set up a special committee on the situation
with regard to following up the implementation of the
Declaration on independence and all other future General
Assembly Resolutions based thereupon. The committee
were emvowered with a broad mandate in order to carry
out its task by use of all means which it would have at
its disposal within the framework and procedures set
forth in the Declaration for the proper discharge of
(48)ObvioUSlY, the administering powers had to keep in
mind the fragile fabric of Chapter XI, therefore they
did not withstand a boycott. They had simultaneously
submitted to the system based on this Chapter. The
administering powers knew the vital importance of their
co-operation with the UN in this respect. Accordingly,
they took part in the frustrating process of inter-
pretation with legalistic tools which proved to be of
little effect. Consequently, the U.K., France, Belgium,
Portugal and Spain took a conservative stand with regard
to the Assembly1s competence in the area. However, the
united States sympathised with the legal position of its
sister administering powers.
(49)Kapleyn, P.3.G. et al., Op. Cit, p. 1.A.13.3.6
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its functions. In"this respect, it was entrusted to
make recommendations and suggestions on the progress
and extent of the implementation of related Resolutions
of the General Assembly and Security Council(SO). As
a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, it might
despatch visiting missions to particular areas in order
to receive petitions and hear petitioners from the
territories concerned. However, the committee succeeded
in adopting procedures similar to those of the Trustee-
ship Council including the examination of information
papers prepared by the UN Secretariat on each territory
and of information submitted by the administering states.
However, with a view to centralizing the UN action
in the sphere of decolonisation, the Committee absorbed
in 1961, the Special Committee on South-West Africa
(Namibia) and the Portuguese Territories in Africa.
Moreover, the same happened in 1963 to the Committee on
Information from non-self-governing territories by which
the Decolonisation Committee assumed their functions(SI).
Thus, the Decolonisation Committee was considered as the
sole body of the General Assembly in connection with the
remaining non-self-governing. territories and other Trust
territories. In fact, the Committee also became a
channel of communication among the organs of the UN,
international regional organisations and liberation
(SO)Ibid p. 1.A.13.3.6.-
(Sl)sandersa AJGM, QQ. Cit, p.80
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movements. In this respect, the Committee decided on
August 11th, 1971 to despatch a mission to Guinea-
Bissau in order to report on the situation there. The
decision was taken only after extensive consultation by
the Committee's Chairman with the Secretaries General of
the UN and the OAU and the leader of the national liberation
movement in the territory(52). Similarly, in conjunction
with the OAU Secretariat and representative of the liberation
movements recognised by the OAU, the Committee worked out
a programme of action with emphasis on Southern Africa
which was adopted in 1970 by the UN General Assembly(53).
Moreover, the Committee invited the representatives of
the national liberation movements in Africa, as recognised
by the OAU, to participate in its meeting as observers
whenever their territories were under consideration(54).
At all events, the Decolonisation Committee produced
issues which were not foreseen by the drafters of the
UN Charter in 1945. Therefore, the UN efforts at
decolonisation are now governed by the
principles articulated in the Declaration on Independence
adopted by the General Assembly in 1960 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Accordingly, the
issues of colonialism and apartheid have become questions
directly affecting the maintenance of international
peace and security(5S). From numerous Resolutions adopted
(52JMittelman, James H., Op. Cit, p.SO
(53)~apleyn, P.J.G. et al., Op. Cit, p. 1.A.13.4.1.
(S4)~tltte1man, James H., Op. Cit, p.S2
(SS)As a result of the report of the Decolonisation Committee
on the Policies of Apartheid in Southern Africa the UNGeneral Assembly passed Resolution 2506(XXIV) o~ November 21st,1969. It called for an end of suppression and persecution ofpersons oppressed by the policies of apartheid. It also urgedthat freedom of fighters taken prisoner in the course of the
liberation s~rugg1e should be extended hum~ne t~eft~ntliq9conformity w1th ehe Geneva Conventions or August 2th, 94'
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by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, a
general fact has emerged. It was the transfer of the
colonial question which had by now been linked with the
issues of apartheid from the field of a legal inter-
pretation of the UN Charter to the field of effecting
the maintenance of international peace and security.
In this respect, various wars of national liberation
have broken out in Africa, beginning with the Angolan
uprising of 1961. It was estimated that this armed
conflict stretched over a front of two thousand miles
from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean. However,
it should be pointed out that since the adoption of the
Declaration on Independence, a total of almost 70 million
people have attained independence. This was a direct
consequence of the radical recommendations submitted by
the Decolonisation Committee to the General Assembly and
the Security Council. These recommendations were
reflected in the demand for the recognition of the
legitimacy of armed struggle of colonial peoples in non-
self-governing territories as a means of exercising
their inalienable right to self-determination and independence.
As far as the African territories were concerned, the
Committee concluded that the effects of foreign economic
and financial interests within the offending regimes in
Southern Africa were slowing the process of decolonisation(56).
(56)
El-Ayouty, Yassin, Ope Cit, p.236.
u
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Thus, it led to a number of General Assembly calls
on major trading partners to respect the collective
will of the international community by halting
commerce, trade in arms, economic and financial
assistance to such regimes in Southern Africa(51).
As far as the specific action taken by the General
Assembly and the Security Council was concerned,
in respect of the Committee's recommendations one
found substantial differences in the tone as well
as the substance of Resolutions adopted by the two
organs. The General Assembly passed a strongly
worded Resolution describing the combination of
colonialism and apartheid as a crime against humanity,
whilst the Security Council, in spite of the increase
of African membership, remained unable to respond
to the Assembly Resolutions. It maintained that
while the maintenance of international peace and
security were disturbed in Southern Africa, they
were not threatened(S8). Nonetheless, the Council
for the first time in the history of the UN, invoked
in 1966, Chapter VII of the Charter by imposing
sanctions against the regime of Southern Rhodesia(59).
(S1)For instance, the Security Council singled out in
1965 for the first time, the allies of Portugal in
NATO, for criticism for their direct or indirect
assistance in suppressing the African liberation move-
ments. The Security Council also addressed itself to
the issue of military bases and installations in
dependent territories, condemning their presence as an
infringment of the Charter of the UN and constituting
a direct threat to the maintenance of international
peace and security.
(S8)El-Ayouty, Tassin, Ope Cit, p.237
(59)Kapleyn, P.J.G. et al., Op. Cit, p. 1.A.9.2.d
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In these sanctions the Council decided that member
states should immediately sever all diplomatic,
consular, trade, military and other relations and
terminate any representations that they may have in
the territory with tIleregime of Southern Rhodesia.
As far as South-West Africa was concerned, the
Council described South Africa's presence in the
territory as an occupation which constituted an
aggression and encroachment on the authority of the
UN(60). With regard to the situation resulting
from the African rebellion in Southern African
territories, the Council condemned the attacks
against independent African states which cons~ituted
a threat to international peace and security(61).
At all events, the UN involvement in the process of
decolonisation and protection of human rights in
Southern Africa have helped the cause of justice and
freedom. However, considerations of these two







THE OAU AND TIlEERADICATION OF COLONIALISM FROM AFRICA:
The Preamble to the OAU Charter envisaged the
principle of the inalienable right of all peoples to
control their own destiny(1), while Article II(d) laid
down as one of the purposes of the OAU, the eradication
of colonialism from African Soil(2). Moreover, Article
III(b) declares that African states solemnly affirm their
adherence to the principle of absolute dedication to total
emancipation of African territories which are still under
foreign control(3). To this end, the first Resolution
of the founding Summit of the OAU set.up a Liberation
Committee and established a special fund to be contrib-
uted on a voluntary basis by member states(4).
Subsequently, the OAU laid down practical steps to be
taken by member states to achieve its objectives of
eliminating the remaining vestiges of colonialism on
African soil. In this respect, the issue of decolon-
i$ation was elaborated at the first ordinary session of
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which
took place in July 1964 at Cairo, Egypt(S). The Assembly
adopted a Resolution on decolonisation defining the
role of the OAU in the liberation of African dependent
(1)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.2
(2)Ibid p.3
(3)Ibid p.2 )
(4)Ghali, Boutros, The League of Arab States and the OAU,
edited by EI-Ayouty, Yassin, Preager Publishers, New York,
~,PP.47-49 .
5 Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.371
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territories. It also declared that the OAU was to become
the vehicle of direct moral, military and territorial
support to the African liberation movements waging armed
struggles in their respective territories. Moreover, it
set out the terms of reference for the Liberation Committee
on decolonisation which was elaborated in the Rules of
Procedures of the Committee. Furthermore, it set forth
the Committee's functions as follows:-
(1) ••••to be responsible for the co-ordination of
all assistance provided by African countries to the
liberation movements;
(2) to manage a special fund set up for that
purpose and to submit its own budget to the Council
of Ministers for approval;
(3) to promote unity of action among the various
liberation movements in order to make the best use of
all assistance given to them;
(4) to offer its good offices to conflicting
liberation movements for the purpose of reconciliation •••(6).
Therefore, the OAU Liberation Committee took on the role
of conscience of Africa in so far as the eradication of
colonialism and the total emancipation of African peoples
in dependent territories was concerned. The
African states discussed how difficult this task was, which
they had entrusted to the OAU, so.they set up the special
(6) Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.SO
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fund to be raised by voluntary contribution. It was
designed to supply the necessary practical and financial
aid to various African liberation movements. As stated
earlier, the special fund was administer~d by the
Liberation Committee which was started on the basis of
voluntary contributions from OAU member states at the
founding Summit of ~~y 1963(7). Subsequently, at the
first ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State
which was held in 1964 at Cairo, it was decided to levy
a fixed contribution based on UN membership contributions(8).
However, the decision did not bring the expected improve-
ment and the non-payment of contribution became a session of
problems for the OAU organs. Hany member states refused to
contribute to the special fund because they felt that the
Executive Secretariat of the Liberation Committee was
misusing the funds(9). However, it was true that
(7)Kapungu, Leonard T., The OAU'S Support for the Liberation
of Southern Africa, The OAU After Ten Years, Comparative
Perspectives, edited by EI-Ayouty, Yassin, Praeger
Publisher, New York, !2Zi, p.136
(8) Cervenka. Zdenek. Op. Cit. p.S9
(9)
In this respect, Tunisia objected at the meeting of the
Council of Ministers held in November 1966 at Addis Ababa,
to the very high administrative costs and to the manner in
which the fund was managed. The Tunisian delegation accused
the Liberation Committee of extending aid to movements of
certain political ideology even when they were not carrying
out liberation struggles.
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there was some mismanagement but this reason was used
simply by a number of member states in order to avoid
paying their contributions. Consequently, the financial
position of the Liberation Committee became precarious
at most sessions of the Council of ~linisters(10). Thus,
the burden of contributions to the special fund fell on
the shoulders of a few member states whose dedication to
the liberation of Southern Africa was unswerved(11).
It must be pointed out that the frontline states bordering
dependent territories accorded the liberation movements
the facilities necessary for the movement of their freedom
fighters and materials to and from dependent territories.
However, it is not a light responsibility for a country
to have an extra-territorial guerrilla force on its own
territory. African states, like any other states, are
very sensitive to the security situation of their countries.
(10)Similarly, the bulk of outside aid to the liberation
movements came from the Scandinavian countries, Holland,
China, the Soviet Union and East European countries.
However, the Scandinavian and Dutch aid is described as
humanitarian and consisted of medical and food supplies,
clothing and educational facilities for the civilian
population in the struggle areas and for refugees.
Whilst, the Soviet, Chinese and Eastern European assistance
consisted largely of arms supplies. Despite the fact,
the liberation movements are cautious and do not wish to
rely on supplies from the Communist bloc. However, the
reason for accepting such aid was because they had been
turned down by the Western powers. The latter states
justified their refusal by reference to the principle of
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states.
The Scandinavian countries provided non-military aid,
but declined requests for military aid, on the grounds
that it would affect their neutrality and their disapproval
of violence.
(11). Legum. Colin, Op. Cit, pp.215-216
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Nonetheless, they have allowed guerrilla forces to be
trained on their soil and military hardware to be stored
on their territories. Consequently, these states have
been victims of air raids and invasions by the minority
regimes in Southern Africa which justified their actions
on the grounds that these states harbour guerrilla units
in their territories(12). Under these circumstances,
the impression that all OAU member states are contributing
to the special fund is not true because in reality, many
member states do not keep to their commitments. In fact,
the solution to this problem of arrears was to enlarge the
membership of the Liberation Committee. The reason behind
that solution was that some member states refused to pay
their contributions to the special fund unless they were
represented on the Committee. As it has been pointed out
earlier, the Committee was established as a co-ordinating
Committee in order to collect the necessary funds, and
subsequently to distribute it among the liberation move-
ments in African dependent territories. It meets bi-annually.
The first meeting was designed to examine matters relating
to financial and material aid, while the second was designed
to discuss strategy and review the achievements and short-
comings of the various liberation movements(13). Its main
organs are the standing commission on Information, Adminis-
tration and General Policy, the Standing Commission on
Finance, Defence and the Executive Secretariat(14). The
(12)ACR, 1970-71, pp. CS6-S7
(13)Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.SO
(14)Ibid pp.SO-Sl
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duties of the first Commission inter alia were to keep
the OAU member states informed about the state of affairs
in the dependent territories. It was also responsible
for collecting information from the liberation movements
and publicizing their achievements(lS). The S~anding
commission on Finance deals with all requests for financial
assistance from the liberation movements which must be
approved by the Liberation Committee. When the aid is
attested, the Standing Commission on Finance pays for the
purchase of all military materials(16). Thus, the
Commission acts only as a banker and is rarely involved in
direct purchases. The Standing Commission on Defence
assists the liberation movements to choose suitable weapons
and arranges sites for training camps in the territories of
OAU member states(17). The Committee has its headquarters
in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. The Executive Secretariat is
the central organ of the Committee, responsible for co-
ordinating the work of the above-mentioned Standing
Commissions. It also provides the administrative link
with the OAU Secretariat in Addis Ababa and with the Council
of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Govern-
ment(18). Initially, the Committee consisted of nine
African states but it has been expanded to a total member-





(19)Kapungu, Leonard T, Ope Cit, p.136
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to the Council of Ministers which makes recommendations
to it and reports its activities to the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government(20). Therefore, it is the Assembly
that is ultimately responsible for deciding what role the
.Committee should continue to play in support of the struggle
for the liberation of African dependent territories. However,
within the Assembly there has been controversy over the
Committee's role which resulted from the conflicting views
between states advocating armed struggle and those supporting
a peaceful approach to the problem of decolonisation. In
addition, the membership in the Liberation Committee was
often a subject of bitter disputes between the OAU member
states(21). As is often the case, the states with largest
arrears of contributions to the special fund, administered
by the Liberation Committee, have b~en its critics(22).
(20)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.47
(21)When Tshombe became Prime Minister of the Congo, Uganda
challenged, in February 1965, the Congo membership at the
Committee meeting at Dar-es-Salaam, on the grounds that he
had instigated Katanga's secession attempt. Similarly,
Tanzania at the 1965 Accra Summit of the OAU Assembly,
opposed Malawi's membership in the Liberation Committee
on the grounds that the latter was in collusion with the
Portuguese authority in Mozambique, to sabotage the
Committee's work. However, Tanzania threatened that if
Malawi was admitted as a member, Tanzania would quit.
Consequently, Malawi withdrew its candidate. The other
similar incident was when Tanzania recognised Biafra in
1966 and Nigeria only allowed its representative to return
to Tanzania after the reconciliation with Tanzania at the
1970 Summit Conference of the Assembly of Heads of State
and Government.
(22)
Meyers. David B., Ope Cit, p.S15
- 592 -
However, the constant criticism of the Committee made it
subject to the never-ending scrutiny of the Assembly
which has often changed its competence, structure and
composition. In 1966 it entrusted the Council of Ministers
to put an end to the autonomy of the Liberation Committee(23).
Accordingly, it restricted the Committee's competence to
take independent action and placed it under the overall
control of the OAU Secretariat. Moreover, it insisted
upon the Committee circulating its military bulletins on
the activities of the various liberation movements, as well
as all its documents to the OAU member states, who had no
diplomatic relations with the minority regimes in Southern
Africa(24). However, in doing so, to limit the Committee's
autonomy and subject its activities to the public scrutiny
of the Council's reforms, the latter failed to understand
that there is a fundamental difference in character between
the Committee and any other organs of the OAV. In any event,
there were a number of reasons for the loss of enthusiasm
in the activities of the Liberation Committee. For instance,
the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war in 1967 and the
campaign for dialogue with South Africa launched by President
Houphonet-Boigny in 1970. This was in addition to the
failure of sanctions imposed by the UN against Rhodesia
and the aggrevation of the overall economic situation in
Africa(2S). These circumstances made some OAU member states




regard the contribution to the special fund of the Liberation
Committee as useless and unnecessary. Despite this, a turn
for the better came at the 1972 Summit of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State which was held in Rabat, ~Iorocco(26).
The host to the Summit, King Hassan of Morocco, extended
a donation of one million dollars to the Liberation Committee's
special fund. At the same time, the Summit adopted a number
of important decisions concerning the Liberation Committee.
The Assembly approved an increased contribution to the special
fund by 50%. It also granted representatives of the
liberation movements the right to attend and speak at meetings
of the Council of Ministers on all matters concerning the
liberation struggle and to attend the closed session of its
meetings(27). The spirit of the Rabat Summit was also
evident in the recommendations on special measures to be
adopted on decolonisation and the struggle against apartheid
and racial discrimination. To this end the Assembly called
upon OAU member states to supply those states bordering
white minority regimes, with modern military equipment and
aid, including men. It also decided to make the Portuguese
territories the first priority in Africa's liberation struggle
against colonialism in Southern Africa. Consequently,
emphasis was put on speeding up the total liberation of
Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau through concerted
practical actions of all kinds and at all levels(28). Thus,
such special measures might imply direct military support
(26)Cervenka, Zdenek & Legum) Colin, The OAU in 1972,
ACR~ 1972-73, p. A49
(27JIbid p.50
(28)ACR 1972-73, p. C16
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for the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Accordingly,
African regular armies might be directly involved in the
liberation struggles which constituted a major shift from
the previous strategy which had been limited to moral and
material support. -Despite this fact, it would appear
that the leaders of the liberation movements in the
territories concerned did not favour the direct involvement
of African regular armies in their respective liberation
struggles(29). They emphasised that their own freedom
fighters were quite capable of winning their battles, but
they were in need of more arms, money, equipment and shelters
for training and operation camps(30). Consequently, the
principle was accepted by the OAU and embodied in all
subsequent Resolutions on the liberation struggle of Southern
Africa. Accordingly, the objectives and strategy have not
been subject to any change which deals with the absolute
dedication on the part of African states to the total
emancipation of the still dependent African territories.
(29)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.149
(30)The departure from this position occurred during the
civil struggle for power in Angola by which some 10,000
Cuban soldiers fought and won battles for the MPLA.
However, there were two reasons for the MPLA's decision
to accept the Cuban direct involvement in its liberation
struggle. The first one was the need for military advisors
to train its guerrillas to use the Soviet arms~supplied to
it on a massive scale. The second one resulted from
South African intervention which would have upset the
balance of the civil struggle for power if the Cubans had
not helped. At the same time, the OAU split over the
South African intervention which ruled out any possibility
of an OAU joint force. Therefore, the Cubans appeared to the
MPLA to be the kind of force whose presence would be justified
without compromising its political stand vis-a-vis the'OAU.
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However, most damaging by far to the functioning of the
Committee has been the disagreements between the rival
liberation movements in Southern Africa. As a matter of
fact, the liberation movements in all the Southern African
territories had suffered from internal strains brought
about by personality clashes, ambitions and differences in
strategy. These strains led on the whole to polarization
of the movements and each territory began to have more
than one movement claiming the legitimacy and supremacy
in the struggle for that territory's liberation(31).
Consequently, the Liberation Committee was faced with a
situation as to which of these movements were to be regarded
by the OAU as the legitimate spokesman for the aspirations
of the African people in these territories(32). The OAU
recognition is essential for the liberation movements,
in order to secure diplomatic advantages in dealing with
international organisations and non-African states.
Despite this fact, some movements maintained that the OAU
would come to recognise them in time, in consequence of
(31)Legum, Colin, Africa in the 1980's, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, London, !i12, pp.45-47
(32)In South Africa there are the African National Congress
(ANC), the Pan-African Congress (PAC), while in Na~bia,
the South West African National Union (SWANU), the South
West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). In Zimbabwe
there were the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAHU). In Angola
there were the Fronte Nacional de Liberatacao del Angola
(FNLA), the Movemento Peopular de Liberatacao de Micambique
(FRELMO) and the Comite Revolucionaris Africane de
Indepolancia de Guine e Cabo Verab (PAIGC) and the Fronte
Para a Libertacao'e Indepencia de .Guine Portuguese (FLING).
All vied for legitimacy and supremacy in the liberation
of their territories.
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support given to various movements by some African states.
Thus, this attitude of defiance by some liberation move-
ments undermined the unifying role of the Liberation
Committee. It also hindered the Liberation Committee's
efforts at mediation between these rival liberation
movements which consumed much of the Committee's time.
However, having failed to forge unity of a common front,
the Committee decided to give support to the liberation
movements that seemed to be waging a genuine armed struggle
inside their territories(33). Consequently, there are no
fixed rules governing the recognition, but the main criteria
are the degree of support the liberation movements enjoy
in their territories, and how effective they are in their
struggle(34). However, the Liberation Committee served
as a liaision between the recognised liberation movements
where their representatives have offices at Dar-es-Salaam
and have been de facto accredited to the Committee. In
this respect, visiting delegations often come directly
from the front to discuss their activities with the
Executive Secretary General who is appointed by the host
(33)Legum. Colin, Op. Cit, pp.SS-S8
(34)The recognition accorded to the (FNLA) National Liberation
Front of Angola in 1963, was withdrawn in 1964 on the grounds
that its armed struggle had waned. Despite this the (FNLA)
was recognised again in 1972 but with another, the (MPLA)
People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The same
fate met the National Union for the Liberation of Angola
(UNITA) which was hastily recognised by the OAU at the
insistence of Portugal, wishing to negotiate the transfer
of power in Angola with the three liberation movements.
Despite the Liberation Committee's efforts at mediation
in order to establish a united front, the dispute was
resolved by the military victory of the MPLA which challenged
the legitimacy of the FNLA and UNITA as genuine liberation
movements.
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country, this post was always held by a Tanzanian.
subject. He is assisted by three assistant executive
secretaries who are appointed by the Liberation Committee(35).
The main task of the Executive Secretary General is to
implement the recommendations of the Standing Commissions
which could involve negotiations with the OAU member states
about the passage of men and arms in their territories. It
has also involved visits to the theatres of operation of
the liberation movements which could often lead him to
conduct delicate negotiations with the host countries.
Moreover, he is in charge of administering the Committee's
budget and preparing reports for the Council of Ministers.
Furthermore, he"is responsible for the safe custody of
the Committee's files and for providing administrative,
technical services at all the Committee's meetings and
its Standing Commissions(36). As stated earlier, the
Committee deals only with the liberation movements which
were accorded official OAU recognition, by which they
are eligible not only for aid from the special fund, but
- ---..
also for representations at its meetings. In spite of
the condition of recognition, the Committee called upon
all national liberation movements in Southern Africa to
co-ordinate their efforts by establishing common action
fronts in order to strengthen the effectiveness of their
struggle and the national use of the concerted aid given
(35)ACR 1972-73, Op. Cit, p. C44
(36)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp.51-52
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to them. Nonetheless. the call went out and it was
repeated time and time again, but the Committee's efforts
fell on deaf ears(37). At this stage, the Committee
attempted to utilize the services of some of the OAU member
states in order to urge the liberation movements to establish
a united common front in each of the territories concerned.
In this respect. the Committee set up a military commission
of enquiry which consisted of representatives from Cameroon,
Mauritania and Sierra Leone so as to determine. in the
military field, the effectiveness of the movements which
were engaged in the struggle for the liberation of Guinea-
Bissau(38). A similar commission of three w.as also
created to forge a common front between FNLA and ~~LA in
Angola~39). With regard to Rhodesia, the Committee
entrusted to Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia
the task of assisting ZAPU and ZANU in establishing a common
front in the struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe(40).
Despite these efforts at mediation, the Committee was
unsuccessful because of the continued support given to the
liberation movements by certain individual African states.
(37)President Somera Michel of Mozambique proposed to the
Committee in his address before the Committee's meeting in
January 1971 at Maputo, that the correct line of action was
for the OAU to recognise only one liberation movement in each
territory. Indeed, had this line been adopted, the Committee
could have been spared the frustations of years of attempted
conciliation between the movements in Angola as well as in
Zimbabwe and to a lesser degree in South Africa.
(38)Cervenka, Zdenek, Cuba and Africa, ~, 1976-77, PP.·A84-86
(39)ACR 1972-73, pp. C28-30
(40)Ibid p. C41
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The result of this attitude was that each movement
hoped that the OAU would recognise it at some time, which
resulted in frustrating the Committee's efforts at
mediation(41). The decisive criterion for the support
of "any particular liberation movement by certain
individual African states was the ideological affinity
in such situations which prevailed during the Angolan
civil war and the Western Saharan prob1em(42). Under
(41)Kapungu. Leonard T., Op. Cit, pp.138-139
(42) For instance in Rhodesia, Zambia openly preferred and
supported ZAPU while Tanzania openly preferred and supported
ZANU. Similarly, Zaire openly preferred and supported
FNLA in Angola while the Republic of the Congo openly
preferred and supported ~WLA. Even when the OAU"at one
stage seemed to prefer ZAPU in Rhodesia, FELIMO in Mozambique,
FNLA in Angola and PIAGC in Guinea-Bissau, the contending
liberation movements continued to survive through the aid
given to them by these certain African states. On May 10th,
1913, the People's Front for the Liberation of Saguiet a1-
Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO) were established in
Western Sahara. In February 1916 a conflict arose over
the recognition of the POLISARIO which sought the independence
of the territory under the name of the Saharan Republic. The
OAU member states were split over the issue of recognition.
Algeria called for recognition, while Morocco and Mauritania
both threatened to withdraw from the OAU if the POLISARIO
were given the status of OAU Liberation Movement. However,
11 OAU member states voted for the Algerian proposal "while
9 sympathised with Morocco, and 21 abstained. The Council
of Ministers decided to leave the matter to each OAU member
state to recognise the POLISARIO or not, as it chose.
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these circumstances, every individual OAU member state
had its own preferences among liberation movements which
identified themselves with its national cause(43}. At
all events the polarization of the liberation movements
was an assent to the regimes they were fighting by which
such regimes were able to infiltrate the ranks of the
liberation movements and obtain vital military information(44}.
They also encouraged polarization by having agents planted
in various parts of the world releasing statements purporting
to have been issued by one liberation movement attacking the
others contending movement(45}. These insidious ,attempts
demoralized the liberation movements and made unity very
difficult between them. However, the polarization approach
{43} •A similar kind of problem was faced by the Liberat10n
Committee on the future of the territory of (Afars and
Issas) Djibouti. The OAU recognised the Front for the
Liberation of the Somalia Coast (FLCS) backed by Somalia
and the Djibouti Liberation Movement (DLM) backed by
Ethiopia, but not the other three movements in the terri-
tory. Those were the African People's League for Indepen-
dence (APLI), the People's Liberation Movement (~WL) and
the National Union for Independence (UNI). Nonetheless,
they all have contacts with the Liberation Committee. The
latter's main concern was to guarantee the future security
and territorial integrity of Djibouti. Consequently, the
Committee endeavoured to stop both Somalia and Ethiopia
making their periodic claims on the territory. Accordingly,
the Committee reached a mutually acceptable solution to
the problem by making both states sign an understanding to
guarantee and respect the territorial integrity and indepen-
dence of the territory.
(44)In fact, on two occasions the colonial regimes succeeded
in carrying out such policies aimed at crippling the fighting
forces of the movements. In 1969 the leader of FRELMO, the
Liberation Front of Mozambique, was assassinated. In 1973
the leader of PAIGC, the Liberation Front for the Indepen-'
dence of the Portuguese Guinea was also, gunned down by hired
assassins. The OAU Secretary General concluded in his'
report to the OAU Assembly that the two incidents proved once
more that the colonial power would stop at nothing in their
efforts to demoralize the liberation movements.
(4S)Kapungu, Leonard T., 9p. Cit, p.139
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continued to be like that until 1973 when the Liberation
Committee began to make some headway in the formation of a
..
common front of some of the liberation-movements. The
headway started when the OAU set up an ad hoc commission
-composed of the Foreign ~tlnisters of the Congo, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zaire with a specific mandate to forge a common
front of the Liberation movements in Southern Africa(46).
At this time, the OAU succeeded in at least making the
liberation movements sign formal documents setting up common
political organs and unified military commands. Despite this
fact, unity of the liberation movements does not follow from
formal documents signed under the threat of financial
penalties. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the OAU
has endeavoured to make the African peoples in dependent
territories feel that they are not alone in the struggle
against foreign rule. Thus, Resolution after Resolution,
Declaration after Declaration, the OAU has sought to identify
the whole of Africa with the struggle for the liberation of
African dependent territories. The moral and material
support the OAU has given is unlimited and decolonisation
of African dependent territories has become the rallying
issue of the OAU.
(46)Ibid p.140
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TilE Cor.1PATIBILITY OF THE OAU COLLECTIVE MEASURES ''lITH
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UN CHARTER:
The Preamble to the OAU Charter declares that
D •••• the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to the principles of which we reaffirm our adherence
provide a solid foundation for peaceful and positive co-
operation among statcs •••(I)n And, Article 2(1)(e) of
the OAU Charter calls it one of its main purposes that
n••••to promote international co-operation having due regard
to the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ••••(2). It is understood that the UN Charter
envisaged provisions on regional organisations in their
roles in the maintenance of international peace and security
and their legal powers to act on their part in self-defence.
In general terms, Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that
•••••in the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the members of the UN under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement their
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail •••• (3)~
However, in practice the respective jurisdictional spheres
of the UN Security Council and regional arrangements in the
field of peace and security have often been a matter of
dispute. In this respect, the first area of dispute is
the peaceful settlement of regional disputes(4). The relevant
(I)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.2 (2)Ibid p.3
(3)Panhuys, H.F. van'et al., Ope Cit, p. 46
(4)The OAU considered itself competent to deal with the un-
settled crisis of civil war in the Congo in 1963, but when
Belgium and the United States carried out the military operation
to rescue the hostages at Stanleyville, the OAU joined its
member states in making the UN Security Council consider the
action as a violation of the UN Charter.
- 603 -
prov1sions of the UN Charter in this respect are Articles
33 and 52(5). In concert with the provisions of these
Articles, regional organisations should have exclusive
jurisdiction up to the degree of it being unable to find
-a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute. The second
area of difficulty which is more problematic is related to
the enforcement action. The relevant provisions in this
respect are Article 53(1) of the UN Charter which provides
that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional
organisations without the authorization of the UN Security
Council(6), and Article 54 which provides for the require-
ment that the UN Security Council at all times shall be
kept fully informed of measures undertaken by regional
organisations for the maintenance of international peace
and security(7). However, the authority of the UN Security
Council in this respect has in fact been eroded through the
practice of the Council accepting reports from regional
organisations outlining the consequence of actions(8).
As far as the concept of collective self-defence is concerned,
it would appear that Article 51 of the UN Charter provides
for a legal basis upon which a regional security system can
take concerted action by two or more states. The major
powers were the first to interpret Article 51 as justifying
the establishment of collective military defence alliances
in which the concept has been given a wide meaning of
mutual defence(9). Most of these defence treaties included
(5)panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.33 and p.36
(6)Ibid p.36
(7)Ibid p.36
(8)Akehurst, Michael, Ope Cit, pp.18S-188
(9)Ibid pp.177-180
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an explicit reference to Article 51 which stipulated that
one party would come to the aid of another if the latter
has been attacked by a third state(10). As far as the right
of self-defence is concernedJ it is a matter of debate whether
the right includes the power of anticipatory self-defence or
not. It is understood that Article 51 of the UN Charter
constitutes an exception to a general principle envisaged
in Article 2(4) which prohibits the threat or use of force(II).
AccordinglYJ an exceptional principle of law to a general rule
must be interpreted restrictively in order not to undermine
the general norms. Therefore the term •••••of an armed
attack occurs ••••• which is articulated in Article 51 can
only mean that an armed attack has actually taken placeJ
as distinct from being merely imminent. Consequently, an
action of self-defence can be taken without the authorization
of the UN Security Council. In any event, the Council has
the power to order the cessation of such actionJ but it is an
1affirmative decision which must include the concurring votes
of the five permanent members(12). ThereforeJ the role of
(10)Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty of June 6th, 1949
,provides that ••••the parties agree that an armed attack
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall
be considered an attack against them all and consequentlYJ
they agree that if such an armed attack occurs each of them
in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the UN
will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking
forthwith individually and in concert with the other parties
such action as it deems necessary including the use of armed
force to restore and maintain the security of the North
Atlantic Area ••••
(11)••••the right of self-defence according to the natural
law doctrine is the right of an individual or a state to
defend his person property or honour against a real or
imminent attack. It is a right of the attacked or threat-
ened individual or state and of no other individual or
state .••• (Kelsen, Hans, Ope Cit, p.792)
(12)Kelsen. Hans, Ope Ci~, pp.239-244
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the Council in this field ·could be hindered by the veto
of any permanent member by which the provisions of the
Charter in this respect have been of very limited effect.
Consequently, the UN member states have decided to give a
-considerable impetus to regional alliances in the vital
area of the maintenance of peace and security(13). They
were also forwarded on November 4th, 1950 to the UN General
Assembly to adopt(14) ..the well-known •••••Uniting for
Peace Resolution ••••• in which it interpreted its competence
within the UN collective security system as follows:-
•••••if the Security Council because of lack of unanimity,
of the permanent members fails to exercise its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security in any case where there appears to be a threat
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,
the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately
with a view to making appropriate recommendations to make
for collective measures including in the case of a breach
of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force
when necessary to maintain or restore international peace
and security. If not in session at the time the General
Assembly may meet in an emergency special session within
twenty-four hours of the request thereof. Such emergency
special session shall be called if requested by the Security
Councilor the vote of any nine members or by a majority
of the members of the UN••••(15). At the same time, the
(13)Akehurst. ~Uchael, Ope Cit, pp.178-180
(14)GA Res. 377 November 3rd, 1950
(lS)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p:209
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Assembly established a Collective Measures Committee
which was given the responsibility of studying ways and
means which might be useful to maintain and strengthen
international peace and security(16). Subsequently,
the Committee recommended to the General Assembly that
there should be mutually supporting relations between
(
the activities of regional organisations and the
collective military measures taken by the UN when the
latter is engaged in such action(17). It should be
noted that the main concern of this section in the
relationship between the UN and the OAU was in dealing
with the colonial questions and the problem of apartheid.
As stated earlier, the OAU Charter prescribes the
superiority of the law of the UN Charter as it makes
deferential reference to the UN Charter and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. In this respect, a
consideration would be given to the OAU practice with
regard to the maintenance of international peace and security,
(16)




As far as the area of peaceful settlement of regional
disputes is concerned, the OAU has explicitly pointed
out its preference for an African solution within the
framework of its Charter but without a rigid thesis of
exclusive jurisdiction(18). Accordingly, their approach
conforms with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter
as mentioned above(19). The approach that African
regional disputes should preferably be settled within
the framework of the OAU Charter has thus far been fairly
generally followed in practice. As far as the enforce-
ment action is concerned, the OAU is also involved in
action by which Article 53(1) of the UN Charter would
appear to apply(20). So far, the OAU has taken regional
(18)Okoye, Felix Chuks, Op. Cit, p.148
(19) .The foundation of this approach was laid down as early
as 1963. The first occasion was the Algerian-Moroccan
border dispute which erupted in major hostilities in October
1963. Notably, Morocco preferred bilateral negotiations,
and should that fail, consideration by the UN Security
Council, while Algeria sought consideration of the dispute
by the OAU. However, the permanent members of the UN Security
Council were able to dissuade Morocco from trying the OAU
machinery. Under these circumstances, the OAU Council of
Ministers met on November 15th, 1963 in extraordinary session
in Addis Ababa in order to consider the dispute. It adopted
a resolution confirming the unwavering determination of
African states always to seek a peaceful solution to all
regional disputes within the framework of the OAU.
Subsequently, this approach was also confirmed on February
12th, 1964 by the OAU Council of Ministers when the latter
met in extraordinary session in Dar-es-Salaam in order to
consider the border disputes between Somalia and its
neighbouring states of Ethiopia and Kenya. The Council
declared its conviction that the solution to all African
regional disputes should be sought first within the frame-
work of the OAU Charter.
(20) Akehurst, Michael, Ope Cit, p.181.
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measures against colonial and settler regimes in Southern
Africa by which the OAU member states have been requested
to sever diplomatic and economic relations and all forms
of communication with these regimes. The OAU, through
its Liberation Committee, also requested its member states
to provide moral and material assistance including financial
aid, military training and transit facilities to African
liberation movements already struggling for the liberation
of their respective territories(21). However, there is
nothing to show that the UN Security Council ever authorized
or encouraged the OAU to take such measures(22). Nonetheless,
the action of the OAU could not be condemned too hastily
as offending the UN Charter in consequence of reference
being made in the Charter to enforcement action of both
military and non-military measures(23). ,With regard to
the enforcement action of non-military measures, it would
appear to follow that such measures do not amount to
enforcement action which requires the authorization of the
UN Security Council(24). Turning to moral and material
assistance, including financial aid, military training
and transit facilities to African liberation movements,
could such measures be justified under Article 51 of the
UN Charter, as a form of collective self-defence. Initially,
a distinction should be made between the utilization by
the OAU of the military forces of its member states and the
use of force by African liberation movements with aid and
(21)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, pp.371-372.
(22)Akehurst, Michael, Ope Cit, p.183
(23)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 12, !2&J, p.329
(24)Andemicael, Berhanykum~ 0 i_ _ p. C t, p.10S
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.other indirect assistance from those states. As long as
the OAU does not assume an official role so as to enforce
a decision relating to the maintenance of regional peace
and security. It is very difficult to assert that its
indirect role could constitute enforcement action of
military measures. As regards the compatibility of such
aid and indirect assistance with the spirit of Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter. It would appear that no armed forces
of the OAU member states are being used against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any
states. In fact, it is the African liberation movements
that are using force in their own territories with moral
and material assistance, including financial aid, military
training and transit facilities from the OAU. Thus, it
has been discerned that moral and material aid to such
movements struggling for the eradication of colonialism
and the elimination of racialism could hardly be regarded
as being inconsistent with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter(2S).
Therefore, the OAU moral and material aid to African
liberation movements struggling for the eradication of
colonialism and the elimination of racialism is considered
to be in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter(26).
(2S)Provisions are to be found in Article 1 establishing
as purposes of the UN, paragraph (2) states that
••••to develop friendly relations among nations based on
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace •••• (I/O Ope Cit, p.2S)
(26)Kapleyn. P.J.G. et a1., Qp. Cit, p. 1.A.6.b.6.
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It is also regarded as being compatible with the Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation Among States adopted on October
24th, 1970 by the UN General Assembly(27). In this respect,
the·Declaration specifies that ••••every state has the duty
to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples
referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal
right and self-determination of their rights to self-
determination and independence •••(28). It also adds that
•••••in their actions against and resistance to such
forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right
to self-determination such peoples are entitled to seek
and receive support in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter ••••(29). Accordingly, if the
moral and material support given to African
(27)!2!2 p. 1.A.6.6.b.
(28)~ p. 1.A.6.6.b
(29)When the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration
by consensus, some delegations expressed the reservation
on the majority views concerning certain elaboration of
the seven principles enshrined in the Declaration. One
major point of difference was the meaning of support for
the .struggle of oppressed dependent peoples. The majority
of member states maintained that where the right of
peoples to self-determination, freedom and independence
was suppressed by force, then the type of support being
given by governments to liberation movements, directly or
through regional organisations, could not be subject to
that aspect of the principle of non-use of force.
Consequently, this could not prohibit liberation move-
ments from incursion into the territory of another. state.
On the other hand, some other states, including the
Western powers, stressed that such forms of aid could
not be permissible in conformity with the Declaration.
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liberation movements by the OAU one equated to those
enshrined in the Declaration. It could hardly be said
that African states were exercising through the OAU their
right of collective self-defence under Article 51 of the
UN Charter. This issue would seem to arise only if
the regular forces of the OAU member states were actually
used to threaten or attack the territorial integrity or
political independence of another state which is in
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In any event,
it would also appear that the OAU does not justify its moral
and material aid on the grounds of self-defence(30). The
justification which is put forward by the OAU for its moral
and material aid envisaged in its Resolution on decolon-
isation which was adopted at the founding Conference of the
OAU on lrIay25th, 1963(31). It was also elaborated in
the well-known 1969 Lusaka Manifesto which clearly defined
-the OAU responsibility to take such a necessary action
in defence of humanity(32). Therefore, reliance is
placed upon the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention which
was known as early as the seventeenth century as forming
part of Customary International Law(33). In conformity
with such a doctrine, intervention by a state or group
of states in the affairs of another state, is lawful if
that other state is guilty of cruelties against its nationals
in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights(34).
(30)Akehurst. Michael, Ope Cit, p.182
(31)Cervenka Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp.SO-51
(32)Manifesto on Southern Africa,Published by·the Information
Division, CAU General Secretariat, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,
~, Introductory Note .
(33)Sanders, A.JGM,Op. Cit, p.149
(34)Whiteman, ltlarjorieM., Digest of International Law,
Volume 12, 1963, pp.204-215
- 612 -
Accordingly, the action to be taken must be objectively
requisite and aimed solely at the protection of the
subjectsof that other state and restore their fundamental
human rights. In this respect, in the opinion of African
states, the situation in Southern Africa justified the
humanitarian intervention taken by the OAU which took the
form of moral and material assistance, including financial
aid, military training and transit facilities(35). They
have also pointed out that colonialism and racialism
contribute a flagrant violation of human rights and the
principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter.
Therefore, African states feel that the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention constitutes an exception not only
to the prohibition of intervention in domestic jurisdiction
of states, but also to the prohibition of the threat or use
of force. Accordingly, the OAU acts in conformity with
the belief that it requires no authorization of the UN
Security Council. However, it is obvious that the
OAU has never been criticized by the UN for doing so.
In fact, the facilitative role of the OAU to African
liberation movements was considered as being compatible
with the purposes and principle of the UN Charter. It
(35)The intervention on the grounds of humanitarian
purposes was permissible in certain cases in which
the United States accepted to join Belgium in November
1964 to intervene in the Congo to rescue hostages who
were citizens of at least eighteen countries. Great
Britain and France intervened in the 1956 Suez Crisis
which justified an exercise of right to protect British
and French citizens and defend national interests of the
two states. The United States intervened in the
Dominican situation which was justified on the grounds of
humanitarian reasons to protect the lives of United States
citizens and American interests in the country concerned.
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has been widely recognised as legitimate by the UN General
Assembly and in certain situations by the UN Security
Council(36). To this effect, the UN General Assembly
has repeatedly asked member states by an overwhelming
majority of votes to extend material assistance to national
liberation movements(37). On certain occasions, the UN
Security Council likewise requested member states to give
such aid to the people of a colonial territory(38). At
all events, the OAU has so far considered colonialism
and apartheid aOsa breach or at least a threat, to inter-
national peace and security. Hence, African states
requested the UN Security Council to supplant the OAU action
by taking compulsory measures under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. But the Security Council could only be dissuaded
to order comprehensive mandatory sanctions against the
Rhodesian regime and a mandatory embargo on arms against
South Africa(39). Consequently, there is no real problem
(36)Brown1ie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.391
(37)Panhuys, H.F. van et al., Ope Cit, p.290
(38)upon the request of African states and support of the
third world states, both types of measures of diplomatic and
economic sanctions and assistance to liberation movements
have been endorsed by the UN General Assembly in a series of
Resolutions. Subsequently, African states raised the issue
of those measures at the UN Security Council in order to
persuade the Council to urge all member states of the UN to
apply them as recommended by the UN General Assembly, but the
Council sought to play the role of illusionment. Nonetheless,
a few years later the,Council requested the UN member states
to extend moral and material aid to liberation movements in
Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa (Namibia) which
strengthened the authority of the UN General Assembly
Resolution in this respect.
(39)Sanders, AJGM, Op. Cit, p.149
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of jurisdictional conflict that would seem to arise between
the OAU and the UN from the measures being taken under the
auspices of the OAU Liberation Committee against minority
regimes in Southern Africa. Nonetheless~ it would appear
that the increasing support given by the OAU to African
liberation movements stems from the relative ineffective-
ness of the UN in achieving the common objectives in Southern
Africa(40). It is understood that the OAU resources
are very limited and this is the reason why it has in fact
been eager to involve the UN Security Council to take greater
initiative regarding the issue of majority rule in Southern
Africa. As a matter of fact, the absence of co-operation
from the United States, the U.K. and France in the Security
Council makes remote the possibility of reaching an amicable
solution to the situation in Southern Africa. Consequently,
the deteriorating situation in Southern Africa poses a
serious challenge to the capacity of both the UN and the OAU
of bringing about a peaceful settlement to the problem in
the area.
(40)There was only a real possibility of jurisdictional
conflict between the OAU and the UN Security Council in the
case of Rhodesia immediately after the 1965 Unilateral
Declaration of Independence. The problem arose when the
OAU contemplated direct use of force by its member states
against the illegal regime in the spirit of Article 51 of
the UN Charter, without the Security Council's authorization.
Despite this fact, there was no actual armed attack against
any OAU member states in order to precipitate the inter-
vention of the right of collective self-defence. However,
the OAU believed that the rebellion carried out in Rhodesia
by the illegal regime was a real threat to the security of
neighbouring African states, especially Zambia which had
welcomed refugees and liberation movements struggling against
the minority regime in Rhodesia. However, the OAU
subsequently decided not to recommend such direct military
action by its member states against the minority regime in
Southern Rhodesia.
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THE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION IN PORTUGAL'S
AFRICAN TERRITORIES:
In 1930 the Portuguese Parliament passed a colonial
act giving the government in Lisbon the authority to make
the colonial territories in Africa(l) an integral part of
Portugal. In 1951 the Portuguese government made
these territories overseas provinces entitled
to the same form of administration as their counterparts
at home(2). However, the assimilation policy produced
a small group of educated blacks and many of them were
opposed to Portuguese policy in their respective countries.
As no negotiation or political changes were permitted by
the Lisbon government, national liberation movements were
established and actively supported by the newly independent
African states. In Angola, the war of liberation commenced
in 1960; in Guinea-Bissau in 1961 and in Mozambique in
1964(3). As far as the situation in Angola was concerned,
(l)The Portuguese presence in the littoral of west and
central Africa existed as early as the sixteenth century.
The latter possession of Mozambique originated as trading
posts established in the sixteenth century. In the
eighteenth century the Portuguese zone on the coast extended
from Cape Delgado in the north into the Bay of Louren~o
Marques. In Guinea-Bissau the Portuguese presence was
established in accordance with the Convention of May 12th,
1886 dividing the Portuguese and French colonial possess-
ions in the area. Consequently, the Berlin Conference of
1885 recognised the Portuguese claims in the north and south
which received the approval of the other major colonial
powers in the area in consequence of agreements concluded
in 1885 and 1891. (Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, pp. 297,
1025 and 1219)
(2)Sanders, AJGM, Ope Cit, p.89
(3)Ibid p.89
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the 1961 uprising by the Angolan liberation movements
against the integration policy, induced the Portuguese
government to apply repressive measures. Consequently,
the matter was brought,by the Liberian government,before
-the UN Security Council, but the latter was unable to
adopt a Resolution in consequence of certain permanent
members' opposition. Subsequently, the Council was
convened in May 1961 at the request of forty-four Afro-
Asian states at which it was able to adopt a Resolution
without opposition. The Council described the situation
as one, the continuation of which, was likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security.
Consequently, it called upon the Portuguese government
to desist forthwith from repressive measures and large
scale killings(4). Subsequently, the UN General Assembly
in December 1962 condemned the attitude of Portugal which
was inconsistent with the provisions of the UN Charter
and concluded that the colonial war in Angola and
Portugal's non-compliance with the UN Resolution,
constituted a serious threat to international peace and
security. It also recommended member states to halt
arms supplies to Portugal which might be used to suppress
the Angolan people pursuing their right towards self-
determination and eventual !ndependence(S). Nonetheless,
(4)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 12, !i2J, pp.721-732
<S)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, pp.375-379
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•
the Portuguese government refused to consider granting
independence to its overseas provinces which it regarded
as an integral part of Portugal whose future was, therefore,
not negotiable with any international authority(6). In any
event, .when decolonisation was d-iscussed in 1963 at the
founding Conference of the OAU, the situation in Portugal's
African territories had already developed into full scale
war(7). Thus, the OAU policy on decolonisation in the
latter territories between 1963 and 1974 largely followed
the pattern of its policy on Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and
South-West Africa (Namibia) which reckoned upon the diplomatic
offensive at the UN. Therefore, one of the initial acts of
the OAU following its establishment, was to despatch a
mission of four African Foreign Ministers to draw the attention
of the UN to the explosive situation arising from Portugal's
colonial policy(8). .Accordingly, the UN Security Council
convened in December 1963 at the request of the African
group at the UN to consider the situation in Portugal's
African territories as a whole. The Council described the
situation as seriously disturbing the peace and security in
the African continent and so it called for urgent negot-
iation about independence between Portugal and the political
parties within and outside the territories. It also
recommended all member states to h~lt the sale and supply
of arms and military aid that would enable Portugal to
continue its repressive measures and large scale killings(9).
(6)Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.13S
(7)Krishnan, }.{ayaM., Op. Cit, p.212
(8)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.109
(9)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Op. Cit, pp.723-724
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Despite this firm attitude of the UN, Portugal continued
its non-co-operative stance and pursued the intensification
of its repressive measures. Consequently, the UN Security
Council convened again in November 1965 at the request of
the African group at the UN,in order to reconsider the
broader international implication of the situation in the
territories concerned. The Council decided to broaden
the arms embargo imposed upon Portugal to include a
termination of the supply of any material for the
manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition. It
also called upon Portugal and the OAU member states to
conduct urgent negotiations for a peaceful implementation
of UN Resolutions on the granting of independence to the
territories concerned. In conformity with the general
mandate of the aforesaid Resolution, the UN Secretary
General arranged a brief dialogue between the represent-
atives of the concerned parties in the dispute at the UN,
but the negotiations ended unsuccessfully(10). Under
these circumstances, African groups at the UN resumed
their efforts at applying diplomatic and economic
measures, but these attempts failed to win sufficient
support in the UN Security Council from the permanent
members, except the USSR. As a result, African states
turned to the UN General Assembly who adopted, on




not only such sanctions but also requestea member states
to extend moral and material support to the peoples of
the Portuguese colonies for the restoration of their
inalienable rights(11). Despite this fact, several
member states expressed opposition to the paragraph
calling for sanctions because they believed that the UN
General Assembly, unlike the UN Security Council, did
have the competence under the UN Charter to impose such
measures. In particular, the United States, the U.K.
and France also opposed the description of the situation
in the territories concerned as being an actual threat
to international peace and security and thus justified
the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter. Moreover, they did not accept the
assumption that Portugal was using in its administering
African territories, arms, equipment and military aid
received from its NATO allie8(12). Nonetheless, some
(1l)Ibid p.725
(12)African states believed that Portugal could not stand
the expenses of the war in Africa which was estimated in
1971 to have been over ~500 million, representing 50% of
its annual budget. They accused the NATO powers of being
the real prop of the Portuguese colonial war. The reason
was the strategic importance of all Portugal's African
territories. Angola and Guinea-Bissau between them
controlled 1816 km of Atlantic coastline which was seen
as an integral part of Atlantic defence. The Cape Verde
islands held the key to the South Atlantic while
Mozambique constituted a buffer zone for South Africa
and access to the sea for Rhodesia. Angola is rich in
material and represents vast raw material sources for
the industries of the NATO countries. Therefore, African
states believed that there was even more reason to give
military support to Portugal despite growing disapproval
of public opinion in the West.
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progress was made in the next two years in the UN General
Assembly towards the acceptance of diplomatic and economic
measures against Portugal. However, this was made in
consequence of a sUbstitution of the recommendation to
the UN Security Council to apply sanctions instead of
the Assembly's own call upon the UN member states to
take such measures. Consequently, the UN General Assembly
avoided mentioning a reference to Resolution 2107(XX) in
its subsequent Resolution 2507(XXIV) adopted in November
1969(13). Therefore, the Assembly was able to secure
maximum agreement by refraining from characterizing the
situation as an actual threat to international peace
and security. It was only able to call on more
general effective steps in conformity with the relevant
provisions of the UN Charter. Nonetheless, the Resolution
reinstituted a stronger tone on the General Assembly's
appeals to UN member states and international bodies within
the UN family to extend, in co-operation with the OAU,
moral and material aid to liberation movements in the
territories concerned(14). However, the appeals gained
significant support and had been more widely accepted
than the calls for the application of diplomatic and
economic sanctions. As far as the collective measures
of the OAU were concerned, for its part the OAU had
endeavoured since 1965 to ensure that its own member states
had strictly observed the 1964 diplomatic and economic




sanctions that had been imposed against Portugal. To
this end, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and
Government entrusted the OAU Secretariat to establish a
Bureau of Sanctions to examine the application and to
make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and
extent of ~he sanctions' implementation(IS). Despite
this fact, the efforts of this organ had had relatively
little influence in bringing about a total African
boycott. Unfortunately, some member states did not
fully comply with the OAU recommendations and few went
as far as acting in defiance of the OAU recommendations
by strengthening their links with Portugal in order to
sabotage the OAU collective measures(16). Under these
circumstances, the OAU alternative, which had more
significant pressure on Portugal, was the extension of
moral and material support to liberation movements in
the territories concerned. Accordingly, the OAU through
the Liberation Committee, increased its financial and
other military aid to the liberation movements who
were in fact struggling for the 1iberation of their
respective territories. The Committee also made
arrangements with the OAU member states to permit the
movements to use their territories for military training
and for transit facilities(17). In spite of increasing
aid to the movements, the effectiveness of their struggles
had been undermined by rivalry between factions of the
(lS)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.112
(16)Ibid p.113
(17)
Krishnan. Maya, Op. Cit, p.213
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movements, especially in Angola. Consequently, the
Liberation Committee was entrusted with the major task of
bringing about the formation of a common front for each
territory under Portuguese administration(18). At all
events, the OAU support for the liberation movements was
further increased which in fact induced Portugal to conduct
raids within African countries bordering its colonies.
Thus, the situation rapidly deteriorated from a potential
threat to an actual breach of international peace and
security by Portuguese incursions across international
boundaries. Initially, the OAU went to the UN and sought
redress through the UN Security Council which adopted a
Resolution without any opposition, condemning the military
incursions and urgently called upon Portugal to desist
forthwith from such actions(19). Nonetheless, a new stage
was reached in November 1977 following the Portuguese attack
on Guinea which turned the relations between OAU member
states.and Portugal into a state of undeclared war(20).
(18)Cervenka, Zdenek, The OAU in 1970, J&R, 1970-71, p.A35
(19)J.leyerS,David B., Op. Cit, pp.124-125
(20)The invasion on November 22nd, 1970 was devised by
General Antonio de Spinola, Commander-in-Chief of the
Portuguese armed forces in Guinea-Bissau. It was also
carried out by an invading force of 350,000 troops
brought by four smaller partro-boats. The troops were
equipped with infantry arms and divided into groups
which were despatched to attack strategic points as
follows:- the army camps, the airport, the electric
power station, the Presidential palace and the head-
quarters of PAIGe, which was destroyed. The vessels
used to transport the forces were Portuguese; the crews
were mostly members of the Portuguese armed forces while
the invaders, who were commanded by Portuguese officers,
were African dissidents.
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Therefore, the operation was of such magnitude that
the UN Security Council treated the situation differently
from previous attacks against African states. It
declared that such armed attacks against an OAU member
state and indeed the continuation of Portuguese colonialism
in Africa, constituted a serious threat to the peace and
security of the African continent. The Council also
went far beyond this condemnation by warning Portugal
that in the event of any repetition of such action
against OAU member states, the Council would immediately
convene to consider appropriate measures in conformity
with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter. Moreover,
the Council requested Portugal to pay appropriate com-
pensation for the damages that had been caused by its
military incursions. Furthermore, the Council urged
all member states to refrain from providing Portugal
with any military or material aid enabling it to continue
its repressive measures against the peoples under its
domination(21). In any event, the tough approach
adopted by the Council was unacceptable to the United
States, the U.K., France and Spain which abstained in
consequence of their belief that the Resolution went
far beyond the findings of the Special Mission. As a
matter of fact, the active co-operation of these permanent
members of the UN Security Council was essential if any
measures recommended by the Council were to be effective.
(21)
ACR, 19Z0-71, pp. CS6-S7
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As stated earlier, the latter states advocated peaceful
negotiations with Portugal and seemed to be unwilling to
support any measures going beyond a voluntary partial
arms embargo involving only those types of arms and
ammunition used by Portuguese troops in Africa(22).
As the alternative was unacceptable to the OAU, the
latter began to realise that African states could not
rely on the UN Security Council alone for effective
support. Consequently, the OAU concluded that the UN
Security Council was unlikely to apply any sanctions
in conformity with the above-mentioned Resolution.
Thus, it started to intensify its own collective measures
outside the framework of the UN Security Council.
Accordingly, the emergency session of the OAU Council of
~Unisters convened on December 9th, 1970 at Lagos, which
was a stormy affair, with even moderate members calling
for punitive military action against Portuguese military
presence in the territories concerned(23). Under these
circumstances, the situation soon developed into an
extremely costly deadlock which in the long run held out
no hope for the colonial power. As a result, the
Portuguese colonial policy followed the pattern of
increasing the repressive measures which culminated in
the massacre of the total population of the Winiyama
village about 2S km south-east of Tele in Mozambique.
(22)Apdemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.114
(23)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.1S7
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The event led to a formidable blow to the Portuguese
colonial po1icYI reflected in the world reaction at
the Special ~Ieeting of the UN Deco1onisation Committee
on July 20th, 1973(24). Under these circumstances I
the armed struggle in the Portuguese colonies exceeded
all forms of resistance which led to the first major
victory against Portugal in Guinea-Bissau, which uni-
laterally declared independence of the country on
September 24thl 1973. The act was recognised by most
members of the world community except Portugal's NATO
allies and the Scandinavian countries(2S). However I
the OAU was engaged in an effort to bring about
UN approval of Guinea-Bissau's unilateral declaration
of independence. To this end, the UN General Assembly
convened on November 2nd, 1973 at the request of the
African group which adopted a Resolution describing
the Portuguese military presence in certain sectors of
Guinea-Bissau territory as an act of aggression committed
against the people of the country concerned. As African
states anticipated I the veto by the United States, the U.K.
and France at the UN Security Council did not make a request
in the Resolution for the admission of Guinea-Bissau
to the UN membership. Nonetheless, the Republic became
a member of a number of UN Specialised Agencies(26).
Under these circumstances, the Portuguese armed forces
discerned that Lisbon's intransigent attitudes were
(24)Ibid p.138
(2S)ACR 1972-73, pp. CI0-11
(26) Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.138
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-bound to result in the loss of Portugal's stand in
Africa. Consequently, the army became increasingly
impatient and the situation soon developed on April 25th,
1974, into a revolt against the government of Premier
Cactaro(27). The coup d'e~at resulted in a return to
democratic rule in Portugal and a policy of rapid de-
colonisation in respect of its overseas territories in
Africa. Accordingly, Portugal recognised on September
10th, 1974, the independence of Guinea-Bissau under the
rule of (PAIGe) African Party for Independence of Guinea
and Cape Verde(28). As a result of the goodwill shown
by the new Portuguese government, the OAU embarked on
an alternative approach aimed at achieving non-violent
negotiated settlements with Portugal. This approach
was embodied in the 1967 Lusaka Manifesto designed to
ensure a peaceful transition to independence in the
Portuguese colonies and to achieve majority rule peacefully
in Southern Africa(29). Accordingly, Mozambique acceded
(27)General Antonio de Spinola, the Governor and Commander-
in-Chief of Guinea-Bissau wrote a book called ·Portugal
and the Future.- He assessed the Portuguese integral
policy of African territories as being bound to result
in a loss of Portugal's stand in Africa. Nonetheless,
the author did not suggest that Portugal abandon its
colonies, but proposed a federation to be formed, in
which Portugal and its territories could stand on an
equal footing. As a result of his book, Spinola was
dismissed and arrested, but this led to an armed revolt
which overthrew, on April 25th 1974, the Cactaro govern-
ment. Consequently, General Spinola became Portugal's
new President and Mario Soar as leader of the Portuguese
Socialist Party, returned from exile to become Foreign
Minister.
(28)Sanders. AJGM, Op. Cit, p.89
(29)Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa, Published by the
Information Division, OAU General Secretariat, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia, without date, pp.1-21
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to independence on June 25th, 1975, followed by the
independence of Cape Verde on July 5th, 1975 and Sao
Tome and Principe on July 12th, 1975(30). Whilst the
transfer of power in all Portuguese territories was a
smooth and orderly decolonisation process, Angola
entered independence hopelessly torn apart by internal
power struggles between Angolan liberation movements.
The crisis continued throughout 1914 and in October
erupted into a full scale civil war with all the
ingredients of cold war politics(31). Under these
circumstances, the OAU decided that there should be no
negotiations with Portugal about the terms of independence
until a united front had been established, by bringing
together the three An~olan liberation movements. Accordingly
the dissension between the MPLA,. FNLA and UNITA became a
crucial topic in the 1914 negotiations between the OAU and
the Portuguese government over Angola's independence(32).
(30)Legum, Colin, Op. Cit, p.216
(31)cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, pp.61~62
(32)There were additional problems because Angola's
neighbouring African states, notably Zaire, the Congo
Republic and Zambia were inclined to support their own
favourites amone the Ancolan liberation movements. The
OAU feared the external and regional interventions which
might jeopardise its efforts at national reconciliation
in order to bring a united front of the guerrilla move-
ments. In this direction, the OAU Liberation Committee
brought together the movement for the Popular Liberation
of Angola (MPLA), joining it with the Front for National
Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total
National Independence of Angola (UNITA). The Committee
succeeded in &etting the rival groups to unite at least
for the purpose of forming a transitional government. The
reason for the OAU effort was to achieve an orderly transfer
of power by which they hoped to.avoid the chaos and misery
which had accompanied Belgium's sudden decolonisation.
- 628 -
In this respect, the OAU through its Liberation Committee,
mobilized all available diplomatic efforts at its disposal
which resulted in making the movements sign, on January
5th, 1915 the l-fombasaAgreement. It laid down the rules
on negotiating jointly with the Portuguese government
at Penina where an agreement was reached on January 5th,
1915 setting Angola's independence day as November 11th,
1915. The latter government stipulated that the country
would be run by a transitional government of both the
Portuguese government and the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA which
were recognised as the only legitimate movements(33).
Nonetheless, there were great differences between the
three movements in ideology and rationale. They were
also supported by different African states with their
main backing in different parts of the country and among
different ethnic groups and so the welding together of
the three movements proved impossible. Consequently,
hostilities broke out between the movements within days
of the investiture of the coalition government and
continued throughout most of 1915. In the course of
the year, Kinshasa, Mombasa and Aluen ceasefire agree-
ments were signed under the aegis of the OAU, but they
were broken(34). However, the last effort at national
reconciliation by the OAU through its Liberation Committee
was the meeting between the leaders of the three move-
ments which took place in July 1915 at Nokuou, Kenya.
(33)ACR 1972-73, p. C21-28
(34)Ibid p. C28-29
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An agreement was reached providing for peaceful transition to
independence, but the reconciliatory effort was shattered by the
renewal of armed hostilities on the eve of the Summit of the OAU
Assembly which took place in Kampala, Uganda{3S). As a
result, the Assembly adopted a Resolution defining the OAU
attitude towards the liberation movements. It deplored the
bloody confrontations between the principal liberation move-
ments and their non-respect for the agreement they signed at
Nakuru, Kenya. It also appealed to the parties in dispute
to lay down their arms. Moreover, it requested the Portuguese
government to resume responsibility for the maintenance of
law and order in Angola until independence on November 11th,
1975. Furthermore, it set up a fact-finding commission of
inquiry and conciliation which'entrusted with the OAU Defence
Commission, was to give overall consideration and assessment
of the possibility of establishing and despatching an OAU
peace-keeping force to Angola(36). However, the Resolution
did not make any mention of foreign intervention despite
the MPLA accusation that regular units of the Zaire army
were fighting with FNLA. At the same time, the United
States and China channelled arms supplies to FNLA through
Kinshasa as part of the package of aid to Zaire. On the other
hand, Soviet arms supplies were channelled to MPLA through the
OAU Liberation Committee which helped to secure the delivery(37).
Under these circumstances, the fighting in Angola continued and '
hopes for a national reconciliation were dashed(38).
(3S)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.141 (36)Ibid p.142
(37)Morison, David, African Policies of the USSR and China
in 1976, ~ 1976-1977, PP.76-82
(38)At this stage, the OAU Assembly were requested to conveneat an emergency session in Addis Ababa, but the Summit adjourned'
and requested the OAU Bureau to follow up the Angolan crisis.
It would be very difficult to say that the extraordinary session
of the OAU Assembly was a total failure because it did not pass
any Resolution. In fact, the OAU is not a supranational organ-isation capable of imposing decisions of a majority or a minority.
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Consequently, the conflict had become a full scale war
with South Africa intervening on the side of UNITA-FNLA
while the )~LA had the support of Cuban commandos(39).
Under this challenging atmosphere, the OAU Assembly met
on January 10th, 1976 at an emergency session "which took
place at Addis Ababa. The situation in Angola occupied
the meeting's discussion in which African leaders arrived
at the conclusion that the consensus that all three
Angolan movements had an equally valid claim to share in
the government of independent Angola which had collapsed
for two reasons(40). Initially, the struggle for power
had had international repercussions which had affected
inter-African relations. The presence of South Africa's
regular troops on the side of the FNLA-UNITA coalition
had stirred African hostilities against South Africa(41).
The latter had also caused damage to the integrity of
the FNLA and UNITA as true national movements entitled to
participate in an Angolan government of national unity.
(39)Cervenka, Zdenek, Cuba and Africa, ~ 1976-77, p. A84
(40)ACR 1976-77, Ope Cit, p. C5
(41)The UN Security Council convened on March 31st, 1976
at the request of Kenya to consider the African charges
against South Africa which committed an act of aggression
and interference in the domestic jurisdiction of Angola.
The Council adopted a Resolution condemning South Africa's
intervention in the internal affairs of Angola. It also
demanded South Africa. to halt utilizing Namibian
territory as a base for carrying out provocative or
aggressive acts a~ainst Angola. Moreover, it called upon
South Africa to pay full compensation for the damage and
destruction inflicted on the state and for the restoration
of equipment and material which its invading troops had
seized.
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Secondly, the engagement of 12,OOO-strong Cuban commando
units and the massive arms supplies by the Soviet Union,
had turned the conflict into a full scale war. As a
result of these two reasons, the OAU belief in a govern-
ment of national unity, a coalition of MPLA, FNLA and
UNITA, which would steer the country to independence,
became very slim. Under these circumstances, the
situation soon developed into an extremely costly
deadlock which in the short term held out no hope for
South Africa FNLA-UNITA forces. The Cuban troops
took part in the Angolan civil struggle, equipped
with Soviet arms supplies which were despatched to
Angola at an unprecedented scale, and turned the war
in favour of the }'IPLA. By January 1916, the Cubans
were able to stop the advance of South African and
UNITA forces in the south and the MPLA captured FNLA
headquarters in the north at Camona and pushed its
troops back behind the'frontiers of Zaire(42). At all
events, South Africa's intervention(43) damaged the
integrity of FNLA and UNITA and so MPLA was in an
extremely strong position to repudiate any OAU efforts
to bring about a united front to run the transitional
government. Therefore, the consensus among African
(42)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp. A85-90
(43)South Africa kept the size of its involvement in
,Angola secret. It only disclosed that it had despatched
,a limited number of troops to protect the Cuene River
,hydro-electric and irrigation projects under construc-
tion in Angola.
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states was that HPLA should be recognised forthwith
as the only legitimate government in Angola, while
FNLA and UNITA should forfeit any right as genuine
national movements. Consequently, the OAU member
states recognised Angola as an independent state
under the leadership of ~~LA, and on February 11th,
1976 it was admitted as the 47th-member of the OAU(44).
Nonetheless, Zaire and Zambia delayed their
recognition. Zambian recognition was issued on
April 14th, 1976 while Zaire issued its declaration
of recognition on January 10th, 1977(45).
(44)Cervenka. Zdenek, The OAU in 1976,
~, 1976-77, p.68
(45)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.147
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THE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION IN ZDIDABWE:
The British colony called Southern Rhodeisa had
dominated African politics ever since the dissolution
of the Central African Federation in 1962(1). The
Rhodesian government insisted on its right to indepen-
dence which had been granted to the two other members,
namely Zambia and ~~lawi, but the OAU requested the
colonial power not to transfer the power to a minority
government imposed on the majority by the use of force
and under the cover of racial legislation(2). In fact,
the OAU feared the possibility of a unilateral declaration
of independence by the minority government which became
reality on November 11th, 1965(3). Consequently, the
OAU took the position that since Great Britain was still
constitutionally answerable for Rhodesia, it was up to
the colonial power to end the white rebellion and to
restore legality in Southern Rhodesia. At the same time,
the territory as a non-self-governing territory, came
under the umbrella of the UN thereby the Rhodesian crisis
was brought before it, within the meaning of Chapter XI
of the Charter. As a matter of fact, the question of
Southern Rhodesia had already been brought before the UN
General Assembly since the breakdown of the Central African
(l)The present boundaries of Zimbabwe were established by
the Southern Rhodesian order in Council of October 20th,
1898. In 1923 the Charter of the British South Africa
Company was abrogated and Southern Rhodesia was formally
annexed as a Crown. colony. (Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.1081)
(2)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp.122-123
(3)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.380 .
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Federation in 1962 upon the insistence ·of African states.
In this respect, the Decolonisation Committee determined
that Southern Rhodesia was non-self-gove~ning within the
meaning of Article 73 and 74 of the UN Charter and General
Assembly Resoiution 1S14 (XV)(4). But, the UK rejected
the aforesaid interpretation, arguing that Southern
Rhodesia had attained in 1923 and further in 1961,
constitutional rights and privileges which naturally
curtailed the powers and functions of the British govern-
mente Therefore, the territory status remained outside
the constitutional definition of the non-self-governing
territory within the meaning of the provisions of the
UN Charter(S). Consequently, the 1963 founding Conference
of the OAU adopted a regional strategy on Rhodesia which
was designed to persuade the UK not to attribute sovereignty
to a minority government(6). To this end, the OAU sought,
through the UN Security Council, to discourage the UK from
transferring the military force of the defunct Central
(4)Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law,
Volume 13'!i2l, pp.733-734
(S)Ibid pp.73S-739
(6)The OAU strategy on Southern Rhodesia consisted of two
prolonged approaches, as follows:-
(i) to hold the UK responsible for the situation in
Southern Rhodesia and urge it not to transfer the power
and attributes of sovereignty to a minority government
imposed on African people by the use of force and under
cover of racial legislation,
(ii) to declare solemnly that if power in Southern
Rhodesia were to be usurped by a racial minority govern-
ment, the African states would lend their effective moral
and practical support to any legitimate measures which the
African nationalist leaders may devise to transfer it to an
African majority.
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African Federation to Southern Rhodesia. Consequently,
the Council convened at the request of African states
which adopted its first Resolution on Southern Rhodesia,
calling upon the UK to take all necessary action to prevent
unilateral declaration of independence. It also requested
the colonial power to grant independence only in conformity
with the aspirations of the majority of the population.
Moreover, it called upon all member states of the UN to
deny recognition to any illegal entity that might be
brought about through unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence(7). Despite the firm attitude of the UN enshrined
in the Security Council Resolution, the possibility of
a unilateral declaration of independence was revealed in
early November 1965 which caused intensive diplomatic
activity at both the OAU and the UN. In this respect,
the OAU warned that if the UDI was not prevented, it would
reconsider all diplomatic and economic relations of its
member states with the UK. It also requested the UK to
suspend the 1961 Constitution of Southern Rhodesia and to
take all necessary measures, including the use of armed
force in order to resume its administration to release all
political prisoners and to convene a Constitutional
Conference(8). Moreover, it established a committee of
(7)nrownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.403
(8)In its first year, the OAU concentrated on the first
line of policy and sought in vain through the UN to dis-
courage the UK from transferring the military of the defunct
Central African Federation to Southern Rhodesia. It began
seriously assisting the African liberation movements in
Rhodesia only after the British government hinted that it
intended to meet the unilateral declaration of independence
solely by economic sanctions. Thus, ruling out the use of
military force.
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five, charged with"the responsibility of co-ordinating
African efforts to prevent the UDI by all possible means.
Furthermore, it requested the UN General Assembly to
incorporate all these recommendations in its own Resolution
on Southern Rhodesia(9). Accordingly, the UN Ge~eral
Assembly endorsed the OAU's request for the first time,
thereby it called upon the UN member states to extend
moral and material aid to the people of Zimbabwe in their
struggle for freedom and independence(10). Consequently,
the UK stated its firm determination before the Assembly,
to pursue a peaceful settlement through negotiations, but
made it clear that it would not use force to suppress the
UDI. As a result, the Rhodesian government unilaterally
declared, on November 11th, 1965 the country independent,
which induced the UN General Assembly to adopt a unanimous
Resolution requesting the UK to end the rebellion and to
( 9)nrownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.403
(10)The main OAU demands as reflected in the Resolution
of the OAU Assembly can be summarised as follows:-
(1) to obtain from the UK effective measures including
the use of force to end the UDI and to prevent any supplies
including oil and petroleum products, from reaching Rhodesia;
(2) to obtain in the UN Security Council, the necessary
enforcement sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
(3) to condemn Portugal and South Africa for their
support to the illegal regime;
(4) to condemn the activities of foreign financial and
other interests which were supporting the illegal regime
and to invite the states concerned to end such activities;
(5) to condemn any arrangement between the UK and the
illegal regime resulting in a transfer of authority to the
latter government contrary to the principles of universal
suffrage;
(6) to secure moral and material support for the people
of Southern Rhodesia in their struggle for independence.
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restore its administration. It also asked the UN Security
Council to consider the situation as a matter of urgency
and to take the appropriate measures within the provisions
of the UN Charter(II). Consequently,_the Council convened
at the request of the UK, which adopted a Resolution that
called upon all member states not to recognise the illegal
regime and to refrain from extending any aid to it(12).
At the same time, the UK assumed a new approach towards
the question of domestic jurisdiction concerning Southern
Rhodesia. It determined that the only lawful authority
in Southern Rhodesia was the British government and thereby
it was clearly responsible for re-establishing the rule of
law in the country concerned(13). Thus, 'the UK consti t-
utional position was brought close to the position long held
by the UN General Assembly. However, the UN Security
Council adopted, at different stages, four major Resolutions
concerning the Rhodesian crisis hut none of them fully met
the OAU demands. The Council unanimously adopted on
November 12th, 1965 Resolution 217 describing the situation
resulting from UDI as extremely grave and that its contin-
uation would constitute a threat to international peace and
security. It also called upon the UK to quell the rebellion
in Southern Rhodesia by taking all appropriate measures to
eliminate the authority of the minority regime. Moreover,
it called upon all member states to desist from providing
(11)GR Res 2022(XX) November 5th, 1965
(12)sC Res 216 November 12th, 196~
(13)Whiteman, J.lar.iorieM., Ope Cit, p.739
- 638 -
the regime with arms, equipment and material support.
Furthermore, it requested all member states to break all
economic relations with Southern Rhodesia including an
embargo on oil and petroleum products(14). Finally, the
Resolution contained a paragraph most pertinent to the
relationship between the UN and the OAU as a regional
arrangement within the framework of Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter. In this respect, paragraph 10 requested the
OAU to take all appropriate measures at its disposal to
assist in the implementation of Resolution 217(15). It
was the first time that the UN Security Council had asked
the OAU to carry out diplomatic and economic sanctions
against a political entity outside its membership. It
would appear that this constituted both an indirect
endorsement of the collective measures that the OAU had
already taken against the minority regime in Southern
Rhodesia and an authorization for the continuation of
such collective action. However, the OAU economic
boycott against Southern Rhodesia was ineffective, since
most OAU member states had little or no trade with the
country concerned. Instead, the economic measures taken
by the OAU created hardship for Zambia whose economy was
heavily dependent upon Southern Rhodesia. Consequently,
the OAU set up a committee of Solidarity for Zambia to
(14)Brownlie. Ian, Op. Cit, p.394
(IS) Ibid p.39S
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co-ordinate aid from African and other states. But, in
spite of the Committee's efforts and subsequent appeals
by the UN to extend aid to the affected country, the
Zambian government had to bear all the costs with only
assistance from ;he British government(16). As stated
earlier, the OAU demands for mandatory sanctions did not
at this stage receive sufficient support at the UN Security
Council. Despite this fact, the OAU set out to assist
the implementation of the UN Security Council non-mandatory
sanctions but the measures adopted by the OAU Council of
Ministers at its sixth emergency session went far beyond
those contained in the UN Security Council's Resolution
They included severence of diplomatic relations
between OAU member states and the UK in the event of the
latter having failed to repress the rebellion and to prepare
the way for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia before the
5th of December, 1965. They also envisaged mobilization
of military forces in OAU member states in order to plan
a military action in the event of any attack by the minority
regime in Southern Rhodesia on a neighbouring OAU member
state(18). At all events, the OAU member states discerned
from the outset that they had over-committed themselves
far beyond the measures maintained by the UN. This became
obvious when only nine member states carried out the threat
of breaking diplomatic relations with the UK. rt would
appear that the OAU approach was designed to obtain a change
(16)Ibid p.404...........
(17) Tandon, Yashpal, Op. Cit, pp.1168-1199
(18)
Krishnan, Maya, Ope Cit, pp.214-215
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in the British position through the threat of breaking
diplomatic relations, but it became obvious to several
African states that it would be unwise to take such action.
As far as direct military action was concerned, African
states carefully examined the feasibility of mobilizing
forces against Southern Rhodesia and again they became
convinced that it would be unrealistic to take such action.
The OAU realised how difficult it would be to prepare and
organise an effective composite expeditionary force against
the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia. The latter had
a small army, but it was highly trained and eq~ipped with
modern military arms which might also be reinforced by
Portuguese and South African troops. Under these
circumstances, the OAU adopted an alternative strategy
which was designed to increase funds, material and military
training to the liberation movements(19). Nonetheless,
the military action and effectiveness of the liberation
movements was undermined by rivalry between the principal
movements and by their failure to comply with the
recommendation of the OAU Liberation Committee for the
formation of a common front(20). Consequently, the OAU
changed its strategy to induce the UN Security Council to
take more effective measures within the framework of
(19)Kapungu. Leonard. T., Ope Cit, p.144-145
(20)The OAU Liberation Committee succeeded in working out
the Lusaka Agreement of December 10th, 1974 by virtue of
which (ZANU) Zimbabwe African National Union and (ZAPU)
Zimbabwe African People's Union agreed to merge into one
movement accepting the ~ame (ANe) African National Council.
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Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In this direction some
progress was made when the UN Security Council convened
in April 1966 at the request of the UK which authorized
it to prevent by use of force if necessary, the arrival
at Beira, Mozambique tankers reasonably believed to carry
oil destined for Southern Rhodesia(21). Nonetheless, the
Council rejected the African suggestion to expand the
scope of the measures against the illegal regime until
the British government had exhausted prospects for a
peaceful settlement through negotiation. Accordingly,
the OAU appeal to the British government to consult only
the African political parties about the possibility of
a negotiated settlement. Nonetheless, the British
government made a concrete proposal to the illegal regime
in order to implement the majority rule already enshrined
in the 1961 Constitution, but the proposals were rejected(22).
Under these circumstances, the British government decided
to recommend further measures in the UN Security Council,
thereby mandatory sanctions were imposed upon Southern
Rhodesia with regard to certain key products under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter(23). The Council adopted,
on December 8th 1966, Resolution 232 without opposition,
but with the USSR, France, Bulgaria and Mali abstaining.
(21)SC Res 221 April 9th. 1966
(22)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.120
(23)Ibid p.121
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Acting in conformity with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter,
it was decided inter alia that all member states would
prevent the importation into their territories of certain
named products originating in Southern Rhodesia(24).
Simultaneously, the Council reminded member states that
failure by any of them to implement the Resolution would
constitute a violation of Article 25 of the UN Charter(25).
However, some minor amendments proposed by certain African
states were incorporated into the aforesaid Resolution, but
the OAU demands for comprehensive sanctions failed to receive
sufficient support in the Security Council. Subsequently,
the Council convened on May 29th, 1968 at the request of
African states to consider the OAU demands for military
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia but these demands also
failed to receive sufficient support in the Council.
Instead, the Council adopted Resolution 253 in which it
decided to apply mandatory sanctions with regard to all
trade, investment and travel. At the same time, the
Resolution requested the UN Secretary General to report
to the Security Council on the progress of the implementation
of the above-mentioned sanctions. It also established a
committee entrusted to examine a report on the
(24)Brownlie. Ian, Ope Cit, p.298
(2S)The Council decided that all member states should
prevent the following: (1) importation into their terri-
tories of nine vital products of Southern Rhodesia - iron ore,
chrome, pig,iron, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products as
well as hide, skin and leather; (2) shipment in vessels or
aircraft of their registration of any of those commodities;
(3) any activities by their nationals or in their territories
promoting the export of those commodities from Southern
Rhodesia; (4) any activities by their nationals or in their
territory promoting the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia
of arms, ammunition, military and other aircraft, military
or other motor vehicles and equipment and material for their
manufacture and maintenance; (S) participation in any form
in the supply of oil products to Southern Rhodesia.(Whiteman. J.farjorie.M., l!lL, Volume 13, pp.746-747)
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implementation of the sanctions and to seek further
information from any member states and the specialised
agencies regarding the trade of that state, the commodities
and products exempted from the prohibition, any activities
by the ,nationals of that state or in its territories that
may constitute an evasion of the measures decided upon in
the sanctions. Horeover, the Council, for the first time
recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of
Southern Rbodesia to achieve their rights to freedom and
independence(26). Accordingly, it urged all UN member
states to extend moral and material aid to the national
movements in their struggle to put an end to the illegal
regime in their country. Thus, the OAU's long-standing
plea to the UN Security Council for legitimization of
the support being given to the African liberation move-
ments was finally met. Despite the firm attitude of the
UN towards Southern Rhodesia, the measures taken did
not achieve the desired effect. This became quite clear
in the reports of the committee set up to examine the
implementation of the UN sanctions, which concluded that
there were extensive violations and erosions of these
sanctions(27). Therefore, the OAU instructed the African
group at the UN to intensify its efforts to attain
through the Security Council, interruption of all existing
means of transportation and communications to and from
Southern Rhodesia. It also requested African states to
make attempts at extending the mandatory sanction to
Portugal and South Africa(28). Accordingly, the UN
(26)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.298
(27)Ibid p.398
(28)-Tandon, Yashpal, Ope Cit, pp.1169-1170
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Security Council convened in June 1969 at the request of
the African states which submitted a draft Resolution
advocating the application of the aforesaid measures, but
the demands failed to secure the required majority.
Subsequently, the Council met in March 1970 in the wake
of the illegal proclamation of Republican status for
Southern Rhodesia by the minority government. The Council
had to consider Resolution 2508(XXIV) of the UN General
Assembly which drew its attention to the urgent necessity
of applying the OAU demands, but the recommendation was
rejected by the Council due to a veto by both the United
States and the UK. At the same time, the Council rejected
the UK draft Resolution which merely called for non-
recognition of the Republican status proclaimed by the
illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia(29). However, the
Council became so deadlocked that the UK and African states
found it necessary to reach a compromise which was proposed
in a draft Resolution submitted by Finland. The Finnish
compromise was adopted as Resolution 277 passed by 14 votes
to none with Spain abstaining. The Resolution made the
withdrawal of consular and trade representatives in Southern
Rhodesia mandatory. It also requested member states to
interrupt any existing means of transportation to and from
the country concerned(3~). But other means of commun-
ication were exempted and the Council refrained from
extending these measures'upon Portugal and South Africa.
(29)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.122
(30)Ibid p.123
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At all events, Resolution 277 marked the end of the
consideration of the Rhodesian crisis by the UN Security
Council. In fact, the British government had subsequently
attempted to find a realistic basis for a peaceful settle-
ment to the Rhodesian crisis(31). At this stage, the OAU
tried to discourage the conclusion of any agreement with
the illegal regime and to prevent any erosion of the
sanctions being taken. Despite the fact, a serious blow
occurred in 1971 to the OAU attempts, when the American
Congress enacted legislation which would allow the
administration to import Rhodesian chrome(32). Subsequently,
the UK concluded an agreement with the illegal regime
which provided for independence under a Constitution that
would permit gradual progress towards majority rule in
Southern Rhodesia. Nonetheless, the settlement was made
with the proviso that the British government must be
satisfied that the settlement was acceptable to the people
of Rhodesia as a whole. To this end, the British government
established a commission on Rhodesian opinion under the
Chairmanship of Lord Pearce. It was entrusted with a
(31) .To this end the British government intensified its
efforts in the second half of 1966 to conclude an agree-
ment with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia, on the
basis of the following six principles:- (1) ••••unimpeded
progress to majority rule already enshrined in the 1961
Constitution; (2) no •• retrogressive amendment of the
Constitution; (3) immediate improvement in the political
status of the African population; (4) progress towards
ending racial discrimination to the people of Rhodesia
as a whole; (5) the British government would need to be
satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole;
(6) regardless of race, there was no oppression of majority
by minority or of minority by majority.
(32)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.122
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mandate to ascertain the response of all sections of the
population of Rhodesia and to report its findings to the
British government(33). Under these circumstances, the
OAU instructed the African group at the UN to intensify
its efforts to reject, through the UN Security Council,
the British proposals for a settlement. But the Council
failed to adopt the African draft Resolution which would
have rejected the proposals for a settlement in consequence
of a veto by the UK(34). Consequently, the African states
went to the UN General Assembly which adopted a Resolution
describing the British proposals for a settlement as a
flagrant violation of the inalienable right of the African
people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence(35).
Despite this fact, the Pearce Commission went on and carried
out its mandate with competence and impartiality. Its
conclusion was reported to the British government, the
outcome of which was the rejection of the proposals for
(33)ACR 1971-72 Ope Cit, pp. C144-145
(34)Andemicael. Berhanxkum, Op. Cit, p.123
(35)The UN General Assembly simultaneously recommended
member states to order the complete or partial inter-
ruption of postal, telegraphic and radio communications
between Rhodesia and other states. It also requested
the British government to take the following measures:-
(1) to repeal all repressive discriminatory legislation
measures, all restriction political activity and .~
establish full democratic freedom and equality of
political rights; (2) to convene a constitutional
conference attended by legitimate political represent-
atives of the people of Zimbabwe; (3) to work out a
~,settlement the future of Rhodesia to be submitted
for endorsement to the people of the country as a whole.
However, the British delegation described these proposals
as totally unrealistic and therefore unacceptable.
(Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.12S)
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a settlement of the African majority. Howeverl the British
government accepted the validity of this rejection and
it became clear that no appropriate solution could be
found unless the interests of the African majority were
fully represented in any future efforts for a-settlement(36).
Therefore, it decided that at the next stage it should
conduct its efforts in the country concerned between the
racial groups and any further arrangement must be within
the agreed six principles. It also decided that the status
quo, including sanctionsl should be preserved. On the other
hand, the OAU also endeavoured to maintain the status quo
including the sanctions and felt that this was the only
way to bring about the illegal regime to negotiate a new
independence constitution. Accordingly, the Summit of the
OAU Assembly which was held in 1974 at Mogadishu, Somalia,
adopted a special Resolution which called upon member
states to blacklist those personsl companies and institutions
in-their countries who. continued to have dealings or do
business with the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia(37).
(36)ACR 1971-72 Ope Cit, pp. C151-153
(37)It should be mentioned that at the founding Conference
of the OAU, African states agreed unanimously to co-
ordinate concerted measures of sanctions against the regimes
in Southern Africa. The first ordinary session of the OAU
Assembly established in 1964 the Bureau of Sanctions to
supervise the implementation of the OAU Resolutions calling
on member states to apply economic sanctions against the
regimes in Southern Africa. SubsequentlYI the OAU Council
of Ministers informed the Bureau of Sanctions in February
1966 that after two years of supposed African sanctions
against Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal, there had been
no marked progress in the implementation of the OAU sanctions.
Many African states simply ignored the Resolutions and
continued to engage in economic relations with-these regimes
in Southern Africa.
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In any event, the UN sanctions failed in their primary
objectives to topple the illegal regime but the OAU
recognised the need to maintain them. Through them,
Southern Rhodesia was denied access to any international
conference, political or economic, and even more significant,
to the world money market which was indispensable to its
long-term survival. Sanctions and non-recognition also
prevented the illegal regime from consolidating its position
and maintained it both economically and militarily
vulnerable. ~fureover, sanctions were one of the three main
elements, the other two being guerrilla warfare and lately
the independence of Mozambique, which forced the illegal
regime to commence negotiations with the OAU member states.
In this respect, the government of Mozambique announced,
on March 3rd, 1976, the implementation of UN sanctions on
Rhodesia by closing its lifelines to Beira and Maputo.
It also confiscated Rhodesian property and assets in
Mozambique and put the latter country on a state of
protective war footing against possible attack as a means
of reprisa1(38). Consequently, Mozambique's decision
threw the entire burden of Rhodesian international traffic
onto South Africa. It also coincided with the failure of
what was probably the last peaceful efforts at settling
the crisis, which was known as the ·Politics of Detente.-
(38)
Legum. Colin, Southern Africa, The Years of the
Whirlwind, ~ 1976-77, pp. A33-39
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The latter initiative was carried out by four OAU member
states, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, which
later joined Angola in 1976(39). The heads of these
states had attempted under the aegis of the OAU, to
explore ways' and means for the peaceful transfer of
power to the African majority in Southern Rhodesia.
The initiative evolved from the contacts between the
heads of these frontline states on the one hand, and
South Africa and the Rhodesian government on the other.
In this respect, the government of South Africa pointed
out its readiness to negotiate on how the majority rule
would come in Rhodesia in conformity with the Lusaka
~ranifesto(40). Therefore, the'heads of the frontline
states accepted the responsibility of acting as inter-
mediaries with South Africa's government, accepting a
similar role with the Rhodesian government. However,
a constitutional solution in Southern Rhodesia would
relieve South Africa from its costly role as UN sanctions
breaker, and allow her to withdraw her military troops
whose presence in Rhodesia was increasingly an inter-
national embarrassment. In exchange for the goodwill
over Rhodesia, the government of South Africa might
receive assurance from Mozambique that the rail links and
(39)Since the Autumn of 1974, the initiative on the
liberation of Southern Africa, namely Rhodesia and Namibia,
has passed into the hands of the frontline Presidents
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,
Secretse Khana of Botswana and Samora ~Iachel of }.{ozambique.
In 1976 they were joined by President·Augustinho,Neto of
Angola. The OAU Liberation Committee and the staff of the
Executive Secretariat at Dar-es-Salaam used its office at
Lusaka and have effectively been integrated into the
diplomatic teams of the five Presidents.
(40)Lusaka J.lanifesto,Op. Cit, pp.13-15
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harbours of Nacala, Beira and Haputo wouLd remain open
for both South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. At all
events, there were many in Africa who saw detente as a
revival of the policy of dialogue. Most critical were
the radical member, states of the OAU and the liberation
movements, particularly ZANU and ZAPU. Consequently,
the OAU Council of ~tlnisters convened, on April 7th 1975,
in Dar-es-Salaam at an emergency session at the request
of these radical member states(41). The host delegation
to the Conference stated that the OAU should endorse the
use of peaceful means to achieve independence in Rhodesia,
but if this was made impossible, the OAU would resume and
intensify the armed struggle. Consequently, the host state
succeeded in persuading the Council that the initiative was
a change of tactics but not of strategy. Eventually, the
Council adopted unanimously a declaration on Southern
Africa which left the doors open for netotiations on
Southern Africa. Therefore, the Dar-es-Salaam Declaration
was endorsed by the Summit of the OAU Assembly held in
July 1975 at Kamp~la, Uganda(42). The Assembly endorse-
ment marked the decline of the OAU role as collective
policy-maker on Southern Africa, thereby the issues were
(41)Guinea, Algeria and Libya led the critics against the OAU,
and on Algeria's insistence, the extraordinary session of
the Council of Ministers was convened at Dar-es-Salaam on
April 7th, 1975. The Council eventually adopted unanimously
a Declaration, in order to appease the critics of these
states and clear distinctions were drawn between talks
with South Africa on Rhodesia and Namibia, and the talks
on apartheid. The talks on the latter were declared as
unpermissible.
(42)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.129
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handed over to the heads of the frontline states to
be handled solely by them through the assistance of
its Liberation Committee. However, the Dar-es-Salaam
Declaration paved the way to the Geneva Conference on
Rhodesia which opened on October 26th, 1976. But, the
proceedings of the Geneva Conference drifted into
recess after seven weeks and it was never reconvened.
In fact, the Conference was originally called to work
out the mechanism for the transfer of power to the
majority in Zimbabwe, but it failed in consequence of
disagreement on the date for the independence and on
the length of the transitional period. The delegations
of the four Liberation Movements, ZANU, ANC, UANC and
ZAPU were unanimous, though with varying emphasis that
the interim phase should be no more than a year, while
the British government suggested a period of 15 months.
However, the central point of divergence between the
liberation movements on the one hand, and the Rhodesian
government on the other, was over who would control the
instruments of the state and the army during the
transitional phase(43).
(43)~ Volume IS. No.3, April 15th, 1978, p.4790
- 652 -
Under these circumstances, the British government embarked
on another attempt to find a mutually acceptable solution
to the Rhodesian crisis. This attempt culminated in
joint Anglo-American proposals for a peaceful settle-
ment(44), but the Rhodesian government rejected them and
put forward some proposals of its own for an internal
settlement. In this respect, the Rhodesian government
signed, on ~rarch 3rd, 1978, an agreement with three
moderate black nationalist leaders of the ANe, UANC and
ZAPu. The agreement contained a constitutional arrange-
ment which gave the white minority guarantees and
parliamentary representation for 10 years or the lives
of two parliaments, whichever was the longer. It also
stipulated a constitution which would provide for
majority rule on the basis of one man, one vote. There
would be a parliament of 100 seats, 72 of which were
reserved for blacks and 28 for whites. Moreover, the
(44)The Anglo-American proposals for a settlement in
Rhodesia were based on seven points as follows:-
(l)••••the surrender of power by the illegal regime and
a return to legality; (2) an orderly and peaceful trans-
ition to independence in the course of 1978; (3) free and
impartial election on the basis of universal adult
suffrage; (4) the establishment of the British govern-
ment of a transitional administration with the task of
conducting the election during the transition period;
(5) a UN presence, including a UN force during the
transition period; (6) an independent constitution
providing for a democratically electoral government,
the abolition of discrimination, the protection of
individual human rights and the independence of judiciary;
(7) a development fund to revive the economy of the country
which the UK and the United States view as predicted upon
the implementation of the settlement as a whole ••••
(ARB, Volume 14 No.9, October 15th, 1977, pp. 4571-4572)
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agreement provided for an interim government consisting
of an Executive Council and a Lower Council of Ministers.
The Executive Council's main task would be to draft the
new majority rule constitution, while the Lower Council
would be responsible for preparing legislation under
the direction of the Executive Council(45). Under these
circumstances, a frontline Summit was held on March 26th,
1978 at Dar-es-Salaam which called for non-recognition
of the internal settlement reached under the aegis of
the illegal regime in Rhodesia. At the same time, the
Conference instructed African groups at the UN to
request a meeting of the UN Security Council to consider
the matter urgently. Accordingly, the Council met on
March 17th, 1978 and adopted a Resolution by 10 votes
in favour to none against with abstention by the five
Western members of the Council, the United States, the
UK, France, West Germany and Canada(46). The latter
five states characterized the internal agreement as
inadequate and expressed regret that it had not been
(45)The Security Council Resolution adopted on ~~rch
18th, 1978 condemned the Rhodesian election and urged
member states to send observers to them. Neither the
UN member states nor the British government sent
official observers to the election. The OAU had
declared on April 26th, two days after. the pUblication
of the Rhodesian election result, that they were null
and void and again on April 30th, 1978 the Security
Council adopted another Resolution which yet again
condemned the election in Rhodesia and called on
member states not to accord recognition to any govern-
ment set up in consequence of it.
(46)
~, Volume 15 No.3, April 15th. 1978, pp.4790-4791
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possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
However, the Resolution described the internal settlement
as an attempt aimed at the retention of power by a racist
minority. It also declared that the speedy termination
of the illegal regime and the replacement of its military
and police forces was the initial prerequisite for the
solution of legality in Southern Rhodesia. ~1oreover, it
called upon the UK to take all necessary measures to
being about an end to the illegal regime in Rhodeisa,
to be followed by genuine decolonisation in the territory
in line with the UN Resolutions(47). Accordingly, the
British government resumed its efforts at finding a
mutually acceptable solution in conformity with the UN
Resolutions in order to return Rhodesia to a state of
legality. In this direction, it endeavoured to explore
with the OAU frontline states, what form of settlement
would carry international support. There was a general
feeling that a settlement to the crisis mut be seen to
stem from the British government as the constitutionally
responsible authority. There was also consensus between
the UK and the OAU member states that further attempts
must be made to involve all the parties to the dispute
in the search for a peaceful settlement. To this end,
the British government put forward firm proposals on
the constitutional arrangement in order to achieve a
proper basis for legal independence for Rhodesia.
It transmitted invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the
(47)Ibid pp.47-90
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leaders of the Patriotic Front Alliance to attend a
Constitutional Conference which was to open on September
10th~ 1979 at Lancaster House. At the same time~ it
published outline proposals for an independence constit-
ution framed in general terms but largely compatible
with the Constitution which had already been adopted
in Rhodesia. But, the proposals took account of the
criticism which had been made by the OAU member states
whereby they maintained that the representation of the
minority could not have a blocking power and senior
appointments in public services etc. would be vested
in the Premier(48). It was against this background
that the Lancaster House Conference proceeded. It
should be noted that the Conference was marked by three
major turning points. The first was in mid-October 1979
when Bishop Muzarewats delegation had agreed to the
British proposals for the independence Constitution.
Subsequently, the Patriotic Front pointed out that it
conditionally accepted the constitutional proposals,
and thereby the Conference was able to move on to discuss
their implementation(49). It was at this stage that
the British government was ready to appoint a governor
with executive legislative power in order to convey
Rhodesia to independence. Consequently, the Conference
entered its final and most difficult phase, at which
Bishop Muzerewa's delegation again accepted, on




November 26th, 1979 the Brit.ish proposal t.hon e prinCiples
of the ceasefire and subsequently, the Patriot.ic Front a~so
accepted, on December 5th 1979, the proposals thereby a
formal ceasefire agreement was signed(SO). As a result.,
a Zimbabwe Bill was introduced in the-British Parliament
in order to enable Rhodesia to be brought to independence
on a date to be declared. On December 7th, 1979, the
British government appointed Lord Soames as Governor of
Rhodesia, who resumed the local administration on the
following day(51). Consequently, legality. was restored
for the first time since November 11th 1965, thereby the
UN sanctions were automatically lifted. An election
campaign was conducted by all parties to the Lancaster
House Agreement, as exiled leaders returned and others
emerged from years of confinement or forced inactivity.
Under these circumstances, the OAU Council of Ministers
held, on March 10th 1980, a special session on Rhodesia
at which the Council endorsed the outcome of the election
as free and fair(52). Finally, Britain's last African
colony, the rebellious war-weary-beseiged and landlocked
country of Rhodesia attained on April 17th, 1980,
recognition and legal independence. Consequently, Lord
Soames formally ceded his power as British Governor to
Robert MUgabe, leader of the Zimbabwe African National
Union (ZANU) and thereby, Zimbabwe became the 50th
member of the OAU(53).
(SO)Ibid p.411
(51)ARB Volume 17, No.1, February 15th 1980, PP.5547-5548 .-'(52)~, Volume 1Z. No·3, AJ:!rillSth. 1280 p. 5602(53)ARB Volume 1Z, No·4, May 15th. 1280 PP.5639-5641-'
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TOWARDS THE PROCESS OF DECOLONISATION IN NA}ITBIA:
South West Africa (Namibia) came into being as such
under treaties and boundary settlements between the colonial
powers of the era, namely, Germany, Portugal and Great
Britain(I). After the defeat of Germany in the First
World War, its overseas possessions were placed under the
Mandates System of the League of Nations in conformity
with the Peace Treaty of 1918. Therefore, Namibia
ceased to be under the sovereignty of Germany, which
had formerly governed it, and Great Britain assumed the
mandate for the territory, to be exercised on its behalf
by the government of the Union of South Africa(2). In
this respect, the mandate for Namibia was conferred on
December 11th, 1920 upon South Africa by a Resolution of
the Council of the League of Nations in accordance with
Article 22 of the Covenant(3). The mandate agreement
authorized South Africa with full administrative and
legislative power over the territory as an integral part
of its territory, but with the proviso that would guarantee
freedom of conscience and religion. It also provided for
(1)••••the alignment with German South West Africa was
established as a consequence of the delimitation of
spheres of influence by the Anglo-German agreement of
July 1st, 1920 ••••
(Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.1213)
(2)Dugard, John, The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute,
University of California Press, Los Angeles, !ill, pp.15-11
(3)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.149
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the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the
traffic in arms and the prevention of the establishment
of fortification or military and naval bases and of
military training of the native for other than police
purposes and defenc; of the territory(4). Subsequently,
the UN Charter came into force on October 24th, 1945
which introduced the Trusteeship System. According to
Article 77 of the UN Charter, the Trusteeship System
shall apply to any territories held under the
Mandates System of the teague of Nations which ceased to
exist after the Second World WareS). However, the
representative of South Africa to the UN requested the
General Assembly at its.first session, that the territory
of Namibia be incorporated into the Union of South Africa
on the grounds that the territory was sparsely inhabited
and could not exist independently. The General
Assembly rejected the South African request and thereby
called upon the latter power to place the territory under
the Trusteeship System in conformity with the UN Charter(6).
Despite this fact, South Africa adopted an attitude of
defiance towards the UN efforts to bring the territory
of Namibia under the Trusteeship System. In this respect,
(4)Kapleyn. P.J.G. et al., Qp. Cit, p. 1.A.13.4.a
(S)Goodrich. Leland at al., Op. Cit, pp.478-487
(6)Andemicaal. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.12S
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it refused to enter into a Trusteeship Agreement with the
UN in conformity with Article 19 of the UN Charter, arguing
that its responsibility for the Mandates had ceased to
exist with the dissolution of the League of Nations(1).
It also sought to wash away the international criticism
of its policies within the territory by arguing that
Article 2(1) of the Mandates System empowered it with full
administrative and legislative power over the territory
concerned(8). At all events, the UN General Assembly
disagreed with South Africa's interpretation of the
Mandates System. Therefore, the matter was submitted in
1950 to the ICJ for advisory opinion. The Court endorsed
the General Assembly's position that the UN is the
successor of the League of Nations in relation to the super-
vision of surviving mandate territories(9). Therefore, the
Mandates System persisted and continued to govern the right
and duties of South Africa as the mandatory power.
Nonetheless, South Africa maintained that the ICJ advisory
opinions were political rather than legal in character(lO) •
.( 7)nugard, John, Op. Cit, pp.96-104
( 8)Cervenka, Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.149
( 9)International Status of South West Africa Opinion 1950,
ICJ Report, pp.143-144
(10)Legal jurists are unanimous in their view that Advisory
Opinions of the ICJ cannot be considered as legally binding.
The Court itself declared with the utmost finality in its
advisory opinions on Interpretation of Peace Treaties with
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania - ••••it is only of an advisory
character as such it has no binding force •••• Consequently,
it is generally recognised that an advisory opinion does not
produce the effect of the res judicata. Nonetheless, it is
not sufficient to deprive an advisory opinion of all the
moral consequences which are inherent in the dignity of the
organ delivering the opinion or even its legal consequences.
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Consequently, two African states which were members of
the League of Nations, namely Ethiopia and Liberia,
in 1960 initiated a litigation against South Africa.
The decision of Ethiopia and Liberia to take the matter up
with the ICJ was in response to a Resolution of the
1960 Summit Conference of Independent African States and
with their financial assistance. However, they contended
that South Africa had consistently violated the provisions
of the Mandates System in consequence of the application
of the policy of apartheid in Namibia. It also failed
to promote the moral and material well-being and social
progress of the indiginous inhabitants of the territory
concerned(ll). The judicial phase'of the case came to
an end on July 18th, 1966 when the Court dismissed the
joint litigation by the narrowest majority of seven to
seven, ~ith the President casting a decisive vote. It
ruled that the plaintiffs, Ethiopia and Liberia, could
not be considered to have established any legal rights or
interests appertaining to them in the subject-matter of
their claims before it(12). Otherwise, they were simply
not considered competent to institute the proceedings
against South Africa. Consequently, the Court frustrated
the expectation of African states for a binding instruction
to South Africa to cease forthwith the violation of the
provisions of the Mandates, especially the introduction of
(11)south West Africa Case (Second Phase), 1966,
ICJ Report, pp.10-15
(12)Verzijl, J.H. W., The South West Africa (Second Phase),l1R, Volume 3, 1966, pp.87-97
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apartheid into Namibia. The astonishing fact was that the
Court did not even restate its earliest advisory opinion
of 1950 which endorsed the position of the UN. Consequently,
the OAU adopted its own course of action thereby instructing
the African group at the UN to do its utmost to find a
peaceful solution to the Namibian problem through the UN(13).
In this direction, the UN General Assembly convened on
October 27th, 1966 and adopted Resolution 214s(XXI),
terminating South Africa's mandate over Namibia(14). The
Resolution entrusted the UN with direct responsibility for
the administration of Namibia in order to enable the people
to achieve self-determination and independence. It also
established an ad hoc committee of 14 members which was
given the responsibility of recommending practical ways and
means on how .Namibia could be run under direct UN
administration(lS). However, the committee examined
various proposals which were submitted by the different
groups and the deliberation revealed contrasting attitudes
towards the respective roles of the UN and the OAU with
(13)Concerning the imminence of a threat to international
peace and security which the Namibian situation might cause,
the level of agreement among the permanent members of the
UN Security Council has been low until the beginning of
1972. Concerning the special responsibility of the UN
for the future of the territory, the problem is one of
discrepancy between the OAU demands and the moderate steps
which have been taken by the UN Security Council, this
having been the cause of the OAU's greatest dissatisfaction.
(14)The adoption of the Resolution by the UN General
Assembly coincided with the 7th session of the OAU Council
of Ministers held in October 1966 in Addis Ababa, which
welcomed the action and endorsed the Resolution of the UN
General Assembly.
(15) Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, pp.40s-407
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regard to Namibia. On one hand, the Soviet representative
proposed that the UN should confer wide powers on the OAU
in its capacity as a regional organisation. In this
respect, the OAU was to inform the UN of steps being taken
to promote the moral and material well-being and social
progress of inhabitants towards achieving their right of
self-determination and independence(16). Accordingly,
the Soviet suggestion recommended an unprecedented delegation
of power to a regional arrangement and an indirect role for
the UN to expel South African administration from
Namibia. At the same time, the Soviet representative
rejected the proposal of establishing a UN body to assume
direct administrative responsibility in the territory.
At all events, the Soviet proposal was rejected by the
majority which maintained that it was the UN responsibility
to carry out this difficult task which was beyond the
limited capabilities of the OAU. Therefore, the African
proposal requested the establishment of a UN Council for
Namibia which would run the territory with the help of
a commissioner to prepare the people for self-
determination and eventual independence. The Council
would have at its disposal a UN police force in order to
maintain law and order in the territory concerned. At
the same time, any action by South Africa
to frustrate or obstruct the Council's task in any way,
(16)Andemicael, Berhanykum,. Op. Cit, p.126
- 663 -
would be regarded as an act of aggression against the
people and the territorial integrity of Namibia. Therefore,
if such an action did occur, the UN Security Council could
call for enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter(17). It would appear that African states preferred
a peaceful settlement to the problem of Namibia which would
be sought exclusively through the UN machinery. At all
events, Western members in the committee, i.e. the United
States, Italy and Canada, maintained through various emphasis
on the UN direct responsibility, thereby they mentioned that
they could not support the African suggestion. Instead of
the establishment of a provisional UN administration in
the territory, they proposed that the UN should designate
a three-member Council and special representative for
Namibia. The Council would be responsible for surveying the
economic and political situation in the territory. It would
also be responsible for establishing all contacts which the
special representative might consider necessary in consulting
the people of the territory concerned. Moreover,it would
be authorized to determine the appropriate conditions that
would enable the people concerned to achieve their right
of self-determination and independence(18). Accordingly,
any form of alien administration of the territory concerned
was unacceptable. In the last resort, a compromise was
tabled by the Latin American members who proposed a plan
resembling the above-mentioned three proposals, but ignored
the establishment of an international police force and the




the proposal mentioned consultation with South Africa which
was unacceptable to the majority(19). In consequence, no
agreement could be reached, so the four proposals were referred
to the fifth special session of the UN General Assembly.
However, the African proposal which had already been endorsed
by the OAU was acceptable to the UN General Assembly with
minor modification. Accordingly, it was adopted as Resolution
2248(IV) by a vote of 85 to 2, Portugal and South Africa
against it and 30 abstentions(20). However, African, Asian
and Latin American states voted in favour while most of the
states that were capable of exerting influence on South Africa,
were among those abstaining. Thus, the attitude of these
states cast doubt upon the role of the established Council for
Namibia. At all events, the Council created on May 19th,
1967, and empowered to administer the territory which in the
following year renamed the territory as Namibia. Subsequently,
in 1974 it established the office of the UN High Commissioner
in order to strengthen its legal authority over the terri-
tory(21). Despite this fact, a problem of immediate concern
for the Council was the measures being taken by South Africa
to implement the 1964 Odendaal Commission's recommendations(22).
(19)Ibid p.127
(20)~eman, Marjorie, Digest of International Law,
Volume 13, pp.766-767
(21)Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.150
(22)The Commission recommended separate development of ethnic
homelands. Accordingly, South African government accelerated
the implementation of its separate development policy in
Namibia by a number of acts designed to give effect to the
Odendaal Commission's recommendation. Therefore, South African
Parliament passed the acts for the development of self-
government for native nations in'Namibia. The acts restricted
the different groups in Namibia to exist, each within its own
area and its own political system.
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It recommended the transfer of the legislative and
administrative powers from the local government in Namibia
to the government of South Africa. It also recommended
the establishment of ethnic-based separate homelands with
nominal self-government for the black population(23).
Thus, the measures involved forcible relocation of large
numbers of the black population. This was also accompanied
by the arrest and sentence of several Namibians alleged
to have participated in guerrilla activities in Ovomboland,
the region designated to become the ethnic homeland(24).
As a result, the OAU instructed the African group at the
UN to intensify its efforts at inducing the UN to take
appropriate measures to prevent South Africa from carrying
out its insane action. Consequently, the UN General
Assembly called upon South Africa to desist from applying
its new policy and to release the prisoners immediately,
but the latter state ignored such requests. At the same
time, the UN Security Council warned South Africa that
unless the prisoners were promptly released, it would
urgently meet in order to determine appropriate measures
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the UN
Charter(25). In spite of the firm attitude of the UN,
South Africa sentenced to death in February 1968, 33 of
the 37 prisoners on charges of terrorism. It also
(23)Vmozurike, U~O., International Law and Self-Determination
in Namibia, ~, Volume 8, 1970, Pp.S94-596
(24)Ibid p.595 .
(25)~eman, Marjorie, Ope Cit, p.768
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frustrated and obstructed an attempt by the Council
of Namibia to enter the territory concerned in order
to investigate and report the events to the UN(26).
Therefore, the UN General Assembly convened on June
11th, 1968 at the request of the African group which
adopted Resolution 2272(XXII) declaring the continued
presence of South Africa in Namibia as an occupation
which constituted a grave threat to international
peace and security. It also called upon all member
states to take effective economic and other related
measures against South Africa in order to ensure the
immediate removal of the latter state's measures from
the territory concerned. Horeover, it asked the UN
Security Council to consider the matter urgently in
order to take appropriate measures in conformity with
the provisions of the UN Charter(27). Despite the
urgent request, the Council did not respond fully
to all aspects of the problem until March 1969 when
the latter adopted Resolution 264 by a vote of 13 to
none, with the UK and France abstaining. It has
(26)
Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.128
(27)Whiteman, Marjorie, Ope Cit, p.767
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recognised the fact that the UN General Assembly assumed
direct responsibility thereby approaching the ICJ on
July 29th~ 1970 for an advisory opinion on the legal
consequences of the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia(28). It also called upon South Africa to
withdraw its administration from Namibia in order to put
an end to its occupation of the territory(29). At the
behest of the Security Council~ the ICJ delivered~ on
June 21st 1971~ the following opinion:-
(i ) •••••the continued presence of South Africa
in Namibia being illegal, South Africa is under obligation
to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately
and thus put an end to its occupation of the territory,
(ii) that member states of the UN are under obligation
to recognise the illegality of South Africa's presence in
Namibia and to refrain from any acts and in particular any
dealing with the government of South Africa implying
recognition of the legality of or tending support or
assistance to such presence and administration,
(28)In this respect, South Africa contended that the
Resolution of the Security Council which requested the
advisory opinion was invalid. Therefore, the Court had no
competence to deliver the opinion. The reason why the
Resolution was invalid was because two permanent members of
the Security Council abstained. Consequently~ the Resolution
was not adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members,
including the concurring votes of the permanent members as
required by Article 27(3) of the UN Charter. However, a
customary rule in the voting of the Security Council has
emerged which established that positions taken by members,
in particular its permanent members, of voluntary abstention
as not constituting a ban to the adoption of Resolutions.
Therefore, abstention by a permanent member does not signify
its objection to the approval of what is being proposed.
Consequently, this does not prevent the Council from
adopting a Resolution requiring the concurring vote of the
permanent members.
(29)Brownlie~ Ian, Ope Cit, pp.410-411
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(iii) that it is incumbent upon states which are not
members of the UN to give assistance within the scope of
sub-paragraph (2) above in the action which has been
taken by the UN with regard to Namibia ••••(30).
At all events, South Africa refused to implement the Court's
ruling arguing that the new status of Namibia had no effect
on its control over the territory concerned. As a result,
the OAU instructed the African group at the UN to request
an urgent meeting of the Security Council in order to
consider ways and means of implementing the UN Resolutions
in the light of the legal obligations enshrined in the
ICJ's advisory opinion. However, South Africa has
continued to defy the UN Resolutions and the ICJ advisory
opinions in consequence of the lack of agreement in the
Security Council for taking effective measures against
South Africa. Under these circumstances, the OAU decided
to despatch a mission under the Chairmanship of the Assembly
of Heads of State in order to make a maximum impact on the
proceedings at the Security Council regarding Namibia. The
OAU's Mission demanded the application of the provisions
of Chapter VII of the UN Charter but its request did not
secure sufficient support in the Council. The Western
permanent members, the United States, the UK and France,
pointed out that they would not support any measures under
Chapter VII against South Africa. They also maintained
that they would support any measures which would take a
realistic view of the situ~tion, consistent with the UN's
capabilities(3l). Therefore, the OAU should encourage
(30)te al Conse
of South Africa
(3l)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.l20
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a course of action based on the existing area of agreement
and one that could be backed by the full weight of the
Council's undivided authority. In this direction, the
Council established an_ad hoc sub-committee in January
1970, entrusted with recommending ways and means whereby
the relevant Resolutions of the Council could be effectively
implemented(32). In conformity with the committee's
recommendation, the UN Security Council decided to request
the ICJ to give a further advisory opinion on the legal
consequence for other states of the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia. Simultaneously, the Council
called upon member states to end existing diplomatic,
consular and other relations with South Africa so far as
these apply to Namibia(33). Despite the moderate language
used in this Resolution, the UK and France continued to
abstain, thereby the OAU felt that there was a slight retro-
gression in the position of the UN Security Council
concerning Namibia(34). Under these circumstances, the
(32)Whiteman, Marjorie, Op. Cit, p.760
(33)Cervenka, Zdenek, Qp. Cit, p.150
(34)When the OAU was established many member states did not
understand how the UN worked. They believed that the OAU
could pressure the UN into taking enforcement measures
within Chapter VIr of the UN Charter against South Africa,
on behalf of the oppressed African people. It took almost
two years for the OAU and its member states to understand
that the UN Security Council as presently structured, is
reluctant to take such action above-mentioned, against
Southern African regimes. This fact became clear when the
OAU endeavoured to pressure the UN Security Council to act
on Rhodesia and Namibia, two of the clearest cases that came
under the jurisdiction of the UN. But, the OAU found the
Council unwilling to act, except to pass Resolution after
Resolution supporting the African majority rule in those
countries.
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African group at the UN intensified its diplomatic efforts
thereby the UN Security Council convened and adopted a
resolution calling upon South Africa to withdraw its
administration from Namibia. It also decided that in the
event of South Africa's continued refusal to comply with
the Resolution, the Council would immediately meet to
consider the appropriate measures, in conformity with the
relevant provisions of the UN Charter(3S>. As expected,
the UK and France abstained because they felt that it was
unwise for the UN Security Council to pass Resolutions
which were eventually bound to remain ineffective. They
also questioned the legality and wisdom of the UN with-
drawing unilaterally, the mandate from South Africa.
Moreover, they maintained that even if the UN was the heir
to the League of Nations, it could not in matters concerning
the Mandates System, overstep the authority invested in
-the League of Nations(36). Thus, the position of these
states cast some doubt upon the effectiveness of the
measures adopted by the UN Security Council. Consequently,
South Africa continued its refusal to co-operate, thereby
the Council convened again at the request of the African
group and adopted, on August 12th 1969, Resolution 269 by
a vote of eleven to none, with abstention by the United
States, the UK, France and Finland. The Resolution
described South Africa's presence in Namibia as an occupation
which constituted an aggressive encroachment upon the
authority of the UN and a violation of the territorial
(3S)Brownlie. Ian, Op. Cit, p.413
(36)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.128
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integrity of Namibia. It also declared that if South
Africa failed to withdraw its administration from Namibia
before October 4th, 1969, the UN Security Council would
meet immediately to determine the appropriate measures
in conformity with the relevant provisions of the UN
Charter. Moreover, the Council recognised the legitimacy
of the struggle of the Namibian people against South
Africa's occupation. Furthermore, it requested all member
states to render moral and material aid to Namibian
liberation movements in their struggle for freedom and
independence(31). Subsequently, the Council met
and adopted an Afro-Asian draft Resolution, whereby it
endorsed the ICJ advisory opinion. The Resolution also
declared that any further refusal by South Africa to
withdraw from Namibia could create conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of regional peace and security. Moreover,
the Council requested the ad hoc committee on Namibia to
review and report on all treaties and agreements with
South Africa concerning Namibia which were contrary to the
provisions of the UN Resolutions. Furthermore, it called
upon all member states to refrain from any relationships
which might imply recognition of South Africa's authority
over the territory concerned(38). As indicated earlier,
the UK and France abstained and once again argued that the
UN General Assemb1y1s Resolution had no validity to terminate
the mandate of South Africa over Namibia. They also
(37)SC Res 269 August 12th, 1969
(38)Panhuys, ".F. van et al., Op, Cit, p. I.A.13.4.h.
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maintained that the appropriate course of action would be
to call upon South Africa to fulfill its obligations to
negotiate in good faith with the UN in order to establish
an international regime that would enable the Namibian
people to exercise their right of self-determination.
Moreover, they stressed that it was by dialogue rather
than confrontation that progress could be made in promoting
the Namibian interests and safeguarding the prestige of
the UN(39). In this direction, those states suggested
that the UN Security Council should give careful consider-
ation to the OAU's appeal for a UN initiative. Accordingly,
the Council responded by asking South Africa to get in
touch with the UN Secretary General in order to negotiate
an agreement on the establishment of a provisional inter-
national regime that would enable the Namibian people to
exercise their right of self-determination(40). Despite
this fact, South Africa remained unmoved by the diplomatic
efforts of the UN Secretary General, thereby the OAU
requested the UN Security Council to hold a special session
on African questions in an African capital. Accordingly,
the Council met, on January 28th, 1972 at Addis Ababa,
which adopted an African draft Resolution by a vote of
(39)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.131
(40)Voster in his 1971 talks with Waldheim and Escher,
mentioned that no more than a ten-year plan for eventual
independence without commitment by his government.
Waldheim had also extensive discussions with representatives
of ethnic and political groups in Namibia which had clearly
confirmed that the overwhelming majority of the opinion
consulted, was in favour of immediate independence.
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fourteen to none with the People1s Republic of China not
participating in the voting. Resolution 309 called upon
the parties concerned to initiate contacts with a view
to creating the necessary conditions in order to enable
-the Namibian people to exercise their right of self-
determination and independence. It also called upon
South Africa to co-operate fully with the UN Secretary
General in order to establish an international regime
that would enable the people of Namibia to exercise their
right to self-determination(41). As mentioned earlier,
China did not participate in the voting because it felt
that the draft Resolution did not enshrine an immediate
independence for Namibia, whilst the UK. and France gave
the draft Resolution strong support, since it conformed
with the approach they had been advocating. On the other
hand, the OAU member states decided to support the draft
Resolution because they believed that unanimity in the
Council would bring about diplomatic pressure that might
persuade South Africa to negotiate in good faith(42).
Therefore, if the new approach failed to produce positive
results, the consequences might clear the ground for an
eventual intervention by the UN Security Council. The
proceedings of the Addis Ababa session of the UN Security
Council on Namibia marked a considerable progress in the
sense that the OAU found common ground with the UK and
(41)~ 1972-73, p. C24
(42)Manning, C.A.W., The South West Africa Cases,
Personal Analysis, ~, Volume 3, 1966-71, pp.98-107
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France in endeavouring to find a peaceful settlement.
Thus, the new approach involved consultations with the
Namibian people as well as negotiations with South Africa
for the purpose of establishing the appropriate conditions
for self-determination. In this direction, the UN
Secretary General visited, on March 6th 1972, a number of
African capitals as well as Namibia and had intensive
discussions with the authority of the states concerned,
as well as with representatives of ethnic and political
groups in Namibia. The conclusion reached from the
discussion with the Namibian people confirmed that the
overwhelming majority were in favour of the inunediate
abolition of South Africa~s homelands policy, withdrawal
of its administration, the preservation of Namibia's
territorial integrity and its accession to national
independence. In contrast, the UN Secretary General's
efforts did not produce complete and unequivocal clarifi-
cation of South Africa's position towards self-determination
and independence for Namibia. However, South Africa
maintained that on the basis of the present development
of the population as a whole, the territory might need
ten years to be ready to exercise its right to self-
determination(43). In the course of the efforts of
the UN Secretary General, the South African government
had officially proclaimed two homelands, Ovomboland and
(43)Seiler. John, South Africa in Namibia, Persistent
~Usperception, Ultimate Failure, ~, Volume 20, 1982, p~693
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Kavangaland as self-governing regions. It also established
an Adyisory Council for these areas, consisting of members
of the homelands administration but excluding represent-
atives of Namibian political parties(44). Thus, this
action convinced not only the OAU, but several other
states, that further continuation of those contacts with
South Africa might be detrimental to the interests of
the Namibian people. The latest attitude had seriously
questioned the good faith of South Africa in the contacts
with the UN Secretary General(45). In fact, it used the
dialogue to neutralize the termination of the mandate,
thereby consolidating its presence in the territory. As
a result, the OAU as well as the UN Council for Namibia,
urged the UN Security Council to put an end to those
contacts and to adopt a firm attitude towards securing
that the only acceptable contacts should be aimed at the
transfer of power from South Africa to the UN Council for
Namibia •. However, the OAU request.was met by the UN
General Assembly Resolution which was adopted on November
28th, 1973, asking the UN Secretary General to end contacts
with South Africa. At the same time, the Resolution
(44)Vmozurike. U.O., Op. Cit, p.594
(4S)A peaceful solution of the international conflict
over Namibia had been a significant preoccupation of the
Western contact group, but neither the efforts led by
them, nor the efforts taken by the UN Secretary General
had succeeded. Some responsibility must go to the UN,
but a much larger·share rests with the Western contact
group.
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reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle of the Namibian
people for freedom and independence. It also recognised
the South West African People's Organisation (ffi~APO)(46)
as the authentic representative of the Namibian people~47).
Subsequently, the OAU diplomatic offensive against South
Africa over Namibia entered a new stage when its front-
line member states took the initiative in 1974 to find
a mutually acceptable solution to the Namibian problem.
In this direction, they instructed the African group at
the UN to intensify its efforts at the UN Security Council
to secure South Africa's recognition of Namibian terri-
torial integrity. Consequently, it had to take the
necessary steps to transfer power in the territory to
the people of Namibia with the UN assistance. Thus, the
Council convened on December 13th, 1974 and adopted a
Resolution giving South Africa six months to withdraw its
administration and troops from Namibia(48). Despite this
fact, South Africa's response dashed all hopes for the
early independence of the territory, by reaffirming its
old position. In this direction, it proceeded with the
implementation of its blueprint for Namibia's independence
(46)In this respect, on January 17th 1975, SWAPO subsequently
issued a statement in Lusaka declaring its conditions for
negotiations with South Africa on the future of Namibia.
Nonetheless, South Africa ignored the offer, thereby the
OAU determined to increase its aid to the Namibian liberation
movements in order to intensify the armed struggle for the
liberation of their country.
(47)Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.151
(48)Ibid p.153 .
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by convening, in September 1975, a Constitutional
Conference at Uindhoek. The Conference was attended by
156 delegates drawn from eleven ethnic groups which approved
a Declaration of Intent. The latter provided for an a11-
white administration which committed itself to drawing up
an independence Constitution within three years(49).
However, the Declaration was drafted by the white-ruling
National Party, '''hileSlvAPO and the Namibian National
Convention (NNC) were excluded from the Conference. The
Conference ended on August 18th, 1976 by reaching an
agreement providing for a multinational government leading
to independence for Namibia on December 31st, 1978(50).
At all events, the Summit of the OAU Assembly held on
July 3rd, 1976 at Port Louis, condemned the Constitutional
Conference as a rubber-stamping of the policy of so-called
Bantustans homelands(51). In spite of the OAU's firm
attitude, South Africa went ahead with its plans, which
(49)Seiler, John, 00. Cit, pp.694-696
(SO)The Constitution was approved on March 18th, 1977 by
the plenary session of the Turnhalle Constitutional
Conference. It described the territory not as Namibia,
but as South West Africa and as a republican democratic
state which recognised the principle of free enterprise.
The Constitution provided for the protection of funda-
mental rights and gave an assurance on the equality of
all people before the law. Nonetheless, the Constitution
did not touch upon the discriminatory laws of South Africa
which remained valid. The political parties or groups,
with a Harxist-Leninist ideology were prohibited, as being
enemies of the state. Finally, the structure of the
government under the Turnhalle Constitution was based on
the government of eleven ethnic groups.
(SI)~ 1976-77, Op. Cit, p. C20
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enjoyed the support of the American Administration. Under
these circumstances, the OAU went to the UN General
Assembly which, on December 20th 1976, adopted a Resolution
endorsing the OAU position. At the same time, it recognised
the armed struggle as a legitimate means of attaining
Namibian independence(52). In consequence of the firm
attitude adopted by the UN, the Namibian white population
began to have their doubts about the viability of the
Turnhalle Constitution on which they were requested to
vote in a referendum on May 17th, 1977. This became
obvious when the five Western Contact states namely,
the United States, the UK, France, West Germany and Canada
informed the South African government in April 1977 that
the Turnhalle Constitutional arrangements were unacceptable (53) ,
Instead, they suggested that they would support a settlement
in line with the UN Resolutions and demanded the withdrawal
.of South Africa's police and army from Namibia and the
holding of free national elections .under the UN supervision.
They also requested South Africa to repeal its discriminatory
laws, to release national political prisoners and to permit
participation of SWAPO in the election for independence(54).
As a result, the OAU described the efforts of the Western
Contact states on Namibia as a positive approach which
(52)The five Western governments were upset by this
initiative, therefore decided to despatch their Foreign
Ministers, led by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to
Pretoria in September 1978 in an attempt to persuade the
newly-appointed Prime Minister Botha to think again, but
their efforts failed.
(53)Young. Andrew, The United States and Africa, Victory
for Diplomacy, lfA, Volume 59, 1980-81, p.660
(54)Ibid pp.660-662
- 679 -
would lead to the full implementation of the UN Resolutions
on Namibia. Subsequently, the American Vice-President
met, on Hay 20th 1977, with the South African Prime Minister
in Vienna in order to find a mutually acceptable solution
to the Namibian problem. These negotiations were
deadlocked by South Africa's intransigent position by
which it was determined to maintain its control over
Walvis Bay, Namibia's only deep water port(SS). The
OAU made it clear that Walvis Bay is an integral part of
Namibia and as such, not negotiable. Thus, the OAU
reached the conclusion that Namibia's independence would
be achieved by the same means as that of Zimbabwe. Under
the circumstances, the white-ruling National Party was
split over the issue of Walvis Bay thereby the Republican
Party emerged, pledged to co-operate with black Turnhalle
participants in a federation arrangement. In this direction,
a settlement was reached in mid-1978 when a transition plan
was accepted initially by South Africa and subsequently
by SWAPO. Consequently, the UN Security Council was
called to ratify the agreement, but it revealed an ambiguity
that was sufficient to upset the process of decolonisation.
Therefore, the contact group and the OAU frontline states'
draft Resolution was adopted which called upon South Africa
and an independent Namibia to settle the status of Walvis
Bay before commencing the process ofdecolonisation(S6).
(SS)ARB, Volume 14. No.5, June 15th, 1977, pp.4444-4446
(S6)Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.155
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Hence, South Africa conducted a series of bilateral adminis-
trative and political steps in Namibia which were in
contravention with the latest UN Security Council Resolutions.
In this direction, South Africa declared the establishment
of a constituent assembly in December 1978, in order to
carry on the work of the Turnhalle Conference. As a result,
the five Western countries in the contact group were upset
by South Africa's latest initiative. Thereupon they decided
on September 19th, 1978, to despatch a mission of their
Foreign Ministers led by the American Secretary of State
in an attempt to persuade .the South African government
to abide by the latest Resolution of the UN Security
Council<S7). Nonetheless, South Africa went ahead with
its decision to hold the Assembly election, but simultaneously
continued to negotiate with the contact group and the UN.
However, the process of decolonisation was slackened during
1979 and 1980 in consequence of the breakdown in negotiations
and South African suspicion of the proposal of the contact
group transmitted to it<S8). The proposal introduced a
plan for a demilitarized zone on South Africa's border with
<57)~, Volume 16. No.7, August 15th, 1978, p.493S
<S8)In August 1979, the contact group designated Sir James
Murray, the UK Ambassador to South Africa as its spokesman,
hoping that the symbolic relations of the United States
Ambassador to the UN,Donald McHanry, who had become the
focus of South African disgruntlement, might encourage the
South African government to be more forthcoming. As it
turned out, the South African government made some early
gestures of interest but nothing came of them, leaving
the UK government disillusioned about taking the lead
again.
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Namibia in order to break the negotiatory deadlock.
The proposal was acceptable to the OAU frontline states
and SWAPO, but the contact group discerned that South
Africa should be given a brief period of time in order
to study the plan(S9). Subsequently, South Africa
proposed a pre-implementation meeting outside the UN
framework to deal with substantive issues, notably the
constitutional protection of minority rights. Accordingly,
a multilateral Conference was set for January 7th, to 14th,
1981 in Geneva, but none of the black parties such as
SWAPO, SWANU, the NNF or the newly-formed National
Independent Party (NIP) took part in the Geneva Conference
owing to their refusal to participate under the aegis
of the South African,government(60). Despite this fact,
the OAU frontline states offered, on January 10th 1981,
conciliatory gestures to South Africa in order to secure
its immediate acceptance of the ceasefire-arrangement on
March 31st, 1981 to be followed by transition to indepen-
dence sometime in 1982. They also suggested that
negotiations concerning constitutional protection for the
minority would be completed before the election took place.
At this stage, several participants endeavoured to elicit
the support of the American Administration in order to
prod South Africa into accepting the proposal, but these
efforts failed(61). Consequently, the Conference failed
and South Africa felt sure that neither political nor
(S9)Seiler, John, Ope Cit, p.698
(60)~, Volume 18, No.1, February 15th, 1981, p.5940
(61)Ibid p.5942
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economic pressure was imminent from the West. Subsequently,
the United States put forward proposals for Namibian
independence which gave central attention to the South
African preoccupation with constitutional protection for
the minority in an independent Namibia. It provided for
a bill of rights, an independent judiciary and protection
against expropriation of property. It also contained
provisions which outlined the general format for the
constituent assembly elections. Moreover, it provided
for guiding principles in order to ensure fair represent-
ation in the legislative to different political groups
representing the Namibian people(62). It would appear
that the American proposals for a settlement were designed
to weaken SWAPO's chances of winning the two-thirds
majority in the assembly, required to remove constitutional
protection. Thus, SWAPO rejected the American proposals
for a constitutional arrangement, arguing about its
complexity while South A!rica immediately accepted it.
On the other hand, the OAU frontline states rejected the
American proposals for a settlement on the grounds that
it would enable a party with only 2% of the total vote
to gain an assembly seat via the proportional representation
envisaged in it. As a result, the American Administration
decided to leave the settlement to the South African
Administrator-General to find a mutually acceptable solution
to the problem(63). At the same time, it insisted on
(62)~, Volume 18, No.6, June 15th, 1981, pp.6052-6053
(63)Ibid p.6053
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the simultaneous withdrawal of South African troops from
Namibia and the Cuban troops from.Angola. Under these
circumstances, the.Namibian decolonisation process stayed
on the same course, thereby the National Assembly made no
progress in desegregation of facilities. But, the local
administration continued in 1982, nationalizing the defence
and police forces, but volunteer recruitment of blacks
proved inadequate. Thereupon, compulsory registration
for national service was declared, but the black reaction
was negative since young blacks had no desire to fight
against ffi~APOand many of them fled the country to neighbouring
OAU states(64). This made South Africa intensify its standing
commitment to periodic raids into OAU neighbouring states.
At the same time, it made vigorous attempts to build a
broader anti-SWAPO political coalition in Namibia in order
to keep it away from power(6S). Thus, South Africa believed
that SWAPO had been definitely damaged as a military factor
by repeated pre-emptive raids into neighbouring OAU member
states. Moreover, its political strength was likewise reduced
by South Africa'S broader anti-SWAPO political efforts in
Namibia. It would appear that SWAPO is South Africa's PLO,
so Israelis massive invasion of Lebanon in 1982 gave great
encouragement to the South African government for its own
similar approach to SWAPO.
(64)At this stage the Namibian economy remained stagnant and
investment by international corporations had ceased. The
production of uranium, diamonds and copper had been badly
hurt by deep cuts in international demands. Consequently,
the economic down-turn in Namibia forced sharp stops in
business and income. Moreover, the economic recession in
South Africa has forced its government to look hard at its
subsidization of the Namibian regime, including military and
police costs. Therefore, the war against SWAPO remained at
a low level, punctuated by periodic intensive raids into
southern Angola.
(6S)~, Volume 18 No.7, August 15th, 1981, pp.6120-6122
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THE OAU COLLECTIVE l-tEASURESAGAINST SOUTH AFRICAN
APARTHEID POLICIES:
The South African government had by 1944 embarked on
the policies of apartheid which were described by its
architect~ Prime Minister Melan~ as the way to --ensurethe
safety of the white role and of Christian civilization(l).
Since then it has pursued the implementation of such policies
by forcing the removal of thousands of families~ in the process
of reversing the development of a multiracial society.
However, the policies have been considered by the UN General
Assembly in one form or another since 1946, when it requested
the government of South Africa to abandon forthwith such
policies(2). But, it was only after the Sharpeville
Incident of 1960, which resulted in a large-scale shooting
of peaceful anti-apartheid demonstrators, that the policies
became the centre of UN concern(3). Consequently, the UN
-Security Council convened in April 1960 at the request of
African and Asian groups at the UN, and adopted Resolution 134
(I)Cervenka, Zdenek, Ope Cit, p.IIO
(2)Yn 1959 South Africa's government embarked on a policy
of leading the country's homelands to independence. The
homelands or the tribal areas which comprised about 13% of
South African territory, began to be thought as the political
homes for the country's entire African population. But, the
UN condemned this form of decolonisation which constituted
a flagrant violation of human rights and misinterpretation
of the principle of self-determination. Despite opposition
from the UN and the OAU, the South African government went
ahead with its policy. Subsequently, the Yhosa homeland
became independent in 1976 as the Republic of Transkei.
A year later, Tswana homeland became the Republic of
Bophuthatswana with even less enthusiasm.
(3JBrownlie, Ian, Qp. Cit, pp.425-426
- 685 -
by a vote of nine to none with the UK and France abstaining.
The Council declared that the South African policies of
apartheid had led to international friction whereby their
continuation might endanger international peace and security(4),
Thus, the Security Council Declaration overrode, for the
first time, the South African argument that its apartheid
policies were matters of domestic jurisdiction. Thereupon,
African states have subsequently endeavoured to persuade
the UN Security Council to define the apartheid policies
as constituting a threat to international peace and security
whereby the Council would have to apply enforcement measures
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. At the same time,
the African group intensified its efforts at the UN General
Assembly which adopted Resolution 1761(XVII) in November
1962, by a vote of 67 to 16 with 20 abstentions(S).
The Resolution largely resembled one that was adopted by
the Conference of Independent African States held in
June 1960(6). In any event, the Resolution requested
all member states of the UN, separately or collectively
to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions as well as
an arms embargo against South Africa. It also set up
a Special Committee entrusted with the responsibility
of keeping South African policies of apartheid under
constant review(7). Following the establishment of
(4)Ibid p.426
(S)Ibid p.426
(6) Andemicael. Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.134
(7)Brownlie, Ian, Qp. Cit, pp.427-428
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the OAU in May 1963, an early meeting of the UN Security
Council was requested by the African group at the UN
with the hope that the Council would apply the same
measures as those recommended by the UN General Assembly(8).
At the same time, the OAU despatched a mission of four
Foreign ~nnisters to the UN Security Council's meeting
in order to explain to its members how the OAU saw the
situation in South Africa. Thus, the mission conveyed
to the Council that the OAU regarded apartheid as a
threat to international peace and security. Nonetheless,
the government of South Africa had no intention of
abandoning its policies of apartheid. Consequently, the
OAU would not sit passively when an African population
was subjugated to sub-human level by the South African
(8)The OAU founding Conference took place in Addis Ababa
taking inspiration from the UN General Assembly Resolution
1761(XVII) adopted the previous year. The OAU Resolution
requested the UN to take appropriate measures under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to force the South
African government to abandon its racist policies. The
OAU Resolution proposed the following measures:-
(1) breaking off diplomatic relations with the government
of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations;
(2) closing their ports to all vessels flying the South
African flag;
(3) enacting legislation prohibiting their ships from
entering South African ports;
(4) boycotting all South African goods and refraining from
exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition to
South Africa;
(5) refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft
belonging to the government and companies all under the law
of the Republic of South Africa.
The OAU also made identical demands to its member states
and requested them to apply these measures as Boon as
possible.
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government. Therefore, the OAU mission requested the
UN Security Council to follow its example by implementing
the UN General Assembly Resolution 1761(XVII) of 1962(9).
Thus, the OAU initiative was the beginning of its sustained
diplomatic offensive at the UN against South Africa with
two objectives as follows:-
(i) to persuade the UN member states that the
situation in South Africa constituted a threat to inter-
national peace and security whereby the Security Council
should resort to enforcement measures envisaged in
Chapter VIr of the UN Charter. Such measures might
range from an economic blockade to military inter-
vention by the UN force in order to put an end to
South African policies ofapartheidj
(ii) to put South Africa into an isolated position
in the international community and endeavour to
convince the UN member states of the validity for its
expulsion from the UN and all other international
organisations.
These objectives were only partially achieved in the UN
Security Council meetings of 1963 and 1964 because the
main OAU preoccupation was thereafter shifted to the
situations in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South
West Africa (Namibia). Nonetheless, the OAU has maintained
its efforts at the UN and endeavoured to persuade the UN
member states that the South African policies of apartheid
(9) . . . .
Krishnan, Maya, .Op. Cit, pp.212-214
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are a negation of the UN Charter thereby constituting
a crime against humanity. Therefore, the explosive
situation in South Africa resulted from the inhuman and
aggressive policies of apartheid which disturbed inter-
national peace and security and was still the main concern
of the UN. Thus, the OAU attempts at convincing the
members of the UN Security Council, particularly those
permanent members, to do their utmost to ensure that the
Council would firmly call upon South Africa to abandon
its policies of apartheid. In the event of South Africa
failing to abandon such policies and releasing all
political prisoners, the Security Council would request
all states to take the following measures against the
recalcitrant government:-
(i ) an arms embargo including a stop of all
aid to South Africa's growing armaments industry;
(ii) severance "of diplomatic, consular and
other official relations with South Africa;
(iii) comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions
including the breaking off of all transport and
communications(10).
In this direction the African group at the UN was able to
win support from the majority of the Security Council
(lO)African states feel that the practice of the policies
of apartheid constitute a threat to international peace
and security. They could no longer stand by in silence
while their African brothers in the Republic of South
Africa suffered tragic oppression. African states had
never wished to meet violence and racism with violence,
but it would be the last practical solution to the
problem. The African states have not so far contemplated
armed intervention in South Africa because it would not
be successful without direct help from the major Western
powers.
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members except the UK and France who maintained that it
would be unwise to adopt such unrealistic measures.
Consequently, the UK and Fran'ce abstained in the voting of
a Resolution calling upon all states to halt the sale
and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles
to South Africa(II). However, this was a non-mandatory
ban which was expanded in the Security Council meeting
of December 1963 to include equipment and material for
the manufacture and maintenance of armaments.. These
measures envisaged in Resolution 182, 1963 which was
adopted unanimously reaffirming that the situation in
South Africa was seriously disturbing international
peace and security. It also established a group of
experts entrusted with the responsibility of examining
ways and means of solving the problem caused by the
South African policies of apartheid(12). When the UN
Security Council convened in June 1964 at the request of
the African group, the most it could do was to set up a
committee of experts composed of its members. The
committee was entrusted with the responsibility of
undertaking a technical and practical study of the
feasibility, effectiveness and implementations of such
proposed measures which would appropriately be taken by
the Security Council under the provisions of the UN
Charter. However, the committee reported to the
Council that it was unable to reach an agreement
thereby its failure to recommend a common conclusion had
undermined the chances of consensus at the level
of the Council(13). Under these circumstances, the
(11)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.429
(12)Ibid p.430
(13)Andemicael. Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.13S
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OAU Assembly of Heads of State renewed its request to
the OAU member states to apply economic sanctions against
South Africa independently of the UN Security Council,
but in line with the UN General Assembly Resolution
1161(~II)(14). Thus, the OAU proceeded through its
Secretariat's Bureau of Economic Sanctions to co-ordinate
the application and implementation of relevant OAU
Resolutions(15). At the same time the OAU requested its
member states to campaign for similar efforts through the
UN and friendly countries, to persuade the major trading
partners of South Africa to sever their economic relations
with the latter state. Thus, the African group at the
UN sought without much success, to support the election
to the membership of non-permanent members of the Security
Council, those states which encouraged effective measures
against South Africa, but the group carried out its
mandate at the General Assembly level with considerable
success(16). Accordingly, the Assembly adopted, in
December 1965, Resolution 2054(XX) which universally
(14)ACR, 1969-70, Ope Cit, pp. C195-198
(15~e founding Summit of the OAU decided in May 1963
unanimously to co-ordinate concerted measures of sanctions
against South Africa. Subsequently, the first ordinary
session of the OAU Assembly established in 1964, the
Bureau of Sanctions to supervise the implementation of
the OAU Resolutions calling on member states to apply
economic sanctions against South Africa. In February,
1966 the OAU Council of Ministers at its 6th ordinary
session, was informed by the Bureau of Sanctions that
after two years of supposed African sanctions against
South Africa, there had been no marked progress in the
implementation of the OAU Sanctions Resolutions. Many
African states simply ignored the Resolution and
continued to engage in economic relations with South
Africa. Such disregard by the African states of the
OAU Resolutions has led many people to the conclusion
that the OAU could never mount a successful collective
regional measures against South Africa.
(16)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Ope Cit, p.136
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requested the application of economic sanctions within
the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It
declared that the economic sanctions were the only means
to achieve a peaceful solution to the apartheid problem.
It also appealed to the major trading partners of South
Africa to put an end to their economic ties with the
latter state. J.foreover,it decided to enlarge the
special Committee on Apartheid from eleven members to
seventeen so as to include those states which were
considered as the major trading partners of South Africa(17).
The primary purpose for the enlargement was designed to
engage those states having a large share of world trade
in constant discussion over the question of economic
sanctions. Among those were the three Western permanent
members of the UN Security Council, namely the United
States, the UK and France, but none of them were willing
to apply the recommended sanctions nor were they inclined
to serve on the Committee(18). Thus, the UN General
Assembly became increasingly strong in its condemnation
of South African policies of apartheid and in its criticism
of its main trading partners whose co-operation with
South Africa had an adverse effect on the UN measures.
In this direction, the Assembly adopted Resolution 2396
(XXIII) in December 1968, by a vote of 82 to 2 with
Portugal and South Africa against and with 14 abstentions.
The Resolution described South African policies of
(17)Brownlie, Ian, Op. Cit, p.431
(18) .Kapungu. Leonard T., Ope Cit, pp.146-147
- 692 -
apartheid as a crime against humanity. It also called
for the exercise by the people of South Africa of their
right to self-determination in order to attain majority
rule based on universal suffrage. Moreover, it drew
the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation
in South Africa thereby requesting the Council to urgently
resume the consideration of apartheid policies, with a
view to taking effective measures under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter(19). Among these measures, the Council
should ensure the full implementation of comprehensive
mandatory sanctions in order to induce a political change
in South Africa. On the other hand, the Resolution
called upon all states to extend moral, political and
material assistance to South African liberation movements
in their legitimate struggle for freedom and independence.
It also declared that all freedom fighters who were taken
prisoner by the South African authorities, should be
treated as prisoners of war under international law and
Geneva Conventions of 1948. Finally, it authorized the
Special Committee on Apartheid to conduct an intensive
campaign by holding international sessions away from the
UN Headquarters or to despatch a sub-committee on a
mission to consult the UN Specialised Agencies, regional
organisations and non-governmental organisations in order
to intensify disseaination of information on the evils
of apartheid(20). Thus, the position of the UN General
(19)Andemicael, Berhanykum, Op. Cit, p.136
(20)Ibid p.137
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Assembly was far ahead of that of the UN Security Council
which had been unable to reach an agreement on the
measures which should be taken against South Africa(21).
It was hardly able to obtain support for the recommended
measures from all the permanent members of the Security
Council. Thus, when the question of apartheid was brought
before the Council in 1970 it became very difficult even to
maintain the level of agreement on measures imposed in
1963 upon South Africa. The Council convened at the request
of the African group at the UN to consider the problem of
violation of the arms embargo, in particular the violation
of categories of arms for maritime defence. The
acrimonious debate over alleged violations of the arms
embargo, especially by those major trading partners of
South Africa, revealed that the 1963 consensus on the arms
issue had largely been eroded(22). The major trading
partners maintained that arms intended for the external
defence of South Africa had actually been exempted, while
the embargo applied only to arms which might be used for
internal repression. When the Security Council sought,
in 1970, to strengthen the embargo, the United States,
(21)Thus, it must be considered that without all these
diplomatic efforts of the OAU, Western support to South
Africa would have been greater and the arrogance of the
regime would have been beyond defiance. At the same
time, these diplomatic efforts have advanced the moral
justification for the guerrilla activities of the
liberation movements in South Africa. This is not to say
that the world community support these guerrilla activities,
but at least most states have refrained from condemning
them and have chosen to be ambivalent on the general issue
of using force to effect changes in South Africa. If it
were not for the OAU diplomatic efforts, most probably the
states would be condemning the liberation movements in
South Africa.
(22)nughes, Anthony, Arms and South Africa, ~,
1970-71, p. A4
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the UK and France abstained irithe voting for a Resolution
along the lines advocated by the African states.
Resolution 282 strongly condemned all violations of the
arms embargo thereby calling upon all states to implement
the ban unconditionally and without any reservation
whatsoever. Xt also urged all states to strengthen the
arms ban by withholding the supply of all vehicles,
equipment and spare parts for the use of the armed forces
and para-military organisations of South Africa. Moreover,
it requested all states to revoke all licences and military
patents granted to South Africa for the manufacture of
arms, ammunition and military vehicles. Furthermore, it
called upon states to ban economic investment, technical
aid and training for military purposes and to cease all
other forms of military co-operation with South Africa(23).
As indicated earlier, the United States, the UK and France
abstained on the voting thus casting doubt upon the
effectiveness of the arms embargo. Consequently, the
OAU considered that the lack of active support from
these states was a major setback at a time when there was
an urgent need, not only for an arms ban, but also for
economic sanctions. Despite this fact, the setback was
alleviated during the UN Security Council session held in
January 1972 at Addis Ababa, when an African draft
Resolution relating to apartheid was adopted. Resolution
311 was passed, with active support from the UK but not
France, which expressed the grave concern of the Security
(23)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, pp.435-436
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Council that the situation in South Africa was seriously
disturbing international peace and security. It also
recognised the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed
people of South Africa in the pursuance of their human
and political rights as set forth in the UN Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover,
it requested all states and international organisations
to contribute generously to the UN fund used for human-
itarian and training purposes to assist the victims of
apartheid. Furthermore, it called upon states to observe
strictly the arms ban but the Resolution refrained from
reiterating the Council request of 1970 that they should
cease all forms of military co-operation with South
Africa(24). Subsequently, the OAU was, in 1974, close
to achieving its second objective, but South African
membership in the UN was saved by the veto cast by the
United States, the UK and France. When these states
repeated their veto in June 1975, the African group
attempted instead to secure a mandatory arms embargo
against South Africa, an action under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, but its request did not find sufficient support
in the Council(25). As a result, the OAU realised
that the UN Security Council, as presently structured, is
reluctant to take such measures against South Africa.
This fact became clear when the OAU found the UN Security
Council unwilling to act, except to pass Resolutions
(24)ACR, 1972-7"3, Ope Cit, pp. C25-26
(25) .Hughes, Anthonl, Op. Cit, p. A4
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expressing great concern that the situation in South
Africa was disturbing international peace and security.
Therefore, the OAU began to shift its tactics in
consequence of the report of its Secret~ry General, which
revealed that the OAU anti-apartheid offensive measures
were powerless and had no significant effect on South
Africa. This conclusion became obvious when the
findings of the International Conference on economic
sanctions against South Africa,.held in 1974 in London,
revealed that the UN sanctions would have small and
marginal effects on the state concerned(26). Despite
this fact, the OAU perceived that the UN is the only
excellent platform to appeal to international conscience
about the atrocities that the South African government
were perpetrating against the African population. At the
same time the OAU also perceived that it had a duty to
marshall world support for sanctions by seeing how best
its own efforts in Africa could be made effective.
Therefore, it could not expect the UN to take the OAU
request seriously for mandatory sanctions if its member
states made no great sacrifice in these matters.
Unfortunately, many of the OAU member states were still
trading with South Africa and its vessels enjoyed the
facilities of African ports. As a result, the OAU
found it necessary in 1976 to urge those of its member
states which had not yet done so, to refrain forthwith
from all relat~ons with South Africa(27). In this
(26)weiss, Ruth, South Africa: The Grand African
Economic Design, ~, 1970-71, pp. All-17
(27)Kapungu, Leonard T., Ope Cit, pp.144-145
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direction, the OAU majority member states had gradually
complied with the OAU collective measures against South
Africa, but certain members continued to sabotage the
OAU sanctions(28). Despite this fact, the OAU put much
-of the blame on the Western powers whose economic ties
with South Africa were responsible for the survival of
that country and its apartheid policies. The OAU is
fully aware of the fact that the success of its collective
measures against South Africa is ultimately dependent
upon the persuasion of Western powers to halt their
co-operation and whose economic and military strength
has a decisive say on the issue. Consequently, the
OAU appealed to the Western powers to discontinue the
.encouragement they had given to the maintenance of
apartheid by halting their investments and trade relations
with South Africa. It also urged these states to maintain
a strict embargo on the supply of arms and military
equipment and to cease their military collaboration with
South Africa(29). However, the OAU fully realised the
(28)Some OAU members which acted contrary to the OAU
collective measures, like Malawi, who declared on September
10th 1976, the establishment of formal diplomatic relations
with South Africa. In defiance of the OAU collective
measures, Malawi ignored the appeals of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State which were envisaged in the Resolution
of the OAU Summit which took place in Kinshasa. The
Resolution also condemned the political, economic and
military collaboration of the Western powers with South
Africa. Moreover, the Resolution requested all OAU
member states to be vigilant in boycotting South African
products. The attitude of Malawi was also condemned,
with Zambia taking the lead in proposing its expulsion
from the OAU, but the OAU members were fairly restrained
and there was even so~ sympathy for the attitude of
Malawi from a number of OAU member states.
(29)ACR, 1970-1971, p. C4
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difficulties and the magnitude of convincing these
states, who are responsible for the survival of that
country and its apartheid policies, to halt their economic
and military ties with South Africa. Therefore, the OAU
attempted. to explore other possibilities based on a dual
strategy on South Africa to try a peaceful approach and
if that failed, then it would resume and intensify the
armed struggle. In this direction, an important OAU
initiative on decolonisation and apartheid in Southern
Africa was formulated in the Lusaka Manifesto in April
1969 which was adopted by the Conference of East and
Central African States(30). The Manifesto was endorsed
in 1969 by the Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and Government which took place in Addis Ababa.
Thereafter, the Assembly entrusted its Chairman with
the responsibility of presenting the Manifesto to the
24th session of the UN General Assembly. The latter
adopted the Manifesto on November 20th 1969, as Resolution
2505(XXIV) which passed by a roll-call vote with 113
states in favour, 2 states against (South Africa and
Portugal) and 2 abstentions (Malawi and Cuba). The
(30)The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa was a joint
Declaration proclaimed in April 1969 by the Conference
of East and Central African States. The initial
signatories to this Declaration were Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire and Zambia.
The Manifesto was subsequently approved by the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
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Resolution described the Hanifesto as an import.ant step
in the direction of the peaceful settlement to the
problem of Southern Africa and recommended it to the
attention of all states and peoples (31). The J.lanifesto
outlined the OAU objectives in Southern Africa, de-
colonisation and the elimination ot apartheid and refuted
South Africa's claims that its apartheid policies
constituted an internal matter within its domestic juris-
diction. The signatories to the Manifesto elucidated
their common concern with the questions of decolonisation
and apartheid in Southern Africa as follows:-
••••• our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our
commitment to this principle of human equality. We
are not hostile to the administrations of these states
because they are manned and controlled by white people.
We are hostile to them because they are systems of
minority control which exist as a result of and in
pursuance of doctrines of human inequality. What we
are working for is the right of self-determination for
the people of those territories. We are working for
a rule in those countries which is based on the will
of all the people and an acceptance of the equality
of every citizen ••••(32). The Manifesto further
elaborated by asserting that •••••the Republic of South
Africa is an independent sovereign state and member of
the UN ••••• but, while recognising that •••••on every
legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively
for the people of South Africa •••• (33). It is obvious
(31)Manifesto' on Southern Africa, Lusaka






that the policies of apartheid exceed the limit of
internal affairs and are of rightful concern to the
international community. Under these circumstances,
African'aims are summed up as follows:-
(i) •••••that the peoples in the territories
still under colonial rule shall be free to determine
for themselves their own institutions of self-
government;
(ii) that the individual in Southern Africa shall
be freed from an environment poised by the propaganda
of racialism and given an opportunity to be men not
white men, brown men, yellow men or black men ••••(34).
The ~~nifesto further pointed out that •••••we would prefer
to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill.
We do not advocate violence, we advocate an end to the
violence against human dignity Which is now being perpet-
rated by the oppressors of Africa. If peaceful progress
to emancipation were'possible, or if changed circumstances
were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our
brother in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods
of struggle even at the cost of compromise on the timing
of change ••••(3S). It should be noted that the Manifesto
constituted a departure from the OAU strategy adopted
in May 1963 at the founding Summit of the OAU which
banned any direct contacts with the South African govern-
ment. Notably, neither the OAU Resolutions on apartheid
were ever addressed nor were appeals ever made to
the government of South Africa •. Despite this fact,
(34)Ibid p.S
(3S)Ibid 9 10---- pp. -
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the existence of South Africa as an independent sovereign
state and member of the international community was
recognised by all OAU member states. In fact, the OAU
collective pressures for a change in South Africa had
always been advocated through the UN and those '<[estern
powers that maintained close relations with the state
concerned(36). In 1970, the member states of the
Organisation Conunune Africaine et ~falagasce (OCAH),
proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations,
trade missions and an exchange of delegations with South
Africa. They believed that mutual contacts bebween the
OAU member states and South Africa would eventually.cause a
change of heart on the·part of the South African ,,,hite
population, thus the contacts would bring about the
end of apartheid policies(37). The initiative was
subsequently supported by the member states of the Entente
Council but they maintained that they would not take an
independent initiative towards South Africa without OAU
approval(38). Therefore, the challenge of the dialogue
(36)As a matter of fact, the OAU does not possess military
and economic resources to challenge South Africa decisively.
Therefore, the OAU had no choice other than the UN and
Western powers to advocate its collective will to bring
about an end to the apartheid policies in South Africa.
(37)The proposal for a dialogue with South Africa was put
forward by President Houphonet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast on
November 6th, 1970. He invited African leaders to join
him in launching a peace mission to assist the South African
whites to enter into dialogue with their own black popul-
ation. Thus, the dialogue with the South African govern-
ment would encourage moderate white opinion and influential
business pressure groups within South Africa to make peace
with the blacks and put an end to apartheid. Nonetheless,
he was cautious enough to take an independent initiative:
towards South Africa, therefore he maintained that he would
act only in co-operation with the other OAU leaders. His
initiative was designed to encounter the danger to the peaceand security of the continent which he perceived to be
th~~atened by Communism.
(3H}Cervenka. Zdenek, Op. Cit, p.120
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policy forced the OAU to define its attitude tm'lards
South Africa as a matter of urgency(39). In this respect,
a show-down between the supporters and opponents of
dialogue occurred at the Summit of the OAU Assembly of
Heads of State held on June 21st, 1971 at Addis Ababa.
The Summit was preceded by the usual meeting of the OAU
Council of ~anisters which rejected the dialogue with
South Africa, describing it as a manoeuvre by the latter
state in order to divide the OAU member states. The
Council eventually adopted a Declaration reiterating the
commitment to the principles envisaged in the OAU Charter
and pointed out that the Lusaka Manifesto was the only
basis for a peaceful settlement to the problems of
apartheid and decolonisation in Southern Africa. It
also indicated that no member states of the OAU should
initiate or engage in any type of activity that would
undermine or abrogate the solemn undertakings of the
.OAU Charter. J.toreover,it requested all OAU member
states to only undertake activity that was consistent
with the guidance, conSent and approval of the OAU(40).
It would appear that the right of each member state to
an independent opinion and independent foreign policy
did not apply in the case of dialogue with South Africa(41).
(39)under these circumstances, the Emperor Haile Selassie
of Ethiopia and General Gowon of Nigeria met in May 1971-
and made consultation about the OAU rules for dealing with
the dialogue policy with South Africa. In their joint
statement of May 6th, 1971 they reiterated the OAU
strategy that there would be no meaningful dialogue which
was not based on the respect for human equality and dignity
envisaged in the Lusaka J.lanifesto.
(40)ACR, 1971-72, pp. C3-4
(41)The Declaration was adopted by 28 votes to 5 against,
Ivory Coast, Gabon, Lesotho, l-lalagacsy,J.Ialawiand J.lauritius,
while 4 abstained, Benin, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta.
However, J.lalawialso defied the Declaration and in August
1971 its President Banda paid an official visit to SouthAfrica.
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Subsequently, the signatories to the Lusaka Hanifesto
met in October 1971 at l-Iogadishuin order to review the
development that had taken place since the adoption of
the Hanifesto in April 1969. At the end of the Summit,
the East and Central African States adopted a Declaration
which reaffirmed the OAUls objection of dialogue with
South Africa and concluded that there was no way left
for the liberation of Southern Africa except armed
struggle(42). However, the effect of the Declaration
was felt in the intensification of armed struggle on
all fronts in Southern Africa, thereby sealing the fate
of dialogue and making it a dead issue. Under these
circumstances, the Summit of the OAU Assembly which was
held in June 1972 at Rabat, Horocco shifted the OAU
stand to the previous strategy on Southern Africa adopted
at the founding Summit of the OAU in lolay1963. Thus,
the OAU called for world-wide measures against South
Africa with the following objectives:-
(1) the discontinuation of all military aid and
co-operation with South Africa;
(2) the boycott of South Africa in economic,
cultural and other related fields;
(3) the termination of torture in South African
prisons and the release of all political prisoners;
(4) the application to freedom fighters of the
relevant provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
(42)
ACR, 1971-72, Op. Cit, p , C16.
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on prisoners of war and the participation of
liberation movements in the drafting and application
of international humanitarian laws applicable to
internal conflicts;
(5) the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions
and the prohibition of forced emigration, especially
of slcilled workers to South Africa(43).
Thus, the Rabat Summit of the OAU Assembly was the finest
example of African unity and it was entirely dominated
by the issues of total decolonisation of African territories.
Despite this fact, the OAU was concerned over the repressive
measures and the military build-up in South Africa which .
constituted a threat to international peace and security.
Under these circumstances, the OAU decided to go back to
the UN in order to co-ordinate concerted international
measures of sanctions against South Africa. It perceived
that it could only be done through the UN. However, the
UN and the OAU are in full agreement over the objectives
to be attained in South Africa but there is a great
difference over the measures that should be taken to
meet these objectives. This was partly due to differences
over the assessment of the extent of threat posed by the
apartheid policies to international peace and security
and the measures needed to solve the problems. As indicated
earlier, it was agreed among all members of the UN Security
Council, and especially those of the permanent members,
(43) ACR, 1970-71, Ope Cit, p. C4
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that the situation in South Africa was seriously
disturbing international peace and security. Butl nothing
more than a partial arms embargo banning arms for internal
use could command their unanimous support. Consequently,
it had become obvious to the OAU that the UN would not
be the machinery for the liberation of the African
population in South Africa. Nonetheless, the OAU
realised that the UN would be an excellent platform
from which to appeal to international conscience about
the atrocities the South African government were
perpetrating(44).
(44)At the time of writing, a new Constitutional
development has taken place in South Africa. The
all-white Parliament was replaced by three Chambers,
one each for whites, Indians and coloured (people of
mixed race). But, blacks who make up more than 70%
of the population would still be excluded. lillite
voters decided the fate of the proposal in a referendum
held on November 2nd, 1983 which resulted in an over-
whelming majority in favour of the Constitutional
reform.
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TIlEOAU ATTITUDE TO\'lARDSISRAELI OCCUPATION
OF EGYPT'S SINAI PENINSULA:
The Israeli occupation of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula,
the decolonisation and apartheid problems in Southern
Africa presented the OAU with three cases of extra-
regional aggression committed by a third state against
its member states. On these occasions the OAU reaction
was limited and indecisive because the Organisation was
not better prepared to assist its member states against
external aggression committed by a third state. As a
result of the Six Day War of 1967, Israeli troops
occupied substantial territory belonging to Egypt(l).
Despite this fact, Article II(c) of the OAU Charter
provides that one of the purposes of the Organisation
is the defence of sovereignty and territorial integrity
of its member states(2). Nonetheless, it proved
extremely difficult to obtain agreement for the OAU
action on behalf of Egypt against an external aggression
committed by a third state. The OAU member states were
split in their feelings about the war and its results.
(1)Cattan, Henry, Palestine and International Law,
Longman, London,!2Zl, pp.126-135
(2) Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.3
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At the emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the
OAU member states were divided sharply on most of the
major roll-call votes(3). In this respect, only twenty
percent of the Sub-Saharan African votes wer-epro-Arab,
while over forty percent were pro-Israel. As a matter
of fact, those African states who voted pro-Israel at
the UN General Assembly made it clear that they did not
consider Israeli occupation of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula
as an African dispute(4). Despite this fact, Egypt is
an original member of the OAU and its territorial
integrity had been violated by an external aggression
committed by a third state. However, when Somalia
requested, on June 19th 1967, an emergency session of
the OAU Council of ~unisters to be convened to consider
the Israeli occupation of Sinai, few Sub-Saharan states
supported the request(S). In fact, it proved impossible
(3) During the deliberations, while all the African repres-
entatives stressed the importance of the reactivation of
the Jarring ~ssion as well as the principle of the non-
acquisition of territory by war, their approach varied as
to the means of accomplishing these ends. As a result,
African votes on UN General Assembly Resolution 2977(XXVII)
were divided between yes and abstention. Despite this
fact, the African group at the UN united on the need for
withdrawal from occupied territories, a principle envisaged
in the OAU Charter relating to territorial integrity and
political independence. With regard to the right of
self-determination enshrined in the Resolution, they con-
firmed the legality of the peoples' struggle for self-
determination. This represented the link between African
liberation movements in Southern Africa and the Palestinian
National J.Iovementswithin the same UN concern with liberation.
(4)El-Ayouty. Tassin, The OAU and Arab-Israel Conflict,
A Case of t-Iediationthat Failed, The OAU After Ten Years,
Comparative Perspective, Edited by El-Ayouty, Yassin,
Praeger Publications, New York, 1.975,p.193
(S)Only a few Afri~an states took individual acti~n inresponse to the 1967 Six Day War. Amon~ the non-Arabstates only Guinea offered material ass1stance to Egypt.Only Guinea of the twenty-nine African states broke offdiplomatic relations with Israel but, with the rest, Israelcontinued to trade with most Sub-Saharan African statesand maintained its military collaboration.
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to obtain a quorum, therefore the occupation of Sinai
,...as only considered subsequently by the regularly scheduled
1967 Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State which
took place in Kinshasa, Zaire. Although, a concerted
effort of the OAU Arab states to obtain a strong Resolution
of support for Egypt failed to find sufficient support in
the OAU Assembly of Heads of State. Instead, the Assembly
agreed on a Declaration rather than a Resolution which
expressed a sense of solidarity with Egypt, but contained
no operative paragraphs. It reaffirmed the OAU stand for
respect of territorial integrity and articulated sympathy
for Egypt. It also mentioned that the OAU member states
would continue to work through the UN to secure the with-
drawal of foreign military forces from Egyptian soil(6).
Despite this, the OAU Arab states subsequently·attained
substantial support at the meeting of the OAU Council of
~nisters held in February 1968 which adopted a Resolution
condemning the Israeli occupation of Egypt1s Sinai
Peninsula, which constitutes an integral part of the
African continent. The Resolution also called upon all
OAU member states to render moral and material support
to the countries that were victims of aggression(7).
Notwithstanding, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State
was unable to adopt a Resolution of this type at its
1969 summit because it proved impossible to get the OAU
member states to approve such a Resolution asking for
(6)ARB, Volume 4 No.9, October 23rd, 1967, p.8S6
(7)ACR, 1968-69, Op.Cit, pp.620-621
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direct action by the OAU. This was in consequence of
a few member states who were explicitly pro-Israel, in
addition to a number of others who continued to claim
that the occupation of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula was not
an OAU concern. Only a few'Sub-Saharan states took
individual action in response to the 1967 Six Day liar,
while the others were unwilling to support the OAU
Collective Security response against an external aggression
committed by a third state. In any event, the OAU Arab
states attained a victory at the 1971 Summit of the OAU
Assembly which took place at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia(8).
The Assembly adopted a Resolution on the Arab-Israeli
conflict which resulted in an unprecedented involvement
by the OAU in the Middle East crisis. The Resolution
condemned Israeli occupation of part of the territory
of a member state which constituted an integral part of
(8) .
As of that Summit, the OAU went beyond the realm
of adopting Resolutions condemning Israel's occupation
of part of the territory of a member state. Since then,
the OAU sought to exert direct pressure aimed at the
achievement of a durable and just peace in the ~addle
East. The transformation of the OAU role in that
regional conflict from one of pure exhortatory to
action-oriented led especially after the war of October
1973. This led to a dramatic alteration in African-
Israeli interaction, when all the African states
belonging to the OAU, with the exception of ~lalawi,
Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, severed diplomatic
relations with Israel. As part of these trends on
the OAU which began as early as 1971, the intertwining
of co-operation between the Arab League and the OAU
commenced with regard to both the ~ddle East and
Southern African conflicts. In this regard, the PLO
received the full support of the OAU as the only
legitimate representative o£ the Palestinian people
in their struggle against Zionism and racialism.
- 710 -
the African continent since the result of the Six Days
War on June 5th, 1967. It called for the immediate
withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all occupied Arab
territories. ~toreover, it blamed Israel for the impasse
of the Jarring Mission(9) in consequence of its refusal to
withdraw back to Egypt's international frontier. Furthermore,
it established a Special Middle East Peace Committee which
would act as a neutral third party in order to seek the
resumption of the Jarring Mission and the implementation of
the UN Security Council Resolution 242(10). It should be
noted that the OAU Resolution was a clear diplomatic victory
for Egypt and was the most forceful action taken by the
OAU on the Middle East crisis since the 1967 War. As
stated earlier, the OAU initiative was directed towards
the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution
242 and the resumption of Egyptian-Israeli indirect
negotiations under the Jarring auspices. It was not
surprising that priority was given in the OAU Resolution
to the principle of withdrawal from all Egyptian and
( 9)In conformity with Paragraph (3) of Resolution 242,
the UN Security Council requested ••••Secretary General
to designate a Special Representative to proceed to
the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with
the states concerned in order to promote agreement and
assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted
settlement in accordance with the provisions and
principles in this Resolution •••• Thus, Secretary
General Waldheim designated the Swedish representative
to the UN, Dr. Jarring with the mandate set forth in
Paragraph (3) to advocate the resumption of indirect
negotiations in order to implement the Security Council
Resolution 242.
(10)!£g, 1971-72, Ope Cit, pp. CS-6
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other territories occupied since June 5th, 1967 because the
OAU Charter envisaged the principle of territorial integrity
of states whereby the provisions are primarily aimed at
opposing fragmentation through either secession or acquisition
of territory by war(11). Thus, the only unifying principle
for the OAU membership as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict
was concerned, was the withdrawal of Israeli forces from
the occupied Arab territories. Despite this, the OAUIS
firm attitude revealed at the 1971 Addis Ababa Summit
transformed the conflict from an issue of sympathy to an
issue of action. In this direction, the OAU initiative
could be understood in terms of an African effort to
facilitate the resumption of the Jarring Mission and to
assist in the implementation of the UN Security Council
Resolution 242(12). Consequently, the OAU initiative was
based on Security Council Resolution 242(13), upon which
(11)Brownlie, Ian, Ope Cit, p.3
(12)The OAU initiative was based on Security Council Resolution
242 of November 22nd, 1967. Therefore, it'was not considered
as supplanting that Resolution or replacing Ambassador Jarring.
In this respect, Senegal's Foreign ~tlnister, whose head of
state led the OAU Mission, informed the UN General Assembly
in December 1971, that the OAU initiative was not to supplant
the principles enshrined in Resolution 242 or to replace
Dr. Jarring's ~llssion.
(13~Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires
the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the ~fiddle
East which should include the application of both the following
principles: (1) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
territories occupied in the recent conflict; (2) termination
of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political independence of every state in the area and
their right to live in peace within secure and recognised
boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Affirms
further the necessity (1) fpr guaranteeing freedom of navigation
through international waterways in the areasr (2) for achieving
a just settlement of the refugee problems (3] for guaranteeing
the territorial inviolability and political independence of
every state in the area through measures including the establish-
ment of demilitarized zones. a
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the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government requested
its Chairman to advise African leaders to use their influence
to ensure the full implementation of this Resolution(14).
However, the legal intent and orientation of Resolution 242
were not Bufficiently clear and offered no clues as to the
method of implementation. nlerefore, the decision on the
nature of implementation was apparently left for later
consultations between the Chairman of the OAU Assembly of
Heads of State and Government and African leaders. In any
event, following the African approach which had been
developed under the OAU umbrella for peaceful settlement of
African regional disputes, a group of heads of states,
numbering ten were designated by the OAU committee of imple-
mentation. It consisted of Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast,
Kenya, Liberia, Nauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania and
Zaire (15). tiith the exception of ~lauritania, all these
-OAU member states maintained diplomatic relations with
Israel. It would appear from the composition that the OAU
deliberately attempted to include a variety of political
views between those holding pro and anti-Israeli positions,
in order to avert the OAU involvement in what was regarded
as primarily a non-African problem. In this respect,
Mauritania and Liberia for instance, could be taken as
representing the two extreme shades of the spectrum of opinion
on the OAU Committee of Ten. In fact, the OAU unanimity
on the need for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Egyptian
territory did not imply unanimity among its members on
(14)ACR, 1971-71, Op. Cit, p. C6
(1S)ARB, Volume 8, No.l1, December 15th, 1971, p.2275
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the commitments regarding the problem as an African concern.
For this reason, Israel apparently did not object to the
DAU initiative and at the same time, did not wish to
endanger its good bilateral relations with many Sub-Saharan
states. Nonetheless, the DAU Committee of Ten represented
states known to have good relations ldth either side of the
conflict or considered as a non-aligned party wishing to
assist the conflicting parties to initiate a dialogue in
order to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict.
Thus, following the creation of the Committee of Ten, four
members were chosen to represent a fact-finding mission
entrusted with the responsibility of clarifying the
Egyptian and Israeli views(16). The ~ussion consisted
of the following heads of state: Ahidjo of Cameroon,
Hobutu of Zaire, Co\~on of Nigeria and Senghor of Senegal
as Chairman. The l-ussion was also entrusted with the
responsibility of establishing better grounds for understanding
between the parties to the conflict in order to make it
.possible to reactivate the indirect dialogue under Jarring's
auspices(17). It would appear that the range of African
views, from support for the Egyptian position on Resolution
242 to neutrality could also be found in the composition
of the Uission of four. If Cameroon and Nigeria could be
regarded as representing the former point of view, both
Senegal and Zaire might be considered as representing the
(16)Tbe }ussion visited Egypt during November 1971, and
Israel twice where it prepared its report based upon their
conclusions and recommendations. Subsequently, the Vdssion
visited the UN in December 1971 during the debate on the
~ddle Eastern Issues. At this stage, the views of the
four Presidents were revised in the light of political
consideration at the UN.
(17)Citelson, Susan Aurelia, The OAU ~ssion and the
~Uddle East Conflict, ~, Volume 27, 121J, p.414
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latter position. Despite this, neither Egypt nor Israel
expected the efforts of the OAU ~tlssion of the Four Wise
~Iento accomplish much in initiating dialogue between them
in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the
conflict. Because the Egyptians needed to obtain from
the OAU peace-making efforts on the Israeli positive
response to the Jarring memorandum regarding prior Israeli
commitments on withdrawal. At the same time they did not
wish the OAU efforts to be considered as a mediation mission,
but rather as an initiative seeking the implementation of
the UN Security Council Resolution 242. Therefore, the
OAU mission could only seek to reactivate the Jarring
indirect negotiations and clarify the position of the
conflictin~ parties. They were also seeking to use the
Israeli negative position in the event of the OAU efforts
being unsuccessful as a means of furthering the isolation
of Israel in the international community. Simultaneously,
Israelis economic and political interests in Africa might
be adversely affected in consequence of its non-compliance
to the principle of non-acquisition of territory by war(18).
On the other hand, the Israelis expected the OAU initiative
would result in modifying pro-Egypt position in Africa
which prevailed at the 1971 Summit of the OAU Assembly
of Heads of State at Addis Ababa. It was also regarded
as potentially significant in the Israeli efforts at
improving its relations with the third world countries.
(18)ARB, Volume 8, No.l1, December 15th, 1971, pp.2275-2276
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Moreover, they hoped that the OAU initiative would be used
as a new turning point for free negotiations in which
no pre-conditions or pre-commitments be requested as was'
being done by the Jarring Peace Initiative of November,
1967 and February 1971(19). Against this background,
the OAU Mission began by visiting the two conflicting
countries during Novenrner 1971 in order to complete the
preparation of a report based upon the conclusions and
recommendations of its members(20). The Mission followed
the usual precedent for individual third party efforts
in African inter-state conflicts(21). It should be
noted that African leaders saw the present OAU efforts
as an opportunity to increase African contribution to
the international legal system. At the same time, they
shared an awareness of the effect that an important
international role might also enhance their domestic
political positions. However, the Mission accomplished
its discussion through two visits to each country and
eventually turned to the UN and Dakar, Seneg~l ~n order
(19)EI-Ayouty, Tassin, Op. Cit, p.193
(20)Gitelson, Susan Aurelia, Ope Cit, p.415
(21)
The OAU Mission began fairly well and set about its
fact-finding-tasks in the hope of initiating positions
and persuading the two conflicting parties to reach a
mutually acceptable solution to the conflict. The African
leaders indicated a desire to be impartial and independent
to examine the situation on its own merits and to make
suggestions that might alleviate mistrust between the two
sides. Eventually, the Mission reached a stage which
became overwhelmingly beset by outside forces and by the
irreconcilable positions of the two parties to the conflict.
- 716 -
to consider the report with the members of the OAU Niddle
East Peace Co~nittee of Ten. The Committee considered
the Mission's report which contained suggestions and
assessments which might help to reconcile the sharp
differences between the positions of the conflicting parties.
The report advocated the resumption of indirect negotiations
under the aegis of Dr. 3arring, an interim agreement for
re-opening the Suez Canal and free navigation in the Straits
of Tiran. It also mentioned that secured and recognised
boundaries be determined in the peace agreement and security
could be achieved through UN guarantees. ~Ioreover, it
proposed demilitarized zones, and that international forces
be stationed at some strategic points. Furthermore, with-
drawal of Israeli armed forces from Egyptian soil would be
envisaged in the peace treaty(22). At all events, a
study of the report and the responses of the parties to
the conflict revealed sharp differences between the
Egyptian and Israeli positions. The two parties agreed
to see the 3arring Mission resumed although with a
different order of negotiations. The Egypti ans clung
to the reaffirmation of the UN Security Council Resolution
242 and the 1911 Resolution of the OAU Assembly of Heads
of State and Government, while the Israelis saw in the
report of the OAU Mission, the promise of a new start
to free negotiations(23). Accordingly, they agreed to
(22)Gitelson. Susan Aurelia, Op. Cit, p.416
(23)EI_Ay~utYI Yassin, Ope Cit, p.196
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resume indirect negotiations without prior conditions
under the Jarring aegis with the terms of Resolution 242
in order to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the
conflict(24). Thus, it would appear that the sharp
differences between the positions of the two conflicting
parties on the issue of no prior conditions, versus the
issue of prior commitment on withdrawal, could not be
reconciled. As far as the proposal for re-opening the
Suez Canal was concerned, the Egyptians were ready to
undertake arrangements for re-opening the Canal in return
for a first stage of Israeli withdrawal and on condition
that Israel responded positively to Jarring's memorandum
of February 8th, 1971. On the other hand, Israel proposed
a Suez Canal agreement be negotiated which would cover
measures to ensure supervision and observance of the
treaty(25). It would appear that the Israeli position
on the conclusion of an independent agreement on the re-
opening of the Canal would apparently treat the issue as
subsidiary. Thus, it was in contrast with the Egyptian
position which stressed the comprehensiveness of Resolution
242 as covering all aspects relating to the peaceful
(24)The OAU Mission could claim partial success since
the Jarring Mission was officially resumed in August,
1972. Thus, little credit was given to the OAU for
this. Nonetheless, the resumption of Dr. Jarring1s
Mission appeared to have been more directly related to
the desire of the UN Secretary General to reactivate
the UN role. However, this depended upon the suggestion
of the OAU Mission and the changed circumstances within
the ~m regional system. In this respect, Egypt
endeavoured to reduce Soviet influence and followed a
more non-aligned policy.
(25) .Cervenka. Zdenek, Ope Cit, pp.159-161
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settlement of the entire conflict. As far as the issue
of secured and recognised boundaries was concerned, the
OAU }tission's report mentioned the idea that such boundaries
be determined in the peace treaty. Israel agreed to this
proposal that boundaries would be determined by negotiations
between the parties concerned and envisaged in the peace
treaty. Whilst the Egyptians agreed to the OAU formula,
they stipulated that any agreement would have to conform
to the OAU Resolution that withdrawal from all Egyptian
territory occupied since June 5th 1967 was necessary(26).
It should be noted that it was on a very difficult task
upon which the OAU initiative failed to bridge the gulf
that separated the conflicting parties on the issues of
withdrawal and boundaries. nlUS, the Egyptian demand
was rejected by Israel, but the latter's refusal was
countered by insistence on the principle of non-acquisition
of territory by war, envisaged in the UN and the OAU
.Charters. As far as the security guarantee was concerned,
the African report mentioned that the solution to such a
problem could be found within the establishment of
international forces at some strategic points and the
creation of demilitarized zones. In this respect, Egypt
accepted the entire African formula, except where it
referred to demilitarized zones outside the borders, while
Israel raised the need for reciprocity of territorial
demilitarization(27). The final point was"the proposal
for the stationing of international forces at Sharam-el-
Sh~ikh in order to guarantee freedom of navigation to
(26)Sl-AyoutY, YassiD' Qp. Cit, p.197
(27)Gitelson, Susan Aurelia, Ope Cit, p.415
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all ships through the Straits of Tiran. In this respect,
Egypt accepted the African formula in its entirety while
Israel preferred it to be included as a separate agreement
in order to provide for free navigation in all international
waterways for all ships and cargoes(28). It should be
noted that there were sharp differences between the positions
of the conflicting parties, therefore the OAU initiative
did not succeed in eliciting the reconciliation of essential
elements in the above-mentioned positions. Thus, the OAU
initiative was unable to find a compromise between the
Egyptian demand for an immediate withdrawal, and Israeli
insistence upon negotiating first(29). This could be
judged by the past OAU position regarding the occupation of
Sinai as non-involvement beyond the adoption of Resolutions
supporting the UN calls and Egyptian stands. As a result,
the ~tlssionls report found no sufficient support among the
Committee of Ten. Thus, the lack of agreement about the
report of the Four liise Hen made some OAU member states·
reluctant to support the OAU initiative at the UN in the
December 1971 debate on the Middle East conflicts. Three
members of the four, Cameroon, Nigeria and Senegal, joined
with Ethiopia, l-tauritaniaand Tanzania in the participation
of the sponsoring 21'powers Arab-Asian Resolution which
called for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the
territories occupied in the 1967 War(30). The Resolution
(28}El_AYOutY, Tassin, gp. Cit, p.197
(29)It would appear that Egypt gained in the short term at
least because it got the resumption of the Jarring Missiontied to the February 8th memorandum which held the majority
support in both the UN and the OAU. Israel, on the other
hand, gained when the OAU ~tlssion came to view the Middle
East situation on its own merits with them. It had also
got the sympathy offa few African states which continuedto maintain theirf r1igendlyrelations with it, even afterthe October war 0 73.
(30)Gitelson, Susan AUrelia, Qp. Cit, p.416
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also called for an end of all claims or states of war and
respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity of
every state in the region and its right to live in peace
with secured and recognised boundaries free from threats
or acts of war. Horeover, it expressed full support for
all the efforts of the Special Representative (Jarring
~Ussion) in order to implement Security Council Resolution
242 of 1967(31). It should be noted that Senegal proposed
an amendment indicating that the UN General Assembly
noted with satisfaction, the responses given by Egypt and
Israel to the African memorandum of the OAU ~[ission and
considered the replies sufficiently positive. However,
the amendment failed to pass, partly because it was
submitted too late in the deliberation of the General
Assembly sess10n(32). It would appear that the reason
for the shift of view among the majority of the OAU member
states from the report of the OAU ~tlssion, lay with the
change in the political environment within the African
regional system. Egypt called upon African solidarity
with a fellow member of the OAU, which could also be
important in return on votes of particular concern for
Africans, such as the liberation of Southern Africa.
Consequently, the OAU was unsuited for a neutral role
concerning one of the major conflicts resulting from the
war of 1967 which led to the occupation of Egyptian Sinai
which constitutes an integral part of the African continent.
(31)GA Res 2799(XXVI) December 13th, 1971
(32)Gitelson, Susan'Aurelia~ Op. Cit, p.416
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In addition, Israel refused to give the OAU Hission any
promise that it would not permanently annexe any of the
territory that it held as a result of the war of 1967(33).
Thus, notice of the Israeli refusal occasioned the OAU'S
strong anti-Israeli Resolution adopted in June 1971 at
the Summit of the OAU Assembly which took place in Rabat,
Horocco. This was also facilitated by the site of the
gathering, in an OAU Arab member state, Horocco, and by
an Arab Chairman of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State
and Government(34). Despite this, the Resolution did
not have the support of all the delegates present. It
was only passed by consensus, but once again, certain
Sub-Saharan states were reluctant to'count votes because
this would have emphasised the lack of enthusiasm for
involvement in the ~llddle East conflicts(35). At all
events,the Resolution explicitly denounced Israel and
called upon her to withdraw from Egyptian territory which
constitutes an integral part of the African continent.
It was also, for the first time, that the OAU Assembly
made explicit reference in its Resolution to Article
II(c) of the OAU Charter which lists defence of terri-
torial integrity among the main purposes of the OAU.
(33)Mayers, David 8., Ope Cit, p.210
(34)~, Volume 9, No.6, July 15th, 1972, p.2495
(35) .Israel has maintained good relat10ns with most
Sub-Saharan states like Ghana, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia
and Kenya but, after the October War of 1973, 21
Sub-Saharan states broke off diplomatic relations ,dth
Israel, except Ma1ald, Lesotho, Botswana and Swazi1ana.
Nonetheless, the Sub-Saharan states regarded their
action simply as a gesture of support for Egypt's
stand.
- 722 -
~toreover, it requested all the OAU member states to extend
to Egypt every aid possible at their disposal to assist
their fellow member state to regain its occupied
territory(36). Thus, the Resolution made a significant
change in African .attitudes towards Israel and the Hiddle
East conflicts. During the year since the Resolution was
passed, a few Sub-Saharan states have broken off their
diplomatic relations with Israel, but the ,vast majority
of Sub-Saharan states continued their normal diplomatic
and trade relations. Consequently, the OAU failed to
make a symbolic response to the occupation of part of a
member's territory by an extra-regional third state •.
It would appear that there was no feeling of regional
community and so, support for Egypt has been limited,
and that that member's conflict with Israel was not
regarded as being an African concern. This was in
consequence of the belief of many OAU member states that
Israel is not a potential threat to African security,
whereby they neither wish to extend collective security
assistance to Egypt nor for the OAU to be involved in
what was seen as a ~liddle East conflict. Despite this
fact, the OAU attempts at mediation of the Egyptian-
Israeli sector of the M1ddle East conflict precipitated
a series of gradual transformations in the international
relationships between Sub-Saharan states and Israel.
These transformations isolated Israel in Africa and brought
(36)
~, 1972-73, pp. C23-24
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the League of Arab States and the OAU together in the
process of harmonization of policies regarding both the
}liddle East conflict and the problems in Southern Africa(37).
This has also established ideological interaction between
the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the African
liberation movements in Southern Africa. Since the October
1973 War, these processes have accelerated, particularly
in terms of Afro-Arab co-operation in the aftermath of the
rise in oil prices. Thus, these trends have been reflected
in subsequent Resolutions adopted by the OAU with regard
to the ~liddle East conflict(38). In this direction, the
OAU Council of }linisters adopted a Resolution in 1973 at
its meeting which took place in Addis Ababa, condemning
Israel for its refusal to ,·dthdraw from all occupied Arab
territory. It also denounced IsraelIs expansionist policy
which led to the uprooting of the Palestinian people from
their rightful homes. Following the October l'larof 1973
in which Egypt recaptured by force of arms, part of its
occupied territory, this was noted with African satisfaction.
At this occasion, the OAU Council of ~linisters met
(37)Arab Review, General Union of Arab Students in the UK
and Ireland, Volume 4. No.3, December 1982, pp. 15-17
(38) .
In reality, the change was ne1ther sudden nor
unexpected, tileArab States of the OAU having been pressing
the Sub-Saharan states for some time to take their side
against Israel. Nonetheless, the campaign for an Afro-
Arab alliance had begun long before the OAU was even
established in May 1963. When the Casablanca group was
created in 1961, President Nasser of Egypt saw in it the
first chance of some kind of alliance to halt the Israeli
advance into Black Afr~ca. Nasser linked the problem of
Palestine with the general theme of defence of independence
and security in Africa to which Israel.constituted a threat,
not only to the Arab states in Africa, but to the whole
continent.
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at its eighth extraordinary session which took place in
Addis Ababa and the Council adopted a Resolution whLch re-
called the one adopted in Hay 1973 by the Summit of the
OAU Assembly of Heads of State and_Government. It also
noted the OAU satisfaction with the gain achieved by
Egypt during the liar. Horeover, it requested all the
OAU member states to sever diplomatic relations with
Israel until the latter withdrew from all the occupied
Arab territories and until the recovery by the Palestinian
people of their legitimate national rights(39).
(39)ARB, Volume 10, No.l1, December 15th. 1973, p.3039
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CONCLUSION
EVALUATION OF THE OAU SYSTEN FOR REGIONAL DISPUTES:
A surge of nationalism swept across the African
continent after the Second l"orldliar. African politicians
who had a prominent part in a series of Pan-African
Congresses abroad, returned home to lead movements for
independence and the right to self-determination.
JI!eanwhile,between 1958 and 1962 there was a rapid
emer~ence and disappearance of regional groupings among
the independent African states. And, on Hay 25th, 1963
the Third Summit Conference of Independent African states
took place in Addis Ababa where the outcome was the
adoption of a Charter of African Unity. The OAU Charter
envisa~ed the fundamental principles of the inalienable
right of all peoples to self-determination, freedom,
justice, equality and dignity in order to promote co-_
operation among African peoples which would be.based
on mutual understanding and would transcend ethnic and
national differences. It also mentioned the responsibility
of member states to maintain a solid foundation for peace
and security among them in order to safeguard their
political independence and territorial integrity. Nonethe-
less, the OAU system designated no institution with
particular powers in the matter of peace and security,
equivalent to the UN Security Council. Consequently, no
privileged position has been given to the great powers of
Africa. The African states deliberately determined to
avert the formation of any kind of hegemony de facto
or de jure on the model of the Organisation of American
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States wher-e the United States plays a dominant role.
The OAU structure also avoided the weight voting formula
at present in effect in the European Economic Community
and in a number of UN Specialised Agencies. The OAU
system adopted the formula of one vote for one state.
However , African states discerned that peace and security
which they so badly needed, was in constant danger.
Therefore, the initial undertaking of all member states
was to observe the principle of peaceful settlement by
negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. Nonetheless,
the OAU Charter has also enshrined a principle of a
somewhat different character, the principle of absolute
dedication to the total emancipation of the African
territories \ihich are still dependent. In pursuance of
this principle, African states are endeavouring to secure
_ the legitimacy of the armed struggle against the colonial
powers in order to attain the legal recognition of
liberation movements. In this direction, African states
expressed a deep desire to see Africa rid itself of all
foreign military bases and to stand aloof from any military
alliances and from the armaments race. African states
have sufficient points of common interest on a number of
crucial questions which constitute a continental approach
to international affairs. However, any independent
sovereign African state shall be entitled to become a
member of the OAU, except South Africa, which was excluded
because of its apartheid policies which are in absolute.
conflict with the aims and purposes of the OAU Charter.
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At the same time, the procedures for termination of
J:lembershipin the OAU are very easy. Any state which
desires to withdraw its membership shall forward a written
notification to the Secretary General. At the end of one
year from the notification, the Charter shall cease to
apply with respect to the renouncing state. However, the
Charter contains no provisions for collective security
and defence in case of an external agression against any
member state or when a member state has recoursed to war
in an effort to solve a dispute with another member state,
or to subvert Ule political independence of its neighbouring
member states. Even so, there is no provision for partial
or comprehensive sanctions or equivalent to Article 6 of
the ~ ~larter. As stated earlier, the OAU Charter
is based upon ~le principle of sovereign equality of all
member states, but the budget is contributed in accordance
with the scale of assessment used by the UN, provided
that no member state is assessed an amount exceeding 20%
of the yearly regular budget of the Organisation. However,
the OAU Charter maintains no provisions equivalent to
Article 19 of the UN ~larter which allows the suspension
of the voti~ rights in the UN organs of those states who
are in arrears with their financial contributions to the
OAU. In fact, there are a number of members who are in
arrears of payments. As a result, the entire Organisation
is caught in financial problems. As far as the internal
structure of the OAU is concerned, the principal institut-
ions are clearly distinct from the specialised commissions
of the OAU which are provided for in Article 20 of the
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Charter. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is
the supreme organ of the OAU. It consists of the heads
of state or government or their duly accredited represent-
atives. The Assembly meets at least once a year in
ordinary session but it may meet in emergency session at
the request of any member states upon approval by a two-
thirds majority of the menmership. Each member has one
vote in the Assembly where all Resolutions and decisions
are determined by a two-thirds majority of the member
states. Questions of procedures require a simple majority
only. It should be noted that all decisions require a
simple majority except the ones that are concerned with
amendments to the Charter and the appointment of the
Secretary General and his assistants, as well as budgetary
matters. Resolutions are recommended to the member
states. This conforms to the principles of non-interference
and sovereign equality which the Charter stresses heavily.
Thus, the Charter neither established an organ with
disciplinary powers in order to enforce compliance with
OAU Resolutions nor allows the expulsion of a member which
had persistently violated the OAU Resolutions. It has
become customary that the head of the host government
is elected the Assembly's Chairman along with eight
The Assembly has the power to debate,
deliberate and adopt Resolutions on any matters of common.
concern to Africa. The Assembly is not specifically
charged with the settl~ment of regional disputes but as
the supreme organ, it has inevitably become involved in
settling regional disputes through a variety of procedures
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and techniques. In such casesl the Assembly has made
use of the techniques of conciliation, mediation and good
office in dealing with regional disputes. The Assembly
has also provided a forum for negotiations between the
member states in disputes and is usually relied upon by
the Council of ~linisters to implement these procedures.
The Council consists of Foreign ~linisters or such other
ministers as are designated by the government of member
states. The composition of this organ is clearly flexible
in order to allow member states to designate any minister
to represent them as circumstances require. The
Council meets at least twice a year or when requested by
any member state .and approved by two-thirds of all member
states in emergency session. One of the ordinary annual
sessions which are held in February each year, is devoted
to considering and approving the programmes and budget
of the OAU for the next fiscal year. The other one held
in August, is devoted to the preparation of the ,Assembly's
annual Summit Conference and is usually held at the same
place where the Summit is taking place. All Resolutions
of the Council are determined by a simple majority which
makes no distinction between substantive and procedural
questions. The Council is responsible to the Assembly
of Heads of State and Government ,which is entrusted with
the implementation of its decisions. Notably, the Assembly
is the decision-making organ but in practice, the Council




Resolutions are not binding upon member states unless they
are approved by the Assembly. As indicated earlier,
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neither the Assenmly nor the Council are specifically
charged with the settlement of regional disputes, but
the Council has assumed this competence under the provisions
of Article II of the Charter. The Council has always
used the technique of setting up an ad hoc committee
entrusted with the dual function of fact-finding and
conciliation. Such functions involve the investigation
of the issue in dispute between the parties and simul-
taneously attempt to bring about a mutually acceptable
solution to the problem. As far as the Secretary General
is concerned, he is appointed by the Assembly of Heads
of State and Government. He is assisted·by one or more
Assistant Secretary Generals who are also appointed
by the Assembly. The Council of ~nisters is not
competent to consider nomination for the Secretary General
and his Assistants or even to make recommendation to the
Assembly in this matter. The OAU Charter only refers to
the administrative and budgetary functions of the Secretary
General. The other aspects of its functions are defined
in the internal regulations of the General Secretariat
which were drawn up by the Council of ~unisters. The
Secretary General is also responsible generally, for
supervising the implementation of decisions of the Council
of Ministers. It should be noted that it clearly appears
that the Secretary General's contribution to the settlement
of African regional disputes has been severely limited.
This could be attributed to the deep cleavage among
African states which has affected the influence of the
post of the OAU Secretary Generalship. The cleavage
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reflects such basic factors as British or French back-
ground and the difference between Arab and non-Arab
cultures. The other divisions stem from differing
foreign.trans-regional organisations such as the Arab
League and the Commonwealth of Nations. Therefore, the
agreement on the site of the OAU headquarters and the
election of the Secretary General could largely be explained
in terms of Africa's major cleavages. In the years
preceding the establishment of the OAU, the major difference
between African states involved their attitude towards the
Algerian War of Independence and their support of the
different factions in the first Congolese War. These
divisions \iereinstitutionalized in the rival sub-regional
grouping established at Casablanca, Brazzaville and
l-lonrovia. Ethiopia was a non-member of any of the sub-
regional groups Which successfully initiated efforts to
end these splits on the African continent. Consequently,
it succeeded in bringing the Brazzaville group, with a
number of African moderate states, to the Monrovia
Conference. Subsequently, Guinea succeeded in convincing
the Casablanca group to participate at the founding Summit
of the OAU at Addis Ababa. Therefore, the circumstances
at the time, determined the nationality of the Secretary
General and still continue to limit the number of states
that can furnish candidates for the post of,the OAU
Secretary General, whose application must secure the
required two-thirds of the Assembly. The Secretary
General regularly participates' in the deliberation of
of all organs of the OAU through which he initiates
debates on controversial problems. As the head of the
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OAU, he has become spokesman for the Organisation and
has often been entrusted by the Assembly or the Council
with powers which have the nature of executive functions.
Nonetheless, his influence has been limited by his
-inability to recruit the personnel serving in the General
Secretariat and the continued reluctance of African states
to provide the General Secretariat ,dth sufficient material
resources, which limit the potential influence of his role
in regional disputes. Thus, the role entrusted to the OAU
Secretary General does not possess the unique prominence
of the UN Secretary General who is usually perceived as
the primary representative of the UN. The OAU Secretary
General has rivals each year. One is the Chairman of the
Assembly of Heads of State and Government ,...ho issues
statements on behalf of the OAU. Other rivals are the
Secretary of the Commonwealth and the Secretary General
-of the Arab League, whose prestige has been increased by
their successes in the settlement of regional disputes.
This is in contrast with the OAU practice through which
the Assembly appoints one or more of the African Heads of
State to lead efforts to initiate the peaceful settlement
of African regional disputes. Thus, the OAU Secretary
General has never been the mediator in any of the major
African regional disputes and is unlikely to be so in the
future. The Assembly has often referred such disputes
to an ad hoc committee representing the diversity of views
within the OAU. Consequently, the office of the OAU
General Secretary has been viewed as a weak, non-political
institution and the incumbent's efforts to expand his
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authority have been mistrusted and in general rebuffed
by the member states. As far as African regional disputes
are concerned, the OAU Charter envisaged provisions in which
member states pledge to settle all disputes among themselves
by peaceful means and,to this end decided to establish a
Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. The
composition and conditions of service which have been
defined by a separate protocol approved in July 1964 by
the Council of }tlnisters and endorsed by the Assembly at
its second regular session. The competence of the Commission
is obvious in settling regional disputes. It is the sole
organ of the OAU exclusively and specifically responsible
for such functions. The functions of the Commission on
enquiry, fact-finding and investigation in regional disputes
appeared to have been largely vitiated. The member states
have the right to recourse to anyone of three modes of
peaceful settlement, mediation or arbitration and all
dependent on the consent of the parties to the particular
dispute. In the absence of such consentl the Commission
is only competent to refer the matter to the Council of
Ministers for consideration. In such circumstances, the
Council will endeavour to find a mutually acceptable
solution but in case of disagreement, the matter is referred
to the Assembly of Heads of State. 1I0weverl the three
methods of peaceful settlement are alternative and not
necessarily successive procedures by wllich parties in a
certain dispute are free to make a choice of anyone of the
three methods in respect of a dispute. It is obvious
that the Commission has no compulsory jurisdiction over
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member states but rather is optional like other inter-
national tribunals. As a matter of fact, African states
would not accept the principle of compulsory jurisdiction
at such an early phase of their development. Despite this
fact, African states have shown some interest in the
development of the Commission, but in practice they have
continued to express a preference for mediation and
conciliation under the aegis of African heads of state.
The OAU Charter provides that one of the purposes of the
Organisation is to promote international co-operation
having due regard to the Charter of the UN and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. It is obvious from these
provisions that the OAU was intended to be a regional
arrangement within the framework of Chapter VIII of the
UN Charter. It is understood that Chapter VIII contains
three articles. Article 52 deals with the peaceful
settlement of international disputes; Article 53 deals
with enforcement action and Article 54 deals with the
reporting of measures taken by regional arrangements to
the UN Security Council. As far as the settlement of
African regional disputes is concerned, the OAU performs
I
a valuable service for the UN in a continent which contains
states made up of a conglomeration of nations with a
number of difficult frontier and boundary disputes. As
far as the OAU's enforcement action is concerned, attention
should be paid to the moral and material assistance
extended to African liberation movements. This can hardly
be regarded as enforcement action requiring the UN Security
Council authorization. Similarly, diplomatic and economic
measures recommended by the OAU against the colonial and
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minority regimes in South Africa cannot be considered
as enforcement actions requiring authorization. These
types of measures have been approved by the UN General
Assembly and endorsed by the Security Council whLch can be
regarded as constituting legitimization of these activities.
However, the OAU has been recognised as a regional arrange-
ment within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.
The UN Security Council gave recognition to an emerging
relationship with the OAU in the context of Chapter VIII
of the UN Charter by encouraging the OAU's role in the
peaceful settlement of African regional disputes. According
to Article 54 of the UN Charter, regional arrangements are
obliged at all times to report to the Security Council,
activities conducted under their auspices concerning the
maintenance of international peace and security. In practice,
the OAU does not often report its activities concerning
African regional disputes to the Security Council but it
does transmit its Resolutions regarding the issues of
apartheid and colonialism. African states had no influence
on the establishment of the UN, therefore they have joined
the Asian states which have interests in economic develop-
ment, human rights and the struggle against colonialism
in order to form a pressure group in the UN General Assembly.
This period did not last long because of the rapid increase
of African membership in the UN which has allowed them to
express themselves as a separate caucus. After the rapid
increase in their membership, they also laid claim to more
/
equitable representation in the UN organs and its Specialised
Agencies. Accordingly, amendments to Articles 23 and 61
of the UN Charter were made and endorsed by the UN General
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Assembly in its Resolution of December f7th, 1963. But,
this is not all that the African states want, for they
also believe that there are certain provisions of the UN
Charter which should be revised to provide for adequate
equality of representation on the.principal organs of the
UN. They argue that the UN Charter was written and
adopted while most of the African states were still
colonial territories. Nonetheless, they hold the Charter
in the highest esteem because it embodies their hopes for
a world in which all nations work together in peace and
security. But, the UN was far from united and the East
and West constituted two separate powerful blocs competing
to gain the votes of the new members. As a result,
African states followed the lead taken by India to a position
of non-alignment with respect to the two rival blocs.
Nonetheless, non-alignment as used by African states only
means a refusal to be committed in advance to giving support
toone bloc or other in the deliberation of international
processes, thereby this is not intended to mean neutrality.
The African delegations always decide in each individual
case which side to cast their votes or to whom to promise
support in return for reciprocity. Such support is ad
hoc and is intended to be limited only to the subject
matter in hand. As stated earlier, the existing African
states did not play an active role in the development of
international law during the creative period of its history
in the nineteenth and beginning of the present century.
African states believe that international law is created
by an~ for a few prosperous industrial nations with a
common cultural background and strong liberal individualistic
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features and is hardly suitable for African states in the
present heterogeneous world society. The majority of
African states are small, weak and poor and badly in
need of technological and industrial know-how. Accordingly,
they want the protection of a system of international law
which would attempt to mould conditions in accordance
with their interests. nley based their argument on the
grounds that alterations to the sociological structure
of the international community must be accompanied by
alterations in international law. Consequently, African
states have sought to reshape and renovate some of the
old principles of international law according to changed
circumstances. Having been, in their eyes, victims of
an unequal position and a passive contribution to the
present system of international law, it is not surprising
to find African states protesting against some of the old
established principles. In the first instance, these
states demand annulment of the former international law of
domination as expressed in the colonial system and abrogation
of unequal treaties. African states have considered
colonialism as a sort of permanent aggression and, therefore,
believe that it is legal to throw off colonial rule by
•force, if other means fail, since it is more or less an
act of self-defence. Consequently, they argue that it
is not prohibited to use violence in the struggle for
liberation under Article 51 of the UN Charter in which
self-defence is an admitted exception to the general
prohibition against the use of force. Nonetheless, African
states are increasingly following national interests in
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their conduct in international affairs. Therefore, there
is no wholesale rejection of the established principles
of international law on their part, but they do increasingly
consult the rules of international law before formulating
their national policy. As stated earlier, African states
on attaining independence are endeavouring to reject some
of the traditional' principles of international law and
its peaceful procedures for the settlement of disputes.
Despite this fact, African states are keen to develop an
effective machinery for the peaceful solution of regional
disputes. They regard the intractable boundary and border
disputes among themselves and other forms of regional
disputes as threatening their political independence and
regarding their objectives for social and economic develop~
mente Therefore, for all of them, security, stability and
settlement of regional disputes by peaceful means are
inseparably linked to the process of social and political
development. In recognition of this fundamental principle,
African states have provided in Article 3(4) of the OAU
Charter for the peaceful settlement of regional disputes
by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
African states are also interested in the establishment
of an African Court of Justice, although the African
attitude towards judicial settlement is less certain.
They have shown a marked preference for the settlement of
regional disputes by means of mediation and conciliation.·
This technique is usually carried out under the aegis of
an African head of state and outside the institutional
machinery established under the OAU Protocol of Mediation,
Conciliation and Arbitration. African states, on the
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attainment of independence have become members of the UN
by which they have undertaken to bring about the peaceful
settlement of international disputes in conformity with
Article 33(1) of the UN Charter. According to Article
93(1) of the UN Charter, all of the UN member states are
ipso facto parties to the statute of the ICJ. African
attitude towards the ICJ as a means for the judicial
settlement of international disputes is apparently sceptical.
This seems to be an indirect manifestation of the rebellion
of African states against the present system of international
law. As far as acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under
Article 36(2) of the statute on optional reservation clause
is concerned, African states have in general, followed the
pattern of other states, particularly the UK and France.
Despite this, African states shy away from compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ. They believe that the acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction might imply acceptance of the
substantive rules of the traditional principles of inter-
national law. In consequence, African states have not
yet developed a regional judicial institution which is
capable of settling their regional disputes. Under these
circumstances, African states have endeavoured to settle
their regional disputes at the level of diplomatic
negotiation in close line with their tastes and traditions.
Accordingly, the OAU has departed from the nature of
procedures envisaged in the framework of the original Charter
and the Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
The Charter specifies that all regional disputes between
member states shall be brought before the OAU to be referred
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to the Commission of "Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
The Commission, as a forum for the peaceful settlement of
regional disputes, was abandoned upon its establishment.
African states have avoided the more formal institution-
alized mode of peaceful settlement including the procedure
enshrined in the OAU Protocol of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration. They favour ad hoc informal responses
to individual conflicts by the OAU Assembly of Heads of
State and the Council of Ministers. The Assembly usually
recommends recourse to mediation by_ an individual or group
of heads of state or to an ad hoc body established by it
or the Council of Ministers, rather than have recourse to
the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration.
At the Addis Ababa Conference of 1963, African leaders
reached a consensus regarding their awareness of various
security concerns. They discerned the possibility of
entrusting an inclusive African regional organisation with
this important and urgent task. This stemmed from the
consideration of potential security problems such as
internal disruption, border and boundary disputes and
allegations of subversive activities by neighbouring states.
It also took into account the existence of threats of
extra-regional aggression and the need for collective action
in order to counter such threats, with a regional collective
self-defence system. Despite this, the provisions
concerning collective defence which are found within the
framework of the OAU Charter, are weak and ambiguous when
compared with other regional security arrangements. The
African states were not able to agree on strong regional
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security arrangements because of considerable differences
in outlook regarding the question of defence and security
displayed at the Addis Ababa Summit Conference of 1963.
This was mainly the result of geopolitical currents running
through the African continent at the time of the establish-
ment of the OAU. All African states were the residue of
the colonial experience. The French-speaking African
states desired to retain their close links, and especially
their defence security relations, with their former
colonial masters. The Anglophones were mostly also
members of the Commonwealth of Nations and, therefore,
motivated in an opposite direction to the Francophones
in defence· and security matters. The position of the Arab
states in Africa was more confused for three reasons.
Firstly, the Arab states are more sharply differentiated
from each other. The Maghrib Arab states preferred not.
to align themselves too closely with Egypt, while being
themselves divided by the different defence and security
policies pursued by Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya.
Secondly, the collective security system by the Arab League
had tended to impose different priorities from those of
most of the rest of Africa. Thirdly, the colonial
experience in Africa had created a dividing line between
the Arab states of North Africa and the Sub-Saharan states
which produced and maintained a psychological barrier.
As a result, although the Sub-Saharan states have refused
to accept the Sahara as a political barrier, they are,
nevertheless, anxious not to become too closely involved
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nonetheless, this tension
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with the OAU was partly resolved after the 1973 War
when the Sub-Saharan states moved slightly closer to the
Egyptian position over the demand for the restoration of
the occupied Arab territories. Despite this fact, the
OAU did not prove to have effective machinery for collective
defence against extra-regional acts or threats of aggression
against its member states. For th~s reason, the OAU
member states have become increasingly dependent upon the
super powers for their defence and security. Therefore,
it seems that the OAU will not be able to defend the security
of its member states in case of any future aggression or
even in case of internal disruption.
According to Article I of the UN Charter which deals
with the purposes of the UN, paragraph (2) provides for
the development of friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights also enshrined self-determination
in paragraphs (1) and (2) which provide not only for the
attainment of political independence, liberation from foreign
domination and constant freedom from foreign interference,
but also provides that internal self-determination must be
ensured. Despite this, the UN has stood firm against
secessionist self-determination which reads as follows:-
•••••nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed
as authorizing or encouraging ,any action which.would
dismember or impair totally or in part the ter~itorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign independent state ••••
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However, the principle of self-determination still lacks
general acceptance and agreement on the nature and content
of the concept which constitute a part of customary inter-
national law. Due to these circumstances I self-determination
-has been considered a concept of political rather than legal
character. Nonethelessl the UN has never endorsed the
right to secedel and took the position that the scope of
self-determination should be limited to cases of colonialism
and peaceful secession, agreed upon without an automatic
resort to military measures. African states declare their
adherence to Article III of the OAU Charter to the principle
of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of each state. These commitments have been reiterated
in subsequent OAU Resolutions which have proclaimed that
the borders of African states on the day of their independence
constitute a tangible reality and member states were pledged
to respect these frontiers. Simultaneously, they asserted
that self-determination is the right of the majority within
an accepted political unity, therefore there can be no such
thing as self-determination for the indigenous minorities
living within a unit of an OAU member state. Despite this
firm attitude towards secessionist self-determination,
it simultaneously declared that such matters are within
the domestic jurisdiction of member states and thus,
interference from the OAU is precluded. Thus, the OAU
is severely handicapped in its mediative role by inter-
preting the non-interference provisions of its Charter
in absolute terms which prevent it from dealing with
threats to peace and security arising from secessionist
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movements in the African continent. .Consequently, the
role assumed by the OAU in such issues has produced only
verbal condemnation of secessionist self-determination
and the despatching of a consultative mission of heads
of state to the head of the victim state assuring him
of the OAU's stand on the territorial integrity, unity
and peace and security of his country. The OAU commit-
ment to the absolute preservation of the principle of
territorial status quo would make sense if it were combined
with serious endeavours to prevent the conflict from
threatening the peace and security of the continent.
However, the problem of secessionist self-determination
could be substantially solved by adequate safeguards
providing for human rights and security of minorities
in African states. The OAU needs to develop institutional
machinery to which both member states and individuals
would have access somewhat along the lines of the
European Human Rights Commission. Such machinery does
not need to have enforcement powers, but must have
investigative powers and the right to publicize its
findings in case its recommendations are not accepted.
At the same time, OAU member states must contain
"
constitutional provisions that provide for equal protection
by the law and equal opp~rtunities for all citizens without
regard to their ethnic, religious, regional or linguistic
backgrounds. In addition, the OAU should have the task
of ~etermining and communicating to its member states
these critical situ~tions in which minority groups face
severe denial of human rights. The OAU should also
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establish an African Court of Justice along the lines of
the European Court of Justice.
African borders are unique in their artificial
character, but they do not greatly differ from inter-
national borders elsewhere on the globe in the sense that
often indistinguishable. Therefore, the description of
they are designed to divide landscapes that are otherwise
African borders as artificial in the sense that they were
drawn with total disregard for local conditions is not
accurate. In fact, a considerable number of African
colonial borders were shaped gradually and by stages,and
endeavours were made by colonial demarcation commissions
to take certain local features into account and to introduce
changes and amendments over the years. Therefore, a high
proportion of African independence movements accepted
political divisions made by the colonial administration.
Thus, the principle of continuity has been regarded as one
of the principles of a state's succession in the processes
of deco1onisation in Africa. Despite this, the problem
of borders received no explicit reference in the OAU Charter,
but the key development was the 1964 Resolution adopted
at the first Summit of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State,
which took place at Cairo. The Resolution maintained
that the borders of African states on the day of their
independence constituted a tangible reality. But, the
Resolution has suffered from several weaknesses. One
was that Somalia, the state most directly concerned,. .
declared that it did not feel bound by the Resolution
because of her non-participation in the Summit. Other
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weaknesses were inherent in the text of the pledge to
respect borders existing on their achievement of national
independence. Under these terms, Ethiopia and Morocco
could presumably claim territories that had been their own
at their independence, prior to the colonial partition
at the end of the nineteenth century. This has been the
essence of previous Moroccan claims to Mauritania and
presently to Western Sahara. There was also no provision
in the Resolution that might assist in settling border
conflicts arising from different interpretations of treaties
defining borders. Finally, one of the main weaknesses was
the absence of any provisions in the Resolution concerning
the question of secession and self-determination. However,
when issues concerning borders have arisen in the debates
of the OAU organs, the OAU adhered rigidly to the principle
of status quo and inapplicability of secessionist self-
determination in these cases. The attitude behind this
firm stand is clear enough, for if the principle on
revision was to be agreed upon, there would be considerable
difficulties in applying the principle to the ethnic and
tribal complexities of African societies. The Resolutions
as such probably have no binding effect as far as inter-
national law is concerned, nonetheless, the principle may
coincide with the hitherto generally acceptable argument
that frontiers do not lapse when decolonisation takes
place. However, the Resolution based upon a rule of
regional customary international law is binding on those
African states who have unilaterally declared their
acceptance of the principle of the status quo as at the
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time of independence. ~forocco and Somalia did not accept
the Cairo Resolution of 1964, taking the position that
the Resolution only applied to future border disputes in
the African continent. These two states have an ethnic
or irredentist claim which is based on the sense of ethnic
nationalism. Both Morocco and Somalia have remained
committed to their objectives and have pursued the military
option rather than turning to the means of peaceful
settlement. The role of mediation or conciliation may
be carried out by the OAU Assembly in finding a mutually
acceptable solution to these conflicts. Disputes which
have a technical and legal character may be submitted by
the parties to the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation
and Arbitration. It may set up an African ad hoc Court
of Arbitration which must be given jurisdiction by means
of special agreement for the particular purpose of settling
the issues in disputes in conformity with the principles
of international law. But, claims based on historical
factors or ethnic affinities are not susceptible to
settlement according to recognised principles in inter-
national law. They can only be dealt with by means of
compromise or by the imposition of regional sanctions
upon the'state concerned which refuses to comply with
the regional decision of the majority. As far as
Moroccan claims are concerned, they are based on the
Muslim boundary concept in North Africa by which the
Umma or community of believers determine the geographic
scope of the state and not the territorial limit of the
state. This is similar to the pre-colonial boundary
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concept in Africa which was based on one of frontier
marches and not determined by border lines. Accordingly,
the classical African entities were composed of one or
more centres of power with central allegiance conceived
in terms of people rather than land. However, the
Moroccan-Algerian border dispute presented the OAU with
the first issue of an African regional dispute between
two member states. The dispute also gave rise to a
protracted and complex series of attempts at mediation by
various quarters in an attempt to bring about a cessation
of hostilities as well as a mutually acceptable solution
to the conflict. As far as the mediating role was
concerned, it would be difficult to subscribe to the view
that the OAU was successful in handling the dispute.
Nonetheless, the OAU should be given credit for contributing
to the achievement of an agreement between the states in
dispute and the settling of their differences within its
framework. By declaring its support for the Bamako
agreement, the OAU conferred its authority or the observance
of the terms of such an agreement. Accordingly, the OAU
brought the Bamako ceasefire commission under its aegis
which eventually succeeded in bringing about a ceasefire
as well as defining a demilitarized zone. Nonetheless,
the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute was eventUally settled
by the process of direct negotiation between the states
concerned as well as by assistance and encouragement from
the OAV. In the cases of the Somali-Kenyan border dispute,
as well as the Somali-Ethiopian border conflict over the
Ogaden, since its establishment these types of conflict
have always been thrust upon the stage of the OAU forum.
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But, these conflicts have revealed the limitation of the
OAU and its restricted scope of action and therefore, these
border disputes have continued to exist as a consequence
of the OAU's limited capability to handle them. This
fact in itself has added to the determination of African
states to pursue their objectives and claims by non-
peaceful means. At the same time, OAU involvement in
African regional disputes has remained basically deliberative
rather than one of direct mediation, conciliation and
arbitration. The OAU has also avoided the allocation of
responsibility to any side in African regional disputes
even when it was invited to do so by the parties to a
dispute. This has developed from a belief that African
solidarity may be threatened by an active involvement of
the OAU in regional disputes. The OAU has tended, after
its experience in the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute,
to encourage bilateral negotiations of substantive issues
and to rely more heavily upon the role of selected African
statesmen in emergency situations. Thus, the personal
initiative of individual African leaders has appeared to
compensate for the limitation of the OAU role attributable
to the OAU Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and
Arbitration, as well as the OAU Secretary General, Who
has no role entrusted to him to play in this respect by
the OAU Charter. As far as Ghana's border conflict with
Togo, Upper Volta and Ivory Coast were concerned, the
conflicts were the consequence of Nkrumah!s co~cept of
Pan-Africanism through which he had intended to establish
a state of Greater Ghana. But, this doctrine did not
find favourable grounds with the majority of African states
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who came out strongly in favour of the principle of
sovereignty and territorial integrity. As stated earlier,
the Cairo Summit of 1964 of the OAU Assembly was mainly
concerned in general with African territorial disputes
but these conflicts aroused little discussion or interest
and most of the delegations felt that OAU action would be
premature as bilateral settlement still seemed possible.
However, the border conflicts between Ghana and its three
neighbouring states remained unresolved until after the
overthrow of Nkrumah. Thus, after the Ghanaian coup of
1966, the new military regime sought to improve Ghana's
relations with its neighbours and to resolve outstanding
border disputes. As far as the conflict over the Western
Sahara is concerned, the OAU has insisted that each African
colony in the final stage of decolonisation must exercise
its right of self-determination within the confines of
established boundaries and fixed populations.. But, if
a colonial territory in Africa wishes to unite with another
African country, it should have the right, but it must
be manifested in the process of decolonisation. Thus, it
must be the free choice of the majority in that particular
colony to be absorbed or dismembered. Despite this firm
position, the OAU has so far had little success in
implementing its principles in this vital area. There
is also not much reason for supposing that the OAU will
be able to act any more efficiently in implementing its
principles in the Western Sahara conflict. The result
has been a bitter desert war and a debilitating crisis
within the OAU itself over this question.
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As far as the implication of African refugees on
regional disputes is concerned, the situation has caused
a large series of regional conflicts that have erupted in
several African states. The problem is that some African
governments offer asylum for essentially political reasons
by encouraging and supporting the political opponents in
their subversive activities against their home governments.
Many also encourage passive refugees to do so in order to
bring about internal changes in their country of origin.
This has given rise to tensions which have served to
exacerbate relations between OAU member states and has
also led to conflict situations and the continued increase
in the number of African refugees, which poses a series of
social, economic and political problems for the OAU.
Consequently, receiving refugees from one state to another
has precipitated hostilities between two or more countries.
As a result, the OAU set up a special commission to deal
with the refugee problem and also charged it with respons-
ibility for drawing up certain principles and rules for
governing the treatment of refugees. These aims were
largely met by the Addis Ababa Convention of 1969, which
regulated the specific aspect of the refugee problem in
Africa. Unfortunately, the Convention is not always
observed by OAU member states and therefore, border
tensions have recurred along the frontiers, such as that
between Ghana and its neighbouring countries and between
Burundi and Rwanda and that between Guinea, Ghana and
Ivory Coast. The OAU has endeavoured to prevent such
regional tensions and potential African refugee problems,
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but it lacks the resources necessary to solve the refugee
situation in Africa. As far as the effectiveness of its
machinery in solving regional tensions is concerned, it is
necessary to distinguish between normalization of relations
between member states and final settlement of regional
disputes. In respect to the former matter, the OAU was
able to act as an effective instrument for resolving inter-
state tensions without solving the main causes of the
disputes. The OAU~s principle of non-interference in
the internal affairs of member states does not say that
member states should refrain from taking sides in civil
war situations, but that their support should automatically
go to the member governments. Notably, the obligation of
non-interference in domestic jurisdiction is only imposed
upon member states.and not upon the OAU itself. Nonetheless,
the OAU has chosen to interpret the P!ovisions of its
Charter in absolute terms to exclude any active role of
mediation or conciliation in civil war and internal conflict
resulting from a power struggle to control the machinery
of government. nlis in fact is a classic form of civil
war and undoubtedly in an internal matter, although such
situations have been raised in the OAU forum. But, the
legality of governments who come to power by a coup d'etat
has never been questioned~ except after the overthrow of
Ben Bella of Algeria in 1965, Nkrumah of Ghana in 1966
and Obotu of Uganda in 1971 and even in these three cases,
legality gave way to reality. As far as issues of civil
war are concerned, the OAU has taken the line of establishing
ad hoc commissions in order to bring about national
reconciliation. The initial example of OAU involvement
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in the internal conflicts of a member state was the
East African Hilitary l-iutiniesof 1964 in which the
initiative for an OAU role came not from other member
states, but rather from the_government of the afflicted
country itself. The involvement of the.OAU in this
situation could be seen as a success for the OAU which
served as a Pan-African vehicle for arranging military
assistance to help solve a serious internal problem of
a member state. The main reason which compelled the
OAU to consider the internal matter in one of its member
states, was the realization that most of its member states
achieved independence with a remarkably low level of
defence capability which had direct implications on
African regional disputes. Despite this fact, the OAU
is still no better prepared to assist its member states
in defence, in the event of internal disruption. The
reason for this is the lack of trust in military co-
operation among OAU member states and the general shortage
of resources available to most African states. In addition,
there is a lack of shared interest in a real sense of
continental community. Moreover, most African armies are
small and are particularly deficient in logistic capabil-
ities, especially air transport. Consequently, the OAU
was unable to bring peace to the Congo and could not
resolve its civil war. This was due to the above-mentioned
circumstances in addition to foreign intervention,
exemplified in the East-West rivalry. The OAU was
unfortunate enough to be hit with problems of such a kind
that would have shaken an even older and more solidly
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established regional organisation. The Congo crisis
represented an internal conflict of a nation torn by civil
war at the very centre of the continent, headed by a leader
who was considered as controversial by the majority of
the OAU mcmber states and an army led by white mercenaries.
These combined factors created an extremely explosive
situation which was a difficult test for the OAU and which
proved powerless to bring about national reconciliation.
Thus, in the civil war in Nigeria, the OAU member states
were expected to give their full backing to the federal
cause, but half-a-dozen member states did in fact support
the Biafrans. The OAU's active role was only to rally
support for the federal ~tilitary Government and as a
consequence, robbed the OAU of any effective role as
mediator. The OAU treated the conflict as one of purely
internal origin and therefore, allowed external intervention
to such an extent as to upset the equilibrium between the
protagonists and to determine the outcome of the conflict.
By following such an approach, the OAU was in effect
allowing the outcome of African regional disputes to be
determined by external actions. In fact, the supply of
arms to the antagonists in the conflict clearly affected
the conduct of the war. However, the OAU commitment to
the absolute preservation of the territorial status quo
in Africa would make sense only if it were supplemented
by a serious effort to resolve the problems that underlie
and breed secession. In this respect, secessionist
efforts could be substantially reduced if adequate safeguards
were provided for the security of minorities in African states
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As far as the OAU involvement in Chad's civil war is
concerned, the OAU accepted a role in Chad that the
Organisation~s founders had designed for it at their
first Summit in Hay 1963. Despite this, the OAU efforts
-at national reconciliation in Chad were unsuccessful. The
OAU peace-keeping forces had in fact been amply highlighted,
both by an extremely explosive situation and by the
enormous financial difficulties with which it was faced.
Consequently, the OAU made an unprecedented request for
funding by the UN but the latter had never financed a
force which was not-under its aegis.
At the birth of the OAU, a pledge was made to
complete the liberation of those parts of the continent
where colonial rule still prevailed. To this end, the
OAU established an instrument for this purpose, the
Liberation Committee with its headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam.
Its objective was, inter alia, to give effective support
and financial aid to African liberation movements. The
OAU also set up a special fund to be raised by voluntary
contributions but the first ordinary session of the OAU
Assembly of 1964 which took place in Cairo, decided to
levy a fixed contribution based on UN membership contribution.
However, the Committee's role has been controversial and
has led to conflicting views between states advocating
armed struggle and those supporting a peaceful approach
to the problem of decolonisation. However, most damaging
by far to the functioning of the OAU Committee of Liberation,
has been the disagreement between the rival liberation
movements who suffered from internal strains brought about
by personality clashes, ambitions and differences in strategy.
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These strains have led on the whole, to polarization of
the movements and each territory began to have more than
one movement claiming the legitimacy and supremacy in the
struggle for that territory's liberation. Nonetheless,
there is no doubt that the OAU has endeavoured to make
the African people in dependent territories feel that they
are not alone in the struggle against colonial rule. The
moral and material support the OAU has given is unlimited
and decolonisation of African dependent territories has
become the rallying issue of the OAU. The justification
which is put forward by the OAU for its moral and material
aid is placed upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
which was known; as early as the seventeenth century,
to form part of customary international law. Accordingly,
the OAU acts in conformity with this belief which requires
no authorization of the UN Security Council. However, it
has been widely recognised as legitimate by the UN General
Assembly and in certain situations, by the UN Security
Council. At the same time, as well as pursuing this
approach of supporting armed struggle as a means of
completing the liberation of African dependent territories
and the elimination of apartheid in Southern Africa, the
OAU was also engaged in pursuing an alternative option.
It offered to achieve a non-violent negotiated settlement
with the regimes of Portugal, Rhodesia and South West
Africa. These principles were formulated in the Lusaka
J.fanifestoof 1969. This peaceful approach led the
major Western powers to change-their attitudes which
had already begun to orientate their policies away from
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the white communities in Southern Africa towards support
for black majority rule. Thus, the OAU strategy has
succeeded in Portugal's African territories and Rhodesia,
and in Namibia its efforts are close to achieving its
objectives, but in South Africa there .is a long way to go
to achieve a peaceful emancipation of the African populations.
However, a recent constitutional development has taken place
in South Africa but the African population is still
excluded from the new Parliamentary reform. Thus, these
peaceful efforts have advanced the moral justification for
the guerrilla activities of the liberation movements in
Southern Africa. This is not to say that the world
community support these guerrilla activities, but at least
most states have refrained from condemning them and have
chosen to be ambivalent on the general issue of using force
to effect changes in Southern Africa. If it were not for
the OAU diplomatic efforts, most states would probably be
condemning the liberation movements in Southern Africa.
Thus, the decolonisation, apartheid problems and the
Israeli occupation of Egypt's Sinai Peninsula presented
the OAU with three cases of extra-regional aggression
committed by a third state against its member states.
The OAU reaction was limited and indecisive because the
Organisation was not better prepared to assist its member
states against external aggression committed by a third state.
As far as the occupation of Egypt~s Sinai Peninsula is
,concerned, the OAU failed to make a symbolic response to
the occupation of a member~s territory by a third state.
It would appear that there was no feeling of regional
community and so, support for Egypt was limited and that
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member's conflict with Israel was not regarded as
being an African concern. This was a consequence of
the belief of many OAU member states that Israel is not
a potential threat to African security whereby they
neither wished to extend collective security assist-
ance to Egypt nor for the OAU to be involved in what
was seen as a 1oIidd1eEast conflict. The Arab
states of the OAU were upset by the indifferent attitude
towards Zionist colonisation in North Africa and the
completely different one in Southern Africa. Despite
this fact, the OAU attempted in 1971 to mediate the
Egyptian-Israeli sector of the 10m conflict, which has
led to a series of gradual transformations in the
international relationship between African Sub-Saharan
states and Israel. These transformations have isolated
Israel in Africa and brought the Arab League and the OAU
together in the process of harmonization of policies
regarding the )m conflicts and the problems in
Southern Africa. This has also established ideological
interaction between the Palestine Liberation Organisation
and the African liberation movements in Southern Africa.
As has been seen, the OAU has been beset by an endless
series of regional disputes upon which it would seem
that there was no prospect of any compromise and the
break-up of the OAU over these issues would leave
wounds that could not be quickly healed. The survival
of the OAU itself should surely be the overriding aim
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of its member states. Despite its failure to move
towards a Pan-African approach, the OAU has nonetheless,
a record of some achievement. The frontiers inherited
from the colonial era have been a serious irritant for
emerging Pan-Africanism. Numerous crises have erupted
and the OAU through its machinery has been able to
intervene quickly to propose peaceful settlement.
Despite widely varying regimes and ideologies, African
states through the OAU continue to speak to each other.
Ilowever , the OAU is concentrating on an international
political role and the settlement of regional disputes
has clearly neglected other areas of policy, such as
health, transport, defence and famine-relief where a
strong Pan-Africanism is still badly needed. At all
events, the OAU must be saved because of its record
of maintaining peace and security. Without it, Africa
could lose its last hope of resisting extra-regional
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